How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/
EDITORIAL NOTE *
This article concerns a live dispute between three states and sets out the positions of each. The projection cited for possible losses of agricultural land in Egypt derives from modelling studies whose results vary widely according to the assumptions made about the rate of filling and about hydrological conditions, and it should be read as one estimate among several rather than as an established finding.
ABSTRACT *
This article examines the dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as a case in the reconciliation of sovereign development rights with downstream water security. It traces the origins of the conflict to the colonial-era agreements of 1902, 1929 and 1959, which allocated the waters of the Nile between Egypt and Sudan while excluding the upstream states from which most of the flow originates, and it sets out the resulting asymmetry between geographic and political power in the basin. The positions of the three principal parties are then examined in turn: Ethiopia’s framing of the dam as an exercise of sovereignty and a route out of energy poverty, Egypt’s treatment of any reduction in flow as an existential and therefore securitised question, and Sudan’s position between the two. The article assesses the institutional record, including the Nile Basin Initiative, the Cooperative Framework Agreement that entered into force in 2024 without Egyptian or Sudanese ratification, and the limits of the Watercourses Convention of 1997, before considering the involvement of the African Union, external powers, and the Gulf states. It closes by proposing data sharing as a sovereignty trade-off, cooperative sovereignty as an alternative to zero-sum framing, deliberately constructed interdependence, and legal innovations that convert general principles into measurable commitments.
KEYWORDS *
Nile Basin, Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, hydro-hegemony, water sovereignty, transboundary governance, Cooperative Framework Agreement, benefit sharing, data sharing, securitisation, African Union, Watercourses Convention, cooperative sovereignty
INTRODUCTION
The Nile Basin and hydro-politics
The Nile River, stretching over 6,600 kilometres and spanning 11 countries, is the world’s longest river and one of the most politically contested transboundary water systems, sustaining hundreds of millions of people. Egypt, the most downstream and most dependent state, has historically dominated hydro-politics in the basin by invoking historic rights secured through the colonial 1929 and 1959 Nile Waters Agreements, which allocated most of the water to Egypt and Sudan while excluding upstream countries from negotiations. This created downstream dominance and allowed Egypt to veto upstream developments. Geographical imbalances, where upstream nations control most of the sources yet lack the means or political freedom to fully develop them, have shaped the basin’s politics. Today, rapid population growth, climate variability, and demands for socio-economic development have transformed the Nile Basin into a contested geopolitical space where interdependence and political competition are intertwined.
Water sovereignty and resource competition
Water sovereignty refers to the rights of states to control the use and distribution of river resources within their territories without external interference, but in shared hydrological systems, this often leads to cross-border impacts. For upstream states like Ethiopia, the ability to harness water resources within their borders is framed as an exercise of sovereign rights to fuel domestic development and address energy shortages. This challenges the historical water sharing in which dominant downstream countries overrode the principle of equitable allocation by prioritising their own stability and growth while constraining the development of less powerful upstream neighbours. As such, historical rights bring bias to sovereignty claims.
Resource competition intensifies under scarcity, as seen in the Nile Basin, where Egypt obtains over 97 per cent of its renewable water externally and views any reduction in flow as a threat to food security, health, and economic stability. Ethiopia, conversely, highlights its developmental needs and historical marginalisation from Nile usage despite being the river’s primary source. This dynamic institutionalises competition, framing water allocation as a zero-sum game where upstream gains are seen as downstream losses. Globally, such competition is exacerbated by population growth, climate change, and scarcity, serving not only as an environmental constraint but also as a political catalyst for asserting sovereign control.
The dam and the politics of power
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, initiated by Ethiopia in 2011 after decades of planning, represents a shift in Nile Basin power dynamics. Positioned on the Blue Nile near Sudan’s border and designed to generate over 6,000 MW, it aims to alleviate Ethiopia’s energy poverty and drive economic growth while uniting the country behind a monumental national project. Its unilateral construction, without a binding water-sharing agreement, challenges Egypt’s historical hydro-hegemony and asserts upstream sovereignty, escalating tensions with both Egypt and Sudan. For Ethiopia, the dam symbolises sovereignty and long-denied development rights, while for Egypt, it presents a direct challenge to its dominance over Nile waters.
Negotiations and mediations have so far yielded no binding resolution, and Ethiopia inaugurated the dam on 9 September 2025, with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed declaring that Ethiopia built the dam to prosper, to electrify the entire region and to change the history of black people, that it is absolutely not to harm its brothers, and that the dam will improve access to electricity for almost half the population, which had no electricity as recently as 2022, and export the surplus to the region.
The staged filling of the reservoir, initially anticipated to take four to seven years depending on hydrological conditions, raises fears of reduced downstream flows, with potential consequences for agriculture, hydropower generation, and domestic consumption. Projections for the filling period indicate potential downstream water deficits for Egypt, including substantial losses of agricultural land. Such impacts make the dam a focal point of regional power politics, with Egypt even signalling military options, underscoring how entrenched sovereignty and security perceptions keep both sides in uncompromising positions.
The problem
The dispute clarifies a broader international dilemma in shared river basins: how to reconcile the upstream state’s sovereign right to develop with the downstream states’ rights to maintain the required water access, and the need for cooperative transboundary governance. Ethiopia positions the dam as an act of legitimate sovereign development and poverty reduction, while Egypt and Sudan view it through the lens of hydro-security risks. The Nile Basin’s historical agreements ignore the realities of modern demographic expansion and climate change and fail to establish an inclusive, equitable governance mechanism acceptable to all riparian states. This creates a legal and political vacuum, making disputes almost inevitable. Efforts to resolve the dispute illustrate the challenges of reconciling unilateral development ambitions with collective basin-wide management. Initiatives such as the Nile Basin Initiative have created forums for technical dialogue and attracted significant international support, yet have not produced binding agreements on contentious issues. Trilateral negotiations, aided by mediators such as the African Union, the United States, and the World Bank, have repeatedly stalled over legal frameworks for dispute settlement, environmental mitigation, and drought management. The enduring challenge remains whether new frameworks can transcend entrenched sovereignty disputes and foster sustainable, cooperative governance.
Analytical lens
This paper applies a multi-dimensional analytical lens combining insights from international relations theory, hydro-hegemony, and conflict transformation to examine the geopolitics of the dam. Drawing from realist and institutional perspectives, it interprets the actions of Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan as expressions of sovereignty, security, and national interest within an asymmetrical regional power structure. The concept of hydro-hegemony is used to explain how control over water, narratives, and institutional leverage shape negotiation dynamics, while the conflict transformation framework highlights pathways through which cooperation, trust-building, and shared governance can reorient the dispute from confrontation to interdependence. Collectively, these perspectives provide an integrated understanding of how power, identity, and institutional innovation interact in the Nile Basin, offering insights into how the dam can evolve from a symbol of competition into a catalyst for regional resilience and cooperative sovereignty.
MAIN CORPUS
Historical roots of Nile sovereignty challenges: colonial treaties and historic rights
The foundations of modern Nile sovereignty disputes are rooted in colonial-era treaties that privileged downstream states, particularly Egypt. The first treaty, signed in 1902 between Great Britain and Ethiopia, primarily to establish the borders between Ethiopia and the Sudan, restricted Ethiopia from constructing works on the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat without British consent. In its terms, the Emperor Menelek II engaged himself towards the Government of His Britannic Majesty not to construct or allow to be constructed any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tsana or the Sobat, which would arrest the flow of their waters into the Nile except in agreement with His Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Government of the Sudan.
The 1929 treaty, negotiated between Britain on behalf of its East African colonies and Egypt, formally recognised Egypt’s historical and natural rights to the Nile and granted it veto power over upstream water projects. This treaty allocated 48 BCM of Nile water to Egypt and 4 BCM to Sudan. The 1959 treaty between Egypt and Sudan went further, expanding Egypt’s share to 55.5 BCM and Sudan’s to 18.5 BCM, accounting for the full measurable river flow, excluding any share for upstream states such as Ethiopia. Egypt and Sudan have long defended these arrangements as the basis of their historic or acquired rights to water, while Ethiopia disputes their legitimacy, arguing that the treaties ignored the fact that over 80 per cent of the Nile’s flow originates in its highlands, a case of sovereignty. All these instruments effectively marginalised upstream riparian states, whose interests were neither represented nor protected. This absence of upstream representation fostered a profound legacy of disagreement over the relevance and fairness of the treaties that still shape basin politics today and remains central to negotiations over the development and operations of the dam.
Upstream and downstream asymmetry of power
The Nile dispute is characterised by a long-time power imbalance between downstream states and upstream states. Based on its almost total reliance on the river, Egypt has long exerted disproportionate hydro-political influence in the basin due to strategic, economic, and geopolitical advantages, leveraging superior military strength, diplomatic alliances, and financial resources to deter upstream developments. This dominance allowed Egypt to enforce its preferred allocation regime, while upstream countries like Ethiopia, though the primary water sources, were constrained by limited technological capacity, external pressures, and economic instability, leaving their water potential largely unrealised. This asymmetry preserved Egypt’s legal and infrastructural control for decades, fuelled perceptions of inequity, and shaped negotiation dynamics, ultimately prompting Ethiopia to counterbalance by developing the dam.
Postcolonial sovereignty struggles and political realignment
The wave of African independence in the 1950s to 1970s brought new sovereign actors into Nile Basin politics. Many upstream states rejected colonial-era treaties as illegitimate impositions that disregarded their territorial rights. Ethiopia maintains that the dam, located entirely within its borders, is within its sovereign rights and that fears of downstream harm are politically driven. Upstream countries advanced the Cooperative Framework Agreement under the Nile Basin Initiative, while Egypt has viewed any change to existing allocations as a threat to national security. Political crises have triggered temporary realignments, with upstream states increasingly cooperating to counterbalance Egyptian and Sudanese dominance. This realignment underscores the broader contest between historic rights and equitable use, causing recurring tensions as downstream states perceive these actions as direct threats to water security and agricultural livelihoods.
Nile Basin Initiative and Cooperative Framework Agreement
The Nile Basin Initiative, established in 1999, was a donor-backed transitional platform for nine riparian states, later ten after South Sudan’s independence in 2011, to foster cooperative dialogue, joint projects, and capacity building while negotiating a permanent legal framework. Its creation was a decisive departure from the fragmented ad hoc institutional arrangements that had previously governed Nile relations. The transitional mandate led to the drafting of the Cooperative Framework Agreement, which set legal principles such as equitable utilisation, prevention of significant harm, data sharing, and joint environmental measures, with plans to establish a Nile River Basin Commission. While upstream states saw the Agreement as recognition of their rights to use Nile waters, downstream states resisted provisions that could alter historical flow allocations. It entered into force on 13 October 2024, after ratification by six states: Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and South Sudan, though Egypt and Sudan withheld ratification due to unresolved disputes. Its implementation will see the Nile River Basin Commission replace the Initiative as a permanent governing body with legally binding authority, signalling a shift in power dynamics towards greater recognition of upstream states’ development rights, yet the absence of Egypt and Sudan highlights enduring sovereignty challenges and the limitations of institutional frameworks without comprehensive political consensus.
Limits of international water law
The 1997 UN International Watercourses Convention promotes equitable and reasonable utilisation while preventing significant harm, reaffirming in Article 10 that no use of an international watercourse enjoys inherent priority, and encouraging conflict resolution through Articles 5 to 7. Its application to the Nile highlights limitations: broad principles allow divergent state interpretations, Egypt stressing harm prevention, Ethiopia advocating equitable use, while weak enforcement leaves compliance reliant on goodwill. Articles 9 to 15 mandate data sharing, prior notification, and consultation, but lack binding authority to halt unilateral projects, fostering mistrust due to unclear data requirements and an inadequate six-month response window for complex projects. Dispute resolution is voluntary, enabling indefinite delays, and in the Nile’s context of entrenched sovereignty claims and power asymmetries, the Convention remains a reference framework rather than a decisive authority, leaving political negotiation as the primary means of managing conflicts.
The dam and national sovereignty: strategic and symbolic value
Since its inception in 2011, Ethiopia has framed the dam as a hydropower project, a tangible economic asset and a manifestation of geopolitical rebalancing in favour of upstream states. Thus it is a strategic symbol of a new Nile governance order. The Ethiopian government has presented it as the first Nile infrastructure designed to deliver mega benefits not only to Ethiopia’s journey for industrialisation and socio-economic transformation, but also beyond national borders. The dam’s position on the Blue Nile, Ethiopia’s most significant watercourse and Egypt’s primary freshwater source, gives it unmatched geopolitical leverage. Symbolically, it embodies Ethiopia’s refusal to accept colonial-era treaties and its determination to forge sovereign development pathways. The dam is indeed seen as a transformative regional asset, promising shared benefits to Sudan and Egypt while redefining power relations in the entire basin. This dual narrative of development and strategic repositioning underlines the dam’s centrality to Ethiopia’s national identity and foreign policy.
Strategically, it is Africa’s largest hydroelectric dam, with an anticipated capacity exceeding 6,000 MW, capable of transforming Ethiopia into a regional energy hub. Beyond its technical dimensions, it functions as a geopolitical lever, redefining the power distribution among Nile Basin states. Symbolically, it embodies a narrative of sovereignty in funding massive infrastructure projects, with the dam financed largely without foreign aid and driven by national contributions from citizens. This makes it a rallying point for Ethiopian unity, transcending political divides in the face of perceived external pressure. For the Ethiopian government, it is also a political tool to consolidate legitimacy domestically while asserting sovereignty internationally.
Egypt: existential dependence and security dilemma
Egypt’s perception of the dam is rooted in existential dependence on the Nile, which provides over 95 per cent of its freshwater supply. Historical allocations, particularly the 1929 and 1959 agreements, are central to Egypt’s claim of historic rights and its insistence on a downstream veto. From Egypt’s standpoint, any upstream control over the Blue Nile directly threatens national survival. Egypt’s concerns focus on the dam’s filling schedule, which it fears could significantly reduce downstream flow during drought years, threatening agriculture, energy production at the Aswan High Dam, and urban water supply. Despite Ethiopia’s assurances, the prospect that the dam could alter seasonal flows feeds Egyptian fears of strategic vulnerability.
This extreme dependency has translated into a foreign policy doctrine that defines Nile water access as a national security red line, one for which Egyptian leaders, such as the former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, have historically signalled a willingness to go to war. This dependence fosters a persistent security dilemma, whereby Ethiopia’s hydroelectric ambitions are interpreted as pre-emptive threats. Egypt has securitised the dam in both domestic and diplomatic discourse, framing it as a risk to water security, agricultural stability, and internal political legitimacy. The same project, viewed as essential for Ethiopia’s sovereignty and development, is perceived by Egypt as a national security risk. The absence of consensus exacerbates mistrust, and Egypt has pursued diplomatic, legal, and, at times, military signalling strategies to defend its access to the Nile.
Sudan’s balancing act
Sudan occupies a unique middle position in the debate, geographically situated between Ethiopia and Egypt, and politically torn between shared benefits and mutual vulnerabilities. It alternately supports Ethiopia’s hydroelectric ambitions and aligns with Egypt’s calls for safeguards on water flow. While Sudan stands to benefit from regulated flows and reduced flooding that could enhance its agricultural output, as well as potential electricity imports, it remains wary of dam safety and the absence of binding coordination mechanisms. Improved flow management could also optimise Sudan’s own hydropower systems. Given Sudan’s growing need for agricultural water and hydropower, engagement with Ethiopia offers tangible benefits. Yet Sudan’s water policy is constrained by both historic legal affiliations with Egypt and the geopolitical imperative to avoid alienating either side.
Khartoum’s balancing act reflects competing domestic and foreign policy priorities as well as long-term strategic vulnerabilities. While Sudan’s functional cooperation with Ethiopia could unlock mutual economic gains, its alignment with Egypt reinforces historic water-sharing alliances and provides leverage in future negotiations. This delicate balancing act, which prevents its complete alignment with either upstream or downstream states, highlights the difficulty of forging a trilateral consensus and illustrates how national sovereignty is shaped not only by hydro-politics but also by domestic regime changes and governance challenges.
Water security as national security
Across the Nile Basin, and more specifically for the three states of Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt, water security is increasingly equated with national security, making the dam a focal point of strategic competition. For downstream Egypt, ensuring sustained Nile flows is deemed essential for its water, food and energy nexus security, blending traditional and non-traditional security paradigms, to maintain agricultural productivity and social stability. Any alteration in flow is therefore securitised, triggering responses that go beyond economic or environmental diplomacy. For upstream Ethiopia, the dam represents a pathway to energy independence, industrialisation, enhanced geopolitical leverage, and equates its sovereign right to harness the Blue Nile with its broader developmental security, viewing the dam as a precursor to poverty eradication and political stability. For both countries, securitisation of water resources has been further exacerbated by rapid demographic growth and climate change impacts, which have sharpened the stakes of the dispute, particularly for Egypt. This securitisation transforms negotiations over flow management into matters of national defence and territorial integrity. Both positions ensure that the dispute will remain highly politicised, with compromise requiring not only hydrological agreements but also shifts in entrenched perceptions of sovereignty and security. Due to such national security framing, both states have formed uncompromising positions in negotiations.
Regional and global power dynamics: African institutions and water diplomacy
African institutions have sought to position themselves as central mediating actors, with the African Union in particular framing the dispute as part of its vision for African solutions to African problems. The Union assumed a facilitation role after the collapse of earlier American-brokered talks in 2020, launching high-level mediation from 2020 onwards. However, despite multiple negotiation rounds between 2020 and 2021, particularly after Ethiopia began the first stages of reservoir filling, outcomes have remained inconclusive, constrained by entrenched sovereign positions among the three states. The Union’s aim to contain the dispute within a continental forum and reduce the influence of external geopolitical rivalries over Nile governance faced constraints associated with deep-seated mistrust among the three states, the absence of binding enforcement mechanisms, and the complexities of reconciling historical treaty disputes with modern international water law.
The Nile Basin Initiative has also served as a technical and cooperative framework intended to promote equitable use among the riparian states, and it offers a rare multilateral venue for upstream and downstream states to interact. However, its efforts have been undermined by deep-seated sovereignty disputes, historical mistrust, and the refusal of Egypt and Sudan to sign the Cooperative Framework Agreement. These dynamics limit its ability to act decisively in disputes such as this one, where bilateral or trilateral negotiations tend to supersede multilateral initiatives, revealing the persistent gap between technical cooperation on the one hand and entrenched national positions on the other.
Beyond these, other regional organisations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the East African Community, though not geographically encompassing all parties, offer additional forums for dialogue, although they lack the legal and enforcement mechanisms necessary to compel compliance. A hybrid arrangement combining African Union political leadership, technical expertise from the Initiative, and sub-regional coordination could help shift water diplomacy from reactive bargaining toward proactive, basin-wide governance.
External powers and strategic stakes
Global powers have historically shaped the Nile Basin’s geopolitics, and the dam has attracted sustained engagement from external powers whose interests extend beyond water security into regional and global geopolitics. Egypt has linked Nile hydro-politics directly to global ideological rivalries by aligning with superpowers when beneficial for large-scale development projects, such as the Aswan High Dam. The United States has historically maintained a special strategic relationship with Egypt, linking security cooperation, military aid, and political support, which has influenced its stance on Nile water negotiations. While the United States offered to mediate between the riparians, Ethiopia perceived bias toward downstream interests, complicating its credibility as a neutral arbiter, which led to failed negotiations and the eventual freezing of substantial aid to Ethiopia.
The European Union has engaged through development cooperation and technical support for basin-wide initiatives but has generally avoided taking sides, preferring to frame its role as supportive of African Union-led negotiations. Its influence has, however, remained limited by the absence of hard leverage over the disputing parties. China’s deep economic presence in Ethiopia, including infrastructure and hydropower development, has been a source of concern for Egypt. In 2021, a visit by the Chinese Foreign Minister to Addis Ababa prompted Cairo to warn that external intervention could add chaos to the crisis. While more indirect in this case due to Ethiopia’s self-financing strategy, China’s role has been substantial in Ethiopia’s broader infrastructure push, strategically avoiding deep political entanglement but embedding its capital and technical expertise into energy, transport, and construction sectors.
Russia’s growing engagement in the Horn, through security partnerships, military agreements, and potential arms deals, adds another layer of complexity, with Ethiopia protecting the dam with air defence systems of foreign origin. The convergence of American, European, Chinese, Russian, and other powers’ interests in the Horn of Africa demonstrates that the dispute is no longer only a regional water dispute but a focal point in the broader competition for geopolitical influence along one of the world’s most strategic waterways. Thus the dispute serves as a strategic platform for external actors pursuing regional leverage and alignment with African partners in a multipolar international system.
Gulf states and regional influence
The Gulf states have emerged as significant actors due to their political ties with Egypt and Sudan and their strategic and economic stakes in the region. Investments in agriculture, ports, and infrastructure across Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea are part of a broader strategy to secure food supplies and logistical hubs for Gulf economies. As the dam promises to regulate Nile flows and improve irrigation reliability in Sudan, Gulf investors view it as a tool to underpin their regional agricultural projects. Riding on this, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister repaired ties with both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi in 2018, securing financial assistance to alleviate Ethiopia’s foreign currency shortages and stabilise its struggling economy. This financial backing increased Gulf leverage in Ethiopia and positioned these states as potential mediators in the dispute.
However, the Arab League, backed by Gulf countries, passed a resolution on 15 June 2021 opposing Ethiopia’s second dam filling without a binding tripartite agreement. This move demonstrates coordinated diplomatic efforts by Arab states in solidarity with Egypt’s position on water security, driven by a blend of food security, investment, and geopolitical interests. These alliances are structured within the wider Red Sea security architecture, in which they seek to secure influence over strategic maritime routes, and their alignment with Egypt allows them to reinforce strategic partnerships important for maritime security, trade routes, and countering rival regional influences. Their deepening involvement thus reflects a recognition that water security and political stability in the Horn of Africa are closely linked to Gulf economic and geopolitical interests.
Global resource competition
The dispute exemplifies how transboundary water issues are increasingly entangled in global hydro-politics and resource competition. It demonstrates a case within a broader global pattern, where transboundary water management intersects with food security, energy production, sovereignty contestations, and geopolitical rivalries. Having been financed through Ethiopian domestic resources due to the reluctance of conventional institutions such as the World Bank, the construction of the dam illustrates how states may bypass traditional financing channels when global power configurations discourage specific projects, demonstrating a dispute where contested resource projects are pursued outside the established global economic order.
The dispute mirrors other global hydro-political conflicts, where upstream development challenges downstream dependency. Like the Mekong, Tigris and Euphrates, or Indus basins, the Nile demonstrates how contested sovereignty, uneven historical agreements, and uneven development trajectories can transform water management into a matter of national security. In this sense, resolving the crisis requires technical agreements and an appreciation of the dam as part of a worldwide web of interconnected hydro-political challenges. By situating it within the frame of global resource competition, it becomes evident that the conflict is not simply about water allocation, but also about shaping the rules of engagement in transboundary environments. Ethiopia’s insistence on African-led mediation can be interpreted as an attempt to resist the securitisation of water disputes within global institutions that often reflect the interests of dominant powers, making the dam part of a larger contest over who governs shared natural resources in this and the following centuries.
In the context of multilateral frameworks such as the Watercourses Convention, which provides guiding principles of equitable and reasonable use but without enforcement mechanisms, their impact remains limited. The challenge remains to transform these established frameworks into binding operational agreements capable of balancing development aspirations with security imperatives across multiple scales of governance, increasing demographic pressures, and climate change impacts.
Pathways beyond sovereignty conflicts: data sharing, transparency, and trust building
In transboundary water disputes such as this one, transparent data sharing can serve as both a technical necessity and a diplomatic bridge. One of the persistent obstacles has been the absence of transparent and timely data exchange, which has amplified Egyptian and Sudanese concerns over downstream water security. Ethiopia’s 2011 invitation to Egypt and Sudan to join an International Panel of Experts to review dam design documents and study their effects mirrored international requirements and represented a significant, though partial, step towards transparency and confidence building. Notwithstanding the transparency issues existing in the period before construction, Ethiopia’s unilateral filling without a comprehensive, binding operational agreement has deepened mistrust, as downstream states fear sudden reductions in flows during drought years. A core lesson from the Central Asian case is that disputes over transboundary rivers are exacerbated by mistrust, ambiguity, and unilateral action, which in turn undermine prospects for cooperation.
The Vietnamese experience under the Procedures for Data and Information Exchange and Sharing shows that structured, multistage data-sharing frameworks can promote mutual transparency and reduce uncertainty. Drawing from the Helmand River Basin case, Loodin and colleagues stress that emotions, national pride, and historical grievances can magnify mistrust when hydrological information is withheld. Here, real-time release schedules, reservoir filling rates, and inflow data could be shared with downstream states through independent or neutral monitoring mechanisms such as the African Union or a panel linked to the United Nations, to facilitate interpretation and dissemination and to reduce political manipulation. Such an approach would reduce the downstream states’ perception of risk. Transparency requires a sovereignty trade-off: Ethiopia might view data release as a strategic concession, while Egypt and Sudan may fear that such data could be manipulated. However, Soliev and Theesfeld show that without such trade-offs, disputing parties remain trapped in an appropriation problem, a tug of war over access and withdrawal rights, instead of progressing towards collective provision of benefits. By framing data sharing as a sovereignty trade-off rather than a loss of control, upstream Ethiopia could gain legitimacy while downstream states receive security assurances.
Furthermore, transparency measures must be embedded in institutional routines rather than ad hoc crisis responses. In Central Asia, agreements without consistent trust-building mechanisms eroded quickly under stress events like drought or energy shortages. Thus, regular trilateral meetings, public disclosure of technical reports, and the inclusion of civil society observers could help ensure that data exchange is perceived as credible and mutually beneficial. Such transparency not only builds trust but also strengthens institutional credibility, especially when systems are accessible to all parties. This approach can build the resilience of agreements against political shocks, making cooperation more sustainable.
Towards cooperative sovereignty: rethinking national interests
The concept of cooperative sovereignty offers an alternative to seeing nationalism as a contest where one country’s gain is another’s loss. Negotiations have often been shaped by zero-sum perceptions of sovereignty, with Egypt viewing the Nile as a lifeline rooted in historical treaties, and Ethiopia asserting its right to develop water resources for hydropower and economic growth. Without inclusive dialogue, this rigid stance creates winner and loser outcomes that undermine compromise, driven by emotion and pride. Cooperative sovereignty reframes the issue: rather than competing over absolute control, riparians collaborate to manage and benefit collectively, in which case states recognise that shared resources require shared management. A shift towards cooperative sovereignty means acknowledging shared vulnerabilities and mutual dependence on the Nile’s long-term health, and asserting that shared prosperity from the Nile can be maximised without undermining core national priorities. The Vietnamese approach illustrates that perceived national benefit protection can coexist with cooperation if the arrangement allows upstream and downstream interests to be met simultaneously. For Ethiopia, reframing the dam not solely as a national project but as a regional water, energy and food security asset could encourage Sudan and Egypt to view it as a shared safeguard rather than a threat.
Rethinking national interests requires recognising shared vulnerabilities, demographic pressures, climate change, hydrological variability, and food and energy insecurity, which threaten all basin states. This view ensures that both upstream and downstream needs are addressed, and sovereignty becomes a shared resource management tool rather than a weapon. This may extend to developing an economic integration strategy centred on electricity exports, ensuring that downstream states acquire a stake in the dam’s efficient operations instead of solely looking at it as flow-diverting infrastructure. Importantly, sabotage and coercive diplomacy, whether political, economic, or physical, are not strategic solutions; rather, they entrench mistrust and risk creating situations from which states cannot retreat without reputational and strategic damage. Threats of force must be excluded as political tools, as these only harden hostility and create irreversible rifts. Instead, sustained political dialogue, joint technical committees, and culturally sensitive mediation can help bridge entrenched positions. Cooperative sovereignty ensures Ethiopia achieves its developmental aims without jeopardising Egyptian and Sudanese water security, creating a durable political settlement. Such rethinking requires high-level political commitment to principled flexibility, where states accept that sovereignty in shared basins is exercised through cooperative mechanisms rather than isolated control.
From competition to regional interdependence
Historically, Nile riparian politics have been dominated by competition, where upstream states’ development projects are viewed as a threat to downstream states. The dam fits this pattern, with Egypt interpreting the project as a unilateral challenge to its historical rights. However, reframing it and other infrastructure projects as a shared regional asset can shift the dynamics from competitive rivalry to mutual dependency. Such regional interdependence, which requires high-level political support, can be cultivated by aligning national development strategies. A trilateral economic zone based on water, energy and food security linkages could incentivise cooperation, ensuring that harming one partner would directly damage the others. The Indus Waters Treaty offers a precedent, proving that functional cooperation can be sustained even in tense geopolitics when mutual benefits surpass political costs.
Transforming competition into interdependence requires identifying complementary needs and strengths, such as Ethiopia’s hydropower potential, Sudan’s agricultural expansion capacity, and Egypt’s investment and technological expertise, all amidst climate change and demographic pressures. Such plans can extend to building joint infrastructure, like cross-border irrigation systems or transmission lines, which cement interdependence physically and economically. This strategic alignment creates a shared stake in regional stability. While power asymmetries and lack of trust can amplify competitive unilateralism, the deliberate creation of interdependencies can be a stabilising factor. This is exemplified in Central Asia, where a new leadership’s emphasis on regional integration achieved tangible results quickly, providing an opportunity to reconsider transboundary water governance on a fundamental level.
Here, building cross-sector linkages in agriculture, trade, and infrastructure between the three states would raise the cost of conflict while increasing the benefits of regional stability. Importantly, advancing this transformation requires political elites to see cooperation not as a vulnerability but as a form of shared resilience. Thus, mechanisms to advance this must target linkages of mutual benefit, such as joint agro-industrial zones powered by the dam’s electricity, or coordinated flood and drought management that benefits all. This means framing interdependence as a pathway to climate adaptation and regional food, energy and water security, in order to manage demographic pressures and regional socio-economic development.
Legal and institutional innovations for transboundary governance
Soliev and Theesfeld note that reliance on broadly defined international water law principles such as equitable and reasonable use and no significant harm can perpetuate disputes due to differing interpretations. This calls for legal innovations that operationalise these principles into concrete, measurable commitments such as seasonal release schedules or rules, drought management procedures, benefit-sharing clauses, and conflict resolution timelines. Such measures would reduce legal ambiguity. Flexible institutions are vital in such an arrangement. A governance framework should therefore incorporate adaptive management clauses, allowing for scientific review and amendment without reopening the entire treaty. This would enable the basin states to respond collectively to climate variability while maintaining stability in allocations.
Lastly, embedding cooperative institutions within regional frameworks, such as the African Union and the Nile Basin Initiative, can provide legitimacy and reduce the dominance of any one riparian state. Political will is a mandatory requirement here, and such institutions should be designed not just to manage conflict but to proactively create shared value, ensuring that cooperative dialogue is sustained. Institutional innovation also means integrating non-state stakeholders such as agricultural cooperatives, civil society groups, and private energy traders into governance structures, a move that broadens legitimacy and diffuses the monopolisation of water governance by central governments alone.
SUMMARY *
The article’s contribution is to hold three positions simultaneously without collapsing any of them. Ethiopia’s claim rests on the fact that most of the water originates in its territory and that the instruments excluding it from any share were concluded by a colonial power on behalf of others. Egypt’s claim rests on near-total dependence on a river it does not control and on arrangements around which a century of agricultural and demographic development has been organised. Sudan’s position is genuinely divided, since regulated flow benefits it and an unregulated upstream reservoir endangers it. Each of these is coherent, which is why the dispute has resisted resolution, and it is the article’s central analytical move to treat the deadlock as a consequence of that coherence rather than of any party’s bad faith. The proposal that follows from it, cooperative sovereignty, is accordingly not a call for concession but a claim that the parties have mistaken what sovereignty over a shared river can consist of.
CONCLUSION
Rethinking sovereignty in resource conflicts
The case demonstrates that strict, unilateral interpretations of sovereignty over shared rivers often exacerbate disputes rather than resolve them. It illustrates that absolute sovereignty over transboundary resources is increasingly untenable in an interconnected, climate-stressed world. While Ethiopia has framed the dam as exercising its sovereign right to develop its resources, Egypt’s long-standing position is that any upstream project that reduces its historical Nile share threatens its national security, thus invoking the no-harm rule. The visible challenge in the interpretation of equitable and reasonable use and no significant harm remains alive. This conflict points to the need to reconceptualise sovereignty not as a rigid shield of unilateral decision-making, but as a framework for shared responsibility, joint planning, and equitable use, consistent with Article 5 of the Watercourses Convention.
Such rethinking is necessary: instead of viewing sovereignty as exclusive control, states must embrace sovereignty as cooperative capacity, where a portion of autonomous decision-making is traded for greater collective regional stability and prosperity. This transforms shared water into a platform for development rather than contention, and is especially relevant here because the dam exists in an ecological and political system that transcends borders. Hydrological impacts, climate variability, and water needs cut across state boundaries, meaning unilateralism generates negative spillovers. A cooperative sovereignty model allows Ethiopia to achieve its development goals through hydropower while ensuring downstream states can meet their water security needs. This is not a loss of control, but a recalibration of sovereignty to fit the interconnected nature of river basins. In practice, this means both Ethiopia and Egypt must consider embedding sovereignty trade-offs in legally binding operational agreements, supported by continental institutions, so that cooperation is protected from internal political changes.
Lessons for international conflict theory
The case offers theoretical lessons, especially in the study of hydro-hegemony and asymmetric bargaining. The first is that material control over the water source, when combined with financial independence, shifts bargaining dynamics. Ethiopia’s ability to fund the dam domestically limited Egypt’s capacity to block the project through financial pressure or conditional aid. Ethiopia’s upstream technical ability and political will altered bargaining leverage, even if Egypt and Sudan retained geopolitical weight and historical claims. This shows that material capabilities, in this case the ability to build and operate infrastructure, can shift negotiation equilibria, and that bargaining outcomes depend on credible commitments, the availability of outside options, and the capacity to absorb short-term costs. This reinforces the principle that altering material power balances can change the scope of possible negotiated outcomes, even in long-standing asymmetries. Theory must therefore integrate infrastructure, technical capacity, and public will as core elements shaping bargaining power in resource disputes.
Second, the dispute demonstrates how cultural narratives and historical grievances can intensify mistrust and complicate negotiations. Ethiopia’s pan-African framing counters Egypt’s invocation of colonial-era treaties and civilisational claims to the Nile. These identity-based narratives are not peripheral; they fundamentally shape the willingness of parties to compromise. Theory must therefore account for symbolic and cultural dimensions, not merely material resource flows, when assessing cooperation potential.
Finally, the case underscores the importance of trust building as a precondition for institutional success. Data sharing and transparency are not merely procedural tools but structural confidence-builders that change how states perceive each other over the long term. Cooperative outcomes in transboundary disputes depend not just on legal rules but on relational trust. Without mutual confidence, even technically sound treaties risk collapse under political strain.
POTENTIAL SOLUTION *
The article’s analysis is thorough and its proposals are sound; what follows concerns the sequence in which they might be attempted, since the moment has changed and the change is favourable in a way the parties have not yet acted on.
The dam is built and filled. That removes from the table the question that made agreement impossible, namely whether it would exist, and leaves only questions on which agreement is available: how it is operated in a drought, what is released and when, what data is exchanged, and what happens if the arrangement is breached. Every one of these is technical, none requires either party to concede its position on the treaties of 1929 and 1959, and all of them are now more urgent for Ethiopia than before, since a dam that generates power needs a functioning grid, regional customers, and a downstream neighbour who is not planning to attack it. The bargaining position that made agreement unnecessary during construction does not survive the transition to operation.
The instrument that fits this situation is a coordinated operation agreement rather than a water-sharing treaty, and the distinction matters. Water sharing requires settling entitlement, which is the question that cannot be settled. Coordinated operation requires only that each side knows what the other will do, and it is what the Indus Waters Treaty achieved: India and Pakistan did not agree about Kashmir, and they agreed about the rivers, by dividing them rather than sharing them, by establishing a permanent commission that has met annually through three wars, and by providing a neutral expert procedure that either side can trigger alone. That last feature is the one most obviously missing here, and it is the one that would matter most, since a dispute mechanism requiring both parties’ consent to operate is a dispute mechanism that will not operate.
Three further observations. The article’s proposal on data sharing is the most immediately achievable and its framing as a sovereignty trade-off is exactly right; the practical form is telemetry transmitted to a neutral body rather than to the other party, which removes the question of whether the recipient will manipulate it, and satellite altimetry now makes reservoir levels externally observable in any case, which means the strategic value of withholding the data has largely gone. Second, the strongest instrument of interdependence available is the one the article mentions only in passing: power purchase agreements. A downstream state that has contracted to buy electricity for twenty years has an interest in the dam functioning and a lever if it does not, and this converts a threat into an asset more directly than any declaration. Third, the entry into force of the Cooperative Framework Agreement without Egypt and Sudan creates an institution whose legitimacy their absence will always qualify; the question of whether the new commission’s design can be adjusted to make accession possible for them is worth more attention than it is receiving, because a basin institution that half the basin’s population does not recognise will not govern the basin.
Finally, one observation for readers of this journal. The article records that mediation was attempted by the United States, by the World Bank, and by the African Union, and that each attempt failed for reasons that were structural rather than personal: the first was not trusted by one party, the second lacked leverage over any party, and the third had legitimacy without instruments. The combination that has worked elsewhere is a convener with standing, a technical secretariat with credibility, and a guarantor whose participation gives each party something it wants and would lose. That combination has not yet been assembled here, and assembling it is a more tractable problem than any of the substantive questions in dispute.
* Added by the WMO Editorial Team
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Supplementary references added by the WMO Editorial Team
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