A Treaty Built to be Broken: An Assessment of the 28-Point “Plan for Peace”
How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/
EDITORIAL NOTE *
This article analyses a document leaked in November 2025 and assesses the conduct of the governments involved. That assessment reflects the author’s own perspective; this journal’s editorial position is neutral as between the parties. The document analysed was a draft that was not agreed by all parties named in it, and negotiations have continued since; readers should treat the analysis as an assessment of that text at that date rather than of any subsequent version.
ABSTRACT
The leaked Plan for Peace of 20 November 2025 exposes a structurally incoherent and diplomatically unbalanced framework that privileges Russian strategic aims while burdening Ukraine with extensive concessions, ambiguous obligations, and structurally unsound guarantees. Presented as a 28-point memorandum, the plan purports to confirm Ukrainian sovereignty, stabilize European security, and establish a durable ceasefire, yet its vague terminology, exclusion of Ukraine and Europe from negotiations, and repeated intrusion upon NATO and EU prerogatives fundamentally undermine its legitimacy. The document’s treatment of sovereignty, security guarantees, territorial arrangements, and constitutional constraints reveals a pattern of asymmetry; Ukraine is asked to curtail its military capacity, abandon NATO aspirations, accept de facto Russian territorial gains, and submit to externally imposed domestic reforms, while Russia faces minimal substantive obligations beyond symbolic legislative gestures and loosely framed commitments to non-aggression. Simultaneously, the United States positions itself as guarantor, mediator, and beneficiary, often in a manner contradictory to its own domestic and international policy, reflecting the continued erosion of its reliability as an international partner. Embedded within the plan is a broader architecture of strategic vagueness, institutional overreach, and diplomatic exclusion that invites misinterpretation and incentivizes future conflict. Taken as a whole, the proposal functions less as a viable peace settlement than as a blueprint for geopolitical instability, embedding future points of contestation and reinforcing the very conditions it purports to resolve.
KEYWORDS
Ukraine, Russia, United States, Europe, European Union, NATO, diplomacy, mediation, Plan for Peace, Russo-Ukrainian War, conflict resolution, conflict escalation
INTRODUCTION
On November 20, 2025, a proposed peace deal to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine was leaked by Axios, revealing the diplomatic dynamic between Russia and the United States in their joint approach to Ukraine, Europe, and international norms (Ravid and Lawler 2025). Widely criticized as a capitulation to Russian interests, the plan has been described as fundamentally flawed, both in substance and structure. Ukraine and Europe were excluded from the process, leaving the proposals fundamentally one-sided (Harmash et al. 2025). It could be argued that this plan was intended as a first draft of sorts, intended to be shared with Ukraine as a starting point for negotiations. This benefit of doubt was undermined when Reuters announced the following day that an anonymous source claimed the White House has threatened to revoke weapons and intelligence in order to strong-arm them into agreeing, a claim further reinforced by an address by Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy, sharing that Ukraine may now face a very difficult choice, either losing its dignity or the risk of losing a key partner (Balmforth 2025; Novikov and Hatton 2025). Here we will examine the provisions laid out in the 28-point plan, reviewing the verbiage therein, diplomatic implications, and potential ramifications for the future of the conflict.
MAIN CORPUS
Points 1 and 2: sovereignty and non-aggression
The plan starts with a proposed confirmation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, without specificity as to what parties will be confirming, or when said confirmation will take place. We are left to assume Russia will be the party to confirm sovereignty, whatever confirm means in this context is left ambiguous, and thus, without actual meaning. Ukraine’s sovereignty was already guaranteed in 1997 under the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which established the inviolability of the nation’s shared borders, which was first violated during the annexation of Crimea in 2014, along with Russia’s militarization of the Donbas. In regard to Point 2, specifically the ambiguities of the last 30 years, no detail is offered as to what this applies to, either territorially or otherwise, serving to only muddy the waters diplomatically, setting the stage for potential future conflict when these ambiguous ambiguities are revealed to be, unsurprisingly, unsettled. Regardless, both points are undermined in following points ahead.
Point 3: expectations regarding invasion and enlargement
The term expected here leaves the doors open for future incursions by Russia, which has shown a willingness to violate numerous times over the last few decades, regardless of treaty or agreement (Neplii 2024). More importantly, the agreement has no authority on the actions of NATO as a body, much less the NATO member nations themselves who would have to ratify or affirm the validity and applicability of the agreement. This reflects a vital gap in diplomatic understanding by the US officials involved in the language of the agreement, or perhaps an explicit attempt at leveraging ambiguity for future conflict.
Point 4: dialogue between Russia and NATO
Russia is expected to open dialogue with NATO, which includes the US, while the US simultaneously acts as its own mediator for the discussions it is party to? This can easily be excused as poor wording, though such an excuse is far from excusable in the context of war agreements. This may further reflect the US’s weakening alignment with broader NATO member state sentiment, almost framing itself as a distinct party from NATO itself (Schreer 2019). The substance of the point itself holds little weight, only enforcing dialogue to no concrete ends, though the essence of cooperation and conflict de-escalation are present.
Point 5: security guarantees
Axios notes in their article covering the leaked plan that Point 5 is intended to functionally guarantee NATO-style protections to Ukraine, meaning an attack on Ukraine will invoke an Article 5 response to Russia (Ravid 2025). Although a substantial guarantee that utilitarianly incorporates Ukraine into the NATO framework, it again has no bearing on the actual behavior of NATO itself, a recurring theme throughout the proposed plan. Why this language was excluded from the plan itself is unclear. This provision also exemplifies the US’s reputational decay as an unreliable partner, given the US had already provided security guarantees as a part of the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, in which the US and Russia acknowledged Ukraine’s territorial integrity and offered assurances of support in case of attack, which Russia has since violated and the US has increasingly failed to honor, particularly during the current administration (Kimball 2022). This follows other notable bilateral agreements which the US has unilaterally violated in recent years, such as the Iran Nuclear Deal and a plethora of congressionally passed free-trade agreements with several nations. Though the details of these arrangements are beyond the scope of this paper, they serve to highlight the deterioration of the US’s long-standing reputation as a reliable partner, and bulwark of international order.
Point 6: limitation of armed forces
This point serves to reduce Ukraine’s military capacity, undermining the nation’s sovereignty in Point 1 outright, and reducing their forces by nearly one third of their current troop volume. When considering agreements between parties in conflict, it is vital to assess the potential for future conflict, and how said agreements can reduce said potential, or set the stage for escalation if a party violates the agreement. It is a balancing act between the realities of the present, grievances of the past, and most importantly, threats of the future (Goertz and Diehl 2002). While Ukraine is given a demand to limit troop volumes, Russia is not given any such demand, which acts to incentivize future aggression against a weakened opponent. This is merely one aspect of the plan that sets the stage for future conflict, which will be illustrated in future points.
Points 7 and 8: constitutional undertakings and stationing of troops
Demands on a democratic nation to amend its constitution undermines the process of civilian rule, forcing elected representatives to make decisions which the people they are obligated to represent may not favor. Though language present undermines norms of democracy, substantively it repeats the measures intended in Point 3, which already prohibits Ukraine’s entry into NATO. These proposals serve to weaken the international standing of NATO, contradicting consistent messaging by NATO leadership and member states of Ukrainian inclusion. NATO member states, such as the United Kingdom and France, had been working towards developing a coalition of peacekeeping forces to enter Ukraine when the war concludes, which this plan intends to sabotage. It also undermines the ongoing efforts to incorporate Ukraine’s military industry and infrastructure into NATO’s structure (The Associated Press 2025).
Point 9: stationing of aircraft
How an agreement between the US, Russia, and Ukraine is to dictate the stationing of fighter jets in Poland is unclear, nor is the number of jets, and what constitutes European in this context.
Point 10: the conditions of the guarantee
The order of operations in Point 10 is poorly structured, though it is clear the intent is to specify security guarantees, but fails in clarity and further pigeonholes Ukraine against any actions to reclaim territory seized by Russia. This is particularly important given the ambiguity as to which party controls what territory, as there is substantial overlap over claims, particularly in regions claimed by Russia but without troop presence (Ravid and Lawler 2025). In addition, the ambiguity of global sanctions begs the question as to what nations are subject to these agreements. While the global community has largely ostracised Russia economically, they are not beholden to the agreements in this plan. Though if we assume this statute only applies to the US, it should be clarified. In addition, why only two Russian cities are included in the final detail is unclear, in a sense implying Ukraine is permitted to strike other cities with missiles, which is certainly not intended, speaking to the deficient phrasing and structure of the overall plan. Additionally, the prioritization of US compensation in this point speaks to a lack of sincerity in how it engages with partners, tying safety to monetary gain, though simultaneously neglecting any detail as to how compensation will be agreed upon by the parties, who the parties are, and opening the door for the US to falter on its guarantee when inevitable disagreements over reimbursement arise.
Points 11 and 12: European accession and reconstruction
Ukraine’s EU eligibility is reaffirmed under these points, though it lacks substantive weight, as Ukraine was already eligible and in the process of incorporating itself into the EU as the conflict has progressed (Soloviova and Fomin 2025). This agreement also has no bearing on the actions of the EU, and given the lack of European involvement in this plan, eligibility for EU membership to a nation that is already in negotiations to join remains irrelevant. As for Point 12, various guarantees are offered for economic and infrastructure repair for Ukraine, though the ambiguous use of the term powerful and global implies additional nations participating, who are not signatories to this agreement and played no role in its formation. This again weakens the commitments as it predicates the verbiage on an unreliable variable.
Points 13 to 16: reintegration, frozen assets, and legislative undertakings
The following points all pertain to Russia’s relationship with the US and the global economy. The integration of Russia back into international commerce is entirely dependent on other nations, who again, were not involved in the creation of this framework. One hundred billion dollars of frozen funds are reserved for the rebuilding of Ukraine under US direction, while the remaining two hundred billion are reserved as capital for joint US-Russian projects aiming to prevent future conflict. Lastly, Russia agrees to sign non-aggression into law, though Russia’s reputation as an unreliable partner, with countless violations of their own laws and constitution documented under their authoritarian administration, turns this legislative promise into a mere suggestion.
Points 17 to 19: nuclear provisions
These provisions pertain to the de-escalation of nuclear tensions and management of nuclear resources. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, currently under Russian occupation, is put under neutral supervision and output is split evenly between the parties. Perhaps one of the most concise aspects of the peace plan, laying out clear, binding terms of agreement.
Point 20: education, tolerance, and ideology
Perhaps the most egregious aspect of the proposed plan is in the framing of racial intolerance and Nazism, a misleading narrative perpetuated by Russia as a justification for the invasion of Ukraine, predicated on Russian national pride in regards to their victory in the Second World War (Kloo et al. 2024). The irony of the point is that both Russia, and particularly the US, has larger numbers of neo-Nazi and white nationalist movements (Dragas 2021; Lefebvre 2023). While stipulations such as these are typically seen as non-binding cross-cultural niceties, the involvement of the US poisons the waters when it comes to oversight of said initiatives, given the erasure of racial and cross-cultural education and programs under the current administration, and broader backsliding on civil rights, even targeting of specific people groups, including linguistic minorities (Stockemer 2025). This has situated the US in the broader international context as adversarial, which has resulted in weakened ties with other nations and dramatic reductions in tourism to the US, particularly as domestic ideological and ethnic conflicts continue to escalate (Chen 2025). This is to say, it is understood that the intent of these provisions are to reinforce the rhetoric and narratives that have been used as a vector of conflict to target Ukraine.
Points 21 to 23: territory and transit
Recognition of de facto occupation translates to, in essence, de jure. Perhaps this again is a byproduct of poor wording, though as discussed before, this pattern opens the door for reinterpretation, which may be the intent. The binding language regarding territorial claims provides no concessions from Russia, and demands additional concessions from Ukraine, functionally handing Russia an outcome fully aligned with their war aim (Kamil and Sudirman 2025). The only benefit offered to Ukraine in this set of points is the use of the Dnipro River.
Point 24: humanitarian matters
This point included additional components dealing with the exchange of prisoners and children, though did not specify the abduction of thousands of children by Russia during the conflict (Frantsuz et al. 2023). The establishment of a family reunification program, while promising, lacks the necessary depth and detail, a recurring theme throughout the plan. The only other thing of note is the use of the term hostages which could be interpreted to include war criminals who have been apprehended over the course of the conflict.
Point 25: elections
Ukraine’s elections were purportedly only delayed due to the ongoing conflict, which disrupted civic and political institutions necessary to establish equitable liberal functions, and has been largely seen as acceptable by the international community. The inclusion of this point echoes conspiratorial narratives targeting Ukraine and framing the nation as an authoritarian regime, amplified by Russian misinformation campaigns, which international monitors have debunked (Flakus et al. 2025).
Points 26 to 28: amnesty, monitoring, and entry into force
What constitutes parties is left vague, providing dangerously broad applications. Do individuals in the US and various European administrations also receive amnesty? If the actions were taken during the invasion but were irrelevant to the conflict, do they still count? While the questions appear facetious on face value, as the intent is easily inferred, again we are left with the potential repercussions of the substantive and structural deficits therein. Furthermore, how sanctions will be imposed, and by whom, leaves the door open for interpretive bias and misapplication, particularly given the ambiguity throughout the verbiage of the entire framework.
SUMMARY *
The article’s method is its contribution. Rather than assessing the draft politically, the author reads it as a legal instrument and asks of each provision what a party could later claim it meant, who is bound, and what happens if it is breached. The recurring answers are that the operative verbs are conditional, that a substantial number of provisions purport to bind organisations that were not present, and that the obligations are distributed asymmetrically in a manner that would leave one party constrained and the other largely at liberty. From this the author draws a conclusion about function rather than intent: whatever was meant, a text of this construction produces future disputes as a matter of design, because ambiguity is not a defect in an instrument whose signatories differ about what they are signing but a condition of their signing at all.
CONCLUSION
As stated before, any peace agreement must consider the past, present, and future. This plan speaks to only Russian grievances and Ukrainian concessions, leaving it dangerously one-sided. The territorial, rhetorical, and non-binding framing positions Ukraine in a vulnerable dynamic with Russia, rendering it closely dependent on future reinterpretations and policy exploitation, seemingly designed to create plausible deniability and even justification for conflict in the coming years. Those provisions that appear binding consist of arrangements that are substantively vague or fatally structured. The decision ahead of Ukraine is indeed a difficult one, and will have repercussions for democracy abroad and the Western world’s liberal order for the coming decades.
POTENTIAL SOLUTION *
The article’s most valuable finding is one it treats as a criticism and which is better understood as a description of how such texts are made, because that reframing determines what a reader should do with the document.
Constructive ambiguity is a standard instrument. Where two parties cannot agree on a formulation, a phrase that each can read in its own way permits a signature that would otherwise be impossible, and a number of durable settlements rest on precisely such phrases. The distinction that matters is between ambiguity on the peripheral questions, which buys time for the central bargain to consolidate, and ambiguity on the central question itself, which postpones the dispute without resolving it. Judged that way, the provisions the author identifies are of the second kind: what confirm means in relation to sovereignty, what the thirty years of ambiguities are, and whether de facto recognition is or is not de jure are not peripheral matters but the entire substance. A text of this construction has not created a settlement; it has created a document that both sides can sign and then litigate.
Two structural observations follow, and both concern who is bound. A bilateral instrument cannot impose obligations on a third party, which means the provisions purporting to commit the Atlantic alliance, the European Union, and unspecified other states are, as the author says, without effect, and would require separate instruments concluded by those bodies according to their own procedures. And a commitment to amend a constitution is not within the gift of any executive: in the Ukrainian case, alterations of territory require a national referendum, so an undertaking of that kind is a promise to attempt something rather than to deliver it. Both points are legal rather than political and neither depends on any view of the merits.
The most consequential deficiency is the one the article approaches through Point 10, and it deserves to be named directly: a security guarantee that requires a decision at the moment of crisis is not a guarantee. The distinction between automatic and discretionary commitments is the whole of deterrence, and it is precisely why the assurances given in 1994 failed to prevent what followed. Any arrangement in which the guarantor decides, after an attack, whether the conditions for its guarantee have been met leaves the guarantee where it was, and both parties will read it accordingly.
Two observations on the analysis itself. The strongest passages are those that stay with the text, and the passages that move to the domestic politics of the guarantor, on tourism, on civil rights, and on the comparative prevalence of extremist movements, are the ones a reader unsympathetic to the argument will use to set the whole aside. The point they are making, that a state which has resiled from previous undertakings will be discounted when it offers new ones, is sound and stands on the record of those undertakings alone. And the article’s implicit standard, that an agreement should be assessed by whether its terms will still mean the same thing in five years to both parties, is the right standard and is worth stating explicitly, because it is the one question a mediator asks of any draft and the one that this document, on the author’s reading, does not survive.
* Added by the WMO Editorial Team
REFERENCES
Balmforth, T. (2025) Exclusive: US Threatens to Cut Intel, Weapons to Press Ukraine into Peace Deal, Sources Say. Reuters, 21 November 2025.
Chen, N. (2025) The Self-Inflicted Injury to US Tourism That’s Making Some Americans Angry and Disappointed. CNN, 31 August 2025.
Dragas, O. (2021) Russism, New Nazism: Denazifying Denazifier. The Romanian Journal of Society and Politics 15(2).
Flakus, M., Koc, P., Plisiecki, H., and A. Pokropek (2025) Behind Beliefs: Collective Narcissism, Political Orientation, and Belief in Disinformation in the Time of War in Ukraine. Social Psychology 56(1).
Frantsuz, A., Stepanenko, N., and D. Shevchenko (2023) Abduction of Ukrainian Children during Full-Scale Invasion. Journal of International Legal Communication 9.
Goertz, G., and P. F. Diehl (2002) Treaties and Conflict Management in Enduring Rivalries. International Negotiation 7(3).
Harmash, O., Hunder, M., and G. Slattery (2025) Zelenskiy Ready for Honest Work on US-Backed Plan as Europeans Push Back. Reuters, 20 November 2025.
Kamil, F. M., and A. Sudirman (2025) Russia’s Goals and Priorities in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict. Journal of Public Representative and Society Provision 5(1).
Kimball, D. G. (2022) Ukraine, Nuclear Weapons, and Security Assurances at a Glance. Arms Control Association.
Kloo, I., Cruickshank, I. J., and K. M. Carley (2024) A Cross-Platform Topic Analysis of the Nazi Narrative on Twitter and Telegram during the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference 18.
Lefebvre, E. (2023) Masculinity, Race, and the Rise of the White Nationalist Movement. Doctoral dissertation, University of Ottawa.
Neplii, A. (2024) A Long History of How Russia Systematically Violates Peace Agreements. United 24.
Novikov, I., and B. Hatton (2025) Zelenskyy Says Ukraine Faces a Stark Choice and Risks Losing American Support over US Peace Plan. Associated Press, 21 November 2025.
Ravid, B. (2025) Trump Peace Plan for Ukraine Includes NATO-Style Security Guarantee. Axios, 21 November 2025.
Ravid, B., and D. Lawler (2025) Trump’s Full 28-Point Ukraine-Russia Peace Plan. Axios, 20 November 2025.
Ravid, B., and D. Lawler (2025) Putin Made Maximalist Claims to Ukrainian Territory in Trump Summit. Axios, 16 August 2025.
Schreer, B. (2019) Trump, NATO and the Future of Europe’s Defence. The RUSI Journal 164(1).
Soloviova, A., and A. Fomin (2025) Ukraine and the EU: Prospects and Challenges on the Road to Integration. Acta de Historia et Politica: Saeculum XXI 9.
Stockemer, D. (2025) Is the US Moving Toward Autocracy? A Critical Assessment. Politics and Policy 53(3).
The Associated Press (2025) European Military Leaders Discuss Ukraine Peacekeeping Force. NPR, 21 March 2025.
UNIAN (2025) Poroshenko’s Decree on Non-Extension of Treaty of Friendship with Russia Officially Published.
Supplementary references added by the WMO Editorial Team
Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, 5 December 1994.
Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, 1997, terminated with effect from 1 April 2019.
Constitution of Ukraine, 1996, Article 73 on the alteration of territory and Article 156 on the procedure for constitutional amendment.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Articles 31, 34 and 46.
North Atlantic Treaty, 1949, Articles 5 and 10.
Minsk Protocol, 5 September 2014, and the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, 12 February 2015.
Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization, 49(3), 379 to 414, on the commitment problem.
Bell, C. (2008). On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Tariff Diplomacy? When Bridge Building turns into Bridge Burning
How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/
EDITORIAL NOTE *
This article assesses the trade policy of a serving government and reaches critical conclusions about it. The assessment reflects the author’s own perspective; this journal’s editorial position is neutral on contested questions of national policy. The article was written in spring 2025 and its account of current measures should be read with that date in mind.
ABSTRACT
The modern application of tariffs by the United States, once intended as a regulatory mechanism to protect domestic industries, has increasingly evolved into a coercive diplomatic tool, weaponized to influence international behaviour and policy. While historically used with mixed results, recent tariff escalations have demonstrated a destabilizing effect on both the US and the global economy, as evidenced by declining growth projections from the International Monetary Fund and retaliatory actions by major trade partners. Rather than achieving strategic policy reforms, these tariffs have often triggered cycles of protectionism, eroded trust among allies, and inadvertently incentivized adversarial nations to deepen partnerships, as seen in shifting alignments across Asia, South America, and Europe. The imposition of tariffs, particularly those lacking coherent long-term objectives, has proven to be a blunt instrument, one that disproportionately burdens domestic consumers and weakens the credibility of the United States as a stable trading partner.
KEYWORDS *
Tariffs, economic coercion, trade war, protectionism, retaliation, soft power, Smoot Hawley, sugar quotas, Cobden Chevalier Treaty, supply chains, alliances, leverage
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the United States has increasingly utilized tariffs as instruments of economic coercion, particularly under the current administration. Tariffs, typically utilized strategically to level the economic playing field on the international stage, have been broadened to unprecedented levels, leading to significant disruptions in both domestic and global trade. The International Monetary Fund reports that these trade policies have elevated US import duties to levels not seen in a century, adversely affecting global supply chains and increasing the likelihood of a US recession. The Fund projects global economic growth of only 2.8 per cent in 2025, as against an average of 3.7 per cent, while the US economy is expected to grow by only 1.8 per cent (Rugaber 2025). This use of tariffs not only strains international trade relations, but also increases costs for US consumers and businesses, as the burden of tariffs is largely borne domestically (Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal 2021).
The repercussions of these scorched-earth tariff policies extend beyond economic metrics, influencing diplomatic relations and geopolitical stability. US trade policies reach every country, and in a globalized world economy everyone is at risk when these policies endanger financial interests. Nations affected most by US tariffs have implemented retaliatory measures, leading to a cycle of protectionism that undermines international cooperation, not only in trade but in areas such as energy and security as well. For instance, China’s retaliatory tariffs on US goods, in response to the tariffs placed on that country, have escalated tensions, affecting not only bilateral trade but also global markets (Fong, Berman and Siripurapu 2025). These tensions extend to other nations in terms of shifting partnerships, as states seek to diversify and reassess their relationship with the United States as its reputation as a reliable partner wavers. Such actions have prompted concerns among economists and policymakers about the long-term implications of using tariffs as a foreign policy tool, suggesting that they may lead to a fragmented global economy marked by slower growth and chronic instability (Krueger 2025).
MAIN CORPUS
A brief history of US tariffs
Historically, tariffs have been employed by nations as mechanisms to protect domestic industries and influence international policy. In the United States, tariffs were a primary source of federal revenue from 1798 to 1913, accounting for between 50 and 90 per cent of government income over that period (Kennedy, Wolf and Downie 2025). The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which raised US tariffs on over 20,000 imported goods, aimed to protect American farmers and manufacturers during the Great Depression. However, it led to retaliatory tariffs from other countries, resulting in a significant decline in international trade and exacerbating the global downturn (Office of the Historian 2016). The prices of many goods rose, including eggs, which was and still is one of the benchmarks used by economists and, more importantly, by everyday Americans as a measure of the country’s economic health.
An example in which tariffs were largely successful was their use to protect domestic sugar production. In the 1930s, under the Jones-Costigan Act, sugar import policy shifted dramatically to favour domestic producers, setting quotas on imports and, in the 1980s, allowing additional imports but at high tariff rates (Krueger 1988). The United States had once relied on its Caribbean and Central American neighbours for most of its sugar imports, but through these controls it developed a self-sufficient domestic industry, a result which has its own shortcomings and criticisms beyond the scope of this paper.
Internationally, tariffs have also been used to exert political pressure. The Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act of 1922 increased US tariffs to protect domestic industries but inadvertently strained relations with European nations, making it more difficult for them to repay debts accrued during the First World War (Office of the Historian 2016). Similarly, in the 1980s the United States imposed tariffs on a wide variety of Japanese products to address the growing trade deficit between the two countries, though these failed to achieve their goals, as the tariffs never addressed the underlying trade relationship that US businesses and consumers had developed with Japan (Branstetter 2017). These historical instances illustrate how tariffs, while intended to protect national interests, can have unintended diplomatic consequences.
Moreover, the use of tariffs has often been a double-edged sword. While they can provide short-term protection for domestic industries, they may also invite retaliation and reduce the competitiveness of domestic products abroad. The European Union’s response to US steel and aluminium tariffs in 2018, which included tariffs on American products such as motorcycles and whiskey, exemplifies how such measures can escalate into broader trade disputes, affecting diplomatic relations and economic stability. A similar pattern has emerged with the current round of tariffs from the European Union and Canada (European Commission 2025).
Tariffs as tools for fostering cooperation
Despite their contentious nature, tariffs have occasionally been used to foster international cooperation, though it is typically the removal or reduction of tariffs that results in cooperation, the adversarial pressure of tariffs being intended to force dialogue in the first place. The Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 1860 between the United Kingdom and France is a notable example, in which both nations agreed to reduce tariffs, leading to increased trade and improved diplomatic relations. This treaty set a precedent for future trade agreements and demonstrated how mutual tariff reductions could serve as a foundation for cooperation (Timini 2022).
In the modern era, preferential trade agreements among developing countries have used tariff reductions to strengthen economic ties. The Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries, established in 1989, aims to promote trade in the Global South by offering tariff concessions among member states. This initiative has facilitated increased trade and economic collaboration among participating countries, highlighting how the easing of tariffs can enhance diplomatic relations and economic security (UN Trade and Development 2022). In another example, the European Union’s tariffs on electric vehicles made in China, intended to protect domestic manufacturers from being undersold, have recently led to negotiations between the two blocs aimed at settling on prices that allow European vehicles to compete (Blenkinsop, Martinez and Waldersee 2025).
In terms of the recent tariffs imposed by the United States, there are examples of successful leverage in bilateral negotiations addressing broader diplomatic concerns. For instance, recent meetings between US and Indonesian officials have included discussions on increased military cooperation, particularly regarding tensions in the South China Sea. This followed only weeks after China and Indonesia held their own high-profile talks. These arrangements not only affect trade but also strengthen defence and security cooperation, though it remains to be seen whether this strategy can lead to lasting guarantees. Similar examples can be seen in the Philippines and Japan, where military cooperation appears to be at the forefront of some discussions. In cases such as these, tariffs are leveraged to open doors to other concerns which may have been more challenging to engage with otherwise (Shakil 2025). These examples underscore the potential of tariffs, when used judiciously, to serve as instruments for fostering international cooperation and addressing multifaceted diplomatic objectives, though they appear to be the exception rather than the rule.
Tariffs are a gamble
The use of tariffs as a means to compel cooperation has often led to adverse outcomes. The trade war between the United States and China initiated in 2018 serves as a prominent example. The imposition of tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of goods by both nations led to increased costs for consumers and businesses, disrupted global supply chains, and failed to achieve the intended policy reforms, such as addressing intellectual property theft. The National Bureau of Economic Research found that over 90 per cent of the cost of US-imposed tariffs on China during the trade war of 2018 to 2019 was passed on to American firms and consumers, with no significant change in Chinese policy behaviour (Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal 2021).
Similarly, the US tariffs on Canadian and Mexican goods in 2025, intended to renegotiate trade terms under the United States Mexico Canada Agreement, resulted in retaliatory measures and strained diplomatic relations. These actions not only affected economic exchange but also undermined trust among US partners, highlighting the limitations of using tariffs as leverage in diplomatic negotiation as those partners pivot to others to fill the economic gaps (Putzier and Lahart 2025). It is no secret that tariffs largely fail when it comes to imposing policy change, a lesson available from the McKinley tariff of 1890, which imposed levies of roughly 50 per cent on most imports and was framed to pressure other countries into economic difficulty, with many economists of the time predicting that Canada would join the United States as a result (Brown 2025).
The weakening of US soft power has also been widely observed. Arguably one of the greatest assets of the United States is the extensive network of partnerships cultivated over the last century, and these are souring as protectionist policies push nations to diversify and divest. China has taken the opportunity to strengthen its economic relationships in Southeast Asia, where states are themselves leveraging the instability to gain concessions from China, potentially fostering stronger partnerships amid the economic burdens imposed by the United States that threaten to destabilise a regional economy heavily reliant on global trade (Ewe, Marsh and Ajengrastri 2025). As noted above, China has also pivoted towards South Korea and Indonesia in terms of military cooperation, and has been joined by Japan in applying pressure in response to the recent tariffs (Tang 2025). Additionally, Brazil engaged in joint military exercises with China for the first time during this period, indicating that trade policies pose risks to military alignments as well. Furthermore, tariffs reverberate not only at the national level but also in communities, as people in the European Union and Canada have widely boycotted US products in response, and this contributed in part to political outcomes such as the result of the Canadian election of 2025, though of course other policy factors were also at play (Harb et al. 2025).
It is important to remember that regardless of the success or failure of any one instance of bilateral relations in regard to tariffs, there is an underlying pattern in response to the instability imposed by these policies. Trade tensions initiated through tariffs are far less likely to result in successful diplomatic outcomes; rather, nations are prompted to seek economic alliances elsewhere (Tran 2025). Goodwill fostered between long-standing partners can be soured quickly, meaning that even if a beneficial resolution regarding tariffs or military cooperation comes to fruition, future partnerships might be avoided in favour of more reliable partners who do not pose such a risk. It is these unseen partnerships that never come to fruition that are most at risk. Furthermore, the broad application of tariffs without clear strategic objectives can and has led to global economic instability that hurts everyone, including the United States.
Limitations of tariffs as diplomatic instruments
While tariffs are often framed as strategic tools for leveraging diplomatic negotiations, their inherent limitations frequently undermine their utility. Unlike multilateral agreements or targeted sanctions, tariffs are typically blunt instruments that affect entire sectors indiscriminately, impacting not just the targeted nation but also domestic producers, consumers, and international supply chains. Peer-reviewed economic studies have shown that in most instances the costs of tariffs are disproportionately absorbed by the imposing nation’s own economy. Moreover, tariffs often invite retaliatory measures, entrenching adversarial dynamics and escalating trade disputes into broader diplomatic rifts. While tariffs may open diplomatic doors in some instances, evidence shows that far more doors tend to close.
Additionally, unpredictable implementation of tariff policy can erode long-term trust and stability in diplomatic relations. Because tariffs can be imposed unilaterally with little warning, they introduce volatility that deters international investment and cooperation. Countries on the receiving end often perceive tariffs not as invitations to negotiate but as coercive acts of economic warfare, which hardens their negotiating stance rather than incentivizing compromise. Furthermore, as geopolitical alignments become more multipolar, unilateral tariffs may push targeted states into closer partnerships with rival blocs, reducing the influence of the imposing state and undermining its long-term strategic goals. In sum, while tariffs may offer short-term leverage, their long-term diplomatic costs often outweigh their utility.
SUMMARY *
The article’s argument turns on a distinction that the historical material makes visible. Tariffs used as protection, with a defined domestic objective and a stable rule, have sometimes achieved what they were designed to achieve; the sugar programme is the author’s own example. Tariffs used as leverage, to compel another state to change a policy, have a markedly poorer record, and the reason is structural rather than incidental: the cost falls on the importing economy, the target retaliates in the sectors where the imposing state is politically most exposed, and the concession demanded is usually one the target’s own domestic politics will not permit. The author’s most valuable observation concerns what cannot be measured, namely the partnerships that are never formed because a state has become an unreliable counterparty, and the point that a resumption of trade does not restore the assumption of reliability on which long-term arrangements depend.
CONCLUSION
The evidence assembled here suggests that tariffs function poorly as instruments of diplomacy and reasonably well, in specific circumstances, as instruments of industrial policy. Where they have contributed to cooperation, it has generally been through their reduction rather than their imposition. Where they have been applied broadly and without clear strategic objectives, they have raised costs at home, invited retaliation abroad, and accelerated the search among partners and adversaries alike for arrangements that do not depend on the imposing state.
POTENTIAL SOLUTION *
The article’s central finding is well supported and the mechanism behind it deserves to be named, because it is the same mechanism that this journal encounters in every coercive process.
Economic coercion works, when it works at all, where the demand is specific, the relief is credible, and the target can comply without unacceptable domestic cost. Broad tariffs fail all three tests. The demand is frequently unstated or shifting, so the target does not know what compliance would consist of. The relief is not credible, because a measure imposed by executive action can be reimposed the same way, which means a concession purchases nothing durable. And the concession demanded is often precisely what the target’s own politics forbid, since retaliation is selected to hurt the imposing state’s most politically sensitive sectors and the target’s leadership acquires a stake in visible resistance. Sanctions research has established each of these points, and the tariff literature is converging on the same conclusions.
That analysis identifies what would make such measures more likely to succeed, and the conditions are demanding. A defined and achievable demand, stated publicly. A path to relief that survives a change of administration, which in practice means legislation or a treaty. Targeting narrow enough that the pain falls on those who can influence the decision rather than on the general population. And a face-saving formula, since no government concedes to an ultimatum in terms that describe it as conceding. Each of these is a mediation design question rather than an economic one, which is why this material belongs in a journal of this kind.
Two additions would strengthen the article. The rules-based alternative deserves mention, since the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization exists precisely to handle the grievances that tariffs are now used to press, and its appellate body has been inoperative since 2019 because appointments were blocked. States that would once have litigated now retaliate, and the interim arrangement adopted by a subset of members is a partial substitute. The decline of that forum is part of the explanation for the pattern the author describes. And the article’s treatment of the sugar programme as a success invites the qualification the author gestures at: it protected an industry at a cost to consumers estimated in billions annually and displaced Caribbean producers whose economies had depended on that trade, which is a reminder that protection has victims who are not represented in the domestic debate.
Finally, the article’s most original point concerns what it calls the unseen partnerships, and it is worth stating as a general proposition about reputational damage. Trust is asymmetric: it is built slowly through repeated performance and lost quickly through a single reversal, and it does not return simply because the reversal is undone. States that have been surprised once will price that possibility into every subsequent arrangement, through hedging, diversification and shorter commitments. This is the standard finding on reputation in negotiation, and it applies to states as it does to parties in any other dispute. The cost is invisible in trade statistics and it is the most consequential thing the author identifies.
* Added by the WMO Editorial Team
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Mother Nature Is A Battleground: Patterns In Conflict Over Natural Resources
The role of natural resources in driving international conflict has been a consistent feature of human history, influencing economic stability, political power, and global security. This paper examines a series of case studies involving a range of resource-related conflicts, highlighting the drivers and variables involved in disputes over various types of resources to examine conflict patterns over resource security and distribution. From disputes over the Mekong River and South China Sea, to Venezuela’s claims over Guyanese territory and oil, and exploitation of peoples and nations of the global south, these cases underscore how resources transcend national boundaries, intertwining economic necessity with geopolitical strategies. The analysis also explores the dual role of mediation, showing how cooperative frameworks like the Mekong River Commission and the Suez Canal agreement have successfully mitigated tensions, while other attempts, constrained by power imbalances or unilateral actions, have fallen short. Through these examples, the paper illustrates that the success of mediation depends on balancing incentives, addressing structural inequalities, and fostering mutual assurance among stakeholders. In most cases, protectionist policies and geopolitical rivalries overshadow altruistic cooperation, reinforcing polarization and deepening global divides. Yet, when evenly matched parties engage in dialogue, there remains potential for equitable resolutions that prioritize sustainability and shared prosperity. The findings emphasize that resolving resource-driven conflicts requires diplomatic innovation and a commitment to addressing the underlying power dynamics that shape access and control.
Keywords: Natural Resources, Trade Policy, Exploitation, Climate Change, War, Diplomacy, Water, Oil, Agriculture, China, Venezuela, Egypt, Congo, Taiwan.
Introduction: Why Fight?
Natural resources have historically been a catalyst for many international conflicts, as states compete for access to vital materials such as water, minerals, oil, and agricultural goods. The control over these resources can directly influence a nation’s economic stability, security, and political influence, making them critical drivers of both cooperation and conflict. Resources like rivers, oil, and fisheries, which often transcend borders, are particularly contentious as they are vital for sustaining economies and populations. Since the dawn of civilization, natural resources have been weaponized in conflict, such as the poisoning of wells, burning of crops, or salting the earth. This reflects how even our earliest societies understood the value of natural resources and their impact of the sustainability and strength of a nation. The same is true to this day, though now resource wars are fought not just on the battlefield (though that still remains ever present) but also fought diplomatically and politically, ever changing as power dynamic shift and aliances bend, every nation looking out for their own interest over others, as resources insecurity seemingly approaches from all directions. Imbalances in resources remain central to war aims, as nations must weigh the cost and benefit to gaining control over, access to, and loss of resources as tools of leverage over both advisories and allies alike. When these resources are scarce or unequally distributed, tensions can rise between neighboring states, leading to disputes that often require mediation to prevent an escalation to violence. Here, we will explore specific cases of conflict over different types of natural resources, what those resources mean to the nations involved, the domestic and international dynamics at play, and how mediation has succeeded or failed to resolve disputes. Success in mediation is frequently tied to the willingness of states to share and compromise, which is too often tied to power imbalances.
Conflict Over Rivers: The Case of the Mekong
Rivers fill many roles, both culturally, economically, and politically. They are often the crux of communities, where major settlements and cities grow around a major source of fresh drinking water. These waters often serve as cultural resources as well, where communities gather for events and hold historical and religious significance to the communities they sustain. Of course, rivers are major sources of food for many and act as crucial trade routes, sustaining economies on both local and regional scales. They often serve as borders as well, both internally to a nation and broader international divides, due to the naturally defensible barrier rivers create militarily. This underscores just how multi-faceted and vital rivers can be to a nation. The Mekong River is one of the largest rivers in the world and a crucial water source for several Southeast Asian countries, including China, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam; it also serves as a natural border between many of these nations. The river provides essential water for agriculture, fishing, and electricity through the use of hydroelectric dams, supporting hundreds of millions of people across the region. However, conflicts have arisen due to China’s construction of dams along the upper reaches of the Mekong, which have disrupted water flow and harmed the agricultural and fishing sectors of its southeast neighbors (Eyler 2020). China’s control over the river’s headwaters has given it significant influence over the river’s flow, heightening tensions with countries reliant on the river for survival.
Mediation has been attempted through regional organizations such as the Mekong River Commission (MRC), which includes Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, established as a result of the Mekong River Treaty, which acts as a forum for these nations to communicate and collaborate with one another over the use of the river (Jacobs 2002). The MRC also facilitates negotiations and discussions to promote sustainable river management. In some cases, mediation has successfully created temporary agreements on water sharing and dam operation schedules, reducing the immediate risk of conflict. These agreements demonstrate how regional cooperation, supported by multilateral dialogue, can mitigate tensions over shared resources. In many ways this mirrors other efforts in river use mediation, such as the Colorado River Compact in the United States (US), which involves partnerships between states in the American Southwest, First Nations tribes in the region, and even Mexico. This compact has mitigated the economic tensions between communities and legal jurisdictions as climate change threatens water security in the region, though challenges remain. Another case in successful river management can be seen in the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River, which is a framework that establishes various organizations to monitor and collaborate over the Danube River in Eastern and Central Europe, which continues to strive for equitable usage of the waters and environmental sustainability.
However, mediation over the Mekong has often fallen short of achieving long-term solutions, particularly due to the lack of involvement by China, who have routinely declined to participate in the MRC. Unlike the other examples of successful mediation over river usage, there is outsized influence over the Mekong by China which has characterized the MRC as a threat to its sovereignty over the headwaters in its territory in response to criticism over the intense construction of dams within its borders, including 11 major dams with more planned, and not counting the nearly 430 minor dams (Eyler 2020). China likely views the Mekong as a strategic bargaining chip when engaging with its junior neighbors to down river, which renders the MRC political disadvantageous from its geostrategic position (Tran 2021). The regime is overlooking the advantages gained by cooperating with its neighbors, which we will explore in the following section. China’s geographic advantage, combined with its economic and political influence, has limited the effectiveness of the MRC, and undermines the organization’s ability to enforce agreements or hold Beijing accountable for its actions.
Conflict Over Maritime Waters: The South China Sea Dispute
Maritime waters are often another source of conflict, not only in regards to food sources and marine exports, but also the intrinsic territorial claims that come with access and ownership over these coastal waters. Territorial and fishing rights in the South China Sea have long been a source of conflict, as China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and other nations compete for access to the region’s rich fishing grounds. The South China Sea is also strategically important, as it is home to significant oil and gas reserves, and vital shipping routes pass through its waters. Like rivers, marine resources are multifaceted and thus very contentious. China’s expansive claims, demarcated by their ‘nine-dash line’, has sparked disputes over fishing rights with neighboring countries (Gao and Jia 2013). The Nine-Dash Line policy was invented whole-cloth by China to give themselves dominion over the sea arbitrarily and has no international recognition or historical validity; to the contrary, it violates international law, which demarcates the ownership over international water (Darmawan 2021). Chinese fishing fleets, often supported by the country’s navy, have clashed with vessels from other nations, exacerbating tensions in an already volatile region. This tension is greatest between China and the Philippines, who have come into direct conflict over some of the many small islands and atolls that dot the sea, some of which both countries (or more) lay claim to, and would expand their respective Exclusive Economic Zones considerably (De Castro 2015). Private fishing vessels too, under the guise of this conflict, have been documented attacking rival fishing vessels and murdering fishermen from other nations to reduce competition, or in response to piracy in the region. This is not to say the other involved nations do not come into conflict with one another and share disputes, but by large, China has sought dominance over the region and has played a pivotal role in escalating the conflict. In contrast, an example of successful mediation over maritime waters includes the plethora of treaties regarding both the Gulf of Mexico and the Mediterranean, which while their resources are mired in various interests from many nations; these interests arguably more numerous and complex than that of the South China Sea, yet are shared with relative equitability and peace through dialogue and diplomatic cooperation.
Mediation efforts over the South China Sea, largely led by regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have sought to de-escalate conflicts and negotiate disputes diplomatically and equitably. The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was a major effort to create a peaceful resolution and cooperation framework. It outlined principles for behavior in the contested waters, including refraining from actions that could escalate tensions (Thao 2003). ASEAN, along with pressure from the international community, has attempted to bring the conflicting parties to the negotiating table and establish legal frameworks for resource sharing. Despite these efforts, mediation has largely failed to resolve conflict in the South China Sea, and in fact altercations has continued to escalate. China’s growing military and economic power, along with its disregard for the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, which invalidated its claims in the region, has undermined diplomatic efforts. The lack of enforcement mechanisms and China’s refusal to accept third-party rulings have left ASEAN and other mediating organs with limited influence (Kipgen 2018). As a result, fishing conflicts continue, with Chinese vessels routinely intruding into the territorial waters of neighboring countries, leading to skirmishes.
This conflict mirrors that of the Mekong previously discussed, where China has sought to leverage its outsized influence to pressure junior neighbors into policy decisions that overtly favor China. This has arguably worked towards China’s increased detriment, as many of their neighboring countries have pivoted away from China, seeing it as an existential threat to resources and economic security, and instead turned to the US, which has increasingly partnered with Southeast Asian and Indonesian countries to reaffirm its interest in the region and defend international law, routinely patrolling the South China Sea as a show of force, and supporting nations like Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan, and the Philippines economically and militarily. Indeed, the US has capitalized on these conflicts itself through its Pivot to Asia policy established during the Obama administration to further counter Chinese global influence. These countries likewise are leveraging their partnership with the US and other Western nations to push back against China’s outsized influence and bring them closer to the bargaining table (Beeson 2004).
Conflict Over Oil: Venezuela and Guyana
Oil is one of the most in-demand resources and has defined our modern world in many ways. Petroleum products are used in the creation of fuels and plastics, which are used in tens of thousands of products used in every industry around the world. The US is typically criticized for instigating oil wars, primarily in the Middle East, where it has become a hegemonic force, deploying Western-based private oil interests to secure and capitalize on the rich oil reserves in the region. Many nations have completely defined the economies of their oil resources, as seen in many Arab states. The Middle East is the typical focal point for discussion over oil conflict; other areas of the world also come into conflict over these fossil fuels, such as the Arctic, where drilling rights are often contended and environmental interests are often hotly debated. The eastern Mediterranean is often argued over by coastal nations, particularly Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel. The dispute between Venezuela and Guyana over oil-rich maritime territory in the Essequibo region has been ongoing for decades but has recently flared into a political conflict. Venezuela claims sovereignty over the region of Guyana, which has recently been discovered to have rich offshore oil reserves, while Guyana maintains its territorial integrity. The conflict intensified as oil exploration activities by oil companies heightened the stakes for both nations, leading to diplomatic tensions and military posturing. Venezuela went as far as to hold a ‘referendum’ to officially annex the territory this year, though a referendum in an authoritarian / illiberal nation is somewhat of an oxymoron. They have also engaged in military mobilizations, though like the referendum, this is simply posturing to leverage against Guyana, as no action has been taken to materialize its territorial claims (Wilkinson 2024).
Mediation efforts, primarily led by the US and regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS), have aimed to resolve the dispute peacefully. The United Nations (UN) Secretary General has appointed personal representatives to facilitate dialogue, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has been involved in assessing legal claims (ICJ 2023). One may argue that these attempts at dialogue have prevented an escalation in the conflict, but it appears more likely that security guarantees and naval exercises between Guyana and the US has been the leading deterrent for any escalation by Venezuela. This reflects the strategic control the US holds over the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico at large, as it has used its partnerships with the Bahamas and Antilles island chain nations to encircle both Venezuela and its close ally Cuba, greatly limiting their ability exert economic or military influence in the region (Plummer 2011).
The primary failure of mediation has been the inability to produce a lasting settlement that satisfies both Venezuela’s territorial claims and Guyana’s rights to oil exploration. Venezuela’s political instability and domestic crises have made sustained diplomatic engagement both difficult and easier, depending on the perspective one takes. On the one hand, the economic weakening of the authoritarian state has reduced its ability to escalate the conflict, which bodes well for the international community the US has fostered in the region to prevent such conflicts. On the other hand, one could argue that the weakening of Venezuela has pushed it into further isolation and conflict, incentivizing leadership to make increasingly rash decisions as they have “less to lose” on the international stage. Though admittedly, there is no reason to assume that Venezuela would suddenly relinquish its long-standing claims over Guyanan territory if it were in a better economic and military state. As things stand, while mediation has maintained peace, it has failed to bring about a resolution, leaving the conflict in a state of diplomatic limbo, as has more-or-less been the case for decades now.
Conflict Over Agricultural: Congo’s Rubber Atrocities
Agricultural goods come in a wide variety, typically domesticated horticultural products, which vary from nation to nation based on variables involving climate, soil conditions, and demand from local and international customers. Considerable farmland is reserved for the cultivation of these crops, with nations even incentivizing production with special tax laws, land use zoning, and subsidies designed to benefit producers. These products range from staple foods such as fruit and nuts, grains and cereals, livestock feed and spices, textile products such as cotton, and products like soy, corn syrup, palm oil, and more used in a vast array of products. Not only do these products sustain domestic populations, but serve as major exports. A major modern example of conflict involving agriculture can be seen in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While there are many overlapping drivers of this conflict, a major one is the control over the vast farmlands in eastern Ukraine, described as one of the ‘breadbaskets’ of the world, a great deal of grain exports from Ukraine sustain African and Middle Eastern countries. Blockades imposed by Russia on grain shipments in the Black Sea, combined with attacks on ports, caused a real threat of famine in many regions. A great deal of tension during the conflict has been over Black Sea grain shipments being able to leave Ukrainian ports, particularly Odessa, which has been under fire by Russia in their attempt to maintain control over the Black Sea and force concessions from Ukraine and its western partners.
Here we will focus on a much older conflict over rubber harvesting in the Congo ‘Free’ State during the late 19th and early 20th century. This is one of the most infamous examples of resource exploitation and cruelty in modern history. Under the control of King Leopold II of Belgium, the Congo was subjected to brutal labor conditions as local populations were forced to harvest rubber from the trees of the region. Millions of Congolese were enslaved, murdered, worked to death, or mutilated by the horrible regime implemented by Belgian authorities, using the indigenous Congolese to harvest rubber from their homeland (Stanard 2013). This shares some parallels with the Banana Republics that the US had installed in some Central and South American countries, where the high demand for Bananas proved so profitable that it allowed corporate and government interests to interfere with the governance of their junior neighbors and install political regimes that prioritized exports. Local communities were exploited and subjugated in order to secure production, even resulting in labor activists losing their lives at the hands of militias serving at the behest of political and commercial leaders.
The Congo Reform Association, an early international NGO, played a pivotal role in raising awareness and pressuring Belgium to reform its colonial administration. Through extensive documentation of the atrocities and ad campaigns, the association garnered widespread support for its cause (Clay 2016). Ultimately, this pressure forced the Belgian government to take control of the Congo from King Leopold in 1908, ending the worst of the abuses. While the Congo Reform Association’s efforts succeeded in ending the immediate atrocities, they failed to address the systemic exploitation and colonial oppression that persisted in the Congo. The reforms imposed by Belgium did little to improve the long-term well-being of the Congolese people, as many of those who enacted said abuse retained their positions and faced no repercussions. But it paved the way to the Congo’s independence, as part of Europe’s larger exit from Africa.
There are similarities between the Congo Reform Association’s methods and the approach many modern activist groups engage in, particularly when it comes to media engagement and high-profile endorsements from cultural icons and political leadership. For example, the Kony 2012 movement pivoted an international spotlight onto the crisis of child soldiers and human rights abuses by the Lord’s Resistance Army, ironically continuing the legacy of horrific abuse in the Congo region, force attention to a cause through outrage which the developed world may otherwise ignore (Cukic 2024). Other organizations advocate for communities that are under threat or exploited by cartels and companies in order to maintain control over major global exports, such as cocoa beans, mangos, and avocados (literal cash crops). This demonstrates the roles NGOs and private organizations can play in resolving resource-driven conflicts and how public pressure, particularly in regard to human rights abuses, can be used to resolve conflict through reputational damage.
Conflict Over Trade Routes: The Suez Crisis
Trade routes act as the circulatory system of the global economy, getting resources where they need to go, and allowing nations to capitalize on surpluses of natural resources. A threat to a trade route, such as an embargo, piracy, or conflict near a choke-point, can render a country’s natural resources economically mute if it can not deliver goods to international partners. A trade route may itself be seen as a natural, geographical resource, and nations certainly see it as such when it comes to conflict. We have seen these types of tensions rise recently in various conflicts, including the Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea, Ethiopia’s military posturing to Eritrea for port access, and Russia’s threat to Ukrainian grain shipments through the Black Sea discussed earlier, just to mention a few. The focus here is on the Suez Crisis of 1956, which provides a key example of conflict over access to one of the most vital trade routes in the world. Following WWI and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the United Kingdom (UK) administered the Suez Canal directly (Morewood 2016). After Europe’s colonial exodus from Africa, the newly independent Egyptian government gained limited control over the canal. When Egyptian President Gamal Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, a critical trade route for Europe’s oil supply, the UK, France, and Israel launched a joint military intervention to regain control. The conflict risked spiraling into a larger war, as the canal was and is of immense strategic importance for global trade.
This joint military incursion was launched against Egypt, with a handful of skirmishes leaving a few thousand dead, though it had not escalated to full-blown war just yet. Mediation efforts, led by the UN and US, were instrumental in resolving the conflict. The US pressured its allies to reverse their military intervention, even going as far as to threaten full sanctions against Israel, as they facilitated dialogue on the control and regulations of the canal. Former US President Eisenhower adamantly opposed any move that could be seen as colonial (Skardon 2010). Meanwhile, the Soviet Union supported Nasser’s position as they competed with the US for arms trade with Egypt, threatening to send troops to support Egypt which poised them as allies to the Arab world at large, as the conflict had become a symbol of Arab struggle against western occupation, particularly given the recent establishment of the modern nation of Israel, and subsequent conflicts. Ultimately, US diplomacy proved successful with the adoption of UN Resolution 997 (ES-I), which formally called for troop withdrawals, among other agreements regarding the administration and access to the Suez Canal (UN 2024). The successful mediation prevented further escalation and ensured that the canal remained open for international trade while still under Egyptian control, yet further solidified Arab and Jewish divisions, as the assault by Israel and subsequent victory by Nasser, was hailed in the Arab world as a triumph. This division opened the doors for Soviet influence in Arab countries and the Mediterranean, particularly Egypt.
Conflict Over “Unnatural” Resources: Mediation Between Taiwan and China
There is something to say about man-made, or ‘unnatural’, resources, which functionally fill the same economic roles as many natural resources. While the differentiation between “natural” and “unnatural” are ultimately arbitrary, the distinction here has some relevance as it helps us contextualize the dynamics pertaining to the resources discussed. Many man-made products are not necessarily determined by a nation’s climate or geography, but are a result of a nation (or private interest therein) adapting its industry to fulfill a need. Yet in some cases, a man-made product is more-or-less unique to the nation producing it, and thus can be thought of as a ‘natural’ byproduct of a nation’s cultural-commercial behavior and industrial investments. A prime example of this can be seen in the microchip and semiconductor industry of Taiwan, who produce the premier types of these technologies for global consumption, heavily used in artificial intelligence and computing, and even everyday products such as refrigerators and vehicles. This resource is desperately needed in China, as sanctions led by the US and European Union (EU) have kept this technology largely out of reach. This is done to stifle China’s technological growth as fears that the authoritarian regime will exploit these emerging technologies, as evident in China’s abuse of AI technology to pursue a surveillance state within its borders, as demonstrated in its use in oppressing the Uyghur peoples (Healy 2021). This blockade has strategic significance as well, as it has prevented Chinese allies from obtaining these technologies, as seen in Russia following recent conflicts. While mediation between Taiwan and China over trade, particularly in electronics and machine parts, has been a key factor in maintaining the status quo between the two nations (Chen 2009), and as has been seen, the weakening of these agreements has resulted in conflict. Taiwan has leveraged this manufacturing resource when engaging in trade agreements with China. This economic interdependence has, to some extent, moderated Chinese aggression and allowed for a complex relationship of both rivalry and cooperation, but also applies pressure to China in its retaliatory military posturing and claims of sovereignty over Taiwan.
As Taiwan seeks to diversify its trade partners, particularly with the US and Europe, tensions with China have escalated. Mediation attempts, largely through unofficial channels, have succeeded in preventing direct conflict but have failed to resolve the underlying political dispute over Taiwan’s sovereignty. Taiwan continues to strengthen its military and economic ties with the West, even building semiconductor manufacturing centers in the US (Ngo 2024). This continued pull from China risks further economic and military escalation, highlighting how economic partnerships and dependencies promote peace and how the absence of such relationships may create a vacuum for conflict. While mediation attempts have been successful in the past in establishing various trade agreements, including a free-trade relationship, as tensions have increased these agreements have been frozen or discontinued, including China exiting the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement after the election of current president of Taiwan, and pro-independence politician, Lai Ching-te in 2024 (Kang 2024). This is not to say that a nation should yield its sovereignty over its resources and products in response to military threats, but it remains important to acknowledge the response to trade policy (or any policy) by partners and adversaries alike.
What More Is There To Say?
Success in mediation, in terms of resolving conflict over natural resources, appears to largely depend on mutual assurance coupled with a balance in incentives to engage in agreements. Nations with little incentive to engage in resource sharing or those who can leverage a resource against partners rarely appear to engage in meaningful dialogue willingly. This drives junior partners to seek leverage through alliances and collective pressure. When it comes to natural resources, protectionist policies appear to outweigh sentiment for altruistic cooperation, values that all nations preach but rarely engage with when it comes to their own interests. More often than not, approaches relating to realism and securitization, usually involving military posturing, result in forced agreements. Too often, junior parties in these disputes rely on the existing superpowers, which are happy to intervene in the dispute to further their aims and reinforce hegemony against opposing world leaders, demonstrating a tendency to favor the polarization of the global community rather than seeking pathways that seek multi-polar, pluralistic collaboration (Erdmann 2024). In terms of natural resources, which are intrinsically tied to the viability of a nation, it sadly appears that parties in conflict usually default to taking advantage of the situation in the absence of incentives to pursue an equitable agreement. There are, of course, examples of entirely diplomatic resource sharing, but these appear more or less constrained to parties that hold relatively equal power between one another. Power, it seems, is always exploited.
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Ethnic Enmity: Case Studies of Ethnic Division, Escalation, and Violence
How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/
EDITORIAL NOTE *
This article surveys several contested conflicts. The historical accounts, the characterisation of the parties and the attribution of responsibility reflect the author’s own perspective; this journal’s editorial position is neutral as between the parties concerned.
ABSTRACT *
This article examines the role of race and ethnicity in international conflict and asks what distinguishes successful from unsuccessful mediation in such cases. After considering how racial and ethnic categories are constructed and how in-group preference operates, the author surveys five cases: the genocide committed against the Tutsi in Rwanda and its continuation into the Congo wars; the Bosnian war and the settlement reached at Dayton; the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds; the Israeli Palestinian conflict; and the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar, with comparative reference to India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The author’s central claim is that mediation succeeds where it establishes governing frameworks that redistribute power and allow populations to coexist under conditions of relative security, and fails where it addresses symptoms while leaving the underlying distribution of power untouched, or where one party seeks the elimination rather than the accommodation of the other.
KEYWORDS
Race, ethnicity, conflict, division, genocide, exploitation, mediation, Bosnia, Israel, Palestine, Rwanda, Myanmar
INTRODUCTION
Race and ethnicity have long been at the heart of international conflicts; from our ancient ancestors engaging in clan-based feuds to modern-day ethnic conflicts, racial divisions often lead to violence and civil unrest. These conflicts also interplay with a variety of other variables that influence conflict, such as resource distribution, cultural suppression, colonization, and economic inequality, which are collectively referred to as systemic racism (Banaji, Fiske and Massey 2021). Typically, one group is often seen as superior to another, leading to inequality and systemic oppression. Race and ethnicity are powerful social constructs that influence perceptions of who belongs and who does not, and these divisions can be weaponized by political elites to mobilize groups for power or survival. In many cases, third-party interventions, either by nations or non-governmental organisations, are necessary to mediate these conflicts, though success depends heavily on the willingness of conflicting parties to acknowledge their shared humanity and address the underlying causes of division. All too often, the resentment between ethnic divides creates frameworks of demonization of peoples; we see this all the time, even outside of war. Across the globe, there are neighbouring cultures and peoples, and in almost every situation, we find entrenched racial divisions to varying degrees. It is the work of the international community to bridge divides and prevent racism from escalating into violence. Here, we will assess cases of ethnic or racial conflicts and how mediation failed or succeeded in resolving the conflict, to see if we can identify any pattern or shared thread in regard to these issues.
MAIN CORPUS
Perceptions of race and ethnicity
Humans perceive race and ethnicity through both cultural and biological lenses. Though modern science has rejected the notion of biologically distinct races, race is instead a set of arbitrary cultural categories humans craft based on natural gradients in human phenotypes, but also informed by culture, religion, nationality, and history, both real and folk history. From a biological standpoint, human beings are remarkably similar, with genetic differences among individuals being far less significant than people tend to assume. For example, in the United States, African Americans are genetically closer to European Americans than to any single continental African population. Regardless of this fact, humans tend to divide people into folk taxonomies even though the bulk of African American populations have been present in America and engaged in gene flow with the overall population much longer than later waves of European migration to the continent (Edgar 2009). However, socially constructed ideas of race persist, as humans have a natural disposition towards forming in-groups and out-groups, and tend to unconsciously favour familiarity, possessing a tendency to be cautious of unfamiliar peoples. These behaviours are derived from instincts to maintain the survival of oneself and one’s own familial group (Lewis and Bates 2010). This is not to say these instincts or behaviours are justified; to the contrary, they are one of the root causes of conflict and violence and a leading source of human suffering. To think otherwise would be an appeal to nature, a fallacy too often employed when discussing humans and their relation to the natural world (LaBossiere 2010). For the purpose of discussion here, I will focus on the cultural forces at play and their relation to the psychological framework humans operate from when engaging in conflict and race.
Cultural perceptions of race are typically based on visible characteristics, such as skin colour or facial features, but these characteristics are given meaning through historical and social contexts. Ethnicity, by contrast, tends to be defined by shared cultural traits like language, religion, and ancestry. Both tend to overlap to varying degrees, as one’s heritage tends to inform one’s culture and to affect physical characteristics. Likewise, divisions between races often lead to increased divisions in culture due to decreased societal interaction between groups, as well as the systemic pressures typically placed on one group as compared to the privileges enjoyed by the other, which further exacerbates cultural and genetic divides (Erk and Anderson 2009; Brondolo et al. 2012). Race and ethnicity are also markers of identity and belonging, leading to the creation of in-groups and out-groups. Ethnic conflicts arise when these divisions are politicized, often by leaders seeking to consolidate power by appealing to nationalist or racial ideologies. As seen in many international conflicts, these identities can be manipulated to justify violence and exclusion, even when the underlying cultural and biological differences between groups are minimal. The perception of difference is tied to grievances and perceived threats and thus becomes the catalyst for conflict.
Conflict in Rwanda: Hutu and Tutsi
The genocide committed against the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994 is one of the most tragic examples of how racial and ethnic tensions can escalate into mass violence in recent history. Prior to contact with European peoples, the peoples of Rwanda had a social hierarchy in which the categories of Hutu and Tutsi were associated with occupation, cattle ownership and status. In practice they came to be viewed as distinct groups by many Rwandans in terms of perceived heritage (Blench 1999, 41 to 60). When Belgium administered the region from the First World War onward, this division was further exacerbated by the introduction of racial pseudo-scientific narratives describing the Tutsi as of superior descent and the Hutu as of inferior stock (Fornace 2009). While these specific myths originated with European colonisers, they attached themselves to a pre-existing hierarchical system which separated groups on the basis of background and perceived purity. The creation myths of both groups reflect these differences as well, as some accounts describe the origins of Hutu and Tutsi as brothers from a shared father, while others hold one group to have existed prior to the other, mirroring and likely influenced by the prevailing power dynamic (Vansina 1985).
Post-independence, division in Rwanda continued to deepen as political leaders sought to capitalize on the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi. By the 1990s, the Hutu-dominated government began a campaign of propaganda that dehumanized the Tutsi, describing them as cockroaches to be eradicated. After the assassination of Burundian President Ndadaye, mass violence took place in Burundi, a chilling foreshadowing of what was to come. Months later, the aeroplane carrying Rwandan President Habyarimana and the new president of Burundi, Ntaryamira, was shot down, though responsibility for the attack remains disputed to this day. What had happened in Burundi then began in neighbouring Rwanda (Stanton 2004). Despite several international efforts at mediation, including the presence of UN peacekeepers, the genocide unfolded with horrifying speed, resulting in the deaths of an estimated 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu within the span of 100 days (Maron 2019). Mediation attempts failed due to several factors, including the lack of international political will to intervene decisively and the slow response of the UN to recognize the scale of the atrocities. Additionally, the deep-seated hatred cultivated between the groups made peaceful negotiation nearly impossible. Mediation failed because the political and military forces driving the genocide were uninterested in compromise; they sought total elimination of the Tutsi population (Caplan 2012, 446 to 475). Indeed, as Hutu combatants and civilians fled into Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo, armed elements of the former government mounted incursions across the border. This is an example of when diplomacy is virtually impossible, as the international community showed no will to intervene militarily, and in an already impoverished country overcome by internal conflict, economic sanctions would have been of little consequence. There was no leverage to push against the atrocities, as the conflict devolved into total war between the government forces and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which defeated the government during the civil war in the midst of the genocide.
The Rwandan Patriotic Front took control of Rwanda and drove out the forces responsible for the genocide. Large numbers of Hutu civilians fled into the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These events were among the catalysts for the First and Second Congo Wars. Today, the Rwandan government has been reported by United Nations expert groups to support M23, an armed group operating in eastern Congo, a charge the government denies. Prior to the genocide, the Arusha Accords were signed between the competing political factions in Rwanda, intended to mediate tensions before violence erupted (Beloff and Lakin 2019). These accords failed spectacularly, as the power-sharing stipulations only heightened tensions between the signatories, and without enforcement mechanisms they were quickly abandoned. The accords sought to treat the symptoms of a fatal illness that permeated Rwandan politics and culture. The entrenchment of generalized sentiment between the respective out-groups had become ingrained. This demonstrates the capacity for humans to demonize groups over which they hold political power, escalating to violence and the destruction of minority communities when the minority group is framed as a threat to the in-group. This perceived threat need not be violent; it can be economic, cultural, or even genetic, as racial purity is typically emphasized during such conflicts.
Conflict in the Balkans: Serbs and Bosniaks
The Bosnian genocide, part of the broader Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, exemplifies how ethnic tensions can escalate into mass atrocities when exacerbated by nationalist fervour and state-sponsored violence. Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serb nationalist forces sought to create a Greater Serbia by eliminating or expelling Bosniak Muslims and Croat populations from Bosnian territory (Blagojevic 2009). This process, known as ethnic cleansing, was rooted in historical grievances between the various ethnic groups, particularly the portrayal of Bosniaks as foreign because of their Muslim identity. This is made all the more terrible in view of the mass killing of Serbs during the Second World War. To clarify, Bosniak refers to the ethnic group, while Bosnian more generally refers to all people living in the country of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
International mediation was attempted during the conflict, most notably through the Dayton Accords, brokered by the United States in 1995. The accords succeeded in ending the large-scale violence by creating a power-sharing arrangement between the warring ethnic groups, effectively dividing Bosnia into two entities: one controlled by Bosnian Serbs and the other a federation of Bosniaks and Croats, together forming the modern state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Belloni 2001; U.S. Department of State Archive 2001). While the Dayton Accords succeeded in stopping the war, they have been criticized for failing to resolve the deeper ethnic tensions, as the agreement essentially froze the conflict rather than creating a pathway for long-term reconciliation. Despite the success of mediation in halting the violence, the structural divisions imposed by Dayton institutionalized ethnic divisions territorially and governmentally rather than fostering integration and cooperation. These criticisms may, to invert a phrase, be missing the trees for the forest. While it would be preferable to eradicate racism and have people live in harmony, in practice one cannot make someone suddenly love a person who may be responsible for killing their family, and vice versa. What the Dayton Accords accomplished was focusing on the immediate needs of the people in the context of realities on the ground instead of aspirations. The result is a multicultural state that is politically stable, has recovered economically, and has provided the breathing room for these once-warring groups to integrate gradually on their own terms and at their own pace. The guardrails erected by the accords established a framework for Serbs and Bosniaks to see each other more as an in-group than as separate out-groups, though of course they remain distinct ethnicities, reducing tension and the potential for conflict (Clarke-Habibi 2005).
This is not to say things are perfect, but while regional and foreign influences continue to disrupt the Balkans, as is the legacy of the region given the historical borders between Europe and the Ottomans and the subsequent collapse of Yugoslavia, it has proven a bridge between these groups. In some ways it is reminiscent of Czechoslovakia, a multicultural state divided between Czechs and Slovaks, which maintained cultural and political cohesion under Communist rule. Yet after the collapse of that regime, ethnic divisions began to grow as the distinct groups vied for political influence. Instead of allowing this to escalate into violent conflict, the country peacefully split into two states which now better represent the interests of their respective populations without the threat of one subjugating the other. This has similarities to the dissolution of the union of Serbia and Montenegro, which was also a relatively peaceful and gradual process. In contrast, Kosovo, which had a majority Albanian population, went through war before obtaining independence, as Serbia saw it as a strategic threat by an out-group (Macek-Macková 2011). Whether Bosnia and Herzegovina takes the same trajectory and formally splits remains to be seen, as a rise in nationalism, promoted in part by neighbouring Serbia, has prompted cultural and political unrest. But as of now, this appears unlikely.
Outside the Balkans, we are reminded of how ethnic tensions between India and its Sikh population have been managed, a case of both success and major failure. Sikh nationalists have sought, and some still seek, their own sovereign nation in north-western India, which they call Khalistan. In order to provide Sikhs with political power and influence without dividing the nation, Sikhs held a prominent role in the military, which provided cultural and political assurance. This arrangement was a carryover from British rule in India, when Sikhs were recruited in disproportionate numbers into the colonial army, a sadly ironic parallel to their treatment by later Indian governments. Obviously, this system was not perfect, as demonstrated by the conflict between the Indian state and Punjab insurgents in the 1980s and 1990s, the subsequent assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and the retaliatory violence targeting Sikh communities. To this day, these tensions have affected India’s diplomatic relations, as Canadian authorities alleged Indian involvement in the killing of a Sikh separatist leader in Canada in 2023, and further allegations followed in the United States, leading Canada to expel Indian diplomats (Biswas 2024). Regardless of these tensions, Sikhs remain prominent in the Indian military, and while calls for separatism are still present, the movement is largely peaceful, with much political support going to Sikh politicians associated with the Khalistan cause (Takkar 2024).
Conflict in Turkey: Turks and Kurds
The conflict between Turkey and the Kurdish people has its roots in the Kurdish struggle for autonomy and recognition. After the First World War, the Ottoman Empire was partitioned by the Allied powers, and the Treaty of Sèvres envisaged Kurdish autonomy. That provision was never implemented, and the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 established the Turkish republic without it. Since then, the Kurds have been a stateless people, the regions they inhabit split across Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. In Turkey, the government’s refusal to recognize Kurdish identity and grant political and cultural rights led to decades of conflict, with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party engaging in armed struggle against the Turkish state. The Turkish government’s portrayal of Kurds as a separatist threat has exacerbated tensions, often leading to harsh crackdowns on Kurdish communities. Turkey has also conducted military operations in northern Syria in areas under Kurdish control. This conflict has been compared to the historical tensions between the Ottoman state and the Armenians, particularly in the context of the destruction of the Armenian population from 1915, when Ottoman authorities killed and deported the Armenian population of Anatolia. Just as Armenians were portrayed as a threat to Turkish national identity, Kurds have been marginalized and vilified in a similar way (Kasbarian and Öktem 2014).
Mediation attempts have been inconsistent and largely unsuccessful, as Turkey has refused to recognize the PKK as a legitimate representative of Kurdish interests, framing the conflict as one of terrorism rather than ethnic self-defence. While the European Union has pressured Turkey to grant more rights to Kurds as part of its accession process, these attempts have met resistance from Turkish nationalists. The failure of mediation stems from the deep mistrust between the Turkish government and Kurdish groups, as well as the reluctance of the Turkish state to acknowledge the legitimacy of Kurdish demands for autonomy. In the absence of mediation, the United States and its allies have militarily supported Kurdish forces in Syria and Iraq, arguably taking advantage of their position to create geostrategic leverage, given the Kurdish hold of territory between four states, and as part of broader Middle East policy (Hama 2020). This has been to the Kurds’ benefit, as they have consolidated military and economic power in the region and are able to defend and advocate for themselves, achieving many of the attributes of statehood aside from international recognition. This demonstrates how victimized groups can be supported to defend themselves and how this can be used to apply pressure to out-groups who are then obliged to engage with them rather than seek to eliminate them, as happened with the Armenians.
Conflict in Israel: Israelis and Palestinians
The conflict between Israel and Palestine is one of the most enduring and complex ethnic and national conflicts in modern history. Though the region’s contested history extends over many centuries, involving numerous invasions and successive regimes, we will focus here on the modern conflict rooted in the establishment of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent displacement of Palestinians. This conflict has been fuelled by competing national identities and religious claims to the land. Over the decades, divisions between Jewish Israelis and Arab Palestinians have deepened, with both sides portraying the other as an existential threat to their survival. Numerous mediation efforts have been attempted, most notably the Oslo Accords of the 1990s, which sought to create a framework for peace by establishing the Palestinian Authority and laying the groundwork for a two-state solution. While the accords were initially hailed as a breakthrough, they ultimately failed to resolve the core issues, such as the status of Jerusalem, the right of return for Palestinian refugees, and the continued expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank (Alkidwa 2019). The Abraham Accords later sought to normalise relations between Israel and several Arab states, and while mentioning aspirations for peace and Palestinian sovereignty, no concrete commitments followed. Given the escalation of the conflict since 2023 and the scale of civilian casualties, these accords leave the Palestinian question without a clear resolution (Goldstein 2022).
The two-state solution sought by most in the international community mirrors the arrangement in Bosnia and Herzegovina at first glance, but I argue that the strict division of the two into distinct nations removes most incentives for Israel and Palestine to find investments in one another, and may in fact incentivize conflict as the two nationally distinct populations compete for influence and space in the region. The two remain perpetually out-groups to one another with little room for the unification of identities, as can be gradually seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mediation in the Israeli Palestinian conflict has been hampered by the unequal balance of power between the two sides. While third parties, including the United States and the United Nations, have played roles in facilitating dialogue, they have been unable to compel either side to make the compromises necessary for lasting peace. As in the other examples, both sides portray each other as existential threats, the same zero-sum sentiment seen time and again. The phrase from the river to the sea has been used by some Palestinian groups and is widely understood by Israelis as denying Israel’s existence; formulations invoking Israeli sovereignty over the same territory have also been used by Israeli political figures.
Conflict in Myanmar: Buddhists and Rohingya
The conflict between Buddhists and Muslims in Myanmar, particularly the persecution of the Rohingya Muslim minority, has escalated into one of the worst and most underreported humanitarian crises of the 21st century. Tensions between the majority Buddhist population and the Rohingya have long existed, but they intensified following decades of discrimination and denial of citizenship to the Rohingya. The Myanmar military, along with extremist Buddhist nationalists, has portrayed the Rohingya as outsiders and a threat to national culture and security, leading to widespread violence, displacement, and findings of ethnic cleansing and genocidal intent by United Nations bodies (Zarni and Cowley 2014). This parallels the Islamophobia seen across the globe and demonstrates that no religious tradition, even one like Buddhism with a stereotypically peaceful perception in Western culture, prevents its followers from succumbing to prejudice and extremism. The same can be seen in Hinduism, another tradition stereotypically seen as peaceful, which has extremist factions (Malji 2020). It is a mistake to think that a particular religious framework can somehow reduce conflict; assuming otherwise often promotes sentiments of religious supremacy, which ironically lends itself to conflict. As in the other examples discussed, this conflict too is deeply rooted in ethnic and religious divisions, with the Rohingya portrayed as both ethnically and religiously inferior to the Buddhist majority. Human rights organizations have documented extensive abuses, including mass killings, sexual violence, confinement in camps, and the displacement of over a million Rohingya to refugee camps in Bangladesh (Human Rights Watch 2020). In some ways this recalls China’s internment of Uyghur Muslims, the removal of Islamic religious and cultural practice from communities in Xinjiang, and reported practices of sexual violence and forced sterilisation (Associated Press 2020). These cases may demonstrate a larger pattern of growing Islamophobia in Asia.
The rise of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, a militant group formed in response to the persecution of the Rohingya, further escalated tensions, as the Myanmar government used the presence of armed resistance to justify its military crackdown. The military coup and ongoing civil war have allowed the group to establish itself within the conflict. Its reach has extended into Bangladesh, which itself has a history of ethnic conflict between the Muslim majority and various minority groups (Siddiqui 2024). Following recent upheaval in Bangladesh, targeted violence against non-Muslims, particularly Hindu civilians, has been reported. The group has operated within Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh at the border with Myanmar to recruit and extort the displaced people there (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024; Amnesty International 2018). There is some overlap between this and the ethnic conflicts of the nearby Assam region of India, where migration has stirred concern among smaller ethnic communities who fear cultural replacement (Krusch 2024). This further demonstrates how the ostracization of a group often leads to reprisals of violence not only against perceived perpetrators but against civilians who may be ethnically or religiously associated with them.
International mediation efforts have been largely unsuccessful, despite involvement by the United Nations and pressure from countries such as the United States, India, and China, which of course have geostrategic interests in the region. The Myanmar government’s refusal to acknowledge the Rohingya as citizens or grant them basic rights has made mediation difficult. Moreover, the ongoing civil war has further complicated the situation, as the military remains deeply entrenched in the political system and resistant to outside influence. Like Turkey and many other states, actors push to consolidate national identity around ethnic uniformity instead of expanding their idea of national identity to include marginalized communities. In Sri Lanka, similar patterns can be observed, where Tamil minority communities have been marginalised following the civil war against the Sinhalese majority, and where Muslim communities have also been the target of discrimination and violence (Kursch 2024). As things stand in Myanmar, the ongoing civil war has taken up all available attention, and perhaps understandably, as no realistic resolution to the oppression of the Rohingya can be achieved until the conflict between the parties responsible for governance is settled.
SUMMARY *
The comparison the article draws produces a finding that runs against a good deal of contemporary practice. Where a settlement acknowledged group identity and built institutions around it, as at Dayton, large scale violence ended and has not resumed for three decades; where a settlement assumed that identities could be set aside in favour of shared institutions, as at Arusha, it collapsed within months. The author’s explanation is that people who have recently been at war do not first reconcile and then coexist but coexist first, under guarantees they trust, and reconcile slowly or not at all. From this follows the article’s most contested claim, namely that partition into separate states may entrench hostility rather than resolve it, since two sovereign entities have no shared institutions in which any common identity might eventually form.
CONCLUSION
Demonstrated here is a pattern in which the ostracization of one group by another routinely leads towards violence, as dominant ethnic or racial groups attempt to expel or destroy a minority group in response to instability, whether economic or political. This often leads to the radicalization of the oppressed group, which results both in acts of political defiance and self-defence and in acts of terrorism and extremism, which in turn retroactively appear to justify the persecutor’s sentiment and validate extremist factions, bringing that sentiment further into the mainstream and perpetuating the cycle of hatred and violence. Given the human tendency to divide one another into groups on cultural, religious, linguistic, and racial grounds, coupled with behaviours that prioritize perceived in-groups, concrete measures must be taken in order to prevent ethnic conflict beyond aspirations for peace and unity. Not even the experience of genocide prevents a victimized group from committing atrocities in turn, and it may be observed that victimization can give groups a disposition towards escalatory behaviour, as inherited trauma may make them prone to heightened protectionism and entrenched grievance.
As shown, there is evidence that the establishment of equitable governing frameworks can help alleviate the power imbalance between groups while reducing perceived threats, as populations are allowed to acclimatize to other cultures and peoples in an environment of relative peace and mutual benefit. The precursors to ethnic and racial violence are usually clear, yet preventative measures are rarely taken, in order to maintain dominance in government, as leverage against a minority group, or as political gamesmanship. Incentives must be placed upon states that subject peoples to inequitable treatment, which not only pose threats to their respective domestic stability but, as shown, routinely spill over into neighbouring states as prejudice crosses cultural and national borders. Rarely will these states engage in such mediation domestically, as too often politicians benefit from such divisions, capitalizing on them for short-term political gain. The international community must encourage these arrangements of power-sharing through diplomatic means, although this is easier said than done, as no multicultural state is entirely innocent when it comes to the equitable treatment of minority populations. Hopefully, as the world becomes more aware of the systemic challenges to multiculturalism, and as the value of pluralism becomes more widely recognised, these issues will be engaged with more seriously, resulting in meaningful change.
POTENTIAL SOLUTION *
The comparison between Arusha and Dayton is the most productive element here and it repays a closer look, because the difference between them is not principally about how each treated identity.
Arusha was signed by parties still contesting power, with a peacekeeping force whose mandate did not permit it to enforce anything, and with the extremist faction that would carry out the genocide excluded from and opposed to the agreement. Dayton was signed after a change in the military balance, after months of intensive great power engagement, and it arrived with sixty thousand troops under a mandate to use force, a High Representative with authority to impose legislation, and the sustained commitment of the states that had brokered it. The lesson most reliably supported by the pair is therefore about implementation: agreements survive where the guarantor can and will act on breach, and collapse where it cannot. Institutional design matters, and it matters less than whether anyone stands behind the design.
That said, the article’s substantive point about consociational arrangements has considerable support in the literature and deserves stating carefully. Power sharing does reduce the immediate risk of renewed war, and it does tend to entrench the categories it recognises, so that voting, appointment and public employment run along ethnic lines and politicians have a standing incentive to keep them salient. Bosnia illustrates both halves: three decades without war, and a political system in which nationalist parties are structurally advantaged and citizens who decline to declare an affiliation are excluded from the highest offices, a position the European Court of Human Rights found discriminatory in Sejdić and Finci. The design question is therefore not whether to recognise identity but whether to build in a route out, through sunset provisions, review mechanisms and electoral rules that reward cross group appeal, and Northern Ireland’s arrangements provide a comparison worth studying alongside Bosnia’s.
On the Israeli Palestinian case, the article’s argument that separation removes the incentive to invest in one another is a real position in the debate and it has a counterargument the article does not address. Consociational arrangements presuppose that both communities accept a shared state; where neither does, and where one community would be a demographic majority in it, the proposal is understood by the other as a demand for its dissolution. That is why the single state options canvassed in the literature divide sharply between one with equal rights and one without, and why confederal models, two states with shared institutions, open movement and joint arrangements in Jerusalem, have attracted attention as an attempt to hold both the article’s insight and the parties’ insistence on self determination. Naming that literature strengthens the argument considerably.
Two further points bear on the article’s practical conclusion. Its recommendation that the international community impose power sharing arrangements runs against everything the record shows about ownership: imposed constitutions are implemented reluctantly, litigated endlessly and abandoned when the guarantor’s attention moves, and the leverage available in practice is conditionality, accession processes and the withholding of legitimacy rather than imposition. And the article’s opening claim that in-group preference is a natural disposition, which it rightly declines to treat as a justification, has an evidential corollary worth adding: the categories that matter vary enormously across societies and change within a generation, which means the disposition to form groups is far less informative than the political work that determines which line becomes the one that matters. It is that work, and not human nature, that the measures the author recommends are actually aimed at.
* Added by the WMO Editorial Team
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Supplementary references added by the WMO Editorial Team
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