The leaked “Plan for Peace” of November 20, 2025 exposes a structurally incoherent and diplomatically unbalanced framework that privileges Russian strategic aims while burdening Ukraine with extensive concessions, ambiguous obligations, and structurally unsound guarantees. Presented as a 28-point memorandum, the plan purports to confirm Ukrainian sovereignty, stabilize European security, and establish a durable ceasefire, yet its vague terminology, exclusion of Ukraine and Europe from negotiations, and repeated intrusion upon NATO and EU prerogatives fundamentally undermine its legitimacy. The document’s treatment of sovereignty, security guarantees, territorial arrangements, and constitutional constraints reveals a pattern of asymmetry; Ukraine is asked to curtail its military capacity, abandon NATO aspirations, accept de facto Russian territorial gains, and submit to externally imposed domestic reforms, while Russia faces minimal substantive obligations beyond symbolic legislative gestures and loosely framed commitments to non-aggression. Simultaneously, the United States positions itself as guarantor, mediator, and beneficiary, often in a manner contradictory to its own domestic and international policy, reflecting the continued erosion of its reliability as an international partner. Embedded within the plan is a broader architecture of strategic vagueness, institutional overreach, and diplomatic exclusion that invites misinterpretation and incentivizes future conflict. Taken as a whole, the proposal functions less as a viable peace settlement than as a blueprint for geopolitical instability, embedding future points of contestation and reinforcing the very conditions it purports to resolve.
Keywords: Ukraine, Russia, United States, Europe, European Union, NATO, Diplomacy, Mediation, Plan for Peace, Russo-Ukrainian War, Conflict Resolution, Conflict Escalation.
Introduction: The “Plan for Peace”
On November 20, 2025, a proposed peace deal to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine was leaked by Axios, revealing the diplomatic dynamic between Russia and the United States (US) in their joint approach to Ukraine, Europe, and international norms (Ravid & Lawler 2025). Widely criticized as a capitulation to Russian interests, the plan has been described as fundamentally flawed, both in substance and structure. Ukraine and Europe were excluded from the process, leaving the proposals fundamentally one-sided (Harmash, et al. 2025). It could be argued that this plan was intended as a first draft of sorts, intended to be shared with Ukraine as a starting point for negotiations. This benefit of doubt was undermined when Reuters announced the following day that an anonymous source claimed the White House has threatened to revoke weapons, intel in order to strong-arm them into agreeing, a claim further reinforced by an address by Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy, sharing, “Ukraine may now face a very difficult choice, either losing its dignity or the risk of losing a key partner.” (Blamforth, 2025; Novikov & Hatton, 2025) Here we will examine the provisions laid out in the 28-point plan, reviewing the verbiage therein, diplomatic implications, and potential ramifications for the future of the conflict.
Point 1. “Ukraine’s sovereignty will be confirmed.”
Point 2. “A comprehensive non-aggression agreement will be concluded between Russia, Ukraine and Europe. All ambiguities of the last 30 years will be considered settled.”
The plan starts with a proposed confirmation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, without specificity as to what parties will be confirming, or when said confirmation will take place. We are left to assume Russia will be the party to confirm sovereignty, whatever “confirm” means in this context is left ambiguous, and thus, without actual meaning. Ukraine’s sovereignty was already guaranteed in 1997 under the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which established the “inviolability” of the nation’s shared borders, which was first violated during the annexation of Crimea in 2014, along with Russia’s militarization of the Donbas (Yhiah Information Agency, 2025). In regard to Point 2, specifically the “ambiguities of the last 30 years,” no detail is offered as to what this applies to, either territorially or otherwise, serving to only muddy the waters diplomatically, setting the stage for potential future conflict when these ambiguous ambiguities are revealed to be, unsurprisingly, unsettled. Regardless, both points are undermined in following points ahead.
Point 3. “It is expected that Russia will not invade neighboring countries and NATO will not expand further.”
The term “expected” here leaves the doors open for future incursions by Russia, which has shown a willingness to violate numerous times over the last few decades, regardless of treaty or agreement (Neplii, 2024). More importantly, the agreement has no authority on the actions of NATO as a body, much less the NATO member nations themselves who would have to ratify or affirm the validity and applicability of the agreement. This reflects a vital gap in diplomatic understanding by the US officials involved in the language of the agreement, or perhaps an explicit attempt at leveraging ambiguity for future conflict.
Point 4. “A dialogue will be held between Russia and NATO, mediated by the United States, to resolve all security issues and create conditions for de-escalation in order to ensure global security and increase opportunities for cooperation and future economic development.”
Russia is expected to open dialogue with NATO, which includes the US, while the US simultaneously acts as its own mediator for the discussions it is party to? This can easily be excused as poor wording, though such an excuse is far from excusable in the context of war agreements. This may further reflect the US’s weakening alignment with broader NATO member state sentiment, almost framing itself as a distinct party from NATO itself (Schreer, 2019). The substance of the point itself holds little weight, only enforcing dialogue to no concrete ends, though the essence of cooperation and conflict de-escalation are present.
Point 5. “Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees.”
Axios notes in their article covering the leaked plan that Point 5 is intended to functionally guarantee NATO-style protections to Ukraine, meaning an attack on Ukraine will invoke an Article 5 response to Russia (Ravid, 2025). Although a substantial guarantee that utilitarianly incorporates Ukraine into the NATO framework, it again has no bearing on the actual behavior of NATO itself, a recurring theme throughout the proposed plan. Why this language was excluded from the plan itself is unclear. This provision also exemplifies the US’s reputational decay as an unreliable partner, given the US had already provided security guarantees as a part of the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, in which the US and Russia acknowledged Ukraine’s territorial integrity and offered assurances of support in case of attack, which Russia has since violated and the US has increasingly failed to honor, particular during the current administration (Kimball, 2022). This follows other notable bilateral agreements which the US has unilaterally violated in recent years, such as the Iran Nuclear Deal and a plethora of congressionally passed free-trade agreements with several nations (Ufeffer, 2021). Though the details of these arrangements are beyond the scope of this paper, they serve to highlight the deterioration of the US’s long-standing reputation as a reliable partner, and bulwark of international order.
Point 6. “The size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be limited to 600,000 personnel.”
This point serves to reduce Ukraine’s military capacity, undermining the nation’s sovereignty in Point 1 outright, and reducing their forces by nearly one third of their current troop volume (Nimoni, 2024). When considering agreements between parties in conflict, it is vital to assess the potential for future conflict, and how said agreements can reduce said potential, or set the stage for escalation if a party violates the agreement. It is a balancing act between the realities of the present, grievances of the past, and most importantly, threats of the future (Goertz & Diehl, 2002). While Ukraine is given a demand to limit troop volumes, Russia is not given any such demand, which acts to incentivize future aggression against a weakened opponent. This is merely one aspect of the plan that sets the stage for future conflict, which will be illustrated in future points.
Point 7. “Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to include in its statutes a provision that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future.”
Point 8. “NATO agrees not to station troops in Ukraine.”
Demands on a democratic nation to amend its constitution undermines the process of civilian rule, forcing elected representatives to make decisions which the people they are obligated to represent may not favor. Though language present undermines norms of democracy, substantively it repeats the measures intended in Point 3, which already prohibits Ukraine’s entry into NATO. These proposals serve to weaken the international standing of NATO, contradicting consistent messaging by NATO leadership and member states of Ukrainian inclusion. NATO member states, such as the United Kingdom (UK) and France, had been working towards developing a coalition of peacekeeping forces to enter Ukraine when the war concludes, which this plan intends to sabotage. It also undermines the ongoing efforts to incorporate Ukraine’s military industry and infrastructure into NATO’s structure (The Associated Press, 2025).
Point 9. “European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland.”
How an agreement between the US, Russia, and Ukraine is to dictate the stationing of fighter jets in Poland is unclear, nor is the number of jets, and what constitutes “European” in this context.
Point 10. “The U.S. guarantee:
The U.S. will receive compensation for the guarantee;
If Ukraine invades Russia, it will lose the guarantee;
If Russia invades Ukraine, in addition to a decisive coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be reinstated, recognition of the new territory and all other benefits of this deal will be revoked;
If Ukraine launches a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg without cause, the security guarantee will be deemed invalid.”
The order of operations in Point 10 is poorly structured, though it is clear the intent is to specify security guarantees, but fails in clarity and further pigeonholes Ukraine against any actions to reclaim territory seized by Russia. This is particularly important given the ambiguity as to which party controls what territory, as there is substantial overlap over claims, particularly in regions claimed by Russia but without troop presence (Ravid & Lawler 2025). In addition, the ambiguity of “global sanctions” begs the question as to what nations are subject to these agreements. While the global community has largely ostracised Russia economically, they are not beholden to the agreements in this plan. Though if we assume this statute only applies to the US, it should be clarified. In addition, why only two Russian cities are included in the final detail is unclear, in a sense implying Ukraine is permitted to strike other cities with missiles, which is certainly not intended, speaking to the deficient phrasing and structure of the overall plan. Additionally, the prioritization of US compensation in this point speaks to a lack of sincerity in how it engages with partners, tying safety to monetary gain, though simultaneously neglecting any detail as to how compensation will be agreed upon by the parties, who the parties are, and opening the door for the US to falter on its “guarantee” when inevitable disagreements over reimbursement.
Point 11. “Ukraine is eligible for EU membership and will receive short-term preferential access to the European market while this issue is being considered.”
Point 12. “A powerful global package of measures to rebuild Ukraine…”
Ukraine’s EU eligibility is reaffirmed under these points, though it lacks substantive weight, as Ukraine was already eligible and in the process of incorporating itself into the EU as the conflict has progressed (Soloviova & Fomin, 2025). This agreement also has no bearing on the actions of the EU, and given the lack of European involvement in this plan. Eligibility for EU membership to a nation that is already in negotiations to join remains irrelevant. As for Point 12, various guarantees are offered for economic and infrastructure repair for Ukraine, though the ambiguous use of the term “powerful” and “global” implies additional nations participating, who are not signatories to this agreement and played no role in its formation. This again weakens the commitments as it predicates the verbiage on an unreliable variable.
Point 13. “Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy.”
Point 14. “Frozen funds will be used as follows…”
Point 15. “A joint American-Russian working group on security issues will be established to promote and ensure compliance with all provisions of this agreement.”
Point 16. “Russia will enshrine in law its policy of non-aggression towards Europe and Ukraine.”
The following points all pertain to Russia’s relationship with the US and the global economy. The integration of Russia back into international commerce is entirely dependent on other nations, who again, were not involved in the creation of this framework. $100 Billion of frozen funds are reserved for the rebuilding of Ukraine under US direction, while the remaining $200 billion are reserved as capital for joint US-Russian projects aiming to prevent future conflict. Lastly, Russia agrees to sign non-aggression into law, though Russia’s reputation as an unreliable partner, with countless violations of their own laws and constitution documented under their authoritarian administration, turns this legislative promise into a mere suggestion.
Point 17. “The United States and Russia will agree to extend the validity of treaties on the non-proliferation and control of nuclear weapons, including the START I Treaty.”
Point 18. “Ukraine agrees to be a non-nuclear state in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”
Point 19. “The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant will be launched under the supervision of the IAEA, and the electricity produced will be distributed equally between Russia and Ukraine — 50:50.”
These provisions pertain to the de-escalation of nuclear tensions and management of nuclear resources. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, currently under Russian occupation, is put under neutral supervision and output is split evenly between the parties. Perhaps one of the most concise aspects of the peace plan, laying out clear, binding terms of agreement.
Point 20. “Both countries undertake to implement educational programs in schools and society aimed at promoting understanding and tolerance of different cultures and eliminating racism and prejudice:
Ukraine will adopt EU rules on religious tolerance and the protection of linguistic minorities.
Both countries will agree to abolish all discriminatory measures and guarantee the rights of Ukrainian and Russian media and education. All Nazi ideology and activities must be rejected and prohibited.”
Perhaps the most egregious aspect of the proposed plan is in the framing of racial intolerance and Nazism, a misleading narrative perpetuated by Russia as a justification for the invasion of Ukraine, predicated on Russian national pride in regards to their WWII victory with the allies (Kloo, et al. 2024). The irony of the point is that both Russia, and particularly the US, has larger numbers of Neo-Nazi and white nationalist movements (Dragas, 2021; Lefebvre, 2023). While stipulations such as these are typically seen as non-binding cross-cultural niceties, the involvement of the US poisons the waters when it comes to oversight of said initiatives, given the erasure of racial and cross-cultural education and programs under the current administration, and broader backsliding on civil rights, even targeting of specific people groups, including linguistic minorities (Stockemer, 2025). This has situated the US in the broader international context as adversarial, which has resulted in weakened ties with other nations and dramatic reductions in tourism to the US, particularly as domestic ideological and ethnic conflicts continue to escalate (Chen, 2025). This is to say, it is understood that the intent of these provisions are to reinforce the rhetoric and narratives that have been used as a vector of conflict to target Ukraine.
Point 21. “Territories:
Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk will be recognized as de facto Russian, including by the United States.
Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen along the line of contact, which will mean de facto recognition along the line of contact. Russia will relinquish other agreed territories it controls outside the five regions.
Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Donetsk Oblast that they currently control, and this withdrawal zone will be considered a neutral demilitarized buffer zone, internationally recognized as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarized zone.”
Point 22. “After agreeing on future territorial arrangements, both the Russian Federation and Ukraine undertake not to change these arrangements by force. Any security guarantees will not apply in the event of a breach of this commitment.”
Point 23. “Russia will not prevent Ukraine from using the Dnieper River for commercial activities, and agreements will be reached on the free transport of grain across the Black Sea.”
Recognition of “de facto” occupation translates to, in essence, de jure. Perhaps this again is a byproduct of poor wording, though as discussed before, this pattern opens the door for reinterpretation, which may be the intent. The binding language regarding territorial claims provides no concessions from Russia, and demands additional concessions from Ukraine, functionally handing Russia an outcome fully aligned with their war aim (Kamil & Sudirman, 2025). The only benefit offered to Ukraine in this set of points is the use of the Dnipro River.
Point 24. “A humanitarian committee will be established to resolve outstanding issues.”
This point included additional components dealing with the exchange of prisoners and children, though did not specify the abduction of thousands of children by Russia during the conflict (Frantsuz, et al. 2023). The establishment of a family reunification program while promising, lacks the necessary depth and detail, a reoccurring theme throughout the plan. The only other thing of note is the use of the term “hostages” which could be interpreted to include war criminals who have been apprehended over the course of the conflict.
Point 25. “Ukraine will hold elections in 100 days.”
Ukraine’s elections were purportedly only delayed due to the ongoing conflict, which disrupted civic and political institutions necessary to establish equitable liberal functions, and has been largely seen as acceptable by the international community. The inclusion of this point echoes alt-right conspiratorial narratives targeting Ukraine and framing the nation as an authoritarian regime, amplified by Russian misinformation campaigns, which international monitors have entirely debunked (Flakus, et al. 2025).
Point 26. “All parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for their actions during the war and agree not to make any claims or consider any complaints in the future.”
Point 27. “This agreement will be legally binding. Its implementation will be monitored and guaranteed by the Peace Council, headed by President Donald J. Trump. Sanctions will be imposed for violations.”
Point 28. “Once all parties agree to this memorandum, the ceasefire will take effect immediately after both sides retreat to agreed points to begin implementation of the agreement.”
What constitutes “parties” is left vague, providing dangerously broad applications. Do individuals in the US and various European administrations also receive amnesty? If the actions were taken during the invasion but were irrelevant to the conflict still count? While the questions appear facetious on face value, as the intent is easily inferred, again we are left with the potential repercussions of the substantive and structural deficits therein. Furthermore, how sanctions will be imposed, and by whom, leaves the door open for interpretive bias and misapplication, particularly given the ambiguity throughout the verbiage of the entire framework.
Conclusion: A Recipe For Disaster
As stated before, any peace agreement must consider the past, present, and future. This plan speaks to only Russian grievances and Ukrainian concessions, leaving it dangerously one-sided. The territorial, rhetorical, and non-binding framing positions Ukraine in a vulnerable dynamic with Russia, rendering it closely dependent on future reinterpretations and policy exploitation, seemingly designed to create plausible deniability and even justification for conflict in the coming years. Those provisions that appear binding consist of arrangements that are substantively vague or fatally structured. The decision ahead of Ukraine is indeed a difficult one, and will have repercussions for democracy abroad and the Western world’s liberal order for the coming decades.
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