A House Divided: Conflict Dynamics Between Hamas and Fatah

How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/

EDITORIAL NOTE *

This article concerns an internal Palestinian dispute in a highly contested regional setting. The characterisation of the parties and the attribution of responsibility reflect the author’s own perspective; this journal’s editorial position is neutral. The article was written in 2025 and should be read with that date in mind.

ABSTRACT

This article explores the intra-Palestinian conflict between Hamas and Fatah through the lens of conflict analysis, focusing on the historical, ideological, and political divides that fuel the ongoing rivalry. It examines the behavioural dynamics of each party, the power imbalance between Gaza and the West Bank, and the environment in which the conflict persists. The article concludes by outlining sustainable solutions rooted in inclusive dialogue, political reform, and grassroots engagement.

KEYWORDS

Hamas, Fatah, intra-Palestinian conflict, mediation, power imbalance, conflict environment, sustainable peace, political legitimacy

INTRODUCTION

The Hamas and Fatah conflict is a long-standing internal Palestinian division that has fragmented national governance and undermined efforts toward Palestinian self-determination. Though both factions claim to represent the interests of the Palestinian people, their diverging ideologies and strategies have driven them into repeated confrontation since the early 2000s.

MAIN CORPUS

The parties and their origins

Fatah, the dominant party in the Palestinian Authority, was established in the 1950s and has traditionally pursued a secular, nationalist approach. It has shown a willingness to engage diplomatically with Israel and is internationally recognised, through the Palestine Liberation Organization, as the representative of the Palestinian people. In contrast, Hamas was founded at the beginning of the First Intifada in 1987 as an Islamist movement. It maintains a more confrontational stance toward Israel, grounded in its religious ideology and its refusal to recognise the Israeli state.

The legislative elections of 2006 marked a turning point. Hamas achieved an unexpected electoral victory, winning a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council. This exposed deep fault lines in Palestinian politics. The following year, violent clashes erupted between the two factions, culminating in Hamas taking control of the Gaza Strip while Fatah retained governance of the West Bank. This produced a de facto political division that persists today.

Behavioural dynamics

The behavioural dynamics of the conflict reflect differing postures. Hamas has exhibited assertive and at times aggressive behaviour, driven in part by conditions of blockade, by ideological rigidity, and by the objective of maintaining control over Gaza through military capacity and messaging. Fatah, meanwhile, demonstrates a more bureaucratic and constrained character, attempting to maintain international legitimacy and institutional continuity in the West Bank despite internal criticism and charges of stagnation and corruption.

Power and imbalance

From a power perspective, Hamas has held control over Gaza through its military wing and has maintained external support from actors such as Iran and Qatar. Fatah, although weaker militarily, has the backing of Western states and broader diplomatic recognition. This creates a paradoxical imbalance: Hamas has been stronger on the ground in Gaza, while Fatah holds international standing and donor leverage.

The conflict environment

The conflict environment further complicates mediation. Internally, Palestinians face poverty, political fatigue, human rights violations, and generational trauma. Externally, the region is shaped by the interests of Israel, Egypt, the United States, and other regional powers. These actors often take sides or promote solutions that serve their strategic goals more than Palestinian unity. In addition, the blockade of Gaza, limited movement between the territories, and media polarisation deepen mistrust between ordinary citizens and their leadership alike.

Reconciliation efforts, including the Mecca Agreement of 2007, the Cairo talks of 2011, and the reconciliation agreement of 2017, have repeatedly failed for want of enforcement, because of inconsistent political will, and through the interference of external actors. Both parties have accused each other of betrayal, and unity talks have often functioned as political theatre rather than as genuine steps toward reconciliation.

My view of sustainable solutions

For a meaningful and lasting resolution, several strategies must be considered.

Inclusive political dialogue. Neutral third-party mediators, possibly from regional organisations such as the Arab League or from non-aligned states, should facilitate direct and inclusive dialogue between both parties, away from the external pressures and power dynamics that have historically derailed talks.

A power-sharing mechanism. A transitional unity government representing both Hamas and Fatah, with rotating leadership and clear jurisdiction over shared ministries, could gradually rebuild trust and integrate fragmented institutions.

Reform of political structures. Holding transparent and inclusive elections across all Palestinian territories would give legitimacy to new leadership and reflect the current will of the people, many of whom were not eligible to vote in 2006.

Grassroots and civil society engagement. Initiatives led by civil society groups, youth movements, and women’s organisations can reduce reliance on hierarchical political solutions. These groups can act as bridges, rebuilding community cohesion and shared national identity from the ground up.

Transitional justice and accountability. Both parties must be held accountable for internal human rights abuses and the suppression of dissent. An independent national body for reconciliation and justice could facilitate healing and document grievances for institutional reform.

SUMMARY *

The article’s organising observation is that a division usually treated as a symptom of the wider conflict is better understood as a conflict in its own right, with its own parties, its own history of failed agreements, and its own logic of incentives. On the author’s account each faction holds something the other lacks, territory and armed capacity on one side, recognition and access to funding on the other, and neither can govern without the other while each can prevent the other from governing alone. The five proposals that follow address different levels rather than offering alternatives to one another, from mediated talks between leaderships to accountability for what each has done to its own population, with the observation that a generation has now reached adulthood without having voted.

CONCLUSION

The Hamas and Fatah conflict represents more than a political rivalry; it reflects a deep fracture within Palestinian political life that has hindered national unity and weakened efforts toward a broader settlement. Through the lens of conflict analysis it becomes evident that this divide is shaped by ideological difference, imbalanced power structures, and entrenched mistrust, all reinforced by external influence and historical grievance.

Understanding the behaviours at play, from assertion to constrained cooperation, allows mediators to identify the emotional and psychological currents that sustain the conflict. The environment is one in which identity, legitimacy, and survival are constantly negotiated, leaving little room for compromise without trusted facilitation.

For a sustainable resolution, a shift from reactive measures to proactive, relationship-centred dialogue is essential. Third-party mediation, community-based peacebuilding, and mechanisms for inclusive political representation can open a path toward reconciliation. Though difficult, bridging this internal divide is vital both for Palestinian self-determination and for any credible advance in the wider peace process.

POTENTIAL SOLUTION *

The article’s diagnosis is sound and the reason these agreements have failed can be stated more precisely, because the precision points toward what would have to be different.

Every reconciliation agreement since 2007 has foundered on the same two items: the security forces and the movement’s relationship with armed struggle. Neither party will place its armed personnel under the other’s command, because doing so means surrendering the capacity to survive a reversal, and this is the classic commitment problem that defeats settlements between armed factions everywhere. It is not solved by better drafting. Where comparable divisions have been settled, the solution has involved third party monitoring of integration, phased implementation in which neither side disarms before the other, and, frequently, an external guarantor with the standing to impose a cost on defection. Egypt and Qatar have convened; neither has guaranteed.

The second obstacle is external and the article names it without drawing the conclusion. Reconciliation carries an immediate financial penalty, since the Palestinian Authority’s revenues depend on donor funding and on tax transfers, both of which have been suspended in response to previous unity arrangements. A party is therefore asked to accept a loss of income in exchange for a promise from an adversary. Until the international position on a unified administration is settled in advance rather than after the fact, the incentive structure will continue to reward division, whatever the parties themselves prefer.

Two additions bear on the proposals. Elections are the most frequently urged remedy and the most consistently deferred, and the reasons are worth naming: the constitutional position on when a presidential term ends is contested, East Jerusalem participation requires Israeli agreement which has not been forthcoming, and both parties have reason to fear a result they cannot control. The sequencing question this journal has considered elsewhere applies with full force here, since an election held before agreement on what the loser accepts is a mechanism for producing the next round rather than for ending this one. And the emphasis on civil society is right and understates the difficulty: the space for independent organisation has narrowed under both administrations, and any programme built on that constituency has first to secure the conditions in which it can operate.

Finally, one observation from the perspective of this field. The two most striking facts in the article are that the last legislative election was held nearly two decades ago and that a majority of Palestinians have never voted. A settlement negotiated between two leaderships whose mandates predate the adulthood of most of the people they govern will be received as an arrangement between elites, however carefully it is drafted. Whatever else reconciliation requires, it requires a route by which the governed acquire a say, and that is the element every previous agreement has postponed.

* Added by the WMO Editorial Team

REFERENCES

Elgindy, K. (2024) Predictable in Their Failure: An Analysis of Mediation Efforts to End the Hamas and Fatah Conflict. International Peacekeeping 31(1), 45 to 62.

Encyclopaedia Britannica (2024) Gaza Strip. https://www.britannica.com/place/Gaza-Strip

Fitch, A., and J. Schachter (2024) Inside the Sprawling Military Zone Israel Uses to Control Gaza from Within. The Wall Street Journal, 19 November 2024.

Lee, P. (2024) Israel’s Finance Minister Says Occupying Gaza Is Possible and Necessary in Wake of Hamas War. New York Post, 26 November 2024.

Milton-Edwards, B. (2017) The Hamas and Fatah Conflict: Shallow but Wide. Journal of Middle Eastern Politics 19(2), 134 to 150.

Supplementary references added by the WMO Editorial Team

Mecca Agreement between Fatah and Hamas, 8 February 2007.

Cairo Agreement on Palestinian National Reconciliation, 4 May 2011, and the Doha Declaration, 6 February 2012.

Cairo Reconciliation Agreement, 12 October 2017, and the Beijing Declaration, 23 July 2024.

Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority, as amended in 2003 and 2005, and the Palestinian Elections Law.

Reports of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process to the Security Council.

Milton-Edwards, B., & Farrell, S. (2010). Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement. Polity Press, Cambridge.

Roy, S. (2011). Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist Social Sector. Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Walter, B. F. (2002). Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton University Press, Princeton, on the commitment problem in the integration of armed forces.

International Crisis Group, Middle East reports on Palestinian reconciliation, Brussels and Ramallah.