This article looks at how failed mediation and international court decisions played out in the Sudan v. United Arab Emirates case that ended at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The case started because Sudan couldn’t stop the UAE from possibly helping with genocide in Darfur through diplomacy. When talks didn’t work, Sudan took the case to court. But the ICJ said it couldn’t hear the case on May 5, 2025, because the UAE had a reservation under Article IX of the 1948 Genocide Convention. This stopped the court from looking at the main claims. The court’s choice shows how international courts can be limited when diplomacy doesn’t work. By accepting the UAE’s reservation, the court avoided looking at actions that could be against international law. This decision shows a conflict between respecting a country’s choice not to be part of a treaty and keeping the treaty’s goals alive. Even in serious crises, the court didn’t question the reservation. By not going through with the case, the court raises big questions about whether legal courts can really be a last hope for justice. The article suggests this ruling might make the international community rethink how it handles such cases. Will they improve and better coordinate mediation before legal steps are taken? Or will they keep depending on weak rules and delay justice? The court’s decision not only changes how Article IX is seen but also how the world thinks about the link between diplomacy failing and the use of legal processes to stop genocide.
KEYWORDS: Article IX, Diplomatic Mediation Failure, Genocide Convention, International Court Jurisdiction, International Court Limitations, Reservation to Treaties, State Sovereignty vs. International Law.
COLLAPSE OF MEDIATION & TURN TO LEGAL RECOURSE:
When mediation breaks down, how much can countries depend on international courts to settle disputes? This article explores that question by looking at the Sudan v. United Arab Emirates case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Before diving into the case, let’s understand why mediation failed in this situation and what mediation actually is. Mediation has always been a key way to resolve international disagreements under Article 33 of the UN Charter (UN Charter, art.33). It’s a political process where third parties help conflicting countries reach an agreement, often focusing on things like stopping fighting, building trust, and creating long-term peace plans. Unlike court proceedings, mediation depends on both sides wanting to cooperate and being willing to compromise, which makes it vulnerable when trust is low or interests are in conflict.
In Sudan’s case, mediation began with efforts to create a peace plan that included a quick ceasefire, steps to build trust, and setting up a transitional government. Regional and global powers encouraged Sudan to participate in the High-Level Dialogue Support Framework (HDSF), with the UAE playing a big role in supporting ceasefire deals and giving humanitarian aid. The UAE contributed over USD 200 million in humanitarian assistance, used fourteen planes and a special aid ship, and worked to improve South-South relations through trade, infrastructure, and renewable energy projects in Africa( Ahmad, 2025). However, these mediation efforts eventually failed.
Even though the UAE used diplomacy to help people in need, its alleged support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) damaged its reputation as a neutral mediator. The Sudanese government felt the process was unfair and that important issues like accountability and security weren’t properly addressed. Also, different diplomatic efforts didn’t coordinate well enough to stop the escalating violence, especially the threat from the RSF to El Fasher, a city with hundreds of thousands of people. The violence was so serious that it became a major humanitarian crisis.
Even though mediation in theory should have helped reduce tensions and reach peace, in practice it didn’t work because of conflicting international interests, the weakness of voluntary diplomacy, and the urgency of the genocide. With mediation failing, Sudan had no choice but to turn to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a last option to get relief measures to stop more damage to the Masalit people.
After diplomatic efforts failed and the UAE continued to support the RSF despite international criticism and UN reports, Sudan had no other option but to seek judicial intervention. (Spivey,2025) With the mediation process broken and the violence getting worse, especially the threat to El Fasher, Sudan had to go to the ICJ as a last resort to secure urgent provisional measures to prevent further irreparable harm to the Masalit people.
Starting the Sudan v. UAE case at the ICJ came directly from the complete failure of diplomatic approaches to deal with the conflict in Sudan. This case serves as a critical case study on the interplay between collapsed political mediation and the subsequent, often compelled, turn to international adjudication. Despite mounting international condemnation and detailed reports from UN panels of experts, multiple and uncoordinated diplomatic initiatives proved incapable of curtailing the alleged support provided by the UAE to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)(Wintour,2025). With the mediation process collapsed and genocidal violence escalating, particularly the imminent RSF threat to El Fasher, a city sheltering hundreds of thousands, the Sudanese government perceived judicial intervention as its final recourse. As articulated in its application, Sudan was compelled to turn to the ICJ as a last resort to secure urgent provisional measures to prevent further irreparable harm to the Masalit people. Therefore, this legal action wasn’t a choice but a necessity because diplomatic efforts failed.
However, the ICJ dismissed the case on May 5, 2025, showing the big limits of international law as a backup option. The Court’s ruling, pivoting on the UAE’s reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention, demonstrates how procedural sovereignty can trump substantive justice, even concerning allegations of jus cogens violations (Genocide Convention, 1951). The majority opinion, based on cases like DRC v. Rwanda, said the UAE’s refusal was clearly written and matched the Convention’s goals, which it said only related to the Court’s authority, not substantive obligations (ICJ, 2025, Order, para. 31). This technical legalism effectively foreclosed any legal scrutiny of the core allegations, rendering the judicial forum a dead end.
This outcome validates the concerns raised in the Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion, which argued that the Court’s summary removal of the case at the provisional measures stage effectively “punishes Sudan for seeking provisional measures” and deprived it of a full hearing on significant questions of international law, The narrow 9-7 vote on removing the case from the General List highlights the deep judicial division on this procedural approach, underscoring that the jurisdiction was far from “manifestly” lacking in the eyes of nearly half the bench (Joint Partly Dissenting opinion, 2025). Judge ad hoc Simma, in his declaration, further contended that the Court missed a pivotal opportunity to reassess the validity of such reservations in light of the Convention’s raison d’être.
Consequently, the case illustrates a defining paradox: a state, compelled to seek legal recourse due to the collapse of political channels, found its case dismissed on a procedural technicality that is itself the subject of intense legal and doctrinal debate. This raises profound questions about the viability of legal forums as instruments of last resort (Germany v. Italy, 2012).
The verdict suggests that without reform, the international community risks maintaining a system where fragile procedural doctrines, such as the acceptance of broad reservations to compromissory clauses, can indefinitely delay or outright deny justice for the most severe international crimes, even as diplomatic efforts continue to falter (Carli, 2025).
ICJ’s PROCEDURAL APPROACH: ARTICLE IX RESERVATIONS:
Oral pleadings by Sudan’s counsel detail the UAE’s Article IX reservation, elaborated on the history of Article IX reservations, comparative state practice, and interpretive ambiguity, the International Court of Justice’s handling of the UAE’s reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention represents a steadfast adherence to a formalistic, consent-based view of its jurisdiction, ultimately serving as the procedural linchpin for the dismissal of Sudan’s case (Sudan v. UAE, 2025). This approach, while consistent with long-standing precedent, has drawn significant criticism for prioritizing procedural sovereignty over substantive justice, particularly in a case alleging violations of a jus cogens norm (Becker, 2025).
Sudan mounted a multifaceted challenge against the UAE’s reservation during oral pleadings. He argued that the reservation’s wording was ambiguous, as it omitted the specific phrase “including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide” found in Article IX itself, creating interpretive uncertainty about its intended scope. More fundamentally, Sudan contended that even if the reservation’s effect was clear, it was prima facie incompatible with the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention. Sudan emphasized the Convention’s uniqueness, arguing it “is unique among the human rights conventions in allowing for and depending upon immediate direct access to the Court as the sole available international judicial forum” for interstate enforcement, lacking any treaty body for supervision.
The ICJ’s majority, however, swiftly dismissed these arguments. The Court found the UAE’s reservation to be “formulated in clear terms” and concluded that its omission of certain language did “not result in any uncertainty as to its effects”. Crucially, the Court reaffirmed its contentious jurisprudence from DRC v. Rwanda, drawing a sharp distinction between substantive obligations and dispute settlement mechanisms ( Sudan v. UAE, 2025).
The majority held that a reservation to Article IX “does not affect substantive obligations relating to acts of genocide” but merely excludes “a particular method of settling a dispute”; consequently, it was not incompatible with the Convention’s object and purpose. This reasoning allowed the Court to sidestep a substantive examination of the alleged genocide and find a “manifest lack of jurisdiction,” leading it to remove the case from its General List.
This procedural outcome has profound implications. By refusing to re-evaluate the validity of Article IX reservations, the ICJ effectively insulated the UAE’s alleged actions from judicial scrutiny. This approach has been robustly challenged in the dissenting opinions. A joint partly dissenting opinion of six judges criticized the “rush to judgment,” arguing that the complex legal questions surrounding the reservation’s validity and its evolution since DRC v. Rwanda deserved a full hearing in a preliminary objections phase, not summary dismissal at the provisional measures stage (Joint Partly Dissenting opinion, 2025). This sentiment was echoed by scholar Carli (2025), who argued that for a convention establishing erga omnes partes obligations, the compromiser clause is not a peripheral procedural mechanism but an essential enforcement tool integral to the treaty’s raison d’être ( Carli, 2025). From this perspective, a reservation that eviscerates this enforcement mechanism fundamentally undermines the Convention’s object and purpose.
The Court’s decision underscores a deep tension within the international legal order. While the prohibition of genocide is a peremptory norm, its adjudication remains contingent on state consent to jurisdiction. The ICJ’s procedural approach in Sudan v. UAE demonstrates that the Court remains unwilling to challenge the legitimacy of reservations, even those that potentially create an accountability gap for the world’s most serious crimes. As Becker acknowledges, while such reservations may be a “disgrace,” decades of practice cement their validity under the current judicial framework. The ruling thus reaffirms that the ICJ’s role as a guardian of international law is ultimately constrained by the very principle of state consent it is tasked to uphold.
TENSION BETWEEN STATE CONSENT AND THE CONVENTION’S OBJECT AND PURPOSE:
The core legal battle in Sudan v. UAE centered on a fundamental tension in public international law: the primacy of state consent versus the imperative to uphold the object and purpose of a peremptory norm. Sudan’s counsel, Mr. Wordsworth, mounted a vigorous challenge against the UAE’s Article IX reservation, arguing that a formalistic interpretation prioritizing consent would eviscerate the very essence of the Genocide Convention (Sudan v. UAE, 2025).
Central to Sudan’s pleadings was the contention that the Genocide Convention is sui generis. Unlike other treaties, it was created not to facilitate reciprocal state interests but to protect “the right of groups to exist” and to fulfill a “purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose,” as the ICJ itself recognized in its 1951 Advisory Opinion. Mr. Wordsworth emphasized that the Convention is uniquely reliant on the ICJ as “the sole available international judicial forum” for interstate enforcement, lacking any treaty body for supervision. Consequently, a reservation that entirely severs this judicial enforcement mechanism cannot be a mere procedural formality; it strikes at the heart of the Convention’s raison d’être. To allow a state to commit to the substantive prohibitions of genocide while opting out of the only mechanism to adjudicate alleged violations would, in the view of Sudan’s counsel, create a fatal contradiction, rendering the Convention’s guarantees illusory and incompatible with its object and purpose.
This argument was grounded in a teleological interpretation of the treaty, urging the Court to look beyond the text of the reservation to its ultimate effect. Sudan invoked the ILC’s Guide to Practice on Reservations, which cautions against reservations that “purport to exclude or modify the legal effect of a provision of the treaty essential to its raison d’être.” In a convention establishing erga omnes partes obligations—rights owed to the international community as a whole—the compromissory clause in Article IX is not a dispensable procedural accessory but the essential engine for collective enforcement. A reservation that disables this engine, Sudan argued, is inherently incompatible with the Convention’s cooperative, communitarian structure designed to safeguard “common interests.”
The Court’s majority, however, reaffirmed the orthodox, consent-based view. It found the UAE’s reservation to be “formulated in clear terms” and, crucially, held that it was not incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention (Babu& Garimella, 2025). This reasoning, echoing DRC v. Rwanda, relied on a sharp substantive/procedural distinction: the reservation “bears on the jurisdiction of the Court” but “does not affect substantive obligations relating to acts of genocide themselves.” The majority thus positioned Article IX as merely “a particular method of settling a dispute,” the rejection of which leaves a state’s core legal duties untouched.
This formalistic approach was powerfully criticized in the dissenting and separate opinions, which argued the Court had missed a critical opportunity to evolve its jurisprudence. A Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of six judges lamented the summary dismissal, which prevented a full hearing on whether international law regarding such reservations has developed since DRC v. Rwanda, given the now-established understanding of the Convention’s erga omnes partes character. Judge ad hoc Simma, in his declaration, went further, labelling blanket Article IX reservations a “disgrace” and arguing that the Convention’s unique character means its procedural provisions cannot be isolated from its substantive goals (Milanovi, 2025). Another judge emphasized that the extreme nature of genocide demands a dynamic interpretation, with the Court acting as the guardian of the Convention rather than a passive bystander to its procedural neutralization.
Ultimately, the majority’s decision privileged state sovereignty and procedural certainty over a dynamic interpretation of the Convention’s enforcement. It cemented the validity of Article IX reservations, ensuring they remain a potent shield against judicial scrutiny. However, the forceful dissent underscores a growing normative rift. The verdict leaves unresolved whether a treaty aimed at eradicating the “odious scourge” of genocide can truly tolerate reservations that allow states to immunize themselves from legal accountability for their actions, thereby creating a perilous gap between diplomatic failure and access to justice.
NO MERITS REVIEW: THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCE:
The President and Sudan’s Agent confirm that the Court’s procedural conclusion meant no review of the substantive allegations (Mclntyre,2025), that a critical legal consequence of the provisional measures phase, as underscored by the Court’s own directives and accepted by both Parties, is that the Court’s procedural conclusions are made without any review of the substantive allegations. This principle ensures that the urgent nature of interim relief does not compromise the thorough examination required for a final judgment on the merits.
The Republic of Sudan’s Agent, H.E. Dr Muawia Osman Mohamed Khair, explicitly confirmed his understanding of this procedural limit. In his introductory remarks, he structured Sudan’s presentation to align with the Court’s criteria, separating the argument on jurisdictional challenges from the factual narrative (ICJ, 2025). Most significantly, while detailing the allegations of the UAE’s complicity, he acknowledged that definitive proof was a matter for a later stage, stating: “This will, of course, be the subject of full argument at the merits stage” ( Kennedy, 2025).
This mutual recognition confirms that the purpose of the hearing was procedural and protective. Any Order indicating provisional measures would be founded on a conclusion that Sudan’s assertions are sufficiently credible to warrant protection pending a full investigation, not that they are proven. It implies only that the Court might have jurisdiction, the rights claimed are capable of protection under the Genocide Convention, and there is an urgent need to avert irreparable harm. The substantive determination of whether genocide is occurring and whether the UAE is legally complicit remains entirely reserved for the merits phase, ensuring the final judgment is based on a complete and exhaustive evidentiary record.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE PREVENTION, MEDIATION, AND JUSTICE:
Sudan’s oral argument keeps bringing up the limits and risks of procedural roadblocks. The failure of various diplomatic efforts shows how significant the International Court of Justice’s judgment in the case Jurisdictional Immunities of the State really is. For many, this ruling is deeply troubling and reveals a major issue in the international legal system. For someone studying public international law, this case clearly shows the conflict between two key principles of the system: the procedural idea of sovereign equality, which means state immunity, and the need to follow important international norms (jus cogens) and provide justice when those norms are broken. The Court’s reasoning is a great example of legal formalism and judicial restraint.
It carefully looked at Italy’s arguments and found no support in existing state practices or legal traditions for a jus cogens exception or a “last resort” rule that would override the well-known rule of state immunity for official acts. The Court’s main point—that immunity is a rule about jurisdiction, not about whether an act is legal—is logically sound from a legal standpoint. This supports the traditional idea that disputes between countries should be resolved through diplomacy and agreements between states, not through the courts of one country deciding the actions of another. But despite the legal clarity of the ruling, there’s a moral and practical problem.
The Court itself was surprised and upset about Germany’s handling of the Italian military internees’ claims, recognizing the serious injustice at the heart of the case. Yet, it still said that the right place to deal with this injustice wasn’t the Italian courts, but further talks between the two countries. This creates a difficult situation: the fact that the violation was so serious, making it a breach of a fundamental rule, doesn’t give a national court the power to hear the case. Instead, it emphasizes the need for diplomatic talks between states, the very method that didn’t help the victims for over fifty years.
FOR THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THIS JUDGMENT HAS SEVERAL CRITICAL IMPLICATIONS:
For the future of international law, this decision has major consequences. First, it sets a harmful example by showing that carefully placed reservations can make the Genocide Convention’s enforcement optional. This allows certain states to agree with the Convention’s main principles but still avoid being held legally responsible. This turns the Convention from a legally binding agreement into something that only matters in name for those powerful enough to use these reservations. Second, the ruling weakens the International Court of Justice’s role as a final option for settling disputes. When diplomacy fails, as it did in Sudan, states are left with a court that values following procedures over protecting basic legal rules. This creates a serious problem in holding states accountable. As a result, other methods like universal jurisdiction or actions through the UN Security Council may be considered, but these often face political challenges. In the end, this ruling shows the need for countries that are part of the Convention to work together to challenge these reservations and possibly change the Convention to stop such reservations in Article IX. If this isn’t addressed, the international community must accept that the legal ban on genocide for some countries is more about politics than about law.
CONCLUSION:
The Sudan v. UAE case starkly illustrates a critical dysfunction in the international legal order. The ICJ’s dismissal based on the UAE’s Article IX reservation prioritizes procedural state consent over the substantive enforcement of a jus cogens norm. This formalistic adherence to a rigid consent-based jurisdiction creates a perilous accountability gap, effectively allowing states to endorse the Genocide Convention’s principles while insulating themselves from judicial scrutiny for alleged violations. The ruling validates reservations that neuter the treaty’s sole interstate enforcement mechanism, rendering its guarantees potentially illusory and transforming law into politics. Consequently, when diplomatic mediation fails, judicial recourse is revealed as an uncertain last resort, constrained by the very sovereignty it seeks to regulate. This outcome demands a fundamental reassessment of the permissibility of such reservations to preserve the object and purpose of the Convention and ensure that the prohibition of genocide is supported by accessible and effective adjudication.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
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