Germany is often praised for its dealing with the Holocaust and its collective guilt towards that atrocity. At the same time, the missing dealing with colonial atrocities is ignored. Even though Germany acknowledged guilt regarding the Genocide of the Herero and Nama in 2021, the extent of the acknowledgment of guilt differs. Therefore, this paper aims to give in a comparative analysis an explanation of why Germany acknowledges guilt to a different extent towards the committed atrocities of the Holocaust and the Genocide of the Herero and Nama. Seven factors are analysed: Political will and leadership, international pressure, transitional justice processes, historical evidence and research, international law, historical context and time, and public opinion and societal factors. The analysis shows that in both cases political will, international pressure, historical evidence and research, and historical context and time influenced Germany to acknowledge guilt while the factors of the transitional justice processes, international law, and public opinion and societal factors differ.
Introduction
“It is necessary, yet so difficult to come here as a German and as Germany’s Federal President. The terrible crimes that Germans committed here fill me with profound shame” (Steinmeier 2023). Those were the moving words of German Federal President Steinmeier at the commemorative event on the 80th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. He was the first German president to take part in the commemorative event, and by participating, he seized the opportunity to reemphasize Germany’s guilt toward European Jews because of the atrocities committed by Germans in the first half of the 20th century. German politicians have regularly acknowledged and reacknowledged Germany’s guilt regarding the Holocaust as the mass destruction of the European Jewish population under the Nazi regime. Probably one of the most memorable political incidents of German politicians on the guilt was Chancellor Brandt’s genuflection at the memorial to the Warsaw Ghetto on a rainy day in 1970. The photographs of the situation moved around the world, it was a historic moment. In half a minute, Chancellor Brandt changed Germany’s reputation and its memory policy. It was not an undisputed gesture at the time, with half of the Germans not being ready to ask for forgiveness for the Nazi’s atrocities and Poland not being ready to see Germany as a state asking for forgiveness and ready to make amends. Historians agree that Brandt opened with the genuflection and his “Ostpolitik” the way to reconciliation between Germany and Poland (Hille et al. 2020).
Federal President Steinmeier and former chancellor Brandt are not the only two high-ranking German politicians acknowledging and even emphasizing Germany’s historical guilt due to the Holocaust. On the international stage, Germany often gets praised for its dealing with its past, like in the opinion essay “Germany faced its horrible past. Can we do the same?” (Norris 2021), referring to Germany’s “Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung” as a role model which should be considered for the US and its dealing with the history of slavery and racism as well.
But even though Germany has a great reputation for its memory culture and over-complicated words like “Vergangenheitsaufbearbeitung” are known on the international stage, one could wonder why Germany only exhibits its extensive memory culture regarding the atrocities committed by the Nazis during World War Two (WWII). However, there are many atrocities to be committed by Germany in its colonies. Probably the best-known one is the Genocide of the Herero and Nama in today’s Namibia in 1904, which came to be known as the first Genocide of the 20th history (Boehme 2020: 242). Historical reappraisal regarding the German colonial past is much more controversial than the question of guilt when it comes to the Holocaust. While the majority of Germans know about the Holocaust and the atrocities committed by the Nazis, most Germans do not know much about Germany’s colonial past, let alone the Genocide of the Herero and Nama or other atrocity crimes committed under German rule (Pelz 2019). Over the last few years, there have been more and more discussions on Germany’s dealing with its colonial past. One of the highlights of the debate and political actions was arguably the return of the first Benin bronzes to Nigeria in December 2022 (Mücke 2023). Other atrocities on the other hand are condemned by German politicians, but there is no guilt or responsibility officially acknowledged like in the case of the smash down of the Maji-Maji rebellion (1905-1907) in today’s Tanzania (Schiwikowski 2023).
Thus, the following question arises: Why is Germany this forthcoming in dealing with the dark past of the Nazi Regime and the Holocaust, but not with its colonial past even though more and more voices demand reparations or other forms of reconciliation? Or: What factors decide whether a state acknowledges guilt regarding past atrocities? The question is not, however, about when states feel guilty, and thus experience the emotion of guilt because of past atrocities. To address the question, a state of research will be given first. A conceptualization of (collective) guilt will follow which establishes the guilt of Germany regarding past atrocities, acknowledged or not. Then, an analysis of and comparison between two atrocities committed by Germans follows: the Holocaust and the Genocide of the Herero and Nama. To combine research with practices of international politics, academic literature, media coverage and speeches of politicians will be analysed. This paper ends with a conclusion and an outlook.
State of research
The question of collective guilt is a wide-ranging field in academia. Several books and studies deal with the question of the guilt of nations regarding past atrocities and inter-group conflict in general (cf. Barkan 2002; Branscombe & Doosje 2004; Gunn & Wilson 2011; Schori-Eyal et al. 2015; Bassan-Nygate & Heimann 2022). Social identity theory is identified as the underlying mechanism that leads to members of the former perpetrator group to feel guilty because of their identity and the notion that their antecedents or other members of their ingroup have acted morally wrong and/or harmed others (Branscombe & Doosje 2004: 3). Also, moral emotions like guilt are used as a political instrument (Bassan-Nygate & Heimann 2022: 1).
The literature is most extensive on the Holocaust and Germany’s dealing with its horrible past and the emotion of collective guilt (cf. Janowitz 1946; Jaspers 2001; Merkl 1965; Berger 2012). While some sources note that collective guilt is being denied by Germans, especially by the perpetrators and shortly after the end of WWII (cf. Janowitz 1946, von Kellenbach 2013), surveys and contemporary politics show a general acceptance of collective guilt of Germans towards the Holocaust (cf. SPD et al. 2021; Stiftung Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft 2021). A study shows the influence of the interpretation of time on the feeling of collective guilt (cf. Peetz et al. 2010). To mitigate the threat to one’s self-esteem (the atrocity committed by one’s ingroup) as a defence, people tend to place atrocities subjectively more in the past, in particular when German resistance and reparations were not mentioned (ibid.: 608).
However, research on Germany’s acknowledgment of guilt regarding atrocities under colonial rule remains thin in comparison (cf. Sarkin 2009 & 2011; Boehme 2020). Boehme (2020: 238) analyses Germany’s attitude of reactive remembrance towards the Genocide of the Herero and Nama in her paper. A paper on two experiments evaluates the insensitivity of guilt felt by college students regarding the Holocaust and the Genocide of the Herero and Nama (cf. Imhoff et al. 2013). The study shows that individuals feel greater collective guilt if the victims of the atrocity committed by the antecedents of the ingroup still suffer from negative consequences caused by the atrocity (ibid.: 86).
Literature on the guilt of states is extensive, but there are more studies focusing on collective guilt experienced and expressed by individuals rather than groups or states. Therefore, this paper aims to give an explanation of why Germany as a state acknowledges (collective) guilt to a different extent towards the committed atrocities of the Holocaust and the Genocide of the Herero and Nama.
Collective emotions and a conceptualization of collective guilt
Despite the long-standing premise of rationality and emotions contradicting each other, neuroscientists made breakthroughs in research showing that people need emotions for rational decision-making and prioritizing their wants and needs (cf. Mercer 2005). Emotions influence our values and how we view our (social) reality just as “[t]hey connect human beings to each other” (Hutchinson 2016: 74). Therefore, emotions are needed for political thought and behaviour (ibid.). Even though emotions are defined by and connected to biological experiences when we feel something (Mercer 2014: 516), collective or group emotions are central in international politics as well. The concept of collective emotions is based on social identity theory (cf. Tajfel & Turner 1986) and it is more than just the sum of the individual’s emotions of the group (Mercer 2014: 516). Collective emotions are based on the individual’s identification with the group. If a person identifies with a group – like a nationality – he or she will feel about situations or contexts differently and likely adapt to the collective emotion of the group (cf. Peetz et al. 2010; Mercer 2014). The keyword here is identification; merely acknowledging one’s membership in a group does not equal identification and thus not necessarily lead to an individual feeling the collective emotions of said group (Brewer 2001: 20f). If belonging to a group resonates with the member’s self-concept (Hitzler & Honer 1994: 310), the group member identifies with the group instead of just being a member of it. The individual then feels connected to the group, feels belonging, and wants to be an active part of the group. This motivation is the basis for an emotional connection to the group, making one available for the collective emotions of the group because one’s self-worth depends on it (Brewer 2001: 21). Generally, a positive evaluation of one’s ingroup is important for individuals. Social identity theory relies on a constructivist approach: Emotions like the social groups are constructed socioculturally and therefore cannot be separated from social context (Hutchinson 2016: 90f). Emotions condition the rationality of groups (ibid.: 92f). Because of the social context of emotions, ingroup members likely influence each other’s emotions. Mercer (2014: 524) states: “Emotion is contagious”. But, not all group members necessarily feel exactly the same all the time (Koschut 2020: 20f). Ingroup members can feel differently about the same situation. For example, person A identifies stronger with the group than person B. Person A will likely feel more positive about the group and tend to neglect or downplay wrongdoings of the group while focusing on positive emotions like pride whereas person B might be more willing to accept said wrongdoings and therefore feel negative emotions like guilt or shame (Mercer 2014: 522).
Guilt can – like all other emotions too – be felt at an individual or a collective level. (Collective) Guilt is a self-conscious emotion that is felt when someone feels responsible for a negative outcome, leading to other’s harm (Branscombe et al. 2004: 16f). The feeling of guilt has, therefore, moral implications. It can not only be felt by people who actually harmed others, for example, because they committed an atrocity but it can be felt by “uninvolved” ingroup members as well for the sheer identification with the ingroup (Branscombe & Doosje 2004: 3f).
“According to self-categorization theory, when the self or others are categorized at the group level, emotional experiences and expectations for others’ emotional responses should also occur at the collective level” (Branscombe et al. 2004: 18).
The philosopher Jaspers (cf. 2001) states that not all guilt is the same. He conceptualized guilt as a phenomenon that is not only an emotion that can be experienced but rather a fact like the judgment: “You are guilty (and it does not matter if you feel guilty about the crime you committed or not)”. Collective guilt plays a big role in his conceptualization of guilt as two of the four concepts of guilt are placed in a social context: political guilt and metaphysical guilt. Jaspers states that “everybody is co-responsible for the way he is governed” (ibid.: 25f) meaning that citizens, therefore, ingroup members of the national group are responsible for the wrongdoings of their government even though the citizens may not have sanctioned said wrongdoings. The concept of political guilt may be translated into collective guilt. But, it may not be leading mono-causally to collective guilt because whereas the concept of collective guilt is based on the experience of emotion, political guilt makes an ethical argument about the responsibility of the state’s citizens. Metaphysical guilt, which is based on the principle of solidarity between human beings (ibid.: 26), can lead to individuals feeling guilty about the actions of other ingroup members, which in turn can lead to a stronger sense of collective guilt because of the emotions of group members influencing each other. Metaphysical guilt is thus based on the experience of the emotion.
Collective guilt does not necessarily need to be understood as a sense of legal guilt, but rather the emotion itself is at the centre of the concept (Branscombe & Doosje 2004: 3f). Guilt as a collective emotion is an especially interesting phenomenon as guilt usually comes with a high cost and therefore might contradict rational decision-making, showing once again that emotions influence the prioritizing of individuals and social groups. As individuals tend to rely on a positive image of their ingroups, collective guilt is rare. The first reaction when being confronted with an accusation is defence rather than the acceptance of guilt (Jaspers 2001: 41) because (collective) guilt poses a threat to one’s identity (as no one wants to admit to themselves that they acted morally wrong) (Gunn & Wilson 2011: 1475). People rely on defence strategies to avoid feeling guilty and to reaffirm their individual and social identity (ibid.). Another strategy of dismissing (collective) guilt is using justifications: If people feel that morally wrong (or at least disputed) actions were justified for some higher reason, for example, to prevent something even worse, guilt will probably not be experienced as the decision to undertake the action can be morally justified. A prominent example of the justification of a horrible action is the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as US-Americans feel that ending WWII was more important than sparing the lives of the Japanese and thus do not feel guilty about the use of the bomb (Branscombe et al. 2004: 19). But at the same time, group members with a more sensitive moral compass can shape the collective emotion regarding a situation like an intergroup conflict and can increase the chances of collective guilt felt as more and more individuals condemn the actions of other group members (Jaspers 2001: 96).
With all the difficulties that come with collective guilt (as it is an emotion not likely to be felt), the high costs of the emotion are not for nothing: The experience of (collective) guilt has a learning effect and can shape future attitudes of ingroups towards outgroups and therefore lead to a reduction of intergroup conflicts (cf. Ashmore et al. 2001). As a positive attitude towards one’s ingroup leads at least to favour ingroup members over outgroup members, in worse cases, pride and love towards the ingroup can lead to rejection and even hatred towards outgroup members. Human beings need a sense of belonging and the simultaneous differentiation of oneself towards others. These two contradicting needs can explain the positive evaluation of the ingroup and the more negative evaluation of the outgroup (cf. Brewer 2001). But, as people, and therefore, groups do not want to feel guilty, working through the guilt can have the effect of the priorities of groups being renegotiated and leading to a more peaceful future regarding intergroup relations as groups and their individuals might act according to their moral compass to prevent feeling guilty.
However, the concept of collective guilt is not undisputed. The legal system deals with guilt only on the premise that individuals, and individuals only, are responsible for their own actions. Collective guilt, therefore, cannot stand before a court. That is why not social groups, but individual perpetrators who committed mass atrocities are tried before the International Criminal Court (cf. ICC w.D.). Also, condemning a whole social group, like a nation, for crimes committed by only some members of the group can lead to prolonged or new intergroup conflicts. It is important to restore justice after crimes and to compensate victims, but it can be counterproductive to unconditionally assign collective guilt to a social group over several generations while ignoring that the social group is interested in restoring justice and coming to terms with its past. Some scholars (cf. Cribb 2018) make the argument that collective guilt is not needed when all the perpetrators of the condemned action are convicted and punished as they should be. Furthermore, history shows that admitting collective guilt to whole nations can lead to new problems. Victor’s justice after wars can be morally flawed as well. The question of guilt for the World War One (WWI) is a fine example for that. Even though the guilt should not have been attributed to one state only as all nations of Europe were eager for war, the guilt for the war was admitted only to Germany, the loser, by the Allied Powers, the winners (Jaspers 2001: 41f). Like guilt is a learning process that should lead to future morally acceptable decisions, the admission of guilt should be done with morally correct decision-making, too, so that a healing process can begin: The perpetrators get a just punishment, but they (and their social group) are not to be condemned for all times but rather should be encouraged to work for rebuilding their reputation” (ibid.). The question of the admission and acceptance of collective guilt is a political one and can even become a political weapon even though the question remains open whether the admission of guilt helps the victims and makes way to reappraisal (ibid.: 42).
Methods
For the comparative analysis of the two atrocities committed by Germans and the acknowledgements of guilt, a systematic literature and media coverage review, as well as a qualitative content analysis of speeches of German high-ranking political actors will be used. The literature, news articles, and speeches were used because of the keywords “Holocaust”, “Herero and Nama”, “Genocide of the Herero and Nama”, and “guilt”.
Emotions are one of the aspects most difficult to measure in international politics (Hutchinson 2016: 89). Thus in this paper, the question is not whether guilt is actually experienced and, therefore, felt by the people acknowledging guilt, but the expression of guilt will be measured. The extent of the guilt admitted is the interesting factor in this comparative analysis. This will be measured with quantitative means (e.g. frequency in literature, percentage of people admitting to (collective) guilt) as well as qualitative means (e.g. apologies from high-ranking vs. low-ranking politicians, exact wording of the apology, preparedness for reparations).
For the independent variable, the factors “political will and leadership”, “international pressure”, “transitional justice processes”, “historical evidence and research”, “international law”, “historical context and time” and “public opinion and societal factors” will be analysed.
Case study Germany
Unfortunately, Germany has its fair share of past atrocities. The two examples for the comparative analysis are both German atrocities to show that firstly, Germany does not in fact differ from other states regarding its memory policy. Just because the Holocaust is remembered well and guilt is acknowledged commonly, the atrocities committed by Germans in Germany’s former colonies and Germany’s dealing with them paint another picture. As an atrocity during the colonial period, the Genocide of the Herero and Nama is used as an example because of its relatively extensive literature. Even though Germany acknowledged the guilt in this Genocide a few years ago, the two examples still differ in (international) context and the extent of the acknowledgement of guilt, making them two examples that can be compared well. Additionally, in literature, there are connections established between the two genocides committed by Germans with some scholars stating that the Genocide of the Herero and Nama people (not mono-causally) paved the way for the Holocaust (cf. Nielsen 2017).
For each case, a short summary of the atrocity is given for a broad understanding, then follows the analysis of the seven mentioned factors in the methods section.
The Holocaust
Arguably the most commonly known atrocity committed by Germans, the Holocaust is a powerful example of an atrocity to be analysed when it comes to the question of acknowledging guilt as the Holocaust laid the ground for its own research fields: Genocide studies and later also the narrower field of the Holocaust studies. As mentioned in the introduction, Germany is often praised for its “Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung” (Norris 2021) and will be a positive example of the following comparative analysis.
“The Holocaust was the systematic, state-sponsored persecution and murder of six million Jews by the Nazi regime and its allies and collaborators” (USHMM w.D.a). Hitler’s goal was the killing of the whole European Jews, a strategy which he used the euphemism “final solution of the Jewish question” for (von Kellenbach 2013: 15). At the Conference at Wannensee, Berlin in 1942, details on the strategy were decided, fixing it on the plan of killing eleven million Jews living in Europe.
Contemporary Germany expresses a high level of political will in the leadership to deal with Germany’s responsibility and guilt regarding the Holocaust. In the coalition treaty for the government of 2021-2025, the word “Holocaust” is mentioned five times and the responsibility for the care and treatment of Holocaust survivors is stressed (SPD et al. 2021: 110). Acting Federal President Steinmeier’s speech (2023) at the commemorative day of the 80th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising was referred to in the introduction of this paper. Acting chancellor Scholz held a speech on International Holocaust Remembrance Day in 2022, warning that the horrors of the Holocaust will be forgotten if contemporary witnesses die and has admonished that Germany must not allow this to happen (Scholz, cited after Bundesregierung 2022). Those statements show exemplary that the contemporary German body of government and state leadership has a high motivation in remembering and expressing German guilt towards Holocaust survivors. But, German polities also stress that relations between Germany and Israel have to be viewed in the context of Germany’s guilt regarding the Holocaust. Chancellor Scholz (cited after Strack 2023) said that as Germany committed the genocide of European Jews, “every German government bears permanent responsibility for the security of the State of Israel and the protection of Jewish life”.
Even though the international community praises Germany today for dealing with its bloody past (cf. Norris 2021), international pressure after the end of WWII played a key role in Germany’s dealing with the Holocaust. Especially after the horrors of the mass killings in the concentration and destruction camps became visible to the world because of the liberators of those camps and their witness reports, journalists, and high-ranking political actors like the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe and later the US president Eisenhower, international pressure increased. Eisenhower acted with foresight in identifying the importance of eyewitness accounts of the camps. “I made the visit deliberately, in order to be in a position to give first-hand evidence of these things if ever, in the future, there develops a tendency to charge these allegations merely to ‘propaganda’”, he said (cited after USHMM w.D.b) after visiting the Ohrduf camp. This international pressure led to the Conference of Potsdam where the Allied Powers decided on Germany’s future (cf. bpb 2019) as well as the Nuremberg trials, the first-ever international military tribunal to persecute individuals committing atrocities.
The Nuremberg Trials were, therefore, a precedent with far-reaching consequences for international (criminal) law. During the primary trials, three defendants were acquitted, twelve were sentenced to death, and seven were charged with imprisonment (Kirsch 2005: 2). With the verdict of the trial, guilt was attributed to individual actors, but with the Conference of Potsdam and the goals for the reconstruction of Germany, where denazification was a declared goal (bpb 2019), the individual guilt was expanded in the form that Nazi socialist ideology was recognised as the cause of the Holocaust and that ideology had to be systematically removed from society. Further, due to the rule of law judicial processes, future peace should be strengthened as the change in international law and especially the strengthening of international human rights should prevent future predators from committing mass atrocities (Kirsch 2005: 3).
The eyewitness accounts of the liberators of the concentration and destruction camps also played a crucial role in the extensive historical evidence and research: The Holocaust may be considered to be the best-documented genocide in history. But also bureaucracy of the Nazi regime helped with gaining important insights into the Holocaust and its dimensions (cf. Palamarchuk et al. 2019). Up until today, historical evidence of the Holocaust is collected, archived, and reviewed on a grand scale like museums (e.g. the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum or former concentration camps being remodelled into museums for means of education and remembrance like the former destruction camp Auschwitz or the concentration camp Dachau). The academic field of Holocaust studies is dedicated only to this one particular genocide in its research. But not only do academics or bigger institutions play an important role in looking up evidence on predators, crimes, and victims of the Holocaust, but also smaller civil associations work hard on discovering local links and insights into the Holocaust and other atrocities committed by the Nazis. For example, a small association conducts research on former workers at a work camp at Überlingen, Lake Constance, and is dedicated to the education of civil society on the former camp in the region (cf. Dokumentationsstätte Goldbacher Stollen und KZ Aufkirch in Überlingen e.V. w.D.). Additionally, contemporary interviews and testimonials of Holocaust survivors and other involved people like the liberators of former concentration camps complement the conducted research and add an emotional and moral perspective to the remembrance of the Holocaust (Beyer et al. 2020).
During WWII, genocide had not been a crime under International Criminal Law yet, but the intensity of the mass-destruction of one people led to a change in international law. A more general change happened when the classical international law was modernized, restricting the unconditional sovereignty of states (Krell & Schlotter 2018: 112f). But, as Sarkin (2009: 11) states even though not known under the names “crimes against humanity” or “genocide”, atrocities had already been illegal due to human rights law. The United Nations (UN) and therefore, the international community acknowledged for the first time that citizens should be protected from state abuse. Also, atrocities were then specifically considered crimes under international criminal law (Global Centre R2P 2018). It is important to notice that even though sovereignty was not restricted by the time of the Holocaust, Nazi Germany ignored by starting WWII and the later occupation of external territories the sovereignty of other nations (Smith et al. 1992: 336f).
Historical context and time also play a role as to why states do not acknowledge guilt directly after committing an atrocity. As Jaspers (2001: 41) stated, the first answer to an accusation is defence. Responses, after the Germans were confronted with evidence of the horrors of the concentration and destruction camps, were shock and denial of knowledge even though some camps were directly next to German villages (Steinhoff 2001). But incidents like the “Kristallnacht” are indicators of the high level of antisemitism in Germany during the whole time of the Nazi regime (Honig 2021). Also, historians show that the Nazi regime made the concentration camps public (Steinhoff 2001). There is a statement issued by former chancellor Adenauer to the parliament in 1951, acknowledging the awareness of the suffering imposed by Germans and asking for forgiveness for German crimes. Even though he talked about the willingness of reparation payments toward Israel, the speech was not interpreted as an official acknowledgement of guilt in literature, but rather as a first step to shaping a new image for Germany (Löwenheim 2009: 549). Also, in 1951, West Germany still had not regained its whole sovereignty due to the occupation of the Allied Powers (bpb 2019). Former chancellor Brandt’s highly emotional and symbolic apology and acknowledgement of guilt in the form of the “knee fall” in Warsaw in 1970 (cf. Hille et al. 2020) is considered the first acknowledgement of guilt regarding the Holocaust of a high-ranking German politician. This apology may have been influenced by the process of Holocaust orchestrator Eichmann in Israel in 1961 (Honig 2021) and the following Auschwitz trials in Frankfurt (Wildt 2012).
The debate of guilt on a political level and in academics may be important for international politics, and conflict management and probably will help overcome past conflicts and help get at least some closure for Holocaust victims, but for collective emotions, public opinion of Germans regarding German guilt felt towards the Holocaust is crucial as well. If one should feel guilty about something, one must know about the situation/incident one should feel guilty about. However, knowledge of the Holocaust starts to fade in Germany. Asked in a study, 40 % of 18- to 34-year-olds said that they knew nothing or little about the Holocaust (Zeit Online 2018). At the same time people think that antisemitism is on the rise in Europe and consider it a problem (ibid.) Still, these study results are surprising as the Holocaust is deeply implemented in German educational systems (cf. KMK 2005). Almost half of the Germans think that they talked “rather much” or “very much” about the past of National Socialism in school (Stiftung Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft 2021). According to a study from 2020, 32 % of the interviewed acknowledged shame and 82 % believe that Germans have collective guilt regarding the Holocaust and the beginning of WWII. One in four people wants to draw a line under the past National Socialism and 6 % are not interested in the topic at all (Die Zeit 2020). In conclusion, collective guilt regarding the Holocaust is widely acknowledged in German civil society and only a minority neglects that.
The Genocide of the Herero and Nama
In 2021, Germany acknowledged the mass killing of the Herero and Nama in 1904 (Maas, cited after Auswärtiges Amt 2021). Even though guilt was acknowledged, dealing with the past atrocity differs greatly from dealing with the Holocaust.
Today’s territory of Namibia was colonised by Germany in 1884. Since the beginning of the colonisation of the region, there had been repeated uprisings, but the climax was reached in 1904 when more and more German settlers bought land in the colony and human rights violations and racial segregation became more frequent and intense. The Herero started to fight back and after the battle at the Waterberg on August 11th and 12th, 1904, German General von Trotha issued an order for the extermination of the Herero. Tens of thousands of Herero people who fled into the desert died of thirst. Because the Nama people started an uprising as well, an extermination order was issued for them as well. In total, about 80 % of the Hereros were killed, numbers of death vary between 54 000 and 100 000 people (bpb 2021).
During WWI, Germany had to surrender the former colony. For decades, there were no special relations between Germany and Namibia. It was not until 1990 that Germany started development cooperation, but did not yet speak out about the genocide (Boehme 2020: 243f). In 2004, at the 100th anniversary of the Genocide, the then-Development Minister Wieczorek-Zeul issued an apology for the past atrocities, but the then-German government distanced itself from the speech (ibid.: 245). Also, Wieczorek-Zeul attributed the guilt to General von Trotha only (Sarkin 2009: 133). A second momentum started in 2015 when a delegation of Hereros visited the Federal President with a petition for comprehensive compensation and reparation (bpb 2021), and then-President of Parliament Lammert named the crimes against the Herero and Nama genocide and acknowledged the intent of destruction of the two peoples by Germans (Tagesschau 2015). Political actors of the opposition had been demanding an acknowledgement of guilt even before that (ibid.; Boehme 2020: 239) Talks with Namibia were started and after five years, then-Foreign Minister Maas (Auswärtiges Amt 2021) formally acknowledged Germany’s guilt regarding the Genocide of the Herero and Nama. Germany started to support Namibia with 1,1 billion Euros, but they were not framed as official reparation payments, but rather as a reconstruction and development programme (ibid.). Generally speaking, the German government coalitions acted more reactively than proactively (Boehme 2020: 238). In the coalition treaty of the acting German government, regarding Namibia, the word “genocide” is not mentioned, but the parties spoke of a special historical and moral responsibility towards Namibia and plan to work on a reconciliation agreement with Namibia (SPD et al. 2021: 126).
It is contested if the British Empire knew about the Genocide of the Herero and Nama while it was still ongoing. But, the colonies were entangled regions and it is probable that the flow of merchants brought information from the German to the British colonial territory. Still, the British did not speak out about the Genocide and mass violence until 1915 (Nielsen 2017: 319f). The Hereros had been campaigning for an official apology and reparations for a long time with the success of attracting international media and the spread of information about the Herero Genocide in museums (Anderson 2005: 1185). But, international media coverage always is the biggest after actions of Germany (cf. e.g. Burke 2016; BBC 2021). Ironically, before acknowledging the Herero Genocide as genocide, German politicians put pressure on Türkiye to acknowledge its guilt in the Armenian Genocide (Tagesschau 2015).
Regarding a transitional justice process, there has been no criminal trial comparable to the Nuremberg trials or other trials of Nazi perpetrators. Reparation payments may be regarded as such a process (Boehme 2020: 240), but Germany is keen on stressing that the 1,1 billion Euros are not to be understood as reparations, but as developmental aid (Auswärtiges Amt 2021). There have been only symbolic transitional justice processes in the form of apologies (Boehme 2020: 240). But, the Hereros tried to sue German companies for compensation in the US in 2001 (Sarkin 2009: 148).
Literature on the Genocide of the Herero and Nama remains relatively thin, but historical research in the form of oral communication is exhaustive. “Unlike any other group that took part in this research, the Herero/Mbanderu respondents were able to track the direct impact of the war on their own families, providing both the names of people who had died and the places where they died” (Erichsen 2008 cited after Sarkin 2011: 28).
But, European powers also conducted research of the former German colony after the WWI. One of the most important documents may be the so-called “Blue Book”, to which the Germans answered with the “White Book” (Nielsen 2017: 319f). Both books were about the empires accusing each other of violence in the colonies. As mentioned, connections between the Holocaust and the Herero Genocide have been made in academic literature, but more research points to the Herero Genocide being more similar to general colonial warfare and violence than the Holocaust (ibid.: 317f). Overall it can be concluded, that there is enough historical evidence and research done to attribute guilt without fault to Germany.
It was a widely used excuse of German politicians not to deal with the Genocide of the Herero and Nama and the missing need to issue an acknowledgement of guilt because in 1904 (Sarkin 2009: 1), genocide had not yet been illegal under international law but violence against indigenous people in the colonial territories was considered a legitimate political instrument by the European empires (Krell & Schlotter 2018: 109). But as already mentioned, other scholars make the argument that even though the crimes had not been known under the terms “crimes against humanity” and “genocide”, human rights law had been including protection of these crimes already in 1904 (Sarkin 2009: 11).
With issuing the White Book as a response to the Blue Book, in the dimension of historical context and time it becomes clear that states are not ready to acknowledge guilt shortly after the committed atrocity. In this case, Germany issued a book, pointing the finger at other Empires rather than reflecting on its own mistakes (Nielsen 2017: 319f). Also, the racist and imperialistic interpretation of international law allowing violence against indigenous people in the colonial territory (Krell & Schlotter 2018: 109) arguably helped to justify violence against the Herero and Nama in Germany. Even though the normative pressure for apologies for former atrocities rose in the 21st century (Boehme 2020: 238), Germany waited a long time to give in to the pressure. Only 100 years after the genocide, a first apology was issued (Tagesschau 2015), and only after 117 years after the atrocity was there an official acknowledgement of guilt. The fact that German governments are so reticent about admitting guilt may also be due to the general colonial context. Not only were there crimes against humanity in German colonies, but the numbers of indigenous people in colonies worldwide have declined sharply. The case of the Herero Genocide could thus become a precedent for how former colonial powers deal with their guilt (Sarkin 2009: 155f).
After WWII, the German civil society was glad that their colonial past was not under the microscope like in Britain and France (Boehme 2020: 244) as the guilt of the Holocaust was enough to deal with (ibid.: 249). Knowledge of the German colonial era is generally speaking relatively low in the German population (ibid.) even though according to the educational plan for German schools, German colonialism should be talked about (Pelz 2021). Regarding emotional influences on German colonialism, only 9 % of Germans feel that German colonialism should be connected with pride, and 20 % feel that it should be connected with shame (YouGov 2020), indicating that colonialism is only an emotional topic for about three in ten Germans, but it is viewed more negatively than positively. In an international comparison, Germans are the least proud of their colonial past (ibid.). As there is only little general knowledge and historical reappraisal of German colonial times, there is no data about the emotional assessment of Germans regarding specifically the Holocaust of the Herero and Nama. Generally speaking, if there is a debate on colonialism, it is a “white” debate, neglecting black German people as descendants of formerly colonised people (de Wolff 2021: 370). There are, however, civil associations criticising the way Germany deals with its colonial past (DW 2021) which indicates that at least a part of Germans is ready to deal more with Germany’s colonial past. Also, descendants of General von Trotha “expressed deep shame over their ancestor’s actions and apologised”, but did not want to get involved in the political process of Germany acknowledging guilt for the atrocity as a state (BBC 2007). An experimental study showed that Germans are ready to feel collective guilt regarding the Genocide of the Herero and Nama when they believe that the descendants of the victims still suffer because of the past atrocity today (cf. Imhoff et al. 2013).
Comparison
The analysis of the two case studies shows that the analysed factors were influential in both cases even under different circumstances. While we can see the political will regarding the Holocaust being driven forward by people of the governments, political will regarding the acknowledgement of guilt for the Herero Genocide has been evident for two decades as well, even though more located in oppositional powers. Future research should focus on the motivations behind this difference. Also, in a more extensive analysis, the political resistance of members of parliament and political parties should be investigated to paint a more detailed picture of German polity.
International pressure has influenced German politics regarding the acknowledgement of guilt as well. In the case of the Holocaust, this international pressure was most prominent by the Allied Powers whereas with the Herero Genocide, the descendants of the victims of the Genocide successfully played a key role. The role of the international community in pressuring Germany to acknowledge guilt should be explored further. Especially the political debate on colonial atrocities must be analysed further to see how states can be nudged to acknowledge guilt regarding past atrocities. The fact that Britain allegedly knew about the Herero Genocide and did not pressure Germany into stopping the genocide during the atrocity or into an acknowledgment of guilt after the genocide indicates that there is a fundamental difference in dealing with atrocities in a colonial context and atrocities in Europe.
There is no equivalent to the Nuremberg Trials in the case of the Herero Genocide, which is why it is noted that even without the presence of transitional justice processes, the guilt of atrocities can be acknowledged. But, following the logic of Cribb (cf. 2018), collective guilt should be felt maybe even more intense, if the individual perpetrators were not convicted for their crimes. However, the analysis does not show indicators of collective guilt felt by Germans for the Genocide of the Herero and Nama even though none of the perpetrators were convicted. A possible explanation for the lack of guilt despite the missing convictions of the perpetrators could be the missing education on the topic among Germans. Even though the literature on the Holocaust is more exhaustive, historical evidence was enough to prove Germany’s guilt in the Herero Genocide as well.
In both cases, genocide had not been recognized as an atrocity crime. During the Herero Genocide, Germany did not break international law as violence towards indigenous people in colonies was not illegal, but with WWII and the persecution, deportation, and mass killing of foreign citizens, Nazi Germany broke international law. This may be an explanation for why the international pressure by the international community was bigger regarding the Holocaust than it was regarding the Herero Genocide. This follows only the logic that genocide and crimes against humanities were not considered illegal under International Criminal Law and that Human Rights Law is to be ignored.
Collective amnesia and negation of involvement and guilt played a role in both genocides, but the first acknowledgment of guilt regarding the Holocaust was issued much earlier than the first acknowledgment of guilt regarding the Herero Genocide. Some historians see the reason behind this as the Germans were busy coming to terms with the Holocaust and could not deal with committed atrocities under colonial rule.
This is also evident in the Germans dealing with the Holocaust. Still today, general knowledge about the Holocaust is much higher than general knowledge about German colonialism, let alone the Herero Genocide. While a broad majority of Germans feels collective guilt for the Holocaust, for most people, colonialism is not linked to emotions. The acknowledgment of guilt regarding the Herero Genocide was almost entirely a political process with little involvement of private people. This suggests that states can acknowledge guilt even though their citizens may not feel the same way. But, the experimental study shows that Germans are willing to feel collective guilt given that they are educated on the topic. More research is needed to confirm this tendency.
This research is not exhaustive of factors that may influence states to acknowledge guilt regarding past atrocities. Rather, the influence of these seven factors was examined as a starting point and should be reviewed in future research in further detail.
Conclusion
(Collective) Guilt plays an important role in international politics and relations. Intergroup conflict remains one of the challenges in intergroup communications and relations. Social identity theory shows that emotions connected to social identity can cause, intensify, and prolong intergroup conflicts because of the need to have a positive image of one’s ingroup, often connected to the devaluation of the outgroup. Therefore, intergroup conflicts and atrocities become more likely.
Furthermore, this paper has not only stressed the influence of (collective) guilt on international politics and relations but also that Germany may be viewed as a role model regarding its “Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung” (Norris 2021) of the Holocaust, but Germany is not to be viewed as a general role model for historical reappraisal. Germany’s politics show that it views the Holocaust in a different light than colonial atrocities like the Genocide of the Herero and Nama. This could have different explanations which have to be researched further. International pressure, historical evidence and research, and historical time and context seemed to have the biggest influence on the acknowledgment of guilt in the analysis, maybe also political will and leadership, even though leading political actors in the process of the acknowledgment of guilt differed. Future research is needed to explore the influences of the seven analysed factors more. This paper can be used as a starting point for this.
But, further research is especially needed regarding the acknowledgment of colonial atrocities in general of the former European empires. With research showing that the Herero Genocide was more similar to other colonial atrocities than the Holocaust, comparative analyses of the dealing with colonial history and guilt regarding atrocities in former European empires are needed to identify factors influencing the acknowledgment of guilt by those states. Like the Holocaust studies, dealing with colonial atrocities could make up its own field of academia to help victims and their descendants to be heard in their demands of acknowledgment of guilt by their former colonizers. Acknowledging guilt regarding colonial atrocities, under the condition that it and the following appeal for forgiveness is sincere, is likely to better bilateral relations and help overcome colonial structures in the international community. This could then turn to better relations in the international community in general.
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