Why did the hope for peace associated with the Oslo process unravel so quickly?

How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/

ABSTRACT *

This article examines why the Oslo Accords failed to produce the peace they promised, arguing that the design of the agreements was itself the principal cause. Three obstacles are examined. The first is settlement expansion, which continued throughout the process, with the settler population in the occupied territories rising substantially even under the government that signed the accords. The second concerns the narrow basis of the negotiations, conducted with a small circle around Yasser Arafat, and the deportation of Hamas activists to Lebanon, which the author argues produced the opposite of its intended effect. The third is the deferral of the core questions, statehood, borders and Jerusalem, to later stages, together with the division of the West Bank into three zones of differing control. The author concludes that the process substituted a theoretical framework for the political reality in both societies. The characterisations reflect the author’s own perspective; this journal’s editorial position is neutral.

KEYWORDS *

Oslo Accords, Israel, Palestine, settlements, Declaration of Principles, Hamas, interim agreement, Area A B C, Rabin, Arafat, final status issues, peace process design

INTRODUCTION

The Oslo accords were a set of written agreements between Israel, represented by Labour party leader Yitzhak Rabin, and Yasser Arafat, who was representative of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, mediated in most part by US president Bill Clinton (Erakat, 2019). The first meeting, “Oslo I”, was signed in Washington D.C. in 1993. The “Oslo II” accord was signed two years later in Egypt. Having set up the conference, the US insisted that it be based upon the United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338, which outlined Palestinian’s right to self-determination and the principle of ‘land for peace’ (Inbari, 2019). This premise had been accepted by the Palestinians, however initially rejected by Israelis, as the following events would prove to the Israelis, and later the Palestinians, that giving up land in return for peaceful coexistence was a stretch of the imagination (PBS, 2020). The agenda of the Oslo accords was its own reason for failure and why the hopes for peace diminished as quickly as the agreements were signed. This report will detail the intractables at the core of the paradox; the settlements in the West Bank, radically increased terrorist activity, and the factors hindering the implementation of whatever peace was hoped for post-Oslo accord signatures.

MAIN CORPUS

Expanding settlement plans prevailed no matter the situation

Imminently prior to the first Oslo conference, the Likud manifesto announced plans to expand on the settlement-building, with the intention of doubling the settler population in the occupied territories over four years (Berry et. al, 2006). The Oslo I accord negotiated requirement was for Israel to withdraw completely from Gaza and Jericho, leaving a Palestinian police force to take over internal security within four months of signing the agreement (Erakat, 2019). The Oslo accords had been signed under a Labour government. A counter-movement had been initiated within Israel mainly by Benjamin Netanyahu as the leader of the Likud party in his rejection of the accord, pledging to cancel it should he be elected Prime Minister (PBS, 2020). However, even during the Rabin administration from 1992 to 1995, the settler population in the occupied territories increased from 74,800 inhabitants to 136,000, according to the 1997 Foundation for Middle East Peace report (Berry et. al, 2006). This went entirely disregarded during the peace process and would only increase upon Netanyahu’s election, which has been described as a response to a discontent Israeli public for Rabin having negotiated with the widely despised PLO, a first in Israel’s history (PBS, 2020).

PLO and its fragmentations pose a constant threat to the security of Israel

The conference talks avoided dialogue with a large proportion of the PLO and Fatah party. Israel negotiated directly with Yasser Arafat and his few close associates (PBS, 2020). The Declaration of Principles between Palestinians and Israel had been published and signed by both parties in September 1993 in front of the White House (Brown, 2003).

An agenda of the Oslo accords outlined the approval for Rabin to deport 416 Hamas militants to Lebanon following the murder of an Israeli border policeman (Berry et. al, 2006). This was an attempt to undermine their influence in Palestinian territories. This had an obverse effect, as Hamas came into contact with Hizbullah guerrillas who provided Hamas with training and resources, techniques used upon returning or communicating with aspiring terrorists in Gaza and the West Bank (Baconi, 2018). Hamas first employed suicide attacks shortly after deportees returned home, a practice that would become a common weapon used against the Israeli civilian population (Reuters, 2008).

Unclear orders contributed to territorial claims neither side would accept

A core failure in the Oslo Accords which contributed to the deteriorating hope for tangible long-term peace was that the most significant core issues of the conflict affecting both parties had been stalled for later points in the negotiations or ignored entirely; defining statehood, detailing borders, and acknowledging the significance of Jerusalem for both sides and who feel entitled to claim it as their capital and unwilling to divide the city (Berry et. al, 2006). For this reason, the IDF was unable to retract to any given borders, another requirement during negotiations.

Rabin and Arafat concluded the interim agreement in September 1995, which entailed dividing the West Bank into three areas:

Area A: 3% of the West Bank including Nablus, Jenin, Ramallah, Bethlehem, and a majority of Hebron controlled predominantly by the Palestinian Authority

Area B: 23% of the West Bank encompassing 440 villages administered by the PA, while joint Palestinian-Israeli patrols would oversee security

Area C: 74% of the West Bank comprising all Jewish settlements would remain under Israeli control (Berry et. al, 2006)

Overall analysis

An interpretation might suggest that this agreement was deemed treasonous by both sides of the conflict and the interconnectedness of these factors contributed to the failure. While settlers argued this arrangement was prepared to hand the land over entirely to the Palestinians, their Palestinian counterparts voiced vexation at Israel maintaining excessive power on land that is not officially theirs (Berry et. al, 2006). These disagreements had fatal results for Rabin, who was assassinated by a settler as well as 62 Israelis who became victims to Hamas suicide attacks in March 1996 following Israel’s attempt to crack down on militants in their 97% claim to West Bank activity (PBS, 2020).

While the PLO officially agreed to end the armed struggle against Israel, and in turn Israel agreed to recognise the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people (Baconi, 2018), neither Palestine nor Israel would do their signed promises justice. This is largely attributable to the core fault of the Oslo Accords themselves, namely the vagueness and arguable favouring of the symbolic over pragmatic approach to maintaining peace in the region. The dawn of suicide attacks following Hamas’ exposure to Hizbullah resulted in the Israeli public drifting away from the hopes of peace, with one famous grassroots slogan stating “this peace is killing us” (PBS, 2020). It was not long before Netanyahu gained momentum as an opposer of the peace process, paving way for a more intensified approach to the annexation of the West Bank and consequent undermining of any peace process in the near future (Holmes, 2019).

SUMMARY *

The article’s argument is that Oslo failed less because either party abandoned it than because its architecture made abandonment possible without formal breach. An interim framework that deferred every decisive question left the process vulnerable to whatever occurred in the interval, and what occurred, settlement growth on one side and attacks on the other, was read by each society as evidence that the other had never intended to keep its word. The accords contained no mechanism to establish which reading was correct, no consequence for either development, and no protection for the leaders who had staked themselves on the agreement.

CONCLUSION

Taking these key factors into account, it can be concluded that while the hope for peace associated with the Oslo process had initiated the conferences in the first place, the reality in the participants’ respective home states was profoundly misjudged and indeed the opposite of the Oslo accord signing ceremonies’ serenity. The reality of the situation between Israel and the Palestinian territories had been widely disregarded in favour of adopting the theoretical approach set out by the UN with American help.

POTENTIAL SOLUTION *

Oslo is the most studied peace process of the modern period, and the lessons drawn from it belong to mediation practice generally rather than to this conflict alone. Four are worth stating precisely, because each identifies a design choice that could have been made differently.

The first concerns interim agreements. Deferring the hardest questions is a legitimate technique where the interval is used to build the trust that makes those questions answerable. It fails where the interval is used instead to alter the facts on which the eventual settlement would rest. The corrective is not to abandon phasing but to bind it: agreed parameters on the final questions established at the outset, even if implementation is staged over years, and an explicit standstill on unilateral action affecting those parameters, monitored and enforced. Without that, an interim agreement is not a step toward settlement but an interval during which the settlement becomes harder.

The second concerns verification. Each side in this account believed the other was violating the agreement, and each was partly right, but nothing in the framework could establish what had happened or attach consequences to it. Independent monitoring with published findings and defined responses is what converts accusation into fact, and its absence is why both publics concluded that agreements meant nothing.

The third concerns inclusion, and the article identifies it precisely. A process negotiated with a small circle around one leader excludes those with the capacity to destroy it. Hamas was outside the agreement and had every reason to act against it; the settler movement was outside it and produced the assassination that removed one signatory. Wider inclusion is slower, more difficult and frequently distasteful, and it is what makes an agreement survive its opponents. Where inclusion is genuinely impossible, the alternative is a spoiler management strategy agreed in advance, including the commitment that violence will not suspend the process, which removes the incentive that makes attacks effective.

The fourth concerns the protection of those who take the risk. Rabin was killed for signing; Arafat’s authority within his own constituency eroded as the benefits failed to arrive. Leaders who compromise need visible early gains to show their own people, and they need political cover from the international sponsors who urged them forward. Where the costs of agreement are borne domestically and the benefits arrive late or not at all, the next leader draws the obvious conclusion.

Finally, a word on the deportation the article describes. It is a case study in unintended consequence: a measure intended to weaken an organisation strengthened it, by placing its cadres where they acquired capabilities they had not previously possessed. The general lesson is that removing an adversary’s leadership without addressing the conditions that generate its support tends to produce a more capable adversary, and the more specific one is that measures taken during a peace process are part of the process, whether or not they are described in its text.

* Added by the WMO Editorial Team

REFERENCES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Baconi, T. (2018) Hamas Contained: The Rise and Pacification of Palestinian Resistance. [ebook] Stanford University Press, Chapter 1, 2. Available at: https://www.perlego.com/book/745999/hamas-contained Accessed: 28 May 2020

Berry, M. and Philo, G. (2006) Israel and Palestine – Competing Histories. UK: Pluto Press, pp. 19-23, 89-100

Brown, N. (2003). Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords. [ebook] University of California Press, chapter 1, 6. Available at: https://www.perlego.com/book/552361/palestinian-politics-after-the-oslo-accords Accessed: 28 May 2020

Erakat, N. (2019). Justice for Some: Law and the Question of Palestine. [ebook] Stanford University Press, Chapter 4. Available at: https://www.perlego.com/book/876604/justice-for-some Accessed: 28 May 2020

Frontline PBS (2020) Netanyahu at War [YouTube video] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7W-xxpXzAC0 Accessed: 28 May 2020

Holmes, O. (2019) ‘Netanyahu vows to annex large parts of occupied West Bank’, The Guardian, 11 September. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/10/netanyahu-vows-annex-large-parts-occupied-west-bank-trump Accessed: 28 May 2020

Inbari, P. (2019) The Oslo Accords Saved the PLO and Renewed Its Struggle against Israel. Jewish Political Studies Review, pp. 238-242. Available at: www.jstor.org/stable/26642827 Accessed: 28 May 2020

Reuters (2008) ‘TIMELINE: Suicide Bombings in Israel’, Reuters, 5 February. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-explosion-chronology/timeline-suicide-bombings-in-israel-idUSL0565679420080205 Accessed: 28 May 2020

Rotberg, R. (2006) Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict – History’s Double Helix. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 15, 29-39

Supplementary references added by the WMO Editorial Team

Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government Arrangements, Washington, 13 September 1993.

Israeli Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II), Taba and Washington, 28 September 1995.

Gaza Jericho Agreement (Cairo Agreement), 4 May 1994.

United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

Stedman, S. J. (1997). Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes. International Security, 22(2), 5 to 53.

Pundak, R. (2001). From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong? Survival, 43(3), 31 to 45.

Agha, H., & Malley, R. (2001). Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors. New York Review of Books, 9 August.

Why have India and Pakistan been unable to resolve the sources of conflict in South Asia through diplomatic means?

How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/

ABSTRACT *

This article examines why diplomatic resolution of the India Pakistan conflict has repeatedly failed, identifying four interlocking obstacles. The first is the paralysis of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, whose consensus rule allows a single withdrawal to cancel a summit, and which the author regards as caught in a cycle where poor bilateral relations disable the organisation and its weakness in turn prevents dialogue. The second is the role of China, described as Pakistan’s principal defence partner and as a counterweight to Indian regional centrality. The third is Kashmir itself, traced from the accession of 1947 and the position of the Maharajah through decades of separatist violence and the association of the Kashmiri struggle with terrorism. The fourth is nuclear proliferation, where the author draws on Sagan to argue that organisational bias, preventive logic and the dispersal of arsenals under threat make deterrence less stable than its theory suggests. The characterisations reflect the author’s own perspective; this journal’s editorial position is neutral.

KEYWORDS *

India, Pakistan, Kashmir, SAARC, China, nuclear deterrence, Kargil, proliferation, regional cooperation, intractable conflict, partition, security dilemma

INTRODUCTION

India and Pakistan’s complex relations are as old as the countries themselves. The partitioning of India along with their independence in 1947 triggered what would become one of the most complex, intractable and vicious conflict of control over disputed land. The region heavily fought over, Kashmir, is host to valuable resources, strategic geographical sites and numerous potential economic benefits for any country involved. Neither country is willing to let go of what they consider their entitlement to the land. Over the years, a variety of factors contributed to the deepening conflict in the region; SAARCs failed agenda, Chinese involvement, nuclear proliferation and inheritance rights over Kashmir will be detailed as the core intractables preventing diplomatic resolutions in the intricately complex region.

MAIN CORPUS

SAARC’s failures and the involvement of China

The intergovernmental South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, established in 1985, has been hindered in its implementation of its agenda to promote peace, security and prosperity since it’s foundation. This hinderance is largely attributable to the complex relations between India and Pakistan, in which China plays a vital role. India as an increasing superpower has introduced competition to Chinese influence on a global scale (Rahman, 2004). Since India borders most of SAARC’s member states, trade, border crossing and energy agreements are only possible with the cooperation of New Delhi (Yousaf et. al, 2017). China refuses to accept India’s centric role with military might, economic strength and extensive territory and has leveraged itself as a strategic state by enhancing already strong Pak-Sino ties (Hafeez, 2016).

China has emerged as Pakistan’s largest defence provider. The Pak-Sino military cooperation has expanded with China now maintaining significance in Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure, so much so that the Pakistani nuclear weapons program is considered an extension of the Chinese one (Pant, 2016). This certainly strains the relationship in the SAARC community given India’s turbulent history with both China and Pakistan.

Pakistan, India and the other SAARC members are caught in a vicious cycle of SAARC failures preventing effective dialogue in the region and the relationship between the states in turn prevent SAARC from working effectively. This was made clear when India pulled out of the 19th SAARC summit in Islamabad, in response to increased terrorism in India believed to be on account of Pakistan (Yousaf et. al, 2017). According to SAARCs rules, if a single member state pulls out, the summit itself is cancelled; this further stalled any progression.

Kashmir is a centre-point for political rivalry and militant action

Kashmir has been disputed territory between India and Pakistan since their independence in 1947 left two countries and additional terrain posing difficulty in defining its position in the region. While 80 percent of the Kashmiri population was Muslim, its Maharajah was Hindu. The Maharajah failed to take sides, which resulted in Pakistani troop-backed Muslim rebels of the British Colonial Army attacking the Kashmiri state militia. The Maharajah fled to India, only then expressing the desire to become part of India. Indian military units had been immediately deployed to Kashmir to defend the territory, resulting in what is today one of the most heavily disputed territories in the world, with a separatist violence death toll of ca. 5000 in the last decade (CNN, 2020). The violence within Kashmir has further distanced any prospects of diplomatic negotiations. Pakistan acting as a front-line state both in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and in the post-9/11 war of terror, has witnessed extra regional powers pursuing their own interests by training and equipping thousands of Pakistani men (3). This saw an unprecedented rise in radicalisation in Pakistan and Kashmir subsequently, worsening the bilateral relations between Pakistan and India, as the latter has associated the indigenous struggle of the Kashmiri people with terrorism (Hafeez, 2016). China is considered a loyal ally to Pakistan in times India’s dominance seemed intimidating, to an extent that China has tacitly endorsed Pakistan’s strategy of utilising terror as a policy instrument to counteract India (Pant, 2016).

Nuclear power poses more of a threat than a diplomatic power equilibrium

The nuclear proliferation in India and Pakistan has both symbolised the mistrust in each other as well as expanded the mistrust between them. India became a nuclear state in 1974, with its military traditionally uninvolved in decisions surrounding nuclear facilities. Pakistan pursued a nuclear program in response to India, which was intended to be a strategic equaliser in the deterrence tactic of a cold war (Sagan, 2003). Contrasting to its counterpart, Pakistan’s military largely runs the nuclear weapons program (Perkovich, 1999). Despite the theoretical deterrence strategy in a nuclear arms race, the security dilemma of the region structured both countries’ political and military behaviour, each interpreting the defensive moves as constructions for defensive action (Hagerty, 1998).

The aspiration for the deterrence strategy in the situation of nuclear states was undermined during the Kargil conflict. The organisational biases of the Pakistani army arguably sparked crises in the past and will continue to do so during future tensions. The dangers of both preventive and pre-emptive strikes if war is esteemed inevitable prevail, and nuclear deployments may well threaten deterrent forces on the enemy side (Sagan, 2003).

Broader strategic consequences in Pakistan’s preventive approach and its dealing with nuclear arms became dangerously apparent after the December 13 terrorist attack against the Indian Parliament. Having received the warning from India to crackdown on terrorist activity coming from Pakistan, Pakistan feared an attack on their nuclear arsenal and moved it into an unsecure field. These actions make the arsenal more vulnerable to theft from Islamic militants, jeopardising the security of India, Pakistan and Kashmir (Sagan, 2003).

SUMMARY *

The article’s argument is that the four obstacles it identifies reinforce one another rather than operating separately. Regional institutions cannot function because the two principal members are in dispute; the dispute is sustained by a territorial question that neither side can concede without loss of legitimacy; that question draws in a third power whose support alters the balance; and the nuclear dimension raises the cost of any miscalculation while, on the author’s reading, doing less to prevent conflict than deterrence theory would predict. The conclusion drawn is pessimistic: the causes of the conflict are themselves the reason diplomatic resolution has failed.

CONCLUSION

All things considered, the sources of conflict themselves between India and Pakistan have been the sole reason resolution through diplomatic means has failed. Having been established with undefined borders, the countries have been deprived of peace prospects. SAARCs regional integrational approach has been its own worst enemy, displaying itself as a weak intergovernmental entity compared to three nuclear powers bordering each other. Both sides have seen it as essential to their own existence to maintain Kashmir as “theirs”, with claims for occupation ranging from ethno-demographic importance to the containment of terrorism. The conflict today seems as unsolvable as it ever was, and most probably as it will ever be.

POTENTIAL SOLUTION *

The article closes on a note of finality that the historical record does not quite support. This conflict has produced more agreements than most: the ceasefire and the establishment of the Line of Control, the Indus Waters Treaty, the Simla Agreement, the Lahore Declaration, the ceasefire understanding of 2003 renewed in 2021, and the back channel of 2004 to 2007 which, by the accounts of those involved, came close to a framework on Kashmir. The problem is not that agreement has proved impossible but that agreements have not survived changes of government, attacks by actors outside the process, and the absence of any mechanism to hold them in place.

That points to the most important design lesson available here. Every promising process in this relationship has been ended by a violent incident, and the pattern is consistent enough to be planned for. An agreed continuity provision, committing both governments in advance that talks will not be suspended in response to an attack but will instead convene immediately to address it, removes the incentive that makes such attacks effective. Those who wish to prevent an accommodation currently need only one operation; a process designed with this in mind denies them that.

The nuclear dimension the article treats as an aggravating factor is also, in one respect, the most tractable. Whatever their disagreements, neither government wants an accidental exchange, and the measures that reduce that risk are technical, reciprocal and already partly in place: the agreement on non attack against nuclear installations, notification of missile tests, the military hotline. Extending these to cover incidents at sea and in the air, the compressed decision times that new missile systems create, and the confidence building that would make dispersal under threat unnecessary, is achievable without either side conceding anything on Kashmir. The episode the article describes, in which an arsenal was moved to less secure positions out of fear of pre emption, is precisely the scenario such arrangements exist to prevent.

The Indus Waters Treaty deserves particular attention as the standing counter example to the article’s pessimism. Negotiated with third party facilitation, it has survived three wars and numerous crises, because it is technical rather than symbolic, has its own dispute mechanism, and gives both parties something they need continuously. Building comparable functional arrangements, on trade across the Line of Control, on divided families, on pilgrimage access, on environmental cooperation in the glacial regions, is how relationships of this kind recover, and each such arrangement survives independently of the political weather.

Two final observations. The article says relatively little about Kashmiris themselves, who appear mainly as the object of the dispute rather than as parties to it, and no settlement negotiated over their heads has held or is likely to. Intra Kashmiri dialogue across the Line of Control, on movement, trade, family reunification and the fate of the missing, is both valuable in itself and the missing element in every previous framework. And on the article’s central claim that regional institutions have failed: the consensus rule it describes is a design flaw rather than a law of nature. Sub regional cooperation among willing members, which has already developed in energy and transport, demonstrates that progress does not require unanimity, and it accumulates the habits of cooperation from which a wider settlement might eventually be built.

* Added by the WMO Editorial Team

REFERENCES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

CNN Editorial Research (2020) “Kashmir Fast Facts”, CNN, 26 March. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/08/world/kashmir-fast-facts/index.html Accessed: 28 May 2020

Hafeez, M. (2016) ‘Future of Regional Cooperation in South Asia’, 2016 SAARC Summit, vol. 36, no. 3

Hagerty, D. (1998) The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation. Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp. 92, 106

Khan, Y. (2008) The Great Partition – The making of India and Pakistan. Cornwall: MPG Books Ltd, pp. 7-10, pp. 206-210

Pant, H. (2016) India and Pakistan: A road to nowhere, In Indian foreign policy: An overview. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 81-83. Available at: www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvnb7mkr.11 Accessed: 28 May 2020

Paul, T.V. (2009). The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons. [ebook] Stanford University Press. Available at: https://www.perlego.com/book/745843/the-tradition-of-nonuse-of-nuclear-weapons Accessed: 28 May 2020

Perkovich, G. (1999) India’s Nuclear Bomb. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 303, 306-313

Rahman, A. (2004) SAARC: Not Yet a Community. Available at: https://apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/RegionalFinal%20chapters/Chapter9Rahman.pdf

Sagan, S. and Waltz, K. (2003) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons – A Debate Renewed. London: W. W. Norton & Company Ltd, pp. 88-108

Schofield, V (2010) Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War. [ebook] Bloomsbury Publishing. Available at: https://www.perlego.com/book/919406/kashmir-in-conflict, chapters 5, 10

South China Morning Post (2019) All About the Kashmir Conflict [YouTube video] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QgHFGx1F-5U Accessed: 28 May 2020

Vox (2019) The Conflict in Kashmir, Explained [YouTube video] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cyayif_nla8&t=53s Accessed: 28 May 2020

Yousaf, A. and Ahmad, M. and Shah, Z. (2017) ‘SAARC Summit and Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Analysis’, Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, vol. 54, no. 2

Supplementary references added by the WMO Editorial Team

Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir, 26 October 1947, and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 47 (1948) and 91 (1951).

Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan, with the World Bank as signatory, Karachi, 19 September 1960.

Simla Agreement, 2 July 1972, and the Lahore Declaration, 21 February 1999.

Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities between India and Pakistan, 1988, and the Agreement on Pre Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles, 2005.

Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, 1985, Article X on unanimity in decision making.

Coll, S. (2009). The Back Channel: India and Pakistan’s Secret Kashmir Talks. The New Yorker, 2 March.

Ganguly, S., & Kapur, S. P. (2010). India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia. Columbia University Press, New York.

Is Migration Beneficial For The Migrant, The Country They Go To And The Country Of Origin?

How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/

ABSTRACT *

This article examines the consequences of Syrian displacement for the sending country, the receiving country and the refugees themselves. For Syria the author identifies the loss of educated professionals and the resulting depletion of human capital, alongside the significance of remittances and the risk that entrenched patronage will prevent any recovery. For Lebanon the argument is that the economic potential of the newcomers has gone unrealised, since restrictions on labour market access, combined with political reluctance, have produced isolation rather than integration, and that the wider economic damage stems more from the war and from domestic policy than from the presence of refugees. The third section addresses conditions in informal settlements, the absence of work permits and its consequences, the particular vulnerability of women, and the exposure of camp populations to the coronavirus pandemic. The characterisations reflect the author’s own perspective; this journal’s editorial position is neutral.

KEYWORDS *

Syria, Lebanon, refugees, forced migration, brain drain, remittances, informal settlements, labour market access, host communities, vulnerability, COVID 19, human capital

INTRODUCTION

Lebanon and Syria have been hit by an unprecedented wave of a sudden, overwhelming and traumatic migration. While this means a loss for Syria and a gain for Lebanon in human capital, both countries have faced a variety of unforeseen challenges in historically troubled countries within an unruly and seemingly unmanageable region. This essay will briefly detail some of the many challenges that have been imposed on Syria as a sending country, Lebanon as a receiving country, and the refugees themselves in the midst of political turmoil. Respecting the fact that the migrants’ reasoning for leaving in such large numbers is accountable to the fact that war has been plaguing the Syrian nation, leaving many families no other option than leaving, the essay will use the terms migrant and refugee interchangeably. Due to the fact that Syria is indulged in a complex, sectarian and ongoing war, exact figures and results are proving themselves difficult to obtain. Nonetheless, the case of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has been reported on widely for reasons including the fact that Lebanon itself is closely tied to Syria and has many political aspects in common, i.e. nepotism, which has hindered both countries in dealing with sudden problems such as the refugee wave.

MAIN CORPUS

Syria’s civil war starting in 2011 has caused immense amounts of damage both to the country and the people. Syria’s neighbour, Lebanon, has been at the forefront of the refugee influx, currently hosting an estimated 1.5 million Syrian refugees (Rabil, 2016). Numbers this high undoubtedly have profound and lasting effects on Syria as a sending country with vast amounts of people leaving in a short period of time. Due to the massive outflux of people during the war with little plan on rebuilding the country and society, one of the consequences is the brain drain which threatens to depopulate Syria, depriving the country of its valuable human capital (Goldin et. al, 2011). Syria’s educated were some of the first to flee when the civil war started at the beginning of the decade, presumably because they would have been unproductive in the country of the Assad regime in the wake of civil unrest (Christophersen, 2018). Syria now lacks a sufficient skill base in the private and public sectors, a phenomenon that hinders both Syria’s and Lebanon’s intentions for retrieval of brain gain in Syria brought by a returning populace once acquiring a sufficient amount of financial stability and advanced skillset (Goldin et. al, 2011). Moreover, Syria, alongside Jordan and Lebanon, is among the highest recipients of remittances in the world in proportion to their GDP. An advantageous contribution to a household in Syria, receiving households will generally invest more in human capital and the education of their children than their non-receiving counterparts (Chaaban et. al, 2012). Goldin argues that every dollar in remittance spending creates two to three dollars of income in the country of the migrant’s origin (Goldin et. al, 2011). Should this work in accordance with Syria’s financial system, the money generated will be recycled back into its economy, gradually and exponentially growing its potential. In contrast, if Syria’s dire system of nepotism takes over, the concept of a stabilising economy could be imminently discarded and the old, albeit unpopular system, would prevail (Göransson, 2018). This would potentially keep Syria in a cycle of outward migration and a subsequent brain drain, deteriorating chances of integration into the global market, and an inevitable economic crash resulting in an ongoing conflict.

Lebanon is considered a primary receiving country and is at the forefront of the refugee wave, as it is closely related to Syria in terms of economics, politics as well as geographically. This has led to a variety of consequences, in which the negatives seemingly outweigh the positives. The costs of a large number of migrants in relation to the relatively small native population can be highly visible and localised, especially if we consider the Syrian migrants as refugees, often arriving in Lebanon en masse and with little intention for a long-term settlement (Parkes, 2015). This lack of intention, arguably triggered by xenophobia and regulations serving to diminish Syrian refugees’ access to the Lebanese labour market, has meant that Lebanon remains unable to unlock the huge economic potential Syrian migrants might have been able to contribute (Holmes, 2013). According to Lebanon’s interior minister, Marwan Charbel, refugees threaten the security of Lebanon and pose a threat to the already scarce resources of a heavily polluted country (Christophersen, 2018). One argument brought forward was that the presence of refugees in the informal settlements had a vastly negative impact on the natural resources. Accountable to the fact that the settlements are informal and located near water sources, the waste generated by the people in the camps integrate into the environment around them, negatively impacting the water, air and land quality (Rabil, 2016). While the interior minister upholds the notion that refugees are a burden and not a potential blessing, the International Monetary Fund has proclaimed the weak policymaking by the Lebanese government more of a burden than the influx itself. Traditionally a trade-based economy, Lebanon has been more severely hit by the economic impositions placed upon it as a repercussion attributable to the Syrian war than the refugees themselves. Export routes have been blocked catalysing a sharp decline in consumer confidence in addition to the decaying investor sentiment (Holmes, 2013). Lebanon’s historically famous tourism, banking, and trading industries have been hit badly, especially as the refugee wave escalated simultaneously to the economic stagnation which hit Lebanon’s government finances (Rabil, 2016). Lebanon’s politicians and population have turned to increase attempts to isolate their refugee population in the hopes they can drive the refugees away. The policymaking of the government itself appears to be largely ignored in the debate around the refugee problem.

While there is a lot of discussion around the impacts migrants have on their country of origin and country of destination, the impact migration itself has on a person can be detrimental to both the person and their surroundings. A country rich in ethnic, religious, and financial diversity, Syrian refugees, in particular, are reported to be struggling in Lebanon. While Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have designated refugee camps, Syrian refugees are predominantly being hosted in informal settlements or host communities in some of Lebanon’s economically deprived areas (Christophersen, 2018). These deprived areas are often situated in the Northern and Southern districts of Lebanon, districts lacking sufficient infrastructure and plagued by criminal activity. The already deprived areas of Lebanon have expressed the most dissatisfaction in taking on Syrian refugees (Rabil, 2016). The social marginalisation of the Syrian refugees resulting in a refusal from the government to provide job permits, and thus endorsed a socioeconomic disadvantage, has led to Syrians opting for desperate measures to financially support themselves. One such measure witnessed increasingly and repeatedly is the Syrian refugee women turning to sex work. Prostitution being illegal in Lebanon, these women often receive criminal records upon arrest, which in turn worsen already bleak chances of employment (BBC, 2017). According to the UN, women are already the primary victims of displacement and war (Zheng, 2015). Their worsening situation after displacement more often than not contributes to their downward assimilation, often lasting until the next generation and beyond (Goldin et. al, 2011). In addition, the living situation for refugees in an already densely populated country such a Lebanon is often crowded, unsanitary, and lacks infrastructure connecting them to the urbanised parts of the country. Given the situation, Syrians in Lebanon are vulnerable to stress, depression and in more recent times, susceptible to infectious outbreaks (Goldin et. al, 2011). For this reason, refugees in north-eastern Lebanon are reporting the daily struggle attempting to contain the infectious disease Cov-Sars-19. Living on less than 40 litres of water a day per tent as well as the tents being less than one metre apart from each other, refugees are among the most vulnerable in the world in the wake of a pandemic as widespread as Covid-19 (el-Azar, 2020). The already lacking medical facilities in Lebanon paired with the undocumented status of many of the refugees has resulted in fewer applications for medical assistance which has resulted in refugees currently living in a constant state of stress, which almost certainly contributes to the abovementioned challenges of a hazardous journey on a personal level.

SUMMARY *

The article’s structure follows the displacement itself, from the country departed, to the country entered, to the people who made the journey, and its recurring argument is that in each case the damage attributed to the movement of people is better explained by the decisions taken around them. Syria’s difficulty is not that its professionals left but that nothing has been built to which they might return. Lebanon’s economic distress is traced by the sources cited here to the war, to blocked trade routes and to domestic policy rather than to the presence of refugees. And the conditions in the informal settlements follow from the refusal of legal status and work permits rather than from any characteristic of the population living in them.

CONCLUSION

All things considered, both Lebanon and Syria are still suffering economically. This means Lebanon has failed to unlock the economic potential refugees could carry because the country has failed to organise accordingly within its own political system. By falsely identifying the problems, Lebanon has hindered itself in development within the country as well as its position in the region. Syria still operating its politics through nepotism has meant that Syria’s system has remained what it was unpopular for, once again meaning it has failed to adequately meet the needs of the potentially returning populace in addition to its investors. This has prevented Syria from unlocking the potential that could catalyse Syria into a new position of economic strength in the Levant. This in turn could eventually rebuild the country, regaining its cultural glory. Migrants suffering the consequences of the decisions made by both countries have meant many are still living in inhumane conditions numerous years later from the first arrival. As if these conditions hadn’t posed enough sanitary problems, the novel Coronavirus pandemic has left a large community in a constant state of stress as the burden of the unknown future haunts it.

POTENTIAL SOLUTION *

The article identifies the decisive mechanism and it is worth naming plainly: almost every hardship described here follows from the absence of legal status. Without residency, a person cannot work lawfully, cannot register a birth, cannot approach the police when wronged, and hesitates to seek medical care. The consequences the article records, from exploitative labour to the situations facing women without income to the reluctance to present at a clinic during a pandemic, are not separate problems requiring separate programmes. They are symptoms of one condition, and regularisation addresses them together.

The obstacle is political rather than technical, and it should be stated honestly. Lebanon’s confessional balance makes any measure resembling permanent settlement of a large, predominantly Sunni population intensely contested, and the memory of how the Palestinian presence became entangled in the civil war shapes the debate. That fear is not irrational and cannot be argued away. It can, however, be addressed by design: temporary protection with renewable, clearly limited status, explicitly separated from any question of naturalisation, and sector specific work authorisation in agriculture, construction and services where labour demand exists and competition with Lebanese workers is least acute. Such arrangements have been negotiated elsewhere, and they give the host state what it needs, which is control and reversibility, while giving the displaced what they need, which is the ability to live lawfully.

Support directed to host communities rather than to refugees alone is the second element, and it is the one that most affects whether hospitality holds. The deprived districts the article names carry the burden while the benefits accrue elsewhere, and resentment in such conditions is a predictable response rather than a moral failing. Investment in shared services, schools, clinics, water systems and roads, serving both populations in the areas of highest concentration, converts a zero sum perception into a visible common gain. This principle is now standard in international response frameworks precisely because programmes that assist only the displaced have repeatedly generated the hostility they were meant to avoid.

On return, which the article treats as the eventual resolution, the conditions matter more than the timing. Return is durable only where it is voluntary, informed and safe, and where property, documentation and conscription questions have been settled in advance. Return organised as a political achievement, without those guarantees, produces secondary displacement rather than reconstruction. The author’s observation about what awaits returning professionals is the more important point: people return to opportunity and to security, not to an appeal, and rebuilding the institutions they would work within is the precondition for the human capital recovery the article hopes for.

Two final observations. The framing of displaced people primarily as economic potential is a well intentioned argument that carries a risk, since it grounds their claim to protection in their usefulness, and usefulness can always be disputed. The stronger ground is that people fleeing war are entitled to protection irrespective of what they contribute; the economic case is a welcome addition and a poor foundation. And the situations facing women without lawful income deserve a response rather than only a description: legal aid, protection from prosecution for those coerced, safe reporting channels and targeted livelihood support are what change those circumstances, and each is achievable without resolving the wider political question.

* Added by the WMO Editorial Team

REFERENCES

Bibliography

BBC (2017) ‘The Syrian refugees turning to Sex to survive – BBC News’, BBC, March 23. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ZqHUBkLv4E (Accessed: 3rd May 2020)

Chaaban, J. and Mansour, W. (2012) The Impact of Remittances on Education in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Available at: http://erf.org.eg/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/684.pdf (Accessed: 3rd May 2020)

Christophersen, M. (2018) Report Part Title: Mitigating the Impact of the War in Syria and the Influx of Syrian Refugees. Available at: https://0-www-jstor-org.emu.londonmet.ac.uk/stable/pdf/resrep17506.7.pdf (Accessed: 5th May 2020)

El-Azar, S. (2020) ‘Inside the Lebanon refugee camps bracing for coronavirus’, The Independent, Beirut, April 3. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/coronavirus-lebanon-refugee-camps-syria-palestine-video-a9446851.html (Accessed: 6th May)

Goldin, I. and Cameron, G. and Balarajan, M. (2011) Exceptional People. US: Princeton University Press, pp. 162-210

Göransson, M. (2018) Apping and resilience: How smartphones help Syrian refugees in Lebanon negotiate the precarity of displacement. Available at: https://0-www-jstor-org.emu.londonmet.ac.uk/stable/pdf/resrep21314.pdf (Accessed: 5th May 2020)

Holmes, O. (2013) ‘Syrian Refugees Burden and Benefit for Lebanese Economy’, REUTERS, Beirut, April 17. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-crisis-lebanon-refugees/syrian-refugees-burden-and-benefit-for-lebanese-economy-idUSBRE93G0MW20130417 (Accessed: 5th May 2020)

Parkes, R. (2015) Migration: New ‘push’ and ‘Pull dynamics. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, pp. 1-4

Rabil, R. (2016) The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: The Double Tragedy of Refugees and Impacted Host Communities. London: Lexington Books, pp. 1, 11, 109

Zheng, S. (2015) Refugees and internally displaced persons. United Nations. Available at: https://unstats.un.org/unsd/genderstatmanual/Print.aspx?Page=Refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons (Accessed: 5th May 2020)

Supplementary references added by the WMO Editorial Team

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR), annual editions, Beirut.

Government of Lebanon and United Nations, Lebanon Crisis Response Plan, successive editions.

Global Compact on Refugees, United Nations General Assembly, 2018, on responsibility sharing and support to host communities.

International Labour Organization, assessments of Syrian refugee access to the labour market in Lebanon and Jordan, Beirut and Geneva.

Jordan Compact, London Conference, 2016, on work permits in exchange for trade concessions.

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Article 33 on non refoulement, and UNHCR guidance on voluntary repatriation.

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, reports on the situation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

Why is the Conflict in Lebanon So Intractable?

How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/

ABSTRACT *

This article asks why conflict in Lebanon has proved so intractable, taking the protests of October 2019 as its starting point. Three explanations are examined in turn. The first is religious communalism, traced from Ottoman rule through the French mandate to the demographic shift from a Christian to a Muslim majority without a corresponding change in political representation. The second is economic inequality, illustrated by the concentration of wealth in Beirut and Mount Lebanon against an agricultural south and north, and by the persistence of clientelist practice across all confessional parties. The third is globalisation, encompassing the decline of Lebanese agricultural exports, the loss of markets to competitors, and the transnational spread of Islamist extremism. The author concludes that these factors are interdependent rather than separable, and that the failure to reform the system that produced them has allowed the same problems to persist. The characterisations reflect the author’s own perspective; this journal’s editorial position is neutral.

KEYWORDS *

Lebanon, sectarianism, confessionalism, intractable conflict, economic inequality, wasta, globalisation, Hezbollah, Taif Agreement, October 2019 protests, external patronage, agriculture

INTRODUCTION

On October 17th of this year, Lebanese people took to the streets in an exceptional protest against government corruption following the announcement that there would be taxes imposed on the use of the free, internet-based messenger service WhatsApp. Distrusting sentiment towards the sectarian government has been brewing for as long as Lebanon has existed with outbursts resulting in civil wars like those in 1958 and 1975 or the demonstrations -the most notable being March 14 and March 8 alliance demonstrations following Rafik Al-Hariri’s assassination in 2005- all of which have been contained just enough to maintain Lebanon’s existence. What are the roots of Lebanese citizen’s discontent with their government and why has the conflicting environment prevailed?

MAIN CORPUS

The impulsive answer given in response to the question of why the conflict in Lebanon has been so intractable tends to either include or entirely revolve around the fact that Lebanon’s many religious, ethnic, and political identities clash. Although many perceive the communalism of Lebanon as a phenomenon mainly tied to the civil war which took place from 1975 to 1990, the accentuated religious divides appear to have been evident under Ottoman rule.[1] Once the French mandate had taken over, Lebanon had been formed, tying together cities from Tripoli to Tyre along with all the religions enveloped within the newly defined border with their respective elites.[2] Generally speaking, the elites of the individual religious communities (Lebanon counts 17 recognised) upheld the notion that each ‘nation’ is entitled to a state of its own [3]. Furthermore, this has contributed to tensions, not least due to the geographical distribution of these groups, which this essay will elaborate on in the next paragraph. In addition, when the region was preparing for independence, the old French Mandate rule was not disassembled entirely, but modified and adjusted to a system of sponsorship wherein the military and financial absorption of the old colonial powers were ensured. The British and Arab states now de-facto controlled Lebanon [4]. In more recent times, Arab nationalism has been averted into Islamic fundamentalism [5]. This would be one possible answer as to why the conflict in Lebanon has been so intractable, as their dominant power became an international threat that has been difficult to contain. The Islamic fundamentalism plaguing the region is paralleled with Maronite and Sunni/Shi’a relations deteriorating repeatedly after the demographic shifted from a Christian majority to a Muslim majority population [6], yet the (political and economic) representation remaining with the Christians [7]. This has undoubtedly caused resentment to grow in the Muslim community and as the Christian community felt threatened, it once again seeded a lack of trust whereby a conflict can be harvested.

Whilst the discussion in the preceding paragraph centres around the notion that religious communalism is the root cause of the modern sectarian divide in Lebanese politics that has upheld the conflict in Lebanon, it could be argued that this divide may in fact be on the account of a wealth divide and economic inequalities. In the post-independence/pre-war Lebanese state, there has been a disproportionate amount of wealth in Mount Lebanon and Beirut in contrast to the rest of the country. A table demonstrated by Odeh shows how agriculture accounted for the highest-grossing industry for the country’s Net National Income [8], due to the high export rates of harvested goods to other Arab countries. During this time fruit carried the most important among products exported, that were harvested in Mount Lebanon which led to the area and the people residing there, to accumulate a degree of wealth unmatched to the rest of Lebanon. Beirut and Mount Lebanon developed to become industry trade centres and tourism hotspots. It is these regions that were demographically Maronite [9], whereas 94,1% of those employed in agriculture resided in the South and the North, and the Beqaa which were and still are inhabited predominantly by a Sunni and Shi’a populace [10]. This socio-economic divide could be argued as a reason for tensions to have arisen between the religions in the first place, in particular the accelerated growth in popularity of Hizbu’llah in the southern governate of Lebanon. Hizbu’llah maintains the notion that they speak for the oppressed, which they describe as people who are economically, politically, and culturally weak, or rather, unrepresented in Lebanon’s affluence. Perpetuating this rhetoric, they have managed to speak to a wide range of demographics under their territorial rule [11]. As they have proceeded to gain momentum, it has opened up an opportunity for Iran to impose its influence both ideologically as well as financially [12]. Hizbu’llah is now not only a result of poor political practice on the government’s behalf, it has resulted in them governing poorly themselves, once more highlighting why Lebanon’s condition remains agonised. Noting the compelling evidence of the beforementioned roots of economic inequalities among the religious groups, it becomes apparent that despite treaties made to “End the civil war and return political normalcy” to Lebanon [13], the class system has prevailed across all religious parties. This is partly evident in the infamous “wasta” arrangements, whereby a person can enjoy a degree of privilege in bureaucratic procedures and hiring/promotion through people one has connections to in lieu of qualification [14]. Connections in the pollical scene often takes precedence over appropriate university degrees when applying for a job in politics. Subsequently, the people in power remain in power by wasta-ing the environment around them to serve their own best interests.

Taking into account the points made in the previous paragraphs, a further explanation as to what makes Lebanon’s case so unmanageable would be the further growth and elaboration of globalisation. As previously mentioned, Lebanon’s main sector of trade was agricultural produce, 84% of which used to be exported to other Arab states [15]. This figure has been highly challenged, especially in recent years, due to a variety of reasons including but not limited to soil erosion, exhaustion, and pollution of water resources, as well as inappropriate use of fertilisers and pesticides [16]. In a world with growing intricacy, Lebanon seems to be struggling to adapt since many possible trade markets are now more difficult to access [17], most probably due to challenges a war-torn region poses; as well as, according to data from 2010, Arab states importing agricultural goods from new markets located in developing countries in Latin America [18], making the Lebanese market posteriority. Lebanon grapples to adapt to the changes made around them due to globalisation, making it incompatible with the international community. Furthermore, the levant has been plagued with the unprecedented challenge of Islamic extremism. Noting the abovementioned transition of Arab nationalism into Islamic fundamentalism (the drastic confinement of the PLO during the civil war which some academics argued left an ideological and military void [19], as well as Hizbu’llah’s notion of anger towards the “oppressors” [20]), it becomes clear as to how the globalisation of Islamic extremism has been especially difficult for the levant to handle. Attacks on domestic grounds as well as the hardship faced in containing rapidly spreading violence both with the use of the internet and the capitalist approach to arms sales, this catapults Lebanon into international scrutiny while not being provided the means and cooperation to fight what seems the at times a losing battle. Interdependency of the world means that while the international community was relying on Lebanon to hold a stronger position in containing Islamic extremism, Lebanon depended on the international community to provide the means with which it might have been able to achieve said containment (possibly through being provided with military aid, joint intelligence collaboration, awareness). Lebanon’s increasing incapacity to fill the economic void imposed on the country post-globalization, as well as the mistrust between communities in the face of ideological challenges as mentioned above, may explain one of the reasons each religious community feels the need to be financially and militarily backed by their respective proxy powers [21], further complicating attempts at political coexistence.

SUMMARY *

The article’s method is comparative rather than declarative. Three candidate explanations are set against one another, and the author declines to select a single cause, concluding instead that the factors are conditional upon one another. Confessional identity maps onto geography, geography onto economic opportunity, and economic exclusion onto the appeal of movements claiming to speak for the excluded, which in turn draws in external patrons whose support entrenches the divisions further. The recurring element in each account is the failure to reform: agreements that ended fighting did not alter the structure that produced it.

CONCLUSION

More generally, these basic findings are consistent with research showing that Lebanon’s intractable conflict is owed to the persistent prevalence of issues rooted in difficulties related to religious diversity, socio-economic inequity paired with the untimely and unprepared globalisation of the world from the Lebanese perspective. It is difficult to arrive at any definitive conclusions blaming just one factor alone, as they seem to be intricately connected and, in some cases, conditional on each other, compellingly evident in the fact that some communities suffered from socio-economic depravity related to their geographical distribution. The system that emerged from such inequalities was never sufficiently reformed, allowing the same problems to persist throughout the country’s history. As a result of the waves of political activity and conflict mentioned in the introduction the failure of alleviating and eliminating fundamental problems in the political system is illustrated, leading us to the question: are the recent demonstrations genuine grounds for permanent change or another conflict breeding ground for future sectarian warfare?

POTENTIAL SOLUTION *

The article’s refusal to name a single cause is analytically honest, and it has a practical consequence that deserves drawing out. Where religious identity, economic position, geography and external patronage reinforce one another, a reform that addresses only one of them will be absorbed by the others. Confessional power sharing without economic redistribution leaves the same communities poor and the same leaders indispensable. Economic reform without political reform delivers the proceeds to the networks the article describes under the term wasta. This is why Lebanon has produced so many agreements and so little change.

That points toward sequencing rather than comprehensiveness. The most promising entry points are those where reform in one domain weakens the hold of another. An independent civil service with appointment by examination, for instance, is a technical measure with political consequences, because it severs the link between confessional patronage and employment that keeps citizens dependent on their community’s leaders. Universal social provision, delivered by the state rather than through party channels, does the same: where health care, schooling and assistance arrive through a party, loyalty is not a matter of belief but of survival. These measures are less politically explosive than constitutional reform and they erode the foundation on which the confessional system actually rests.

The confessional structure itself admits of gradual change. A non confessional electoral law for at least part of the legislature, an upper chamber retaining community representation as a guarantee, and the removal of confessional designation from state documents were all foreseen in the Taif Agreement and none was implemented. Reviving them addresses the objection most often raised against reform, namely that minorities need protection, by preserving the guarantee while removing the mechanism that turns every appointment and every contract into a sectarian transaction.

Two further observations follow from the article’s own material. The protest movement of 2019 was notable precisely for crossing the divisions the article analyses, with demonstrators in Tripoli, Beirut, Nabatieh and Tyre making the same demands against their own communal leaders. Whether that becomes a durable political force depends on whether it can convert a shared grievance into an organised alternative capable of contesting elections, which is the step at which such movements most often fail. And the external dimension cannot be reformed away domestically: as long as each community can be financed and armed from outside, no internal settlement binds. A regional understanding on non interference, of the kind that has periodically been attempted, is the missing precondition, and it lies beyond the reach of any Lebanese government acting alone.

Finally, a note about what happened after this article was written. The financial collapse that followed, and the explosion in the port of Beirut in August 2020, transformed the conditions the author describes and made the questions posed here more urgent rather than less. The article’s closing question, whether the demonstrations were grounds for permanent change or a prelude to renewed conflict, remains open, and the analysis offered here of why previous reforms failed is the most useful guide to answering it.

* Added by the WMO Editorial Team

REFERENCES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[1] Kisirwani (1980) “Foreign Interference and Religious Animosity in Lebanon”. Journal of Contemporary History. 15 (4): 685–700.

[2] From Beirut to Jerusalem, P. xi

[3] Ziadeh (2006) ‘Sectarianism and Intercommunal Nation-Building in Lebanon’, P. xvi

[4] Ziadeh (2006) ‘Sectarianism and Intercommunal Nation-Building in Lebanon’, P. 112

[5] Ziadeh (2006) ‘Sectarianism and Intercommunal Nation-Building in Lebanon’, P. xvii

[6] Friedman (2012) ‘From Beirut to Jerusalem’, P. 13

[7] Ziadeh (2006) ‘Sectarianism and Intercommunal Nation-Building in Lebanon’, P. 13

[8] Odeh (1985) ‘Lebanon Dynamics of Conflict’, P. 55

[9] Odeh (1985) ‘Lebanon Dynamics of Conflict’, P. 68-69

[10] Library of Congress/Central Intelligence Agency (1988) Contemporary distribution of Lebanon’s main religious groups (Map)

[11] Saad-Ghorayeb (2002) ‘Hizbu’llah Politics & Religion’, P.19

[12] Ben Hubbard (2017) ‘Iran Out to Remake Mideast With Arab Enforcer: Hezbollah’, The New York Times, 27 August https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/27/world/middleeast/hezbollah-iran-syria-israel-lebanon.html (Last accessed: 10.12.2019)

[13] Krayem (2012) ‘The Lebanese civil war and the Taif agreement’ American University of Beirut

[14] Barnett, Yandle, Naufal (2011) ‘Regulation, Trust, and Cronyism in Middle Eastern Societies: The Simple Economics of ‘Wasta”

[15] Odeh (1985) ‘Lebanon Dynamics of Conflict’, P. 68

[16] Ministry of Environment/LEDO, Lebanon State of the Environment Report, 2005-2018 P. 17 https://web.archive.org/web/20071005081710/http://www.moe.gov.lb/NR/rdonlyres/2A90DB39-4C66-4CC8-9734-19931F82753D/0/Chap2Agriculture.pdf

[17] Eckart Woertz (2017) Agriculture and Development in the Wake of the Arab Spring, https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/2274#tocto1n7

[18] Clemens Breisinger (2010) Food Security and Economic Development in the Middle East and North Africa, P. 9 https://www1.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/themes/human_rights/foodsecmiddleeastandnorthafrica.pdf

[19] Ziadeh (2006) ‘Sectarianism and Intercommunal Nation-Building in Lebanon’, P. 131

[20] Saad-Ghorayeb (2002) ‘Hizbu’llah Politics & Religion’, P.16/23

[21] Nada Issa (2018) The State of Lebanon, Al Jazeera, 2 August https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2018/08/state-lebanon-180801132206456.html (Last accessed: 10.12.2019)

SOURCES USED FOR THE INTRODUCTION

Friedman (2012) ‘From Beirut to Jerusalem’

Maclean (2019) ‘Timeline: Lebanon’s ordeal – Economic and political crises since civil war’, Reuters, November https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-lebanon-protests-crises/timeline-lebanons-ordeal-economic-and-political-crises-since-civil-war-idUKKBN1XS0MT

Supplementary references added by the WMO Editorial Team

Taif Agreement (Document of National Accord), 22 October 1989, provisions on the abolition of political confessionalism.

Constitution of the Lebanese Republic, 1926 as amended, Articles 24 and 95.

World Bank (2016). Lebanon: Promoting Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity, Systematic Country Diagnostic, Washington, D.C.

Assouad, L. (2017). Rethinking the Lebanese Economic Miracle: The Extreme Concentration of Income and Wealth in Lebanon 2005 to 2014. World Inequality Lab, Paris.

Salloukh, B. et al. (2015). The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon. Pluto Press, London.

Cammett, M. (2014). Compassionate Communalism: Welfare and Sectarianism in Lebanon. Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

International Crisis Group, Middle East reports on Lebanon, Brussels and Beirut.