How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/
ABSTRACT *
This article examines the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor as an unusual form of mediation, in which the international administration had to build a state and simultaneously reconcile a population with its former occupier. After summarising the conflict from Portuguese withdrawal through Indonesian occupation to the popular consultation of 1999, the author describes the mission as a test case for peacebuilding, faced with the absence of any existing governmental structure. The article argues that mediation in such a setting differs fundamentally from negotiation between two authorised leaderships, since one party had no state, no recognised representatives and a population exhausted by decades of external rule, and concludes that the mission nonetheless achieved its objective.
KEYWORDS *
Timor Leste, East Timor, UNTAET, transitional administration, peacebuilding, self determination, Indonesia, Portugal, state building, popular consultation, local ownership, Sergio Vieira de Mello
INTRODUCTION
The establishment of a new state in itself requires a mediator because on the brink of the 21st century there are no undiscovered lands that would provide space for a conflict-free establishment of a new state hence any change in territorial authority will lead to a conflict of interests between states, Timor-Leste is no exception.
Conflict Summary:
The territory of East Timor administered by Portugal had been placed on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly as a Non-Self-Governing Territory in 1960. Portugal withdrew after failing to control a civil war which led to the military invasion by Indonesia, which caused the death of approximately 200,000 people. In 1998 due to financial struggles Indonesia was considering granting limited authority to East Timor. A United Nations (UN)-facilitated referendum, a “popular consultation,” showed that almost 80 per cent of voters rejected integration into Indonesia. In September 1999 a peacekeeping force was sent by the United Nations Security Council to restore stability in Timor-Leste. The stabilization was successful hence a month later, the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) was established.
MAIN CORPUS
Mission:
Timor-Leste, due to the unprecedented situation that there was no existing government, no administrative system, or any state structure according to the western definition of a democratic state, was considered as a “test case” regarding peacebuilding processes. It was the last peacekeeping operation of the century except for the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and it was one of the most challenging in a way. On the one hand this level of freedom in the hands of the UN gave way to a lot of opportunities because it was a clean slate that the UNTAET could turn into the democratic state that they wished. On the other hand it was also a huge responsibility to handle the situation with at most respect for the locals, who already suffered from the rule of outsiders (Portugal and Indonesia) and the responsibility of preventing any kind of exploitation of the situation. This responsibility and the task of fulfilling its mandate were sitting on the shoulders of Sergio Vieira de Mello, who was the head of this mission.
Mediation:
Mediation under these circumstances meant the management of a smooth establishment of a democratic state structure according to the western standards (communicated by the UN) but with the consent of the (already haggard) locals, in order to avoid sparking any kind of conflict through the enforcement of an undesired regime or system.
The mediator also had to work on the settlement of the relation between Indonesia and East-Timor especially after most of the population of East Timor was affected by the violent invasion of Indonesia and many lives were lost because of the result of the “popular consultation” as well which determined that the population of Timor-Leste desired independence instead of integration into Indonesia. The bases of the positive relationship between the two states were laid down in the Joint Communique between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor.
SUMMARY *
The author’s central observation is that this case departs from the standard model of mediation in a way that is more than circumstantial. Ordinary mediation presupposes parties who exist, who are recognised, and who can bind those they represent. In Timor Leste one side possessed none of these attributes, and the mediating body was simultaneously the transitional government, which meant it was not a third party at all in the usual sense. The task therefore combined three functions that are normally separate: reconciling a population with its former occupier, constructing the institutions through which that population could eventually speak, and securing international acceptance of the entity being created.
CONCLUSION
Here, the UN could also experience the complexity of negotiations and mediation. The UNTAET had to manage the creation and the changes of a new system on every level. The tensions were not just in the diplomatic field and it wasn’t as straightforward as sitting down with two leaders who have a voice and are authorized to speak on behalf of their country and resolve their conflict. In my opinion, it is much easier to discuss the conflict between states that way. In Timor-Leste, the entire population was affected by the fight for independence, and the UNTAET needed to win the people to lead a successful mission. The UNTAET also had to help Timor-Leste find its voice and find it’s leader. It is a unique form of mediation when there is a conflict of interest, there is a need for a mediator but on one side there is half of an island with a country size population but no existing or internationally acknowledged state, and on the other side we see Indonesia as a recent occupier, Portugal as a past occupier and the international community who need to be convinced of the legitimacy of this new creation called Timor-Leste. The UNTAET mission and its members still managed to reach the goal of creating an independent democratic state of Timor-Leste.
POTENTIAL SOLUTION *
The article treats this mission as a success, and by the measure it applies, an independent and functioning state exists, it was one. The more useful question for practitioners is what it cost and what would be done differently, because transitional administration on this scale has been attempted rarely and its lessons are specific.
The central difficulty is the one the article identifies without quite naming: a body that governs cannot mediate. UNTAET held executive, legislative and judicial authority, which meant that when Timorese leaders disagreed with it, there was no neutral to whom they could appeal. The mission’s own subsequent assessments, and the extensive scholarship that followed, converge on this point: the early phase was insufficiently consultative, the National Consultative Council was created belatedly and with limited powers, and Timorese with long experience of clandestine organisation found themselves advising rather than deciding. Where such an arrangement is unavoidable, the remedy is to build the transfer of authority into the design from the first day rather than to treat it as the final stage: joint decision making from the outset, a published timetable of devolution, and an independent complaints mechanism through which the administered population can contest the administrator.
A second lesson concerns what is built. Institutions designed to international standards are not necessarily institutions the population recognises, and Timor Leste’s later difficulties, including the crisis of 2006, arose partly from a security sector and a state apparatus assembled quickly and without sufficient attention to internal divisions among those who had fought the occupation. Building more slowly, with fewer institutions but deeper local ownership, generally produces structures that survive the departure of the international presence.
Third, accountability. The Joint Communiqué established the bilateral relationship, and the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation later documented the violence of the occupation years, but prosecutions for the gravest crimes largely did not follow, and the two states elected reconciliation over trials through the Commission of Truth and Friendship. That choice preserved a workable relationship between neighbours who cannot move apart, and it left survivors without redress. Reasonable people disagree about whether the trade was worth making; what the case demonstrates is that such a trade is usually made, and that it should be made openly and with the participation of those it most affects, rather than settled between governments.
Finally, the transferable point. Missions of this kind are unlikely to be repeated at this scale, and the lesson that has travelled furthest is precisely the one the article gestures toward: even when an international body holds all formal authority, its actual power rests on the consent of the people it administers. Where that consent is cultivated, the state that emerges holds together. Where it is assumed, the institutions remain external, and they falter as soon as the mission departs.
* Added by the WMO Editorial Team
REFERENCES
References:
A road less traveled: Parliamentary approaches to conflict prevention, reconciliation, and peacebuilding, Annual Parliamentary Hearing, United Nations Headquarters, 6-7 December 2012 available: http://archive.ipu.org/splz-e/unga12/timor.pdf, last visited: 13 May 2020
Constitution of the democratic republic of Timor Leste, 20 May 2002, available: http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?cat=37&lang=en, last visited: 13 May 2020
Joint Communique between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor signed in Dili on 29 January 2000, available: https://reliefweb.int/report/timor-leste/joint-communiqué-between-republic-indonesia-and-un-transitional-administration, last visited: 13 May 2020
United Nations Security Council resolution 1272 (1999) of 25 October 1999, available: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1272, last visited: 13 May 2020
Supplementary references added by the WMO Editorial Team
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1264 (1999), establishing INTERFET, and 1704 (2006), establishing UNMIT.
Agreement between Indonesia and Portugal on the question of East Timor, New York, 5 May 1999.
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor Leste (CAVR), Chega! Final Report, Dili, 2005.
Commission of Truth and Friendship (Indonesia and Timor Leste), Per Memoriam ad Spem, final report, 2008.
Chopra, J. (2002). Building State Failure in East Timor. Development and Change, 33(5), 979 to 1000.
Goldstone, A. (2004). UNTAET with Hindsight: The Peculiarities of Politics in an Incomplete State. Global Governance, 10(1), 83 to 98.
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Lessons learned study on UNTAET, New York.
Thank you for providing thus UN test case summary.