The cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/
ABSTRACT *
This article asks whether sectarianism is the fundamental driver of the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, or whether other factors better explain their indirect confrontation across the Middle East. The author examines how the conflict manifests in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon and Qatar, traces the alliances that sustain it, and sets the historical origins of the Sunni Shia division alongside the geopolitical interests that revived it after 1979. The conclusion is that sectarian identity supplies the language of the rivalry while hegemonic competition supplies its substance, and that both governments now have reasons to seek a compromise. The characterisations reflect the author’s own perspective; this journal’s editorial position is neutral.
KEYWORDS *
Iran, Saudi Arabia, sectarianism, Sunni Shia divide, proxy conflict, Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Qatar blockade, regional security architecture, alliances, Middle East
INTRODUCTION
Is sectarianism the fundamental ideology antagonizing these bitter rivals?
This article explores the reasons behind the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, manifested in indirect armed and non-armed confrontation in Middle Eastern countries. Is this rivalry simply historical, sectarian, or else? Uncovering the reasons for this rivalry may also provide insights into possible peaceful outcomes in this regional cold war.
Introduction
Iran and Saudi Arabia are indirectly fighting each other in Middle Eastern countries. In Yemen, Saudi Arabian forces are fighting Houthi rebels, who are supported by Iran. In Syria, Iranian forces are fighting insurgent groups supported by Saudi Arabia. In Lebanon, political groups supported by both countries compete against each other for power and control. In Qatar, the blockage by Saudi Arabia has resulted in increased trade with and improved relationships between Qatar and Iran. Tensions in the Middles East in general, and specifically between the two countries have reached historical highs. Their key alliances are aligned with the forces shaping the current world order, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. on the one side, and Iran with China and Russia on the other. Religious differences do not fully explain current levels of confrontation. Exploring the root causes of this rivalry will clarify the prospects for a peaceful resolution between the two countries.
MAIN CORPUS
How is the conflict manifested?
According to Cambridge Dictionary (no date), conflict is defined as a serious disagreement between people, organizations, or countries with opposing opinions.
The undisputable rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia may not be in the form of direct armed conflict, however, the serious disagreement between these two countries is clearly manifested in their support of opposing groups in the entire Middle East and beyond, and in their increasing investments in arms and defense, pretty much like the USSR and the USA confronted each other during the cold war.
What is not so clear and explicit, is the opposing opinions that confront the two countries and drive them to indirectly confront each other in the numerous regional conflicts.
The countries and nations where Iran and Saudi Arabia are confronting each other include, starting with countries affected by armed conflict, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and Qatar, among others.
In Syria, a country where the majority of the population practices Sunni Islam, the armed conflict started in 2011 and is ongoing although slowly coming to an end. The armed conflict has caused, according to the UN, over 250.000 deaths, 1 million injured, more than 5,6 million refugees, 6,1 million internally displaced people, and more than 13 million people requiring humanitarian assistance (data from 2018). The conflict started with rebel groups taking up arms against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, a follower of Shia Islam. In the eight-year-long conflict, Iran has been openly backing the regime of Assad, while Saudi Arabia has been providing support to rebel groups (The Middle East Institute, 2016). An example of the support that Saudi Arabia has been providing to rebel groups is provided by journalist Robert Fisk. According to an investigation carried out by Fisk, a shipment of weapons manufactured in the US and legally sold to Saudi Arabi ended up in the hands of al-Nusra, an Islamist group fighting the Assad regime (The Independent, 2018).
The armed conflict in Yemen started following social and political unrest brought by the effects of the Arab Spring. The incumbent President Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced to step down in favor of his deputy, Saudi-backed Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. The Houthis, a tribal people from northern Yemen practicing Shia Islam, allied with former President Saleh and part of other Yemeni groups, took up arms, conquered the capital Sanaa, ousted President Hadi, and took control of a significant part of western Yemen. The Saudi’s joined the ousted President to fight against the Houthis. The Iranian government is accused of supplying missiles and weapons to the Shia Houthis (BBC, 2019). In the latest events of 2019, oil installations in Saudi Arabia were attacked by drones causing major oil production disruptions. The Houthis have claimed responsibility for the attacks, however, the United States and Saudi Arabia blame Iran for the attacks (Aljazeera, 2019).
The invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003 resulted in deposing Saddam Hussein, then Iraq’s President, a follower of Sunni Islam. Iraq, where the majority of the population follows Shia Islam, has since then been governed by a Shia-dominated government. Since the establishment of a Shia-dominated government, Iran’s political and economic influence in Iraq, and the rise of pro-Iranian Shia political groups have risen significantly. To confront Iranian influence in Iraq, Saudi Arabia has been supporting the Sunni insurgency against Iraq’s central government. (Atlantic Council, 2019)
Lebanon has been for decades under the competing influence of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran has been supporting the Shia political and militant group Hezbollah since its inception in 1985. Saudi Arabia, in turn, has maintained close historic, economic, and political links with the family of the, until recently, Prime Minister Saad Hariri, a follower of Sunni Islam. With the support of Iran, Hezbollah managed to obtain, together with its allies, the majority of seats in Parliament in the 2018 elections. In turn, in 2017 life on TV from Riyadh, Hariri announced his resignation as Prime Minister and making references to Iran’s interference in the country. He, later on, withdrew his resignation (TRT World, 2019). Saad Hariri holds also Saudi Arabian citizenship. (Middle East Eye, 2017)
Qatar was accused by its neighbors of supporting terrorism, having increasingly close ties with Iran, and interfering in neighboring countries’ political affairs. To pressurize Qatar and force changes in its foreign policies, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrein, and the United Emirates imposed a total land, sea, and air blockade to Qatar in 2017, and cut diplomatic ties. Iran, among other countries, quickly came to support Qatar allowing them to use Iranian airspace and shipping routes to circumvent the blockade. As a result, trade between the two countries increased significantly, and their relationship reached new heights. (Atlantic Council, 2017)
What are the key alliances and how do they influence the conflict?
The alliance between Saudi Arabia and the US dates back to 1945 when President Franklin Roosevelt signed an agreement with King Abdul Aziz in which the US would provide the newly born Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with security, in exchange for oil. The 70 plus years agreement still stands strong under the Presidency of Donald Trump, and the influential Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman. (The Week, 2018)
The enmity between the US and Iran dates back to 1953, when the CIA, with support of British intelligence, staged a coup against the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, as a result of Mosaddeq’s move towards nationalization of the oil industry, which was, until then, in hands of the British. Mosaddeq’s overthrow was complemented by the reinstatement of Iran’s Shah, Reza Pahlavi, a pro-western monarch who would safeguard the west’s oil interests in the country, and who ruled the country for a quarter-century more until the 1979 Islamic revolution. (The Guardian, 2013)
The anti-American sentiment was bolstered with 1979 the Islamic revolution and hostage crisis. The revolution deposed the Iranian Shah in favor of theocratic rule by the Ayatollah’s, Iranian Islamic clerics. The Shah fled the country and eventually entered the US seeking medical treatment. The revolutionaries wanted the US to extradite the Shah back to Iran for his trial. When this was rejected by the US, a mob of revolutionaries stormed into the US embassy in Tehran and took most of the US diplomats hostage. Negotiations to free the hostages took over a year. During negotiations, the US engaged in a vigorous anti-Iranian diplomatic campaign, imposed economic sanctions to Iran, filed suit against the Iranian government in the International Court of Justice, and supported Saddam Hussain, Iraq’s President at that time, in the invasion of Iran by providing finance and weapons. The war between Iraq and Iran lasted for eight years, inflating Iranian economic and social hardship, and established permanent mutual antagonism between both countries. (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019)
The alliance between Saudi Arabia and the US is strengthened by the US position of viewing Iran as the greatest danger to Middle East stability. The US believes the Saudis can counterbalance Iran’s regional influence. More recently, Saudi Arabia and Israel have developed closer links to work against Iran’s growing regional influence (The Week, 2018). Israel, one of Iran’s greatest enemies, is also the US’s greatest ally in the Middle East. Both, Saudi Arabia and Israel have developed increased worries with Iran’s expanding influence in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. (Aljazeera, 2019)
Russia and Iran have been close allies in the Syrian conflict. They have both fought along the Syrian troops to preserve the regime of Bashar al-Assad, against the Syrian rebel groups supported by the US and Saudi Arabia. More broadly, they are both opposed to US hegemony in the Middle East. (Atlantic Council, 2019)
China is the greatest trading partner of Iran. Trade and collaboration between Iran and China are not only restricted to oil, breaching US sanctions on Iran, but extend to arms sales and geostrategic balancing against the US. Iran is also one of the key countries in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the flag-ship foreign, trade, and investment policies of the Chinese government. (Foreign Policy, 2019)
China and Russia have been deepening cooperation during the last quarter of a century, seemingly reconciling their national and regional interests. Although not reaching a fully-fledged alliance, both countries have opted out to increase cooperation and not compete against each other. (Open Forum, 2019)
In turn, the US sees China as its major rival, capable of overtaking the US economically and technologically. Russia occupies second place in terms of rivalry in the US. The three countries are currently the most powerful players in the global military and geopolitical game, dynamically shaping the new world order after the Cold War. (East Asia Forum, 2019)
Alliances are thus created not only through common interests but also in relation to who is the common rival. Two main axes have so developed, the Iran-Russia-China axis, and the Saudi Arabia-US-Israel axis. This somewhat reductionist analysis of highly complex reality is perhaps illuminating although ignoring other many variables not explored in this paper, including the role of other relevant players such as Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, European Union countries, among others.
What is the role of sectarianism in the conflict?
Islam emerged in the 7th century when Mohammed unveiled the new faith to the people of Mecca. Within a century, Islam had spread from Central Asia to Spain. Following Mohammed’s death, his followers debated over his succession. Some argued that leaders of the new religion should be inherited on the basis of qualifications, and believed that Abu Bakr, a close companion of Mohammed, should be the succeeding Leader of the Islamic community, while others believed it should result of Mohammed’s bloodline and Ali ibn Abi Talib, Mohammed’s cousin and son in law, should take the leading role. This basic division was the emergence of Islam’s two main sects, Shias, supporting that religious leader of the Muslim world follow Mohammed’s bloodline for succession, and Sunnis, who oppose succession based on bloodline. Armed conflict and killings between Shias and Sunnis arose in the early days of Islam. (Council on Foreign Relations, no date)
In the sixteenth century, the Safavid dynasty was established in Persia and adopted Shia Islam as the state religion. Over the next couple of centuries, they fought against the Ottoman Empire, at that time the seat of Sunni Islam, establishing the borders between the Shia and Sunni worlds, roughly represented by modern-day political borders between Turkey and Iran. Today, Sunnis make up around 85% of the Muslim world, while Shias the remaining 15%. (Council on Foreign Relations, no date)
The relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia was, for a long time, relatively stable. However, since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, which deposed the Iranian monarchy and instated the Ayatollahs’ regime as theocratic rulers, the relationship between the two countries has progressively deteriorated. The Ayatollahs consider the monarchic rule, by and large, as “immoral and irreconcilable with Islam”, questioning the legitimacy of the Saudi’s claim as custodians of Islam. At the same time, the Saudi monarchy perceives itself as the dominant Arab nation, custodians of Islam and its holy places, and denounce the Shia faith as “a deviation and subversion of Islam and condemned its religious followers as apostates.” (Atlantic Council, 2018)
Under the Ayatollahs’ ruling, Iran began a campaign of Islamic revival, supporting Shia groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bahrain, and Pakistan. The increased centralization of Shiism under the leadership of Iran resulted in a counter-balancing act by the Saudis, who pushed in the region the propagation of Wahhabism, a puritanical brand of Sunni Islam antagonistic to Shia Islam. The efforts by Iran and Saudi Arabia to propagate their own antagonistic religious schools resurrected the “centuries-old sectarian rivalry.” The revived rivalry ignited sectarian violence, resurfacing confessional identity that is now very present in current conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, including Saudi Arabia where approximately 10% of the population is Shia. (Council on Foreign Relations, no date)
SUMMARY
The contemporary rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is thus originally rooted in historic and sectarian grounds, reinvigorated by current geopolitical hegemonic interests of both countries, that merge with the geopolitical hegemonic interests of the global forces that are shaping the current, post-cold war, world order.
CONCLUSION
Can a sustained peaceful outcome be reached?
Reaching a sustained peaceful outcome is a possibility that may result from extensive diplomatic interaction and commitments from both parties.
Both, Saudi Arabia and Iran seem to be interested in turning a page on the current state of high volatility, mistrust, and conflict around the region. They have been recently expressing their desire to finding a political compromise that “would allow for the two regional powers to peacefully co-exist.”
Iran is not only interested in, but also dependent on re-joining the international community and leaving behind decades of isolation to further economic and social development, ridding itself of the severe current economic sanctions. There are indications that Tehran understands the need for becoming part of the regional sub-system, and for that to be achieved through compromises at the regional and global arena. Compromises will include the need for respecting the sovereignty of some Arab states where it is interfering, including Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria. (Aljazeera, 2019)
Saudi Arabia, in turn, has pursued for at least a decade the US military intervention in Iran. The Saudis preference was for the US to restore the power balance in the region that existed before 2003 when Iran was heavily sanctioned and contained. The Saudis have not only failed to achieve this, but they have also recently realized that they may not get the expected direct US support in the eventual case of an armed conflict with Iran. (The American Prospect, 2019)
The fear of being left alone in an armed conflict with Iran, something that would stand in the way of the ambitious plans of Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman and his Vision 2030 for Saudi Arabia, has led the Saudis to seek a compromised solution with Tehran. An indication of this was resorting to Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan to transmit this message to Iran. (AL-Monitor, 2019)
Saudi Arabia is now considering sitting down with Iran to establish a new security architecture for the region, opening up a window of opportunity for a sustained peaceful agreement. (The American Prospect, 2019)
This will not be easily achieved since it will require both countries to review their regional policies, reduce their interference in the internal affairs of their neighboring countries and respect each other as important regional actors. This will also require the neutral participation and support of global powers.
Sunni and Shia Muslims share their faith in the Quran and the Prophet Mohammed’s teachings, they live in peace in many countries, where intermarriages are common and so is praying at the same mosques (Council on Foreign Relations, no date). The current discussions seeking a peaceful, mutually satisfying compromise to their differences refer purely to geopolitical interventions and interests. If Iran and Saudi Arabia manage to settle their dispute and maintain a power balance in the region, Sunnis and Shias will most likely be able to co-exist in peace as long as politics do not interfere once again.
POTENTIAL SOLUTION *
The article’s central finding carries a practical consequence worth drawing out. If sectarian identity is the language of this rivalry rather than its substance, then theological dialogue, however valuable in itself, will not resolve it, and neither will appeals to Islamic unity. What has to be negotiated is what the parties actually want: security, standing as a regional power, and the assurance that neither will be excluded from the region’s future by the other.
That points toward the mechanism the article itself identifies in its closing paragraphs, namely a regional security architecture. Its outline is familiar from other regions that emerged from comparable confrontations. It would begin not with the disputed files but with the measures that reduce the risk of accidental war: direct military communication channels, notification of exercises and naval movements, incident procedures in the Gulf, and agreed rules for maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. None of these requires either side to concede anything about Yemen, Syria or Lebanon, and all of them address the danger that a single miscalculation produces a war neither government wants.
The proxy theatres then become more tractable, because they can be addressed one at a time rather than as a package. Yemen is the natural starting point, since it is where the humanitarian cost is highest, where both external patrons have been seeking an exit, and where the internal parties themselves have proved willing to negotiate under regional facilitation. Reciprocal restraint on arms supply, verified by an accepted monitor, is more achievable than a comprehensive settlement and would demonstrate to both publics that the other side keeps agreements.
Mediation of this kind requires an intermediary neither party regards as belonging to the other camp, which excludes the actors most invested in the region’s alignments. The article’s reference to Pakistani facilitation illustrates the alternative: states with credible relations on both sides, Oman, Kuwait, Iraq, Pakistan, or a European or Asian government without a stake in the outcome, can carry messages and host contacts precisely because they are not powerful enough to impose anything. Quiet channels of this sort have repeatedly opened when public diplomacy was impossible, and they should be maintained continuously rather than assembled in crises.
Finally, a word about the sectarian dimension the article rightly qualifies. Even where elites compete for geopolitical reasons, sectarian mobilisation once released does not simply return to its container. Communities in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and the eastern province of Saudi Arabia live with the consequences long after any agreement between capitals. Any settlement between the two states therefore needs a parallel track at community level: religious authorities on both sides publicly repudiating incitement, protection and equal citizenship for minority communities within each state, and support for the intercommunal coexistence that, as the article notes, remains the ordinary reality in much of the Muslim world. Governments can end a rivalry; only communities can end a sectarian conflict.
* Added by the WMO Editorial Team
REFERENCES
5. References
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.
The Afghan conflict and peace prospects
How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/
ABSTRACT *
This article maps the Afghan conflict as a multi party dispute and argues that any peace process confined to the United States and the Taliban is unlikely to endure. The author traces the war from the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the American demand for the surrender of al Qaeda leaders, through the bombing campaign begun on 7 October 2001, the fall of the Taliban government, the establishment of an interim administration from which the Taliban were excluded, the resurgence of the insurgency from 2006 with sanctuaries across the Pakistani border, and the resulting stalemate, with more than 147,000 deaths recorded by a Brown University study. The article then examines the composition of the parties in detail: the Taliban as a network of networks spanning moderate and radical factions with disputed authority to speak for the whole, the distinction between the Afghan and Pakistani movements, and the emergence in 2015 of the Islamic State Khorasan Province, itself a rival and enemy of the Taliban. A central section analyses the regional and global interests that sustain the war, including Pakistani concerns over Indian influence and its own standing in Afghanistan, Iranian perceptions of encirclement by American bases, and Russian anxiety over NATO expansion and the spread of the Islamic State into Central Asia, concluding with the observation that great power rivalries have aided the Taliban’s survival. The final section assesses the peace talks in Doha, Istanbul and Moscow, the exclusion and frustration of the Afghan government, and the prospects for a power sharing arrangement, while warning that the Islamic State Khorasan Province would remain, that hardline factions may reinforce it, and that declining donor funding could further weaken government services after any agreement.
KEYWORDS *
Afghanistan, Taliban, peace talks, Doha, Islamic State Khorasan Province, Pakistan, Iran, Russia, United States, NATO, power sharing, regional interests, intra Afghan dialogue
INTRODUCTION
This article explores the nature of the Afghan conflict, identifying the national and international parties involved, and the national and international interests at stake. At a moment in time where peace negotiations are throwing hope for the end of the conflict, having a clear understanding of the conflict will be essential to finding ways for a realistic prospect of an end to the conflict.
Introduction
Adopting an uninformed approach to the Afghan conflict, one might believe that the conflict is about the U.S. defending the Afghan government from a terrorist group called the Taliban. Such an approach would most likely guarantee the failure of peace negotiations since it would ignore the complex intricacies of the Taliban as a unified group, and a whole array of players involved in the conflict. In addition to the U.S., Iran, Pakistan, Russia are all important parts of the Afghan conflict puzzle, and no prospects of sustained peace will be found without fulfilling the needs and interests of all relevant players.
MAIN CORPUS
What is the conflict about?
The United States government, following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York that killed more than 3.000 people, identified the terrorist organization al-Qaeda, and its leader, Osama bin Laden, as masterminds that organized the attacks.
Bin Laden, a Saudi Arabian national, had been openly confronting the U.S. and assuming the realization of terrorist attacks on U.S. targets in Africa and the Middle East during the 1990s. To avoid being captured by U.S. forces, bin Laden had taken refuge in different countries before being taken under the protection of the Taliban, the regime of orthodox Islamic clerics that was governing Afghanistan at the time of the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York.
Following the attacks, the U.S. government demanded that the Taliban handed over all al-Qaeda leaders hiding in Afghanistan, threatening the Taliban with daring the consequences if they didn’t (Council on Foreign Relations, no date). The Taliban requested that the U.S. presented evidence of the involvement of bin Laden in the New York terrorist attacks as a precondition to handing him over (The Guardian, 2001). The U.S. reply to the Taliban’s request for evidence was that there was no need of discussing bin Laden’s culpability since they simply knew bin Laden was guilty (The Guardian, 2001). Upon the refusal of the Taliban to hand over bin Laden, the U.S., with British support, started bombing Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 (Council on Foreign Relations, no date).
The bombing was supported on the ground by forces provided by, mainly, Afghan opponents to the Taliban regime. The Taliban regime was quickly and progressively defeated across Afghanistan. After the fall of Kabul in November 2011, the UN invited Afghan factions, excluding the Taliban, to agree on an interim government. An international security assistance force was established by the UN Security Council to support the newly established government. The Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders ended up retreating, dispersed and hiding in the Afghan mountains and across the border in neighboring Pakistan (Council on Foreign Relations, no date). Bin Laden was nowhere to be found.
The U.S., the UN, and international and national NGOs engaged in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) took progressive control of the international security assistance force and, alongside U.S. military forces, became involved in combatting the remaining Taliban forces. Since then, U.S., NATO, and Afghan troops have been fighting the Taliban until today. In 2006 there was a significant surge in attacks by the Taliban, significantly organized from safe havens in Pakistan. The Taliban gained increasing control of Afghan territory, today controlling over one-third of the country. The war is declared a stalemate by the U.S. (Council on Foreign Relations, no date).
According to a study carried out by Brown University, more than 147.000 people have died in the Afghan conflict since the U.S. invasion in October 2001 (Gandhara, 2018).
In 2019, preliminary peace talks between the U.S. and Taliban that started 10 years earlier reached their highest ground, the discussion centering on the complete removal of U.S. troops and the Taliban assuring that Afghanistan will not become a safe haven for terrorist groups. The Afghan government is not yet a participant in peace talks with the Taliban (Council on Foreign Relations, no date).
What parties are involved in the conflict?
The known parties that are mainly involved in the conflict include the Taliban, the U.S., NATO forces, and the government of Afghanistan.
The Taliban is an Islamist movement that originated in the southern Pashtun regions and was lead by Sunni Hanafi clerics at the time of the Mujahedin fight to expel the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Following the expulsion of the Soviet army, the Mujahedin, representing different regional and ethnic groups of Afghanistan, ensued in a civil war that saw the Taliban taking control of the vast majority of the country. The Taliban imposed their own version of Shari’a law and governed Afghanistan until the 2001 U.S. invasion. Today they are a largely united movement with their leadership mainly based in Pakistan (Gandhara 2017).
There are different factions within the Taliban, ranging from moderate to radical. It is not easy to determine the level of unity of these factions and whether one voice represents them all. For example, different factions have been attending preliminary peace talks held in Qatar, Istanbul, and Moscow. According to the Turkish news channel TRT, the Afghan government held informal meetings in Istanbul in 2018 with Taliban factions representing Quetta Shura (council of leaders of the Afghan Taliban), Haqqani Network, and other factions, while the Taliban’s main spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahed, denied their involvement in the talks. The news channel reports that talks may have been held with breakaway factions such as the ‘Mullah Rasul’ group. (TRT World, 2018)
According to The Intercept, the Taliban factions that are currently holding peace talks with the U.S. are mainly moderate factions, and that the key challenges to these peace talks are the radical Taliban factions that “(…) enjoy safe havens in Pakistan”. (The Intercept 2019)
Thomas Ruttig describes the Taliban as a broad movement that is a network of networks, including, for example, the Haqqani network, a member of the Taliban’s Leadership Council (Afghanistan Analyst Network, 2012). There are also references to the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban or Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the latter significantly more factionalized than the former one (Oxford Analytica, 2015).
In 2015 a new player emerged in the Afghan conflict. The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), mainly composed by factions of the Pakistan Taliban, and to a lesser degree by factions of the Afghan Taliban, was officially recognized by Iraq and Syria-based Islamic State group (Oxford Analytica, 2015).
The origins of ISKP start with the TTP factions moving into Afghanistan in 2010, fleeing Pakistani military operations targeting them. Initially welcomed by the local population, who felt they had to support their Pakistani Pashto brothers persecuted by the Pakistani army, the TTP slowly became a powerful armed group ruling the occupied Afghan regions, until they formally allied themselves to Islamic State. Along with TTP/ISKP’s progressive acquisition of power during 2014 and 2015, the local Taliban moved “from passive resistance to head-on confrontation”, their rivalry and animosity growing progressively along with armed confrontation. At the same time that the Taliban started fighting ISKP to regain their lost territory, the U.S. and Afghan governments started also targeting the ISKP. In parallel, across Afghanistan, several groups, mainly from Taliban factions, started proclaiming affiliation to ISKP (Afghanistan Analyst Network, 2016).
What are the common enemies?
Besides the already discussed war between the Afghan government and its U.S. allies against the Taliban and against ISKP, and between the Taliban and ISKP, other regional and global forces are participating in the conflict in Afghanistan to defend their interests.
Afghanistan and Pakistan
The Afghan government views Pakistan as the “center of the Taliban”, providing refuge to the Taliban, treating wounded Taliban fighters, and providing them support in general. In turn, it is believed that Pakistan may be losing ground and relevance as stakeholders in Afghanistan if they withdraw support from the Taliban. This way, they do not see contradictory supporting the Taliban in some regions in Afghanistan, and combating them in some others (The Diplomat, 2018).
Furthermore, Pakistan may be interested in the Taliban fighting ISKP, who are active in Pakistan since, on the one hand, they were originally attacked by the Pakistani military when they were part of TTP, and on the other hand, because the ISKP consider Khorasan Province to include Pakistan and would like to install an Islamic State in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Pakistan also views with concern the establishment of a stable government in Afghanistan that, as per currently, has close ties to India (The Diplomat 2018).
The U.S. and Iran
The U.S. President, Donald Trump, began threatening Iran 12 days after taking office in 2017. Since then, escalating measures have been taken that may indicate the U.S. is prepared to go to war with Iran (The New Yorker, 2019).
The 1979 Ayatollah’s Islamic revolution deposed the western-backed Iranian Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and, following a series of events that “plunge the two countries into an obsessive crisis in relations from which they have yet to emerge…”, the U.S. and Iran have been foes ever since (BBC, 2015).
Considering the large military presence of the U.S. in Afghanistan, and not only (the U.S. has military bases right across the Persian Gulf in Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, and in neighboring Kuwait and Iraq), the Iranians have serious reasons for feeling under threat.
Since the 2011 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Iran “views the Taliban as a useful point of leverage against the U.S.”, providing them with financial and military support (The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2019).
The U.S. and Russia
Russia is naturally concerned about the U.S. military presence just south of its borders. Ever since the end of the cold war, Russia and the U.S. have gone through periods of lesser cooperation and greater competition. The easterly move of NATO, incorporating to its alliance former Soviet Union States, is perceived by Moscow as a threat (Australian Institute of International Affairs, 2018). More recently, with the crises in Syria, Ukraine, and Venezuela, where the two countries have found themselves on opposite sides of the conflicts, tensions have arisen. Russia and the U.S. geopolitical interests are, in most of these conflicts, including the one in Afghanistan, in direct confrontation.
Russia and the Taliban both perceive the Islamic State as an enemy. Russia has fought the Islamic State in Syria and sees it as a serious threat to stability, not only in Afghanistan but also in the Central Asian region. Russia is concerned that ISKP could spill beyond the borders of Afghanistan and destabilize Russian allies in the region, the former Soviet Union states like Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, among others. The U.S. military believes that Russia has not only had diplomatic relations with the Taliban but that they have provided them with military support as well (The Diplomat, 2018).
This complex international geopolitical context in which Afghanistan is submerged has basically contributed to the survival and resurgence of the Taliban. As simply summarised by Abubakar Siddique,
“After 9/11, rivalries such India versus Pakistan, Saudi Arabia versus Iran, Russia versus the United States, and the United States against Iran have greatly aided their survival and capacity to spring back from extinction [of the Taliban]” (Gandhara 2017).
SUMMARY
What are the prospects for peace?
As mentioned earlier in this article, the U.S. is holding preliminary peace talks with the Taliban, the discussion centering on the complete removal of U.S. troops and the Taliban assuring that Afghanistan will not become a safe haven for terrorist groups. The preliminary peace talks are mainly taking place in Qatar (Council on Foreign Relations, no date). This is a unilateral initiative taken by the U.S., with the Taliban as sole counterparts for the time being.
In parallel, informal peace talks have been held in Istanbul and Moscow. In Istanbul, a meeting was held between the Afghan government and the Taliban last January. Although this has been denied by the spokesperson of the main Taliban group, Zabihullah Mujahed (TRT World, 2018). The Taliban consider the government a “puppet regime” that does not represent Afghan citizens and responds to the orders of the “foreign invaders”, the U.S., and thus, they do not negotiate with the puppet government Voice of Jihad, 2018). This may indicate that a Taliban faction, different from the main group holding talks with the U.S. in Qatar, may have attended the meeting in Istanbul. The Moscow peace talks, in turn, bring together the Taliban (the same group that is holding peace talks with the U.S. in Qatar), political representatives from Afghanistan’s opposition parties, including Afghanistan’s former president Hamid Karzai, and representatives from neighboring countries. It is believed that these parallel peace talks may have been supported by the Taliban to purposefully sideline the Afghan government, instill division amongst Afghans, further weakening the government and increasing their bargaining power (RFEFL, 2019).
According to all parties, peace talks are progressing satisfactorily, although no concrete results have been produced yet. The U.S. and the Taliban have seemingly reached a draft agreement on some issues, but one of the key unresolved disputes is their direct dialogue with the Afghan government (Aljazeera, 2019).
In the meantime, the government of Afghanistan feels “furious”, “sidelined, and frustrated” for being left out of these ongoing peace talks (RFEFL, 2019).
CONCLUSION
Taking into consideration the complexity of the Afghan conflict, and the multiplicity of actors involved, it is unlikely that a resolution to the conflict can be reached by solely fulfilling the interests of the U.S. and the Taliban. For a broad agreement on a peace deal, all key players must be involved in the peace process, or, as a minimum, the interests of most key players will need to be satisfied. With the withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO troops, as is in principle agreed by the U.S., the key interests of the Taliban, Iran, Russia, and Pakistan may be met. It will remain to be seen if an agreement on a power-sharing deal can be reached, involving a government with the representation of key political parties and the Taliban. As long as there is a stable government in Afghanistan, that fights against the establishment of terrorist safe havens, this should satisfy the interests of all players, the U.S., Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and the Taliban (if the power-sharing deal fulfills their minimum requirements, yet to be known), at least in what ISKP is concerned. The absence of an agreement will most probably result in ongoing civil war.
In the case such sort of peace agreement is reached, it will clearly resolve the most significant part of the Afghan conflict, but the eradication of ISKP, who most likely will continue terrorizing Afghans and creating havoc. ISKP maybe even strengthened with the inclusion of more radical Taliban factions who will not be satisfied with anything short of establishing an Islamic Emirate or state in Afghanistan and who do not want to join a coalition government. Following the removal of U.S. and NATO troops, it will be up to the shuffled Afghan army and Taliban fighters, who will need to lead the fight against a strengthened ISKP. The likelihood that aid money from foreign donors will keep on dropping in a post-agreement era (since 2011 aid money for Afghanistan has been dropping steadily), in an economy that is already highly dependent on foreign aid (according to Afghan Analyst Network, 2018, 66% of the government’s budget for the year 2017 was provided by donors), may result in further deterioration of government services, including security.
POTENTIAL SOLUTION *
The analysis in this article identifies the fault line in the Doha process with unusual clarity, and the fault line is one of design rather than diplomacy. A negotiation between a departing foreign army and an insurgency can settle only what those two parties control: the timetable of withdrawal and undertakings about transnational militant groups. It cannot settle how Afghans will govern themselves, because neither party at that table has the standing to decide it. An agreement of that shape therefore ends a foreign intervention without ending a war, and the party excluded from the room, the Afghan government, is left to negotiate later from a position weakened by the very agreement concluded in its absence.
Sequencing is the correctable error. Withdrawal is the strongest card any external party holds, and once it has been conceded in advance of intra Afghan agreement, the leverage that might have secured such an agreement is gone. A process in which departure is phased against verified progress on an internal political settlement, ceasefire, agreed transitional arrangements, protection of constitutional guarantees, keeps the incentive alive on all sides. The same logic applies to the multiple tracks the article describes: Doha, Istanbul and Moscow running in parallel allow every party to shop for the most congenial forum and to escape unwelcome proposals by awaiting the next venue. A single coordinated framework, with regional and international actors supporting rather than competing with one lead process, is a precondition for any of them to succeed.
Representation is the second unresolved question, and it cuts both ways. The article notes the difficulty of establishing which Taliban voice binds the movement, and any agreement signed by a faction that cannot deliver its own commanders is an agreement that fragments on contact with reality. Verifiable ceasefire compliance across regions and commands is the practical test of authority, more reliable than any declaration of unity. On the other side, an Afghan settlement negotiated only between armed men will reflect only what armed men value. The constituencies with the greatest stake in durability, women, the urban young, the professional classes, the returning refugee population, ethnic minorities, hold no weapons and therefore no automatic seat, and their inclusion is not a courtesy but the difference between a truce among fighters and a political order citizens will defend.
The regional dimension the article documents so carefully points to its own remedy. Pakistan, Iran, Russia, India, China and the Gulf states each have an interest that can be named, and interests that are named can be traded. A regional guarantee framework, in which neighbours commit to non interference in exchange for assurances about their specific concerns, transit and trade access, the exclusion of hostile groups from Afghan territory, restraint over rival influence, addresses the mechanism that the article identifies as having sustained the war: an insurgency that could always replace its losses because someone across a border found its survival useful.
Two matters should not wait for the political settlement. Militant groups outside any process, such as those the article discusses, will remain regardless of what is agreed, and counter terrorism cooperation among actors otherwise opposed is one of the few subjects on which they already share an interest. And the economy deserves attention now rather than after: a state financed overwhelmingly by external donors, facing declining aid in a post agreement period, may collapse in slow motion even while the guns fall silent, taking with it the services on which any peace ultimately rests. Donors who reduce their commitments the moment fighting ends will discover, as they have elsewhere, that they have funded a pause rather than a peace.
* Added by the WMO Editorial Team
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