How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/
EDITORIAL NOTE *
This article analyses a document leaked in November 2025 and assesses the conduct of the governments involved. That assessment reflects the author’s own perspective; this journal’s editorial position is neutral as between the parties. The document analysed was a draft that was not agreed by all parties named in it, and negotiations have continued since; readers should treat the analysis as an assessment of that text at that date rather than of any subsequent version.
ABSTRACT
The leaked Plan for Peace of 20 November 2025 exposes a structurally incoherent and diplomatically unbalanced framework that privileges Russian strategic aims while burdening Ukraine with extensive concessions, ambiguous obligations, and structurally unsound guarantees. Presented as a 28-point memorandum, the plan purports to confirm Ukrainian sovereignty, stabilize European security, and establish a durable ceasefire, yet its vague terminology, exclusion of Ukraine and Europe from negotiations, and repeated intrusion upon NATO and EU prerogatives fundamentally undermine its legitimacy. The document’s treatment of sovereignty, security guarantees, territorial arrangements, and constitutional constraints reveals a pattern of asymmetry; Ukraine is asked to curtail its military capacity, abandon NATO aspirations, accept de facto Russian territorial gains, and submit to externally imposed domestic reforms, while Russia faces minimal substantive obligations beyond symbolic legislative gestures and loosely framed commitments to non-aggression. Simultaneously, the United States positions itself as guarantor, mediator, and beneficiary, often in a manner contradictory to its own domestic and international policy, reflecting the continued erosion of its reliability as an international partner. Embedded within the plan is a broader architecture of strategic vagueness, institutional overreach, and diplomatic exclusion that invites misinterpretation and incentivizes future conflict. Taken as a whole, the proposal functions less as a viable peace settlement than as a blueprint for geopolitical instability, embedding future points of contestation and reinforcing the very conditions it purports to resolve.
KEYWORDS
Ukraine, Russia, United States, Europe, European Union, NATO, diplomacy, mediation, Plan for Peace, Russo-Ukrainian War, conflict resolution, conflict escalation
INTRODUCTION
On November 20, 2025, a proposed peace deal to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine was leaked by Axios, revealing the diplomatic dynamic between Russia and the United States in their joint approach to Ukraine, Europe, and international norms (Ravid and Lawler 2025). Widely criticized as a capitulation to Russian interests, the plan has been described as fundamentally flawed, both in substance and structure. Ukraine and Europe were excluded from the process, leaving the proposals fundamentally one-sided (Harmash et al. 2025). It could be argued that this plan was intended as a first draft of sorts, intended to be shared with Ukraine as a starting point for negotiations. This benefit of doubt was undermined when Reuters announced the following day that an anonymous source claimed the White House has threatened to revoke weapons and intelligence in order to strong-arm them into agreeing, a claim further reinforced by an address by Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy, sharing that Ukraine may now face a very difficult choice, either losing its dignity or the risk of losing a key partner (Balmforth 2025; Novikov and Hatton 2025). Here we will examine the provisions laid out in the 28-point plan, reviewing the verbiage therein, diplomatic implications, and potential ramifications for the future of the conflict.
MAIN CORPUS
Points 1 and 2: sovereignty and non-aggression
The plan starts with a proposed confirmation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, without specificity as to what parties will be confirming, or when said confirmation will take place. We are left to assume Russia will be the party to confirm sovereignty, whatever confirm means in this context is left ambiguous, and thus, without actual meaning. Ukraine’s sovereignty was already guaranteed in 1997 under the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which established the inviolability of the nation’s shared borders, which was first violated during the annexation of Crimea in 2014, along with Russia’s militarization of the Donbas. In regard to Point 2, specifically the ambiguities of the last 30 years, no detail is offered as to what this applies to, either territorially or otherwise, serving to only muddy the waters diplomatically, setting the stage for potential future conflict when these ambiguous ambiguities are revealed to be, unsurprisingly, unsettled. Regardless, both points are undermined in following points ahead.
Point 3: expectations regarding invasion and enlargement
The term expected here leaves the doors open for future incursions by Russia, which has shown a willingness to violate numerous times over the last few decades, regardless of treaty or agreement (Neplii 2024). More importantly, the agreement has no authority on the actions of NATO as a body, much less the NATO member nations themselves who would have to ratify or affirm the validity and applicability of the agreement. This reflects a vital gap in diplomatic understanding by the US officials involved in the language of the agreement, or perhaps an explicit attempt at leveraging ambiguity for future conflict.
Point 4: dialogue between Russia and NATO
Russia is expected to open dialogue with NATO, which includes the US, while the US simultaneously acts as its own mediator for the discussions it is party to? This can easily be excused as poor wording, though such an excuse is far from excusable in the context of war agreements. This may further reflect the US’s weakening alignment with broader NATO member state sentiment, almost framing itself as a distinct party from NATO itself (Schreer 2019). The substance of the point itself holds little weight, only enforcing dialogue to no concrete ends, though the essence of cooperation and conflict de-escalation are present.
Point 5: security guarantees
Axios notes in their article covering the leaked plan that Point 5 is intended to functionally guarantee NATO-style protections to Ukraine, meaning an attack on Ukraine will invoke an Article 5 response to Russia (Ravid 2025). Although a substantial guarantee that utilitarianly incorporates Ukraine into the NATO framework, it again has no bearing on the actual behavior of NATO itself, a recurring theme throughout the proposed plan. Why this language was excluded from the plan itself is unclear. This provision also exemplifies the US’s reputational decay as an unreliable partner, given the US had already provided security guarantees as a part of the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, in which the US and Russia acknowledged Ukraine’s territorial integrity and offered assurances of support in case of attack, which Russia has since violated and the US has increasingly failed to honor, particularly during the current administration (Kimball 2022). This follows other notable bilateral agreements which the US has unilaterally violated in recent years, such as the Iran Nuclear Deal and a plethora of congressionally passed free-trade agreements with several nations. Though the details of these arrangements are beyond the scope of this paper, they serve to highlight the deterioration of the US’s long-standing reputation as a reliable partner, and bulwark of international order.
Point 6: limitation of armed forces
This point serves to reduce Ukraine’s military capacity, undermining the nation’s sovereignty in Point 1 outright, and reducing their forces by nearly one third of their current troop volume. When considering agreements between parties in conflict, it is vital to assess the potential for future conflict, and how said agreements can reduce said potential, or set the stage for escalation if a party violates the agreement. It is a balancing act between the realities of the present, grievances of the past, and most importantly, threats of the future (Goertz and Diehl 2002). While Ukraine is given a demand to limit troop volumes, Russia is not given any such demand, which acts to incentivize future aggression against a weakened opponent. This is merely one aspect of the plan that sets the stage for future conflict, which will be illustrated in future points.
Points 7 and 8: constitutional undertakings and stationing of troops
Demands on a democratic nation to amend its constitution undermines the process of civilian rule, forcing elected representatives to make decisions which the people they are obligated to represent may not favor. Though language present undermines norms of democracy, substantively it repeats the measures intended in Point 3, which already prohibits Ukraine’s entry into NATO. These proposals serve to weaken the international standing of NATO, contradicting consistent messaging by NATO leadership and member states of Ukrainian inclusion. NATO member states, such as the United Kingdom and France, had been working towards developing a coalition of peacekeeping forces to enter Ukraine when the war concludes, which this plan intends to sabotage. It also undermines the ongoing efforts to incorporate Ukraine’s military industry and infrastructure into NATO’s structure (The Associated Press 2025).
Point 9: stationing of aircraft
How an agreement between the US, Russia, and Ukraine is to dictate the stationing of fighter jets in Poland is unclear, nor is the number of jets, and what constitutes European in this context.
Point 10: the conditions of the guarantee
The order of operations in Point 10 is poorly structured, though it is clear the intent is to specify security guarantees, but fails in clarity and further pigeonholes Ukraine against any actions to reclaim territory seized by Russia. This is particularly important given the ambiguity as to which party controls what territory, as there is substantial overlap over claims, particularly in regions claimed by Russia but without troop presence (Ravid and Lawler 2025). In addition, the ambiguity of global sanctions begs the question as to what nations are subject to these agreements. While the global community has largely ostracised Russia economically, they are not beholden to the agreements in this plan. Though if we assume this statute only applies to the US, it should be clarified. In addition, why only two Russian cities are included in the final detail is unclear, in a sense implying Ukraine is permitted to strike other cities with missiles, which is certainly not intended, speaking to the deficient phrasing and structure of the overall plan. Additionally, the prioritization of US compensation in this point speaks to a lack of sincerity in how it engages with partners, tying safety to monetary gain, though simultaneously neglecting any detail as to how compensation will be agreed upon by the parties, who the parties are, and opening the door for the US to falter on its guarantee when inevitable disagreements over reimbursement arise.
Points 11 and 12: European accession and reconstruction
Ukraine’s EU eligibility is reaffirmed under these points, though it lacks substantive weight, as Ukraine was already eligible and in the process of incorporating itself into the EU as the conflict has progressed (Soloviova and Fomin 2025). This agreement also has no bearing on the actions of the EU, and given the lack of European involvement in this plan, eligibility for EU membership to a nation that is already in negotiations to join remains irrelevant. As for Point 12, various guarantees are offered for economic and infrastructure repair for Ukraine, though the ambiguous use of the term powerful and global implies additional nations participating, who are not signatories to this agreement and played no role in its formation. This again weakens the commitments as it predicates the verbiage on an unreliable variable.
Points 13 to 16: reintegration, frozen assets, and legislative undertakings
The following points all pertain to Russia’s relationship with the US and the global economy. The integration of Russia back into international commerce is entirely dependent on other nations, who again, were not involved in the creation of this framework. One hundred billion dollars of frozen funds are reserved for the rebuilding of Ukraine under US direction, while the remaining two hundred billion are reserved as capital for joint US-Russian projects aiming to prevent future conflict. Lastly, Russia agrees to sign non-aggression into law, though Russia’s reputation as an unreliable partner, with countless violations of their own laws and constitution documented under their authoritarian administration, turns this legislative promise into a mere suggestion.
Points 17 to 19: nuclear provisions
These provisions pertain to the de-escalation of nuclear tensions and management of nuclear resources. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, currently under Russian occupation, is put under neutral supervision and output is split evenly between the parties. Perhaps one of the most concise aspects of the peace plan, laying out clear, binding terms of agreement.
Point 20: education, tolerance, and ideology
Perhaps the most egregious aspect of the proposed plan is in the framing of racial intolerance and Nazism, a misleading narrative perpetuated by Russia as a justification for the invasion of Ukraine, predicated on Russian national pride in regards to their victory in the Second World War (Kloo et al. 2024). The irony of the point is that both Russia, and particularly the US, has larger numbers of neo-Nazi and white nationalist movements (Dragas 2021; Lefebvre 2023). While stipulations such as these are typically seen as non-binding cross-cultural niceties, the involvement of the US poisons the waters when it comes to oversight of said initiatives, given the erasure of racial and cross-cultural education and programs under the current administration, and broader backsliding on civil rights, even targeting of specific people groups, including linguistic minorities (Stockemer 2025). This has situated the US in the broader international context as adversarial, which has resulted in weakened ties with other nations and dramatic reductions in tourism to the US, particularly as domestic ideological and ethnic conflicts continue to escalate (Chen 2025). This is to say, it is understood that the intent of these provisions are to reinforce the rhetoric and narratives that have been used as a vector of conflict to target Ukraine.
Points 21 to 23: territory and transit
Recognition of de facto occupation translates to, in essence, de jure. Perhaps this again is a byproduct of poor wording, though as discussed before, this pattern opens the door for reinterpretation, which may be the intent. The binding language regarding territorial claims provides no concessions from Russia, and demands additional concessions from Ukraine, functionally handing Russia an outcome fully aligned with their war aim (Kamil and Sudirman 2025). The only benefit offered to Ukraine in this set of points is the use of the Dnipro River.
Point 24: humanitarian matters
This point included additional components dealing with the exchange of prisoners and children, though did not specify the abduction of thousands of children by Russia during the conflict (Frantsuz et al. 2023). The establishment of a family reunification program, while promising, lacks the necessary depth and detail, a recurring theme throughout the plan. The only other thing of note is the use of the term hostages which could be interpreted to include war criminals who have been apprehended over the course of the conflict.
Point 25: elections
Ukraine’s elections were purportedly only delayed due to the ongoing conflict, which disrupted civic and political institutions necessary to establish equitable liberal functions, and has been largely seen as acceptable by the international community. The inclusion of this point echoes conspiratorial narratives targeting Ukraine and framing the nation as an authoritarian regime, amplified by Russian misinformation campaigns, which international monitors have debunked (Flakus et al. 2025).
Points 26 to 28: amnesty, monitoring, and entry into force
What constitutes parties is left vague, providing dangerously broad applications. Do individuals in the US and various European administrations also receive amnesty? If the actions were taken during the invasion but were irrelevant to the conflict, do they still count? While the questions appear facetious on face value, as the intent is easily inferred, again we are left with the potential repercussions of the substantive and structural deficits therein. Furthermore, how sanctions will be imposed, and by whom, leaves the door open for interpretive bias and misapplication, particularly given the ambiguity throughout the verbiage of the entire framework.
SUMMARY *
The article’s method is its contribution. Rather than assessing the draft politically, the author reads it as a legal instrument and asks of each provision what a party could later claim it meant, who is bound, and what happens if it is breached. The recurring answers are that the operative verbs are conditional, that a substantial number of provisions purport to bind organisations that were not present, and that the obligations are distributed asymmetrically in a manner that would leave one party constrained and the other largely at liberty. From this the author draws a conclusion about function rather than intent: whatever was meant, a text of this construction produces future disputes as a matter of design, because ambiguity is not a defect in an instrument whose signatories differ about what they are signing but a condition of their signing at all.
CONCLUSION
As stated before, any peace agreement must consider the past, present, and future. This plan speaks to only Russian grievances and Ukrainian concessions, leaving it dangerously one-sided. The territorial, rhetorical, and non-binding framing positions Ukraine in a vulnerable dynamic with Russia, rendering it closely dependent on future reinterpretations and policy exploitation, seemingly designed to create plausible deniability and even justification for conflict in the coming years. Those provisions that appear binding consist of arrangements that are substantively vague or fatally structured. The decision ahead of Ukraine is indeed a difficult one, and will have repercussions for democracy abroad and the Western world’s liberal order for the coming decades.
POTENTIAL SOLUTION *
The article’s most valuable finding is one it treats as a criticism and which is better understood as a description of how such texts are made, because that reframing determines what a reader should do with the document.
Constructive ambiguity is a standard instrument. Where two parties cannot agree on a formulation, a phrase that each can read in its own way permits a signature that would otherwise be impossible, and a number of durable settlements rest on precisely such phrases. The distinction that matters is between ambiguity on the peripheral questions, which buys time for the central bargain to consolidate, and ambiguity on the central question itself, which postpones the dispute without resolving it. Judged that way, the provisions the author identifies are of the second kind: what confirm means in relation to sovereignty, what the thirty years of ambiguities are, and whether de facto recognition is or is not de jure are not peripheral matters but the entire substance. A text of this construction has not created a settlement; it has created a document that both sides can sign and then litigate.
Two structural observations follow, and both concern who is bound. A bilateral instrument cannot impose obligations on a third party, which means the provisions purporting to commit the Atlantic alliance, the European Union, and unspecified other states are, as the author says, without effect, and would require separate instruments concluded by those bodies according to their own procedures. And a commitment to amend a constitution is not within the gift of any executive: in the Ukrainian case, alterations of territory require a national referendum, so an undertaking of that kind is a promise to attempt something rather than to deliver it. Both points are legal rather than political and neither depends on any view of the merits.
The most consequential deficiency is the one the article approaches through Point 10, and it deserves to be named directly: a security guarantee that requires a decision at the moment of crisis is not a guarantee. The distinction between automatic and discretionary commitments is the whole of deterrence, and it is precisely why the assurances given in 1994 failed to prevent what followed. Any arrangement in which the guarantor decides, after an attack, whether the conditions for its guarantee have been met leaves the guarantee where it was, and both parties will read it accordingly.
Two observations on the analysis itself. The strongest passages are those that stay with the text, and the passages that move to the domestic politics of the guarantor, on tourism, on civil rights, and on the comparative prevalence of extremist movements, are the ones a reader unsympathetic to the argument will use to set the whole aside. The point they are making, that a state which has resiled from previous undertakings will be discounted when it offers new ones, is sound and stands on the record of those undertakings alone. And the article’s implicit standard, that an agreement should be assessed by whether its terms will still mean the same thing in five years to both parties, is the right standard and is worth stating explicitly, because it is the one question a mediator asks of any draft and the one that this document, on the author’s reading, does not survive.
* Added by the WMO Editorial Team
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Supplementary references added by the WMO Editorial Team
Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, 5 December 1994.
Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, 1997, terminated with effect from 1 April 2019.
Constitution of Ukraine, 1996, Article 73 on the alteration of territory and Article 156 on the procedure for constitutional amendment.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Articles 31, 34 and 46.
North Atlantic Treaty, 1949, Articles 5 and 10.
Minsk Protocol, 5 September 2014, and the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, 12 February 2015.
Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization, 49(3), 379 to 414, on the commitment problem.
Bell, C. (2008). On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
