Thirty years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a fragile post-conflict state: peace endures, but democratic consolidation and societal reconciliation lag. Dayton’s consociational framework halted violence and ensured short-term stability but entrenched ethnonational divisions, political paralysis, and stalled European integration. This article examines ongoing institutional, societal, and international challenges and proposes targeted reforms to strengthen governance, protect minority rights, and foster cohesion.
Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dayton Peace Agreement, post-conflict governance, reconciliation
Introduction
In December 1995, the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina – commonly known as the Dayton Peace Agreement – brought an end to nearly four years of armed conflict marked by mass atrocities, sieges (such as of Sarajevo), ethnic cleansing, genocide (in Srebrenica), and the displacement of over half the country’s population. The accords not only halted hostilities but also established a complex constitutional framework, codified in Annex 4, which sought to reconcile the country’s three constituent peoples – Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs – within a consociational, highly decentralized political system. While Dayton achieved its immediate objective of silencing the guns, the architecture it created has, three decades later, become both the guarantor of peace and a structural impediment to democratic consolidation, functional governance, and interethnic reconciliation (Toal & Dahlman, 2011; Bose, 2002).
Thirty years on, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains caught between the legacies of war and the demands of European integration. The constitutional order, designed to balance power among ethnonational elites, has entrenched identity-based politics, fostered patronage-driven governance, and hindered meaningful reform. Persistent non-compliance with European Court of Human Rights judgements, most notably Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (2009), underscores the incompatibility of Dayton’s ethnic provisions with fundamental democratic principles (Venice Commission, 2005; Venice Commission, 2012). At the societal level, the endurance of ethnically segregated education systems – symbolised by the “Two Schools Under One Roof” phenomenon – continues to reproduce wartime divisions, limiting the emergence of a shared civic identity (Salcedo, 2023).
The 30th anniversary of Dayton offers not only an occasion for commemoration but also a moment for critical re-evaluation. The internal community’s role, oscillating between assertive intervention and gradual disengagement, has shaped Bosnia’s post-war trajectory in ways that both stabilised and constrained political transformation. With renewed EU engagement, mounting secessionist rhetoric from Republika Srpska, and ongoing debates about constitutional reform, Bosnia faces a decisive juncture: either move beyond the limitations of the Dayton framework or risk perpetuating a cycle of institutional paralysis, deepening ethnopolitical fragmentation. This article examines the post-Dayton settlement’s successes and failures, with particular attention to institutional design, societal cohesion, and the prospects for sustainable reform, before advancing policy-oriented solutions aimed at aligning Bosnia’s governance with both democratic norms and the imperatives of long-term stability.
Post-Dayton Bosnia
The Dayton Framework: Successes and Built-in Limitations
The Dayton Peace Agreement, negotiated in November 1995 at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, stands as one of the most detailed and rigid post-conflict settlements in modern history. Its institutional design, codified in Annex 4 (the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina), established a consociational arrangement intended to accommodate the mentioned three constituent peoples of the country within a single sovereign framework. In practice, this meant the creation of two highly autonomous entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), predominantly Bosniak and Croat, and the Republika Srpska (RS), predominantly Serb, alongside the self-governing Brčko District under international supervision.
From a conflict resolution perspective, Dayton achieved its principal aim: it brought an immediate and durable cessation of hostilities, halted mass atrocities, and provided a framework for the return of displaced persons under Annex 7. It also embedded robust mechanisms for international oversight, most notably the Office of the High Representative (OHR), endowed with so-called “Bonn Powers” to impose laws and remove obstructive officials. In the short term, these measures prevented a relapse into armed conflict and ensured a degree of stability in a highly polarised post-war environment (Bose, 2002).
However, the very architecture that ended the war has, over time, become a source of chronic dysfunction. The rigid ethnic quotas for high political office, the identity-based veto powers, and the complex layering of governance have entrenched identity-based politics and incentivised obstructionism. Rather than fostering cross-ethnic coalitions or a shared civic identity, the system has reinforced the wartime division of territory and political authority. The persistence of these arrangements has been widely critiqued by scholars and international sectors alike. A key illustration of this is the mentioned Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina case (2009), in which the European Court of Human Rights found that Bosnia’s constitution – by allowing only Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs to run for the tripartite Presidency and the House of the Peoples – discriminates against citizens from other ethnic backgrounds, such as Roma (Dervo Sejdić) and Jews (Jakob Finci), underscoring their incompatibility with democratic equality and the European integration process.
Three decades later, Dayton remains both a shield and a cage: it safeguards Bosnia’s fragile peace yet constrains the political imagination necessary for substantive reform. The challenge, therefore, lies not in dismantling the framework wholesale – an approach likely to destabilise the tense post-war balance – but in reconfiguring its provisions to enable functional governance, protect minority rights, and align with Bosnia’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights.
Persistent Ethnopolitical Divisions and Governance Paralysis
While the agreement ended armed conflict, it also embedded ethnicity as the foundation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political order. This architecture has hardened into a structural barrier to functional governance. Political parties in the country rarely compete on policy platforms; instead, elections are framed as zero-sum contests to defend ethnic prerogatives. This logic fuels electoral cycles dominated by fear-based mobilisation rather than programmatic debate, leaving cross-ethnic political cooperation both rare and politically costly (Bieber, 2006).
These divisions are not abstract – they manifest in everyday governance failures. The “Two Schools Under One Roof” arrangement, that started as a temporary measure to integrate displaced kids, is still present in parts of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and symbolises a broader unwillingness to invest and promote integrative institutions. Children of different ethnic groups attend classes in the same building but are physically separate, follow different curricula, and even enter through different doors; this separation perpetuates stereotypes from an early age and undermines the development of a shared civic identity (OSCE, 2018). In the judiciary, recruitment patterns often mirror political and ethnic affiliations, undermining perceptions of impartiality (European Commission, 2022).
Policy deadlock has repeatedly blocked reforms in areas ranging from environmental regulation to public healthcare, illustrating that the paralysis is not only institutional but also deeply rooted in political culture. Beyond institutions, public discourse remains polarised by competing victimhood narratives in which each ethnic group frames itself as having suffered the most during the 1992-1995 war. These narratives fuel denial of atrocities committed by one’s own side and create ongoing disputes over memorialisation, with separate monuments, commemorations, and historical accounts reinforcing divided collective memories, lacking countrywide policies to deal with the past, including strategies on transitional justice. Leaders engage in historical revisionism … genocide denial and glorification of war criminals … contesting established facts and the impartiality of tribunals” (European Commission, 2022, p.29)
Entity-level dynamics further complicate the state’s functionality. Republika Srpska’s leadership, under Milorad Dodik, has pursued a strategy of gradual institutional withdrawal – boycotting state institutions, blocking legislation, and creating parallel administrative structures (International Crisis Group, 2014). In the Federation, disputes over electoral reform have pitted Bosniak and Croat political actors against each other, with the latter insisting on mechanisms to guarantee “legitimate representation” in the Presidency. Both trends weaken central authority, reinforce entity autonomy, and erode cohesion of the state.
International oversight, once decisive, now struggles against diminishing leverage and waning consensus among external factors. The Office of the High Representative remains formally empowered to intervene, yet its willingness to use the “Bonn Powers” has decreased, partly to encourage local ownership, partly due to geopolitical fragmentation among the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) members – where Western states generally support a more assertive role for the OHR, while Russia (and occasionally others) advocate reducing its authority and closing the office altogether. The EU’s conditionality framework – trying to improve accession prospects through constitutional reform- has failed to generate breakthroughs, as domestic elites feel their domination threatens and blocks reforms without immediate political cost (Brljavac, 2011). This stalemate has kept Bosnia in perpetual transition, formally post-conflict yet unable to decisively move toward consolidated peace and governance.
The State of Peace in 2025
Three decades after Dayton, Bosnia and Herzegovina presents a unique lens through which to assess the long-term outcomes of international mediation. While the formal conflict ended in 1995, the country’s trajectory since then demonstrates that peace maintenance is not solely a product of institutional design but also of evolving political, social, and international dynamics. By 2025, Bosnia’s post-conflict landscape is characterised less by overt violence than systemic stagnation, institutional fragility, and the continued salience of ethnic divisions, all of which complicate both governance and societal reconciliation.
The international community’s engagement has shifted markedly over time. The OHR, once a decisive arbiter with the authority to impose laws and dismiss officials, has gradually curtailed its interventionist role. This change reflects a strategic recalibration: external actors now prioritize fostering domestic ownership of reform processes while facing diminishing consensus among the PIC members. Divergent priorities – ranging from differing approaches to EU integration, skepticism about intervention, and broader geopolitical competition – have reduced the PIC’s capacity to act collectively, leaving the OHR in a position where formal power exists but is exercised selectively. Simultaneously, Bosnia’s EU accession perspective has functioned as both an incentive and a source of tension. Conditionality mechanisms, designed to stimulate reforms in governance, constitutional alignment, and human rights, have often failed to produce tangible change (European Commission, 2022). Domestic elites exploit structural vetoes embedded in the Dayton framework to block reform and create a form of “reform inertia”.
The 30th anniversary in 2025 offers a symbolic and analytical milestone. Commemorative narratives frequently emphasize continuity and stability, portraying Bosnia as a success story of externally mediated peace. Yet anniversaries also expose unresolved tensions, including enduring debates over constitutional reform, inter-ethnic mistrust, and the limited effectiveness of mechanisms for accountability and transitional justice. These narratives are further complicated by selective memory politics; victimhood hierarchies, genocide denial, and contested memorialisation continue to shape public discourse, illustrating that the symbolic dimensions of peace are as contentious as the institutional ones.
From a mediation perspective, the country in 2025 exemplifies the challenge of sustaining peace when local political incentives diverge from external expectations. The stagnation highlights a critical gap: international frameworks can create the architecture for peace, but they cannot, by themselves, generate the political will necessary for transformative reform. This underscores the necessity for adaptive mediation approaches that integrate long-term societal reconciliation, support for civic institutions beyond ethnonational frameworks, and sustained international engagement and compromise calibrated to evolving local dynamics (Mujkic, 2007).
Pathways to Reform
The challenges facing Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2025 – constitutional rigidity, entrenched ethnopolitical divisions, governance paralysis, and stalled European integration – require a multi-layered reform strategy that addresses both institutional design and the deeper societal cleavages perpetuating the status quo. Solutions must avoid the destabilising risks of dismantling Dayton wholesale while tackling its most obstructive provisions, combining constitutional adjustments, robust civic integration policies, and a reinvigorated international agreement.
The priority for constitutional reform should be in compliance with the Sejdić and Finci (2009) ruling and related European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) judgements, which demand the elimination of ethnic exclusivity in eligibility for the Presidency and the House of the Peoples. For “unless ethnicity, or affiliation to a single nation … stops being the basic condition for conducting office in government … there is little chance of progress” (Fazlić, 2020, p.183). Rather than imposing a comprehensive redesign – politically unrealistic in the current climate – incremental amendments could remove discriminatory language while maintaining protections for constituent peoples. Models from other consociational contexts, such as Belgium or Northern Ireland, suggest that power-sharing can be preserved while expanding eligibility to all citizens (Bieber, 2006).
An intermediate step could involve creating an additional, ethnically neutral “civic” seat in the Presidency, enabling citizens outside the three constituent peoples to participate in the highest offices without undermining entity representation. This would symbolically and practically signal a shift towards civic equality, “thus a civic state is the only option under which BiH may make progress and realize a stable and harmonious life for its citizens” (Fazlić, 2020, p.183).
Additionally, the complexity of Bosnia’s multi-tiered governance – 14 institutions, 13 prime ministers, and overlapping competences – has created a fertile ground for obstructionism. International best practice from post-conflict federal systems indicates that consolidating overlapping administrative structures can improve efficiency without destabilizing power balances (International Crisis Group, 2014). A gradual “functional integration” approach could begin with harmonizing key sectors such as environmental regulation, energy policy, and public procurement under state-level agencies. Joint service delivery in non-sensitive areas (i.e., disaster response, digital infrastructure) could reduce duplication and foster practical inter-entity cooperation. By demonstrating that cross-entity cooperation can deliver tangible benefits, such measures could lower political resistance to further integration.
But still, a key impediment to integration is the persistence of the “Two Schools Under One Roof” system that undermines interethnic contact and sustains parallel narratives of the past. Comparative studies in divided societies – such as post-apartheid South Africa and post-conflict Northern Ireland – underscore the role of integrated education in fostering social cohesion. Reform should begin with a nationwide curriculum framework that preserves cultural and linguistic diversity while introducing common modules on civic education, human rights, and shared history. This must be complemented by teacher training programs in intercultural competence and conflict-sensitive pedagogy (Emkic, 2018). Given the political sensitivity, pilot programs in municipalities with existing interethnic cooperation could serve as models before broader rollout, supported perhaps by conditional EU funding tied to integration benchmarks.
Another key point is that judicial reform remains essential to restoring public trust. Recruitment and promotion processes should be depoliticized through transparent, merit-based appointments, ideally with international observers during the transition period. The High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council must also be empowered to address high-level corruption and political obstruction. Recent events underscore the urgency of such reforms: in August 2025, the Bosnian state court commuted President Dodik’s one-year prison sentence to a fine, while upholding his six-year ban from public office. Dodik’s ability to avoid incarceration, coupled with his public defiance of the ruling, illustrates both the fragility of judicial enforcement and the entrenched impunity of political elites (Melez, 2025). Without stronger safeguards for judicial independence, such cases will continue to erode institutional credibility and undermine the state’s democratic trajectory.
International actors must recalibrate their engagement from sporadic crisis management to sustained, strategic support. This requires a dual approach: first, enhanced EU conditionality should move beyond generic reform demands towards targeted, sequenced roadmaps with clear political and financial incentives for compliance, coupled with automatic disincentives for obstruction (Brljavac, 2011). And second, there should be better selective use of the Bonn Powers; while overuse risks undermining local ownership, credible willingness to deploy those powers against actors obstructing ECHR compliance of threatening state integrity would re-establish the deterrent value in international insight (Toal & Dahlman, 2011).
Finally, addressing the legacies of wartime atrocities requires a coordinated national strategy on transitional justice. The EU and UNDP could facilitate a Truth and Reconciliation Commission modelled on experiences ranging from South Africa and Colombia to Argentina and Peru, adapted to Bosnia’s multi-ethnic context (Subotic, 2013). This should be complemented by state-supported memorial sites and education campaigns acknowledging crimes committed by all sides, thereby countering historical revisionism and genocide denial. As evidence from other post-conflict states shows, sustained public recognition of past atrocities can reduce intergroup hostility over time (Hayner, 2011).
Conclusion
Three decades after Dayton, Bosnia and Herzegovina stands both as a testament to the power of negotiated peace and a cautionary tale about its limits. The country has certainly avoided a return to complete violence, yet the institutional scaffolding that once guaranteed stability now locks politics into a narrow corridor defined by ethnonational vetoes, governance paralysis, and competing historical narratives. In this sense, Bosnia illustrates that peace agreements can end wars but cannot by themselves create the will the societal and political will for transformation.
The anniversary marks more than a symbolic milestone – it is an inflection point. The choice is not between dismantling Dayton or preserving it unchanged, but between allowing its provisions to ossify into permanent obstacles, or adapting them to foster inclusive governance, civic equality, and a functioning state capable of meeting the standards of European integration. Incremental constitutional reform, depoliticised institutions, integrated education, and credible international engagement are not merely technical fixes; they are investments in a political culture that privileges cooperation over zero-sum ethnic mobilisation.
Bosnia’s future will depend on whether domestic actors and international partners can move beyond the minimalistic logic of “no war” toward a more ambitious vision of shared citizenship and accountable governance. In that sense, the real change for the next decade is not just sustaining peace but redefining it.
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