This paper explores India’s recent actions to withdraw from certain Treaty obligations and assesses whether such unilateral termination is legally permissible. The research finds that international humanitarian law prohibits the weaponization of water resources against civilian populations, highlighting the severe humanitarian consequences of disrupting water flows. Drawing on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the paper argues that the Treaty can only be terminated by mutual consent, and unilateral withdrawal violates international law. It emphasises that material breach or impossibility do not justify exit unless they fundamentally disrupt the Treaty’s purpose, which remains intact. The paper draws comparisons between the IWT with other international water treaties that include explicit exit clauses to highlight its unique rigidity. Finally, it recommends diplomatic engagement through existing Treaty mechanisms, third-party mediation, and Treaty modernization to address current challenges, including security concerns and climate change.
Keywords: Indus Waters Treaty, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, unilateral withdrawal, treaty termination, humanitarian law, water resources, India-Pakistan relations, international dispute resolution, treaty modernization.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Indus Waters Treaty has long been seen as something of a marvel; it is a bright spot in a region often marked by conflict. It was signed back in 1960, with the World Bank acting as the mediator. It has survived wars, diplomatic breakdowns, and numerous tense standoffs (World Bank Group, 2025b). But now, with India’s very recent move, first asking for changes in 2023 (The Hindu, 2023), and then subsequently suspending its commitments in 2025 (NDTV, 2025), raises a thorny legal question, that is, whether a country can simply step away from a bilateral treaty that doesn’t have an exit clause, and that requires mutual agreement before suspending of obligations?
This paper takes a close look at whether India’s stance fits within the bounds of customary international law, using the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as a guide (United Nations, 1969). Neither India nor Pakistan have formally signed on to this Convention, but its core principles that encompasses the idea that treaties must be kept in good faith, how to interpret treaty terms, and the strict rules around ending or pausing treaties —offer the clearest lens through which this problem can be viewed.
Most literature on the Indus Waters Treaty tends to focus on the politics or the nitty-gritty of water-sharing itself. But the legal puzzle of whether a country can unilaterally exit from a treaty that does not have an exit clause is yet to be explored. This paper asserts that while international law does allow for backing out or pausing treaties in very exceptional situations, the threshold is high, and the reason for withdrawal should not deviate from the original intention of signing the treaty. Leaving the IWT unilaterally risks stirring up political turmoil and, more worryingly, it becomes a shaky precedent about how seriously nations should treat their treaty promises.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE INDUS WATERS TREATY
A. Origins And Structure Of The Indus Water Treaty.
The Indus Waters Treaty was signed on September 19, 1960, following nine years of negotiations, and it was mediated by the World Bank under the presidency of Eugene Black (World Bank, n.d.). It was praised by numerous individuals, including U.S. President Eisenhower, as a rare diplomatic achievement in a region that is otherwise entrenched in strife (World Bank Group, 2025b).
According to Article 3, Clause 2 of the Indus Waters Treaty (Indus Waters Treaty, 1960), India was assigned the Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) whereas Pakistan received the Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab), although both nations were permitted restricted utilisations of each other’s rivers as per Article 3 Clause 1 (Indus Waters Treaty, n.d.-b).
The Treaty includes:
• A Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) for day-to-day implementation.
• A three-tiered dispute resolution system: “questions” addressed by the PIC, “differences” referred to a Neutral Expert, and “disputes” escalated to a Court of Arbitration.
• A procedural role for the World Bank in the appointment of neutral authorities.
Despite the solid foundation of the IWT, it lacks an “exit clause” or provisions for unilateral withdrawal or suspension by either party (Indus Waters Treaty, n.d.-b).
B. Evolving Tensions Between The Two Countries
India’s move to build hydropower projects on tributaries of the Western Rivers, like Kishenganga and Ratle, only added fuel to the fire (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2013). Pakistan argued that these projects did not meet the Treaty’s standards, and this sparked legal battles that were judged by a Neutral Expert and then the Court of Arbitration (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2013). In 2016, the World Bank put both cases on hold to try to reach a diplomatic solution (World Bank, 2016). Following this, they restarted in 2022 (World Bank, 2022).
Things deteriorated after India submitted a notification in 2023 requesting that the Treaty be amended (The Hindu, 2023). Following the Pahalgam terror attack, which killed 26 people, India announced in April 2025 that it would withdraw from the treaty obligations (NDTV, 2025). This was the first occasion in almost sixty years that such an event had occurred. India did not officially terminate the Treaty, but it did cease sending hydrological data and indicated that it would use Western Rivers increasingly (NDTV, 2025). Pakistan described this as a violation of international law and, potentially, an act of war (Reuters, 2025).
C. Humanitarian And Socio-Economic Impacts
India’s withdrawal from its obligations under the Indus Waters Treaty has left less of a legal vacuum and more of a human one. The Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers are crucial for Pakistan’s agriculture since they provide the irrigation necessary for food production. Even minor alterations in their flow can cause big drops in crop production.
India is tightening its grip on the Chenab River after the terrorist attack, which means that Pakistan’s main dams, Mangla and Tarbela, would have less water (The Economic Times, 2025). This action put the sowing season for kharif crops in Punjab and Sindh at risk because these areas depend on these rivers for irrigation (The Economic Times, 2025). Furthermore, more than 80% of Pakistan’s farmland relies on the Indus River system. Any problems with this system might significantly threaten food security, crop production, and the livelihoods of individuals in rural areas (Grip Invest, 2025).
It is true that international law offers states room to navigate changing circumstances. There are doctrines that permit suspension or reinterpretation of treaty obligations such as the doctrine of necessity, but only in rare, urgent moments when it must protect an essential interest—and only if doing so doesn’t seriously harm other states. (International Law Commission, 2001, Art. 25). But law is not insulated from consequence. These aren’t choices made in the rarefied air of diplomatic chambers. Their weight lands in dark classrooms, in dry taps, in hospital wards running short on power.
The Indus Waters Treaty is like a lifeline. If a state chooses to walk away from it, the conversation must extend beyond legality, and it must confront the cost borne not by the two governments or negotiators, but by those who had no say in the drafting of the treaty and yet live within its flow every single day.
III. CAN THERE BE A UNILATERAL TERMINATION UNDER THE IWT?
One of the Treaty’s most pragmatic features is its tiered dispute resolution mechanism outlined in Article IX (Ministry of External Affairs, n.d.). It begins with the Permanent Indus Commission and, if needed, proceeds to a Neutral Expert or a Court of Arbitration (World Bank Group, 2025). This structure isn’t just theoretical; it has been tested. Disagreements over the Baglihar Dam and the Kishenganga project, for instance, were settled within this framework (Salman, 2008). In the Kishenganga case, India’s right to divert water was upheld by the 2013 Court of Arbitration, but only after imposing conditions to preserve Pakistan’s access (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2013).
Yet, a more challenging question arises now: can a country step back from such a treaty unilaterally? Article XII (4) answers this clearly—the Treaty can only be ended through a new, ratified agreement between both governments (Ministry of External Affairs, n.d.). In other words, mutual consent is non-negotiable. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), is a reflection of customary international law which echoes this view. Parties are to be held accountable even when tempers run high (United Nations, 1969, Arts. 26, 54–56).
IV. WEAPONIZING WATER: A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
The Geneva Conventions forbid using water supply against civilians, hence essential resources like water cannot be weaponized in response to violence. Cutting off or damming rivers that supply civilian populations raises grave humanitarian law issues. International humanitarian law (IHL) explicitly forbids using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, including by targeting essential water resources (International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], 1949). Under Additional Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva Conventions, it is “prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as… drinking water installations and supplies” if done “for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population (ICRC, 1977a). The same prohibition appears in Protocol II for internal conflicts (ICRC, 1977b). Thus, any deliberate reduction of water flows to punish Pakistan’s civilians would violate the absolute ban on causing starvation under IHL.
V. UNPACKING THE VIENNA CONVENTION — THE HIGH BAR FOR TREATY EXIT.
To understand the legal sanctity of the Indus Waters Treaty, it becomes necessary to return to first principles, specifically, to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which provides the governing framework for how treaties are understood, interpreted, and, in rare cases, brought to an end (United Nations, 1969).
A. The Pacta Sunt Servanda Principle
Article 26 lays down the theory of pacta sunt servanda. Every treaty, once in force, must be performed in good faith. But “good faith” here is not a sentimental appeal; it is a legal obligation that anchors the stability of international relations. (United Nations, 1969, Art. 26). Article 31 of the Convention then adds texture, requiring that a treaty must be read holistically in light of its text, context, object, and purpose. (United Nations, 1969, Art. 31). For the Indus Waters Treaty, that purpose is clear, that is, a stable, long-term system of water-sharing between two states that otherwise share little trust. This approach aligns with the principle of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which underscores that treaties must be interpreted in good faith, considering their text, context, and overarching objectives (Villiger, 2009).
B. The Treaty Can Only Be Terminated By Mutual Agreement
Now, if one were to ask under what circumstances such a treaty could be terminated, the Vienna framework offers answers but sets the bar deliberately high. Article 54 allows a treaty to be ended either according to its own internal terms or by mutual consent (United Nations, 1969, Art. 54). Crucially, Article XII (4) of the IWT permits termination only through a new, mutually agreed treaty. In simpler terms, there is no lawful scope for one party to walk away unilaterally. (Ministry of External Affairs, n.d.). Article 56 allows for withdrawal only when such an intention can be clearly implied from the nature of the treaty, or if it was intended by the parties at the time of formation (United Nations, 1969, Art. 56). Since the IWT contains a specific and binding exit mechanism, Article 56 cannot be invoked as a loophole to justify unilateral termination. To do so would amount to circumventing both the express language of the Treaty and the strict framework set by the VCLT (United Nations, 1969, Art. 56).
C. Material Breach And The Myth Of Impossibility
The temptation to argue material breach, as per Article 60, as a ground for exit must also be met with caution (United Nations, 1969, Art. 60). A treaty may be suspended or terminated if the other side has fundamentally violated its core provisions. But the violation must be internal to the treaty itself. A tenuous link between a country and acts of terrorism, in the absence of clear and direct evidence, does not amount to a breach of the Indus Waters Treaty unless it can be proved to directly interfere with the treaty’s implementation (Villiger, 2009). The International Court of Justice in the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 1997, has made it clear that even grave violations may justify countermeasures, but not the unilateral termination of a treaty. The obligation endures (International Court of Justice, 1997, paras. 106–109).
Likewise, Article 61’s bar of “permanent impossibility” finds little application here; the rivers flow, the infrastructure stands, and the Treaty’s object remains intact (United Nations, 1969, Art. 61).
The rivers are still flowing; the structures for sharing them are intact. Even severe environmental changes do not amount to “destruction” of the rivers, which remain the central object of the treaty.
D. The Doctrine Of Rebus Sic Stantibus
Article 62 invokes the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, which is a fundamental change of circumstances (United Nations, 1969, Art. 62). But such a change must be both unforeseeable and must strike at the heart of the initial consent (Shekhawat & Shekhawat, 2022). The threshold is exacting; not all change is fundamental, and not all fundamental change justifies exit. The International Court of Justice, similarly, alongside my views, has been clear on the point that Article 62 is not a loophole. The ICJ rejected Hungary’s claim of fundamental change of circumstances under Article 62, clarifying that this article must be interpreted restrictively (International Court of Justice, 1997, paras. 104–114). The ICJ had held that since there were no agreed-upon terms in the 1977 treaty for denunciation or withdrawal, the treaty could only be terminated as per the terms enumerated in the Vienna Convention (International Court of Justice, 1997, paras. 104–114).
It is not a convenient exit route for states looking to wriggle out of inconvenient commitments. The provision sits within a broader architecture of customary international law, which is an architecture built, brick by brick, on the understanding that treaties are not ephemeral promises, but the scaffolding of international order. To unravel one casually is to tug at the threads that hold many others together. And so, the law demands more than mere dissatisfaction; it demands disruption so fundamental that the treaty, in its original form, simply cannot survive. That threshold, as the ICJ reminds us, is high and deliberately so.
VI. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: WHAT OTHER TREATIES CAN TEACH US ABOUT EXIT
If the Indus Waters Treaty feels like a relic of a bygone diplomatic era, that’s because in many ways, it is. Negotiated in the early 1960s under the looming shadow of partition and Cold War realpolitik, it lacks the modern treaty architecture that many post-1960s agreements have since incorporated, especially when it comes to mechanisms of exit, review, and recalibration (World Bank, n.d.).
According to Article X of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, exit is permitted if “extraordinary events… have jeopardized the supreme interests” of the State (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, n.d.). When North Korea invoked this clause in 2003, it wasn’t a breach of law — it was a demonstration of what lawful withdrawal looks like in practice.
Similarly, the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (2010) — a multilateral arrangement over transboundary waters — includes clear provisions allowing any party to exit, with two years’ notice (Nile Basin States, 2010). The structure is orderly, the process transparent. There’s room for disagreement, but also a roadmap for disengagement.
By contrast, the Indus Waters Treaty contains no such exit clause. (Ministry of External Affairs, n.d.) It is silent on how it might end — and under Article 54 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that silence is meaningful (United Nations, 1969, Art. 60). A treaty that does not allow unilateral termination can only be ended by either mutual consent or as per its own terms. In IWT’s case, Article XII (4) reinforces this — the treaty continues unless both India and Pakistan agree to amend or terminate it (Ministry of External Affairs, n.d.).
Examining bilateral water treaties elsewhere, the 1996 Ganga Waters Treaty between India and Bangladesh is finite — it lasts thirty years — and importantly, it contains built-in review mechanisms (“Water for Peace,” 2025). That clock runs out in 2026, and both countries are already preparing for renegotiation. In contrast, the IWT’s open-ended duration has no review period, no renegotiation clause, and no sunset provision. It is a permanent fixture, and permanence — in international law — means predictability, but also rigidity.
Another example is the 1944 U.S.–Mexico Water Treaty. Like the IWT, it contains no withdrawal clause (United States & Mexico, 1944). And yet, despite numerous disputes over water allocation from the Colorado River, both countries have leaned heavily on their technical commissions, used negotiation to update operational protocols (like “Minute 319” (International Boundary and Water Commission [IBWC], 2023), and “Minute 323” (United States Department of State, 2017)), and avoided collapse. This shows that even treaties with no legal exit are not doomed to irrelevance — they endure because of political will, not legal loopholes.
This clearly establishes that under modern treaty law, no state can unilaterally withdraw from a bilateral water-sharing agreement like the Indus Waters Treaty without breaching international law.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND WAY FORWARD
First and foremost, India and Pakistan should make the most of the tools that are already in place in the Indus Waters Treaty, especially the Permanent Indus Commission. This commission was set up to provide a direct line of communication between the two countries. It gives them a forum to discuss and settle issues like water sharing, security, or data before they escalate. Both countries can make sure that problems are handled legally and peacefully by sending unresolved concerns to Neutral Experts or arbitration, as the Treaty provides (Climate Diplomacy, n.d.). This approach helps maintain trust between the nations, and it also lowers the chances of tensions turning into conflict.
Re-engaging impartial third-party mediation is another way that this issue could be resolved. The World Bank was crucial in negotiating the Treaty in the first place and has been important in settling disputes in recent years (World Bank, n.d.). It is an unbiased organisation that may help facilitate dialogue (Gupta, 2018). Bringing the World Bank or another renowned international organisation back to the table could foster a more constructive environment for both the nations to work together and solve technical and security issues. This kind of mediation offers solutions that take into account the needs and worries of both sides, promoting cooperation instead of conflict.
Lastly, the Treaty needs to be reviewed and modified to meet the needs of the 21st century. The original agreement, which was signed more than 60 years ago, fails to keep up with current problems like climate change, managing groundwater, or sharing water in an emergency during floods and droughts. Both countries would benefit from working together to come up with updated regulations that take these issues into account. Viewing this process as a necessary and practical update rather than a threat to the Treaty could help build trust between the two sides and ensure that the Indus Waters Treaty remains a strong foundation for peace and cooperation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Indus Waters Treaty has endured decades of political upheaval, conflict, and prolonged diplomatic impasses between India and Pakistan. (World Bank, n.d.) The enduring character is not merely coincidental; it is attributable to a legal structure capable of managing stress and fostering dialogue rather than discord. Legally, there is limited scope to justify a unilateral withdrawal. Article XII (4) of the Treaty stipulates that any termination must be mutually consented to by both parties. (Ministry of External Affairs, n.d.).
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties endorses this notion, as it often favours stability and continuity over unforeseen withdrawals (United Nations, 1969). The law generally favours the preservation of agreements over their dissolution, even in the presence of more significant issues. It generally maintains stability rather than permitting abrupt changes, especially amidst significant political upheaval (Villiger, 2009). States cannot withdraw from agreements only due to unrelated disputes, particularly if those disputes pertain to critical security matters (United Nations, 1969, Arts. 56-62).
However, it would be imprudent to assume that the covenant is without flaws. Significant changes have occurred since 1960, such as encompassing the environment, water usage, and international relations (Nahar, 2025). However, if change is necessary, it must also adhere to the law. This may entail modifying the responsibilities of the Permanent Indus Commission or examining technical regulations for addressing climate-related risks (Eco-Business, 2023). This would not undermine the contract; rather, it would likely enhance its use and responsiveness.
The IWT transcends mere water management. It is a legal framework predicated on the notion that even adversarial nations can reach consensus on matters vital to their survival. That conviction remains valid, but it should not be upheld by disregarding the treaty. Rather, we ought to operate inside it to adjust to novel circumstances.
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