How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/
ABSTRACT
The 2024 European Parliament elections highlight Germany’s deepening social and political fragmentation, with the AfD emerging as the second-strongest party. This article explores the historical context, rising extremism, and societal divisions, concluding with a call to reinforce democratic values, enhance social cohesion, and counter extremism for a more united future.
Editorial note: the assessment of the parties and movements discussed reflects the author’s own perspective. This journal’s editorial position is neutral on contested questions of party politics. *
KEYWORDS *
Germany, political fragmentation, social cohesion, European elections 2024, AfD, right wing extremism, populism, East and West Germany, political education, radicalisation, democracy, trust in institutions
INTRODUCTION
The results of the elections of the European Parliament 2024 show that the social fragmentation Germany has been experiencing for years has made its way into the political landscape. The AfD has become the second strongest force, overtaking the party of the Social Democrats (European Parliament 2024). After months of mass protests against right-wing extremism on German streets (Tagesschau 2024a) and court proceedings concerning the classification of the AfD as a suspected case of right-wing extremism (Jeske et al. 2024), this election certainly shows how fragmented German society is at the moment.
MAIN CORPUS
Election results of the European election 2024
In Germany, the conservative parties of CDU and CSU are clearly the winners of the European elections, with around twice as many votes as the second-placed party, the AfD. Interestingly, the AfD, the SPD, and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen only differ by 1.5 to 2 percentage points each in their votes. Also, other parties reached very similar shares of the votes. In total, 11 parties got more than 1 per cent of the votes (European Parliament 2024). This shows how fragmented German voters are. How can this political fragmentation be explained? Let us take a step back and look at Germany’s civil society.
Drifting apart: social fragmentation in Germany
Humans are social beings. Having social relations with the people of our surroundings is therefore crucial for humans in order to feel content. In an ideal society, humans deal with each other based on respect to reach the best possible circumstances for society. “Therefore, personal interests can never surpass the community’s needs” (Erdmann 2024a). Unfortunately, citizens of a country usually strongly disagree on what is best for the community. While most, maybe all, individuals of a group might agree that peace is the best option for the community, what this “peace” would look like may be different to each individual (Erdmann 2024b).
German society has arguably been fragmented for decades. Looking at historical events like the separation of Germany and its reunification, the divide between West Germany and East Germany is still noticeable today (Regev 2020). There are many attempts at explaining the economic disadvantage of the eastern part of Germany, which is evident even three decades after Germany’s reunification. Stereotypes about people from East Germany are still present in German civil society. One especially relevant stereotype is the tendency of East Germans towards extremism, be it left-wing or right-wing extremism.
Looking at empirical data, however, this stereotype cannot be supported in the simple form in which it is usually stated (Högele 2019). However, whether due to distorted media coverage or a different form of right-wing extremism, East Germany seems to be in the news more often on topics related to right-wing extremism. In the new federal states the PEGIDA movement evolved and has been holding regular protests since the arrival of many Syrian refugees in 2015. An attack on a synagogue by a right-wing extremist, in which two people were killed, also happened in East Germany (bpb 2020). However, there are also signs of racism and other right-wing tendencies noticeable in the western parts of Germany. In May, a video of young adults partying and chanting racist slogans on Sylt went viral on social media (Tagesschau 2024b), just to mention one example.
The question arises: where does this radicalisation come from? While right-wing extremism has a long history in Germany, for many decades right-wing extremism seemed to have been a marginal appearance only. Perhaps the most prominent example is the murder series of the NSU, a neo-Nazi group that killed ten people over the course of more than a decade (Radke 2013). For some years, however, extreme right-wing beliefs and patterns of racism and antisemitism like the above-mentioned incidents have made their way more and more into the midst of society. This radicalisation can have several reasons.
Maybe these beliefs have been there the whole time and they only now surface because of new media types like social media. But that can hardly suffice as a full explanation. Radicalisation seems to be rooted in “profound discontent and scepticism at a fundamental level towards their political system” (Erdmann 2024b). Political fragmentation as shown in the European elections is thus rooted in social fragmentation. What does this fragmentation mean for the political landscape?
Political fragmentation in Germany
Compared to other nations, Germany has always been politically more fragmented than most other nations which rely on a two-party system. Even at the beginning of the Federal Republic of Germany, at least three parties held political power: the CDU and CSU as the conservative camp, the SPD as the social democratic camp, and the FDP as the liberal party. A few decades later, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and Die Linke joined. For a long time, four or five parties were represented in the German parliament. Since 2017, with the AfD moving into parliament for the first time, six parliamentary groups have been forming the Bundestag. Another trend can be noticed: the vote totals of the individual parties are converging in some cases, blurring the boundaries between the traditional large parties and the smaller ones. This can at least be noticed with votes of CDU and CSU, with exceptions, as well as SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and the AfD.
Looking at the AfD, we can see the above-mentioned loss of confidence in the political system. Analysing statements, a populist speech pattern which uses racism and other forms of discrimination can be detected. In the election campaign of the AfD for the German parliament, the slogan was “Deutschland, aber normal” (AfD TV 2021). Traditional life concepts and highly regulated or closed borders are at the centre of the campaign video. The AfD’s election programme in the European elections was even clearer: there was talk of “Festung Europa”. The critical examination of the colonial era is also not desired by the AfD, as this would fuel what the programme calls “antiweißen Affekt” (AfD 2023). Traditional gender roles as well as the family of husband, wife and children are to be preferred to other life concepts.
Democracy: living with different ideologies
Living in a democracy means that every voter has the right to vote for whatever party they want. If we dismiss this fundamental right, we no longer believe in the basis of democracy. However, the electoral result of the AfD in the European election of 2024 still harbours dangers that need to be addressed. First, the tone in politics has changed very much. Campaign posters no longer set out the goals of the respective party; in the last election campaign, many campaign posters were used to differentiate one party from another. This was also very much the case with the established parties. The ÖDP, a minor party, used the slogan “Alternative ohne rechts” (ÖDP 2024), using the rhetoric of the AfD.
Blaming this trend on the rise of populism is too simplistic; however, it may play an important role. Second, aligning with the post-factual age, allegations concerning AfD politicians did not appear to matter to AfD voters. Even though an employee of one of the lead candidates was suspected of espionage for China and the other lead candidate faced allegations of unlawful conduct, the AfD came out much stronger than anticipated in the elections (Pfeffer and Schmidt 2024). This may be due to the AfD presenting itself as a victim of the media, or, as can also be seen in the United States (Murray 2024), to the fact that allegations against politicians no longer influence the voting decisions of their supporters.
This points to a blatant social divide, as people no longer recognise the same rules for social and communal life. Last but not least, slogans of the AfD and other right-wing parties can lead to people in Germany being put into an unsafe position. When a political party openly makes racist and other discriminatory statements or puts corresponding contents into its electoral programme, then it can also lead to individuals with the same views seeing their opinions reinforced and legitimised and behaving accordingly. In the last decade alone, the number of annual offences motivated by right-wing extremism has climbed from 16,557 offences in 2013 to 25,660 in 2023 (BMI 2024). This makes up more than 60 per cent of politically motivated extremist offences.
SUMMARY *
The article’s argument runs from society to politics rather than the reverse. On this reading, the distribution of votes in June 2024 did not create the fragmentation it displayed but registered a division that had been forming for years, along a line the author traces to the incomplete convergence of east and west and, more fundamentally, to a loss of confidence in the political system among people who feel unrepresented by it. The second half examines what follows from that within a democratic order: that the right to vote for any lawful party is not in question, that the tone of political competition has shifted from proposing programmes to positioning against opponents, that allegations against politicians appear to have lost their disciplining effect, and that party rhetoric shapes what individuals believe they may say and do, with the recorded increase in politically motivated offences cited as the measurable consequence.
CONCLUSION
The election result of the AfD in the European elections shows that the AfD and its ideology are an integral part of the German political landscape and an expression of a profound social divide in Germany. Speaking up against right-wing extremism will not be enough anymore; rather, we need to address the underlying social dilemmas of people drawn to right-wing extremism to rebuild trust in the state and democracy. Political education, a more targeted welfare state and integration processes for people who feel left behind by politics are crucial to achieve this goal. Of course, this will not erase right-wing extremism, as extremism is a part of democracy as well. However, the general public should be united to a certain degree so that extremism will be a marginal appearance only. Addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive and coordinated effort from all sectors of society. By reinforcing democratic values, enhancing social cohesion, countering extremism, ensuring media responsibility, promoting political accountability, and encouraging civic engagement, Germany can work towards a more united and stable future.
POTENTIAL SOLUTION *
The article’s central proposition, that addressing grievances matters more than denouncing those who hold them, is well supported and requires one important qualification, because getting it wrong wastes effort and can make matters worse.
The research on this question does not find a simple relationship between economic disadvantage and support for radical parties. Regions in decline show elevated support even where individual incomes are not low, and the stronger predictors are perceived loss of status, the sense that one’s region or way of life is disregarded, and the experience of being spoken about rather than to. That finding points away from redistribution alone and toward what has been called the geography of discontent: the closure of the last bank branch, the bus route, the school, the clinic, the local paper. Places where people have no reason to encounter one another and no institution that belongs to them produce the conditions the author describes. Restoring that infrastructure is expensive, slow, and among the few interventions with a demonstrable effect.
The article’s opening question about east and west deserves the answer the research supplies, since the alternative is the stereotype the author rightly rejects. Attitude surveys find the differences between east and west smaller than the electoral results suggest. What differs is the composition of civil society: fewer associations, unions, churches and local media, a consequence of the institutional collapse of 1990 rather than of any disposition, and a corresponding absence of the intermediary bodies through which discontent is ordinarily channelled and moderated. That is a structural account and it identifies something that can be rebuilt.
Three points belong here from this field’s own experience. First, on how such conversations are conducted: dialogue formats that succeed do not debate positions but begin from concrete local questions on which participants have direct experience, and they are facilitated rather than moderated. Formats that place opposed camps on a stage reliably harden both. Second, on what to expect: the evidence on deradicalisation and on cross camp dialogue shows small effects on entrenched views and considerably larger effects on the much bigger group who are undecided, disengaged or ambivalent. Programmes aimed at the committed frequently fail; programmes aimed at holding the middle generally do not. Third, on the boundary the article implicitly draws and could draw more explicitly: a democracy accommodates disagreement about policy and does not accommodate the denial of others’ equal standing. Locating that line clearly, and defending it consistently rather than selectively, is what makes engagement with grievance something other than concession.
Finally, the increase in politically motivated offences the article records is the point at which this ceases to be a debate about political competition. Where rhetoric is followed by threats against local officials, attacks on places of worship and violence against individuals, the people affected need protection now, and that is a matter of policing, prosecution and support for those targeted rather than of dialogue. The two tracks are not alternatives, and confusing them serves neither: the long work of rebuilding cohesion does not substitute for the immediate obligation to keep people safe, and the immediate obligation does not remove the need for the long work.
* Added by the WMO Editorial Team
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Supplementary references added by the WMO Editorial Team
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