Is Migration Beneficial For The Migrant, The Country They Go To And The Country Of Origin?

How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/

ABSTRACT *

This article examines the consequences of Syrian displacement for the sending country, the receiving country and the refugees themselves. For Syria the author identifies the loss of educated professionals and the resulting depletion of human capital, alongside the significance of remittances and the risk that entrenched patronage will prevent any recovery. For Lebanon the argument is that the economic potential of the newcomers has gone unrealised, since restrictions on labour market access, combined with political reluctance, have produced isolation rather than integration, and that the wider economic damage stems more from the war and from domestic policy than from the presence of refugees. The third section addresses conditions in informal settlements, the absence of work permits and its consequences, the particular vulnerability of women, and the exposure of camp populations to the coronavirus pandemic. The characterisations reflect the author’s own perspective; this journal’s editorial position is neutral.

KEYWORDS *

Syria, Lebanon, refugees, forced migration, brain drain, remittances, informal settlements, labour market access, host communities, vulnerability, COVID 19, human capital

INTRODUCTION

Lebanon and Syria have been hit by an unprecedented wave of a sudden, overwhelming and traumatic migration. While this means a loss for Syria and a gain for Lebanon in human capital, both countries have faced a variety of unforeseen challenges in historically troubled countries within an unruly and seemingly unmanageable region. This essay will briefly detail some of the many challenges that have been imposed on Syria as a sending country, Lebanon as a receiving country, and the refugees themselves in the midst of political turmoil. Respecting the fact that the migrants’ reasoning for leaving in such large numbers is accountable to the fact that war has been plaguing the Syrian nation, leaving many families no other option than leaving, the essay will use the terms migrant and refugee interchangeably. Due to the fact that Syria is indulged in a complex, sectarian and ongoing war, exact figures and results are proving themselves difficult to obtain. Nonetheless, the case of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has been reported on widely for reasons including the fact that Lebanon itself is closely tied to Syria and has many political aspects in common, i.e. nepotism, which has hindered both countries in dealing with sudden problems such as the refugee wave.

MAIN CORPUS

Syria’s civil war starting in 2011 has caused immense amounts of damage both to the country and the people. Syria’s neighbour, Lebanon, has been at the forefront of the refugee influx, currently hosting an estimated 1.5 million Syrian refugees (Rabil, 2016). Numbers this high undoubtedly have profound and lasting effects on Syria as a sending country with vast amounts of people leaving in a short period of time. Due to the massive outflux of people during the war with little plan on rebuilding the country and society, one of the consequences is the brain drain which threatens to depopulate Syria, depriving the country of its valuable human capital (Goldin et. al, 2011). Syria’s educated were some of the first to flee when the civil war started at the beginning of the decade, presumably because they would have been unproductive in the country of the Assad regime in the wake of civil unrest (Christophersen, 2018). Syria now lacks a sufficient skill base in the private and public sectors, a phenomenon that hinders both Syria’s and Lebanon’s intentions for retrieval of brain gain in Syria brought by a returning populace once acquiring a sufficient amount of financial stability and advanced skillset (Goldin et. al, 2011). Moreover, Syria, alongside Jordan and Lebanon, is among the highest recipients of remittances in the world in proportion to their GDP. An advantageous contribution to a household in Syria, receiving households will generally invest more in human capital and the education of their children than their non-receiving counterparts (Chaaban et. al, 2012). Goldin argues that every dollar in remittance spending creates two to three dollars of income in the country of the migrant’s origin (Goldin et. al, 2011). Should this work in accordance with Syria’s financial system, the money generated will be recycled back into its economy, gradually and exponentially growing its potential. In contrast, if Syria’s dire system of nepotism takes over, the concept of a stabilising economy could be imminently discarded and the old, albeit unpopular system, would prevail (Göransson, 2018). This would potentially keep Syria in a cycle of outward migration and a subsequent brain drain, deteriorating chances of integration into the global market, and an inevitable economic crash resulting in an ongoing conflict.

Lebanon is considered a primary receiving country and is at the forefront of the refugee wave, as it is closely related to Syria in terms of economics, politics as well as geographically. This has led to a variety of consequences, in which the negatives seemingly outweigh the positives. The costs of a large number of migrants in relation to the relatively small native population can be highly visible and localised, especially if we consider the Syrian migrants as refugees, often arriving in Lebanon en masse and with little intention for a long-term settlement (Parkes, 2015). This lack of intention, arguably triggered by xenophobia and regulations serving to diminish Syrian refugees’ access to the Lebanese labour market, has meant that Lebanon remains unable to unlock the huge economic potential Syrian migrants might have been able to contribute (Holmes, 2013). According to Lebanon’s interior minister, Marwan Charbel, refugees threaten the security of Lebanon and pose a threat to the already scarce resources of a heavily polluted country (Christophersen, 2018). One argument brought forward was that the presence of refugees in the informal settlements had a vastly negative impact on the natural resources. Accountable to the fact that the settlements are informal and located near water sources, the waste generated by the people in the camps integrate into the environment around them, negatively impacting the water, air and land quality (Rabil, 2016). While the interior minister upholds the notion that refugees are a burden and not a potential blessing, the International Monetary Fund has proclaimed the weak policymaking by the Lebanese government more of a burden than the influx itself. Traditionally a trade-based economy, Lebanon has been more severely hit by the economic impositions placed upon it as a repercussion attributable to the Syrian war than the refugees themselves. Export routes have been blocked catalysing a sharp decline in consumer confidence in addition to the decaying investor sentiment (Holmes, 2013). Lebanon’s historically famous tourism, banking, and trading industries have been hit badly, especially as the refugee wave escalated simultaneously to the economic stagnation which hit Lebanon’s government finances (Rabil, 2016). Lebanon’s politicians and population have turned to increase attempts to isolate their refugee population in the hopes they can drive the refugees away. The policymaking of the government itself appears to be largely ignored in the debate around the refugee problem.

While there is a lot of discussion around the impacts migrants have on their country of origin and country of destination, the impact migration itself has on a person can be detrimental to both the person and their surroundings. A country rich in ethnic, religious, and financial diversity, Syrian refugees, in particular, are reported to be struggling in Lebanon. While Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have designated refugee camps, Syrian refugees are predominantly being hosted in informal settlements or host communities in some of Lebanon’s economically deprived areas (Christophersen, 2018). These deprived areas are often situated in the Northern and Southern districts of Lebanon, districts lacking sufficient infrastructure and plagued by criminal activity. The already deprived areas of Lebanon have expressed the most dissatisfaction in taking on Syrian refugees (Rabil, 2016). The social marginalisation of the Syrian refugees resulting in a refusal from the government to provide job permits, and thus endorsed a socioeconomic disadvantage, has led to Syrians opting for desperate measures to financially support themselves. One such measure witnessed increasingly and repeatedly is the Syrian refugee women turning to sex work. Prostitution being illegal in Lebanon, these women often receive criminal records upon arrest, which in turn worsen already bleak chances of employment (BBC, 2017). According to the UN, women are already the primary victims of displacement and war (Zheng, 2015). Their worsening situation after displacement more often than not contributes to their downward assimilation, often lasting until the next generation and beyond (Goldin et. al, 2011). In addition, the living situation for refugees in an already densely populated country such a Lebanon is often crowded, unsanitary, and lacks infrastructure connecting them to the urbanised parts of the country. Given the situation, Syrians in Lebanon are vulnerable to stress, depression and in more recent times, susceptible to infectious outbreaks (Goldin et. al, 2011). For this reason, refugees in north-eastern Lebanon are reporting the daily struggle attempting to contain the infectious disease Cov-Sars-19. Living on less than 40 litres of water a day per tent as well as the tents being less than one metre apart from each other, refugees are among the most vulnerable in the world in the wake of a pandemic as widespread as Covid-19 (el-Azar, 2020). The already lacking medical facilities in Lebanon paired with the undocumented status of many of the refugees has resulted in fewer applications for medical assistance which has resulted in refugees currently living in a constant state of stress, which almost certainly contributes to the abovementioned challenges of a hazardous journey on a personal level.

SUMMARY *

The article’s structure follows the displacement itself, from the country departed, to the country entered, to the people who made the journey, and its recurring argument is that in each case the damage attributed to the movement of people is better explained by the decisions taken around them. Syria’s difficulty is not that its professionals left but that nothing has been built to which they might return. Lebanon’s economic distress is traced by the sources cited here to the war, to blocked trade routes and to domestic policy rather than to the presence of refugees. And the conditions in the informal settlements follow from the refusal of legal status and work permits rather than from any characteristic of the population living in them.

CONCLUSION

All things considered, both Lebanon and Syria are still suffering economically. This means Lebanon has failed to unlock the economic potential refugees could carry because the country has failed to organise accordingly within its own political system. By falsely identifying the problems, Lebanon has hindered itself in development within the country as well as its position in the region. Syria still operating its politics through nepotism has meant that Syria’s system has remained what it was unpopular for, once again meaning it has failed to adequately meet the needs of the potentially returning populace in addition to its investors. This has prevented Syria from unlocking the potential that could catalyse Syria into a new position of economic strength in the Levant. This in turn could eventually rebuild the country, regaining its cultural glory. Migrants suffering the consequences of the decisions made by both countries have meant many are still living in inhumane conditions numerous years later from the first arrival. As if these conditions hadn’t posed enough sanitary problems, the novel Coronavirus pandemic has left a large community in a constant state of stress as the burden of the unknown future haunts it.

POTENTIAL SOLUTION *

The article identifies the decisive mechanism and it is worth naming plainly: almost every hardship described here follows from the absence of legal status. Without residency, a person cannot work lawfully, cannot register a birth, cannot approach the police when wronged, and hesitates to seek medical care. The consequences the article records, from exploitative labour to the situations facing women without income to the reluctance to present at a clinic during a pandemic, are not separate problems requiring separate programmes. They are symptoms of one condition, and regularisation addresses them together.

The obstacle is political rather than technical, and it should be stated honestly. Lebanon’s confessional balance makes any measure resembling permanent settlement of a large, predominantly Sunni population intensely contested, and the memory of how the Palestinian presence became entangled in the civil war shapes the debate. That fear is not irrational and cannot be argued away. It can, however, be addressed by design: temporary protection with renewable, clearly limited status, explicitly separated from any question of naturalisation, and sector specific work authorisation in agriculture, construction and services where labour demand exists and competition with Lebanese workers is least acute. Such arrangements have been negotiated elsewhere, and they give the host state what it needs, which is control and reversibility, while giving the displaced what they need, which is the ability to live lawfully.

Support directed to host communities rather than to refugees alone is the second element, and it is the one that most affects whether hospitality holds. The deprived districts the article names carry the burden while the benefits accrue elsewhere, and resentment in such conditions is a predictable response rather than a moral failing. Investment in shared services, schools, clinics, water systems and roads, serving both populations in the areas of highest concentration, converts a zero sum perception into a visible common gain. This principle is now standard in international response frameworks precisely because programmes that assist only the displaced have repeatedly generated the hostility they were meant to avoid.

On return, which the article treats as the eventual resolution, the conditions matter more than the timing. Return is durable only where it is voluntary, informed and safe, and where property, documentation and conscription questions have been settled in advance. Return organised as a political achievement, without those guarantees, produces secondary displacement rather than reconstruction. The author’s observation about what awaits returning professionals is the more important point: people return to opportunity and to security, not to an appeal, and rebuilding the institutions they would work within is the precondition for the human capital recovery the article hopes for.

Two final observations. The framing of displaced people primarily as economic potential is a well intentioned argument that carries a risk, since it grounds their claim to protection in their usefulness, and usefulness can always be disputed. The stronger ground is that people fleeing war are entitled to protection irrespective of what they contribute; the economic case is a welcome addition and a poor foundation. And the situations facing women without lawful income deserve a response rather than only a description: legal aid, protection from prosecution for those coerced, safe reporting channels and targeted livelihood support are what change those circumstances, and each is achievable without resolving the wider political question.

* Added by the WMO Editorial Team

REFERENCES

Bibliography

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Supplementary references added by the WMO Editorial Team

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR), annual editions, Beirut.

Government of Lebanon and United Nations, Lebanon Crisis Response Plan, successive editions.

Global Compact on Refugees, United Nations General Assembly, 2018, on responsibility sharing and support to host communities.

International Labour Organization, assessments of Syrian refugee access to the labour market in Lebanon and Jordan, Beirut and Geneva.

Jordan Compact, London Conference, 2016, on work permits in exchange for trade concessions.

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Article 33 on non refoulement, and UNHCR guidance on voluntary repatriation.

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, reports on the situation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon.