Invitation well-earned
How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/
ABSTRACT *
This article examines how a co facilitator in the Myanmar peace process, Ja Nan Lahtaw of the Nyein Foundation, converted a role assigned to her for appearances into an active mediating role. After outlining the conflict between the government and the ethnic armed organisations, the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement of 2015, and the marked underrepresentation of women among the negotiating delegations, the author describes how Lahtaw was designated a master of ceremonies and instead adopted a technique she called summarising, restating what the parties had said in impartial terms until participants came to value the contribution. The article sets out the conditions under which such a strategy can work, principally trust with all parties and impartial phrasing, and closes with an ethical question: whether earning an invitation to mediate in this way constitutes legitimate practice or manipulation.
KEYWORDS *
Myanmar, insider mediation, Ja Nan Lahtaw, Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, women in peace processes, summarising, mandate, ethnic armed organisations, trust, mediator legitimacy, Kachin
INTRODUCTION
In this article, the process of becoming a mediator in the Myanmar war is being analyzed from the perspective of a co-facilitator, Ja Nan Lahtaw. She was forced into a passive role which she turned into an active role as a mediator. Taking matters into her own hands unauthorized, for the greater purpose of peace is the very subject of this analysis.
MAIN CORPUS
Conflict: Myanmar civil war
The longest-running civil war, history has seen so far is the Myanmar conflict between various armed ethnic organizations (AEOs.). Since the end of the British rule in Myanmar in 1948, there has been struggling between the government and the AEOs, who wish to have more autonomy.
The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement was signed by eight of the AEOs in October 2015 and two more by the end of 2019. In 2015 the National League for Democracy party was elected as well as in 2018 which has been the leading party until the announcement of the state of emergency during a military coup on the 1st of February 2021 only days prior to the completion of this paper.
The mediation during the lengthy Myanmar civil war was very complex since there were several parties and several opposing interests. During the negotiations of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, women were underrepresented. This female-male ratio among government negotiators was two to fifty-two while among the EAOs it was one to sixteen.
The underrepresentation in this instance was a clear sign of male opinion on the inferior female roles in such negotiations. There was however one particular individual that was a co-facilitator for the talks Ja Nan Lahtaw Executive Director of the Nyein (Shalom) Foundation who redefined her own role and earned an honorable invitation to act as a mediator.
Mediator: Ja Nan Lahtaw
Ja Nan Lahtaw is a member of the Kachin ethnic minority group and has a history with mediation since her father, Baptist Reverend Saboi Jum, was the mediator of a previous ceasefire between the Tatmadaw and the Kachin Independence Organisation in 1994 that lasted 17 years.
In her article – Unsticking stalled peace processes: insider mediator perspectives from Myanmar – she explained that the role that was assigned to her by others during the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement negotiations was more about appearances as a so-called “master of ceremonies” which was fitter to a woman according to men. She was however more interested in the actual content as well as bringing the parties closer to each other. She called her strategy “summarising” and explained in the article that not everyone was open and positive about her added input.
Still, after a few sessions, there were some generals who appreciated it. One general even went as far as saying how “useful this new style was”. Even though the openness was crucial in bringing this act to success it was an innovative strategy of taking on the role of a mediator without plainly asking for the parties’ cooperation in the process of mediation and having their acceptance (for the most part in this particular case). This is another example of how versatile tool communication is. Communicating about the very topic of the negotiations and repeating the words of the generals was powerful enough to open them up and turn them towards each other without adding any additional information.
Strategy
The above-mentioned strategy (if executed as an insider party) has a key element which is building and maintaining a relationship of trust with all parties. The summary that builds the bridge between the parties has to be firm on both ends, reflecting both their interests but conjoined in the middle by an impartial phrasing. It can also secure an insider mediator in its position if there is personal sympathy between them and the parties.
A friendly female voice might do the trick in a negotiating room full of men threatening each other with their mere presence and interest. It might sound judgemental still Ja Nan Lahtaw herself experienced situations where male negotiators asked her to express certain issues because it will not ruffle as many feathers if she verbalizes them as if a male party does.
SUMMARY *
The case examined here concerns the relationship between formal mandate and actual function. Lahtaw held no mandate to mediate; the role she was given was ceremonial. What she exercised instead was the influence available to anyone trusted by both sides who is permitted to speak, and the instrument was the most elementary in the repertoire, restating what had been said. The article’s interest lies in the observation that this produced acceptance retrospectively: the generals came to value a contribution they had not requested, and the parties themselves subsequently asked her to voice matters they could not raise directly.
CONCLUSION
These components are present at a mediation session initiated by the parties where they conscience invite a mediator as well. The question is whether it is ethical to earn such an invitation or not? Does the greater goal of peace justify the means? One might suggest that gaining trust and building a positive relationship between parties by a third party with the above-described method is manipulation hence it is immoral although it builds a bridge between parties that could have a compromise and could live in peace if only they trusted the mediator in the first place. The question of morality still remains and it is for the reader to decide if it’s an invitation well-earned.
POTENTIAL SOLUTION *
The ethical question the article leaves open has a clearer answer than it may appear, and separating two things resolves most of it.
Summarising is not manipulation. It is the most transparent technique available: the parties hear exactly what is said, they know who said it, and they can object immediately if the restatement misrepresents them. Nothing is concealed and nothing is decided by the person doing it. What would cross into manipulation is a summary that quietly shifts emphasis, omits what one side found important, or presents the facilitator’s own preference in the parties’ words. The distinction is not between authorised and unauthorised speech but between accurate and distorted restatement, and it is testable in the moment: if a party can hear their position summarised and recognise it as their own, the technique is doing what it claims.
The question of mandate is real, however, and worth separating from the first. Insider mediation of this kind almost always operates without formal appointment, because the people best placed to do it are precisely those already inside the situation: religious leaders, elders, respected professionals, people with standing on both sides. Waiting for a mandate that no party is willing to grant would mean that nothing happens at all. What such practitioners can do instead is make the shift visible rather than gradual, saying plainly at some point that they are moving beyond the assigned role and inviting objection. Consent given after the fact is still consent, and it is what distinguishes this practice from quiet steering.
The gender dimension the article records deserves careful handling, because it contains both an opportunity and a trap. Being underestimated can create space to act, and Lahtaw evidently used it; being asked to voice what men cannot say without loss of face is a genuine function, familiar from many settings. The trap is that this is influence without standing, revocable at any moment and dependent on remaining unthreatening. It is a route into the room, not a substitute for a seat at the table, and the ratios the article cites, two women among fifty four government negotiators, describe what still needs to change.
Finally, the article’s own timing gives its subject renewed importance. The coup of February 2021 removed the political framework within which the ceasefire process operated, and in such conditions the formal track disappears while insider mediators remain, because they live there. Their work becomes local and unglamorous: negotiating access for aid, preventing incidents between communities, keeping channels open across lines that governments have closed. This is where most mediation in Myanmar has actually taken place over seven decades, and it is what preserves the possibility of a settlement for whenever the political conditions permit one again.
* Added by the WMO Editorial Team
REFERENCES
Biography
Myanmar: Military Coup Kills Fragile Democracy. (2021, February 1). Retrieved February 3, 2021, from https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/01/myanmar-military-coup-kills-fragile-democracy (Human Rights Watch)
Myanmar Case Study Current Peace Effort. (n.d.). Retrieved February 03, 2021, from https://www.cfr.org/womens-participation-in-peace-processes/myanmar (Council on Foreign Relations)
Origins of the longest civil war in the world. Milko, V. (2019, September 19). Origins of the longest civil war in the world. Retrieved February 03, 2021, from https://www.globalgroundmedia.com/2019/09/19/origins-of-the-longest-civil-war-in-the-world/ (Global Ground Media)
Unsticking stalled peace processes: Insider mediator perspectives from Myanmar. Ja Nan Lahtaw. Retrieved February 03, 2021, from https://www.c-r.org/accord/pioneering-peace-pathways/unsticking-stalled-peace-processes-insider-mediator-perspectives (Conciliation Resources)
Women’s Inclusion in Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. Muehlenbeck, A. Palmiano Federer J. (2016, July). Case study – the institute for inclusive security. Retrieved February 3, 2021, from https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Womens-Inclusion-in-Myanmars-Nationwide-Ceasefire-Agreement.pdf (Inclusive Security)
Supplementary references added by the WMO Editorial Team
Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the Ethnic Armed Organizations, 15 October 2015.
Panglong Agreement, 12 February 1947, and the Union Peace Conference (21st Century Panglong) documentation.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security.
Wehr, P., & Lederach, J. P. (1991). Mediating Conflict in Central America. Journal of Peace Research, 28(1), 85 to 98 (on the insider partial mediator).
Mason, S. J. A. (2009). Insider Mediators: Exploring Their Key Role in Informal Peace Processes. Berghof Foundation, Berlin.
Svensson, I., & Lindgren, M. (2013). Peace from the Inside: Exploring the Role of the Insider Partial Mediator. International Interactions, 39(5), 698 to 722.
Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators (2005), provisions on self determination and impartiality.
UN Test Case alias Peacebuilding in Timor-Leste
How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/
ABSTRACT *
This article examines the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor as an unusual form of mediation, in which the international administration had to build a state and simultaneously reconcile a population with its former occupier. After summarising the conflict from Portuguese withdrawal through Indonesian occupation to the popular consultation of 1999, the author describes the mission as a test case for peacebuilding, faced with the absence of any existing governmental structure. The article argues that mediation in such a setting differs fundamentally from negotiation between two authorised leaderships, since one party had no state, no recognised representatives and a population exhausted by decades of external rule, and concludes that the mission nonetheless achieved its objective.
KEYWORDS *
Timor Leste, East Timor, UNTAET, transitional administration, peacebuilding, self determination, Indonesia, Portugal, state building, popular consultation, local ownership, Sergio Vieira de Mello
INTRODUCTION
The establishment of a new state in itself requires a mediator because on the brink of the 21st century there are no undiscovered lands that would provide space for a conflict-free establishment of a new state hence any change in territorial authority will lead to a conflict of interests between states, Timor-Leste is no exception.
Conflict Summary:
The territory of East Timor administered by Portugal had been placed on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly as a Non-Self-Governing Territory in 1960. Portugal withdrew after failing to control a civil war which led to the military invasion by Indonesia, which caused the death of approximately 200,000 people. In 1998 due to financial struggles Indonesia was considering granting limited authority to East Timor. A United Nations (UN)-facilitated referendum, a “popular consultation,” showed that almost 80 per cent of voters rejected integration into Indonesia. In September 1999 a peacekeeping force was sent by the United Nations Security Council to restore stability in Timor-Leste. The stabilization was successful hence a month later, the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) was established.
MAIN CORPUS
Mission:
Timor-Leste, due to the unprecedented situation that there was no existing government, no administrative system, or any state structure according to the western definition of a democratic state, was considered as a “test case” regarding peacebuilding processes. It was the last peacekeeping operation of the century except for the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and it was one of the most challenging in a way. On the one hand this level of freedom in the hands of the UN gave way to a lot of opportunities because it was a clean slate that the UNTAET could turn into the democratic state that they wished. On the other hand it was also a huge responsibility to handle the situation with at most respect for the locals, who already suffered from the rule of outsiders (Portugal and Indonesia) and the responsibility of preventing any kind of exploitation of the situation. This responsibility and the task of fulfilling its mandate were sitting on the shoulders of Sergio Vieira de Mello, who was the head of this mission.
Mediation:
Mediation under these circumstances meant the management of a smooth establishment of a democratic state structure according to the western standards (communicated by the UN) but with the consent of the (already haggard) locals, in order to avoid sparking any kind of conflict through the enforcement of an undesired regime or system.
The mediator also had to work on the settlement of the relation between Indonesia and East-Timor especially after most of the population of East Timor was affected by the violent invasion of Indonesia and many lives were lost because of the result of the “popular consultation” as well which determined that the population of Timor-Leste desired independence instead of integration into Indonesia. The bases of the positive relationship between the two states were laid down in the Joint Communique between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor.
SUMMARY *
The author’s central observation is that this case departs from the standard model of mediation in a way that is more than circumstantial. Ordinary mediation presupposes parties who exist, who are recognised, and who can bind those they represent. In Timor Leste one side possessed none of these attributes, and the mediating body was simultaneously the transitional government, which meant it was not a third party at all in the usual sense. The task therefore combined three functions that are normally separate: reconciling a population with its former occupier, constructing the institutions through which that population could eventually speak, and securing international acceptance of the entity being created.
CONCLUSION
Here, the UN could also experience the complexity of negotiations and mediation. The UNTAET had to manage the creation and the changes of a new system on every level. The tensions were not just in the diplomatic field and it wasn’t as straightforward as sitting down with two leaders who have a voice and are authorized to speak on behalf of their country and resolve their conflict. In my opinion, it is much easier to discuss the conflict between states that way. In Timor-Leste, the entire population was affected by the fight for independence, and the UNTAET needed to win the people to lead a successful mission. The UNTAET also had to help Timor-Leste find its voice and find it’s leader. It is a unique form of mediation when there is a conflict of interest, there is a need for a mediator but on one side there is half of an island with a country size population but no existing or internationally acknowledged state, and on the other side we see Indonesia as a recent occupier, Portugal as a past occupier and the international community who need to be convinced of the legitimacy of this new creation called Timor-Leste. The UNTAET mission and its members still managed to reach the goal of creating an independent democratic state of Timor-Leste.
POTENTIAL SOLUTION *
The article treats this mission as a success, and by the measure it applies, an independent and functioning state exists, it was one. The more useful question for practitioners is what it cost and what would be done differently, because transitional administration on this scale has been attempted rarely and its lessons are specific.
The central difficulty is the one the article identifies without quite naming: a body that governs cannot mediate. UNTAET held executive, legislative and judicial authority, which meant that when Timorese leaders disagreed with it, there was no neutral to whom they could appeal. The mission’s own subsequent assessments, and the extensive scholarship that followed, converge on this point: the early phase was insufficiently consultative, the National Consultative Council was created belatedly and with limited powers, and Timorese with long experience of clandestine organisation found themselves advising rather than deciding. Where such an arrangement is unavoidable, the remedy is to build the transfer of authority into the design from the first day rather than to treat it as the final stage: joint decision making from the outset, a published timetable of devolution, and an independent complaints mechanism through which the administered population can contest the administrator.
A second lesson concerns what is built. Institutions designed to international standards are not necessarily institutions the population recognises, and Timor Leste’s later difficulties, including the crisis of 2006, arose partly from a security sector and a state apparatus assembled quickly and without sufficient attention to internal divisions among those who had fought the occupation. Building more slowly, with fewer institutions but deeper local ownership, generally produces structures that survive the departure of the international presence.
Third, accountability. The Joint Communiqué established the bilateral relationship, and the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation later documented the violence of the occupation years, but prosecutions for the gravest crimes largely did not follow, and the two states elected reconciliation over trials through the Commission of Truth and Friendship. That choice preserved a workable relationship between neighbours who cannot move apart, and it left survivors without redress. Reasonable people disagree about whether the trade was worth making; what the case demonstrates is that such a trade is usually made, and that it should be made openly and with the participation of those it most affects, rather than settled between governments.
Finally, the transferable point. Missions of this kind are unlikely to be repeated at this scale, and the lesson that has travelled furthest is precisely the one the article gestures toward: even when an international body holds all formal authority, its actual power rests on the consent of the people it administers. Where that consent is cultivated, the state that emerges holds together. Where it is assumed, the institutions remain external, and they falter as soon as the mission departs.
* Added by the WMO Editorial Team
REFERENCES
References:
A road less traveled: Parliamentary approaches to conflict prevention, reconciliation, and peacebuilding, Annual Parliamentary Hearing, United Nations Headquarters, 6-7 December 2012 available: http://archive.ipu.org/splz-e/unga12/timor.pdf, last visited: 13 May 2020
Constitution of the democratic republic of Timor Leste, 20 May 2002, available: http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?cat=37&lang=en, last visited: 13 May 2020
Joint Communique between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor signed in Dili on 29 January 2000, available: https://reliefweb.int/report/timor-leste/joint-communiqué-between-republic-indonesia-and-un-transitional-administration, last visited: 13 May 2020
United Nations Security Council resolution 1272 (1999) of 25 October 1999, available: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1272, last visited: 13 May 2020
Supplementary references added by the WMO Editorial Team
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1264 (1999), establishing INTERFET, and 1704 (2006), establishing UNMIT.
Agreement between Indonesia and Portugal on the question of East Timor, New York, 5 May 1999.
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor Leste (CAVR), Chega! Final Report, Dili, 2005.
Commission of Truth and Friendship (Indonesia and Timor Leste), Per Memoriam ad Spem, final report, 2008.
Chopra, J. (2002). Building State Failure in East Timor. Development and Change, 33(5), 979 to 1000.
Goldstone, A. (2004). UNTAET with Hindsight: The Peculiarities of Politics in an Incomplete State. Global Governance, 10(1), 83 to 98.
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Lessons learned study on UNTAET, New York.
Naming Conflict between Macedonia and Greece
How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/
ABSTRACT *
This article analyzes the 27 year name dispute between Greece and the Republic of North Macedonia, which began when the latter declared independence in 1991 under the name Macedonia, a name identical to that of the neighboring historic Greek region. The author focuses on the role of third party mediation and examines why the United Nations, of which both states are members, became the mediating institution. In discussing the position of UN envoy Matthew Nimetz, the author raises various speculative considerations about possible sources of personal and institutional bias; these reflections represent the author’s personal viewpoint. The editorial position of this journal is that a mediator’s impartiality is a matter of professional conduct, disclosure and the structure of the process, never of ethnic or religious origin. The analysis then widens to the surrounding geopolitical field: Bulgaria’s objections to name variants with territorial connotations, the interests of NATO and the European Union, and the role of Russia in prolonging the dispute. The article closes with the Prespa Agreement of June 2018, by which the country adopted the name Republic of North Macedonia, and with the author’s view that UN mediators are optimally positioned to resolve disputes between member states.
KEYWORDS *
Greece, Republic of North Macedonia, name dispute, Prespa Agreement, United Nations, mediation, Matthew Nimetz, mediator bias, Bulgaria, Balkans, geopolitics
INTRODUCTION
The two countries Greece and the Republic of North Macedonia had a conflict since the second country declared its independence under the name of Macedonia in 1991. The core of the dispute is about the name of one of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia because there is confusion between the name of the country and the historic region of the neighboring country of Greece which has the same name[1].
The Republic of North Macedonia became a member of the United Nations (UN) in 1993, but it was admitted under the notion: the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The membership of both countries provides an argument for a UN mediator being the right choice to settle a dispute between two member states[2].
MAIN CORPUS
The Mediator
On the other hand, there is always a possibility in human nature that it is impartial even when it shouldn’t be for a professional reason. In this case, the mediator Matthew Nimetz is Jewish born in America. It must be taken into consideration that traditionally the Jewish population was numerous in both countries as long as Nazi Germany’s occupation started, which might cause a bias for a Jewish person when it comes to trying to make peace and acceptance of other nations in these countries.[3].
A UN mediator is an even better choice since he is not only neutral but is also very motivated to make peace between two members of his organization to eliminate any possible inner tension. Although his origin might implicate that as an American it is not his interest to push for peace and cooperation between the parties because the weaker other countries are the stronger the United States looks, but at the same time, the United States needs strong trading partners to boost its economy. That means that his goal is to stabilize the relations in the European Union which is a major trading partner of the United States even if an ideal agreement has to be compromised in any way in the process. It might also seem to be a bias to work for the goals of an organization and not just be a neutral guide through a conflict, but in a way leading towards peace always means a bias towards the solution that is peaceful no matter which party agrees with it more.
Why the UN?
Based on the nature of mediation when a conflict doesn’t seem to be solved by the parties even though they are open to the possibility of solving the conflict, a third party is needed to fill in the gap that the two party’s differences of perspective created. In this situation, a third party may be another country or an international organization that either includes both of the countries or non- of the countries. There hasn’t been a third sovereign country that applied and was then accepted to the role of mediator so an international organization had to take on this challenge. The reason for such little interest might be that the two countries are not on the verge of physical conflict or taking any action that might be against the interest of other countries. The other reason might be that no country would like to stand between two poppet states of the United States and Russia. The UN is behind both countries although in this specific case there is some asymmetry. The UN and other international organizations such as the North American Treaty Organisation (which has a strong group of countries supporting Greece in this situation) that had been calling the Republic of North Macedonia the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, (which wasn’t its official name) simply for the reason of acceptance from Greece, for about 27 years. It means that the UN has already stated in its own way that the name “Macedonia” will not be suitable for the country in the long run. Based on this argument the purpose of the UN mediator was focused mostly on finding a middle ground that was acceptable for the Republic of North Macedonia. This sheds light on the aspect of a scenario where the mediator might be unbiased as a person but the sending organization gives him a biased agenda to execute.
The UN has the most advantage as a mediator. The biggest one is, that the members had been operating peacefully under the decision of the UN to call the Republic of North Macedonia the former Yugoslav Republic of North Macedonia for about 27 years even if the Republic of North Macedonia never agreed to the name change officially. This created a precedent of one of the possible outcomes of this dispute, specifically the scene where Macedonia changed its name officially to the Republic of North Macedonia.
Other perspectives
Bulgaria has also expressed its opinion on the name dispute. It doesn’t support certain compromises that include a name referring to northern territories that would suggest Bulgarian territories as well[4]. It is once again proof that any interstate conflict has the potential of affecting the international community as well. In this case, Bulgaria stands with Greece because it discourages any name change that might contain geographical elements that, hints at Bulgaria[5]
by the possible outcome of this dispute. It also suggests that the Macedonian-Greece conflict maybe wasn’t simply a naming dispute but it was meant to be a territorial dispute which they didn’t want to decide in an old-fashioned way by weapons but in a diplomatic way.
The postponing of any solution may be the interest of any country or international organization that has an invested interest in weakening the EU or the UN, like Russia. It means Russia supports the Republic of North Macedonia to keep its ‘original name’: Macedonia. Russia has an interest in having good economic relations with countries of the Balkan.
This sheds light on one more hidden conflict at the core of the actual conflict. History had seen a lot of smaller, local interstate conflicts which were only the puppet states of two giant states in conflict, the US and today’s Russia, and the Macedonia-Greece conflict might just be another one of those smaller battles in one big war.
SUMMARY
In summary, these are the forces that drove the 27 year-long dispute and made it impossible for Greece and the Republic of North Macedonia to settle it on their own.
On 17 June 2018, the Republic of North Macedonia and Greece signed the Prespa agreement. Macedonia officially changed its name to “Republic of North Macedonia” and it has a national referendum pending on the matter and legislation passing through parliament[6].
CONCLUSION
In my personal opinion in such cases, the mediators of the United Nations organization are in the most optimal position to lead to parties in conflict to an understanding. The purpose of the United Nations by nature is to make members sit at the same table and work together which is the exact same action that a mediator wishes to do when working with parties in dispute.
POTENTIAL SOLUTION *
The Prespa Agreement resolved the formal question, but the article rightly shows that the name carried deeper freight: identity, history, territorial anxiety and great power rivalry. A durable settlement therefore requires consolidating the agreement so that it survives changes of government and shifts in the geopolitical weather. Four elements serve that goal.
First, protect the agreement through implementation symmetry. Prespa succeeded because it exchanged simultaneous, verifiable steps: the name change on one side, the end of blockade against NATO and EU accession on the other. The same logic should govern the remaining obligations, from school textbooks and historical commissions to trademarks and commercial labeling. A standing joint implementation committee with a fixed calendar, publishing its progress reports, denies spoilers on either side the claim that only their nation is delivering.
Second, depoliticize identity questions by moving them from parliaments to experts and citizens. The joint commission of historians reviewing textbooks is the model: slow, professional, and removed from electoral cycles. Complementing it with sustained people to people programs, student exchanges, twin municipalities across the border, joint cultural and archaeological projects around the shared Macedonian heritage, converts an abstract compromise into lived normality for the next generation, which is the only place where name disputes truly end.
Third, widen the frame to include Bulgaria before a second name adjacent conflict hardens. The article’s observation that Sofia watches every formula for territorial hints proved prescient. A trilateral good neighbourliness mechanism, ideally facilitated by the EU as the actor holding the accession incentive, should address language, history and minority questions among all three states in one forum, rather than allowing each bilateral dispute to become a new veto point on the accession path.
Fourth, anchor the region against external spoilers through delivered integration. The strongest argument for the compromise was the promise of NATO and EU membership; every delay in honoring that promise strengthens precisely the outside actors the article identifies as beneficiaries of postponement. Rapid, visible dividends, accession progress, infrastructure investment, energy diversification, make the settlement more valuable than its reversal.
The broader lesson for mediation practice is the one the author intuits: a mediator’s neutrality matters less than the architecture of incentives around the table. Where the mediating institution can link a symbolic concession to a tangible strategic gain, even a 27 year dispute over a single word can end with both parties claiming, credibly, to have won.
* Added by the WMO Editorial Team
REFERENCES
1, United Nations webpage(http://www.un.org/en/member-states/)
2, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_Nimetz
3, https://www.rferl.org/a/greece-macedonia-name-dispute-nimetz-un-talks/29004400.html
4, http://greece.greekreporter.com/2018/02/16/bulgaria-issues-warning-over-macedonia-name-dispute/
5, Sarantis Michalopoulos: Bulgaria’s EU Presidency sees an ‘opportunity’ in Sofia on Macedonian nam dispute, May 15, 2018 (https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/bulgarias-eu-presidency-sees-an-opportunity-in-sofia-on-macedonian-name-dispute/)
6, John Smith: Bulgaria Issues Warning Over ‘Macedonia’ Name Dispute, February 16, 2018 (http://greece.greekreporter.com/2018/02/16/bulgaria-issues-warning-over-macedonia-name-dispute/)
7, Helena Smith: Macedonia agrees to new name after 27-year dispute with Greece, June 12, 2018 (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/12/macedonia-agrees-to-new-name-after-27-year-dispute-with-greece)