How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/
EDITORIAL NOTE *
This article concerns the genocide committed against the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994. That genocide is an established historical and legal fact. The article addresses the question of why ordinary people participated in it, and the explanations it examines are offered as analysis and not as extenuation.
ABSTRACT
The following article explores the Rwandan genocide, highlighting the involvement of “ordinary” people in mass killings. Drawing on historical context and perpetrator testimonies, it reveals complex motivations behind genocide. It emphasizes the need for vigilant civil societies and robust institutions like the rule of law to prevent future atrocities.
KEYWORDS *
Genocide, Rwanda, Tutsi, perpetrators, ordinary people, obedience, social dynamics, early warning signs, atrocity prevention, Gacaca, testimony, rule of law
INTRODUCTION
Humans are generally good, at least, that is what most people want to believe. This view is mirrored in the thoughts of countless philosophers like John Locke. Most people cannot imagine using violence against other human beings. Or at least, most people want to believe that. We want to have a positive self-image; we want to believe that we are intrinsically good people. That includes living peacefully with our neighbours. However, history is full of examples of humans persecuting other social groups who are knowingly harmed by others: the support of broad German society for the concentration camps in the Third Reich (Goeschel and Wachsmann 2010) or the violence against the Rohingya (OHCHR 2023). One historical example is even more shocking: in the genocide committed against the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994, “normal” people got involved in brutal violence, turning against and killing their neighbours and friends. How is such an escalation in genocides possible? What makes good people turn evil?
MAIN CORPUS
Causes of and motivations behind genocide
Genocides are a complex phenomenon and are never monocausal. Even though a common belief is that the main root of these atrocities is a deep-seated hatred amongst social groups, Straus (2016) contradicts that, as “deep social divisions, ethnic conflict, distrust between ethnic, regional, or religious groups, and the existence of prejudice and stereotypes, are fairly common globally”, while genocides, on the other hand, are relatively uncommon. He lists instability and conflict, ideology, and previous discrimination and violence as causal factors. These findings show that most people are not intrinsically motivated by their emotions to participate in a genocide. Rather, there seems to be a strategy behind it. This is supported by the fact that there are early warning signs, which of course are not bullet-proof, but can alert the international community (ibid.; USHMM w.D.a). These signs include tension and polarization, apocalyptic public rhetoric, labelling civilian groups as the “enemy”, and removing moderates from leadership or public service.
Naturally, there is no genocide without perpetrators. But how does a person become a perpetrator? Literature suggests that a specific percentage of every society are perpetrators, at least in theory (Baum 2008). While some sources put this percentage at 2 to 15 per cent, others put it at 15 to 20 per cent. Whatever the exact number may be, this social research suggests that in every society, there are people who do not share the same empathy and compassion towards other people as the majority of society. After committing an atrocity, those perpetrators do not feel remorse or guilt.
Hutu against Tutsi: the Rwandan genocide
After gaining independence in 1962, “Rwanda’s population was composed of three ethnic groups: Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa” (USHMM w.D.b). The Hutu population, being the majority, was in power, and Tutsi had been discriminated against from the 1960s on. During this period, there were already incidents of mass violence against Tutsi, and many had to flee the country. A turning point in the long-term conflict between both groups was when “a Tutsi rebel force invaded Rwanda from the north” in 1990 (ibid.). Hutu extremists became radicalized when the war between the government and rebels reached a stalemate, leading to a peace agreement that foresaw a government with power shared between Hutu and Tutsi. When Rwandan President Habyarimana was killed when his aircraft was shot down, Hutu extremists took advantage of the convoluted circumstances. Violence spread when the extremists killed moderate Hutu who stood in their way of promoting genocide against the Tutsi. Tutsi and suspected Tutsi were killed in major massacres when seeking refuge in churches, schools, and government buildings, as well as in their own homes. Actual numbers of the death toll vary; according to the USHMM (w.D.b), “as many as one million people, mostly Tutsis, were slaughtered in 100 days”, while other scholarly sources put the death toll lower. Straus (2004) puts the number at “at least 500,000 civilians”.
The genocide against the Tutsi is not only extremely shocking due to the high death toll in a short time but also because of the broad involvement of “ordinary” citizens. In the Gacaca system, a community court system implemented especially for the reconciliation process, more than 1.2 million cases were tried (USHMM w.D.b). How could that many people become involved in the mass killings?
Rwandan perpetrators
The violence of the Rwandan genocide puzzles scholars. “Neighbors are not supposed to kill neighbors, let alone commit genocide against them”, Fujii (2010) states. Not only is the killing of kith and kin on that scale very uncommon, but the question also arises why rural civilians became perpetrators when peace would have gained them more than violence (ibid.).
Straus (2016) focuses on emotions as a motivation behind participation in the genocide. He talks about a period of “emotional momentum”. In interviews and in the courts after the genocide, perpetrators gave two main motivations. One was built on this emotional momentum: many perpetrators allegedly were afraid because of the unrest and violence before the genocide. In fear for their lives, “they chose to take part in the violence” (Straus 2016). At the same time, they feared repercussions from the authorities, which had planned the genocide, if they did not take part in the violence.
However, Fujii (2010) gives a different explanation. According to her field study, there is little evidence that supports a strong hatred among Hutu against Tutsi. She also dismisses fear as the motivator for participation. Instead, she uses the social interaction argument. Most of the perpetrators who did not have any military training before the genocide and who only killed rather than planned the atrocities, “Joiners” in Fujii’s terms, seemed to have killed people who had been accused of something. Social dynamics were at the centre of changing behaviour. “Even the most active Joiners did not act the same offstage as on” (ibid.). Another important factor was group identity and strength in numbers; the creation of new groups produced more killings, which in turn created more and stronger groups. A vicious cycle started.
But who exactly were the perpetrators or “Joiners”? Reviewing certain testimonies shows different personality types. In the testimony of Jean de Dieu Twahirwa, a convicted perpetrator of the Rwandan genocide, he confesses to killing three Tutsi in a massacre at a Catholic church (Aegis Trust 2020). When asked about his motivations, he confirms what Straus (2016) and Fujii (2010) already stated: it was the “leaders” who motivated him and other perpetrators in the mass killings. “They really motivated us to get involved in the killings,” he said (Aegis Trust 2020). His feelings towards Tutsi seem to have been dualistic even during the genocide. On the one hand, he felt threatened by the Tutsi and believed they wanted to suppress Hutu; on the other hand, he said that he felt sad when he saw his former classmates being killed at the Catholic church. After the incident at the church, he claimed to have fled Rwanda, and he did not take part in any other killings. Even after the genocide, he stated he needed to confess to his crimes to relieve himself of the guilt and to ask for forgiveness.
Twahirwa’s motivations, following the orders of authorities, are mirrored by other testimonies. The Rwandan genocide “was sponsored and conceived from above by a small group of powerful extremists in President Habyarimana’s regime. These mighty few objected to the power-sharing terms of a recently signed peace agreement between Habyarimana and the RPF. Through genocide, they sought to maintain their monopoly on power” (Fujii 2010).
Were the “Joiners” then only used as instruments by the elite who planned the genocide? It is worth looking at some other testimonies as well. For example, the testimonies of members of a group of farmers in Kibungo who killed some 50,000 of their Tutsi neighbours, about 85 per cent of the Tutsi population in that region (Baum 2008). One of the perpetrators states: “Some offenders claim that we changed into wild animals, that we were blinded by ferocity, that is a trick to sidetrack the truth” (ibid.). Even while confessing, there is a total lack of remorse for the atrocities committed.
Learnings from the past
The various perpetrator groups involved in the genocide against the Tutsi should give us pause for thought, and we must learn different lessons from their involvement. It is worrying that there are people in our society who feel less empathy than the majority of society. At the same time, the involvement of people who themselves feel and express empathy and remorse shows that it is not only the people who are categorized as ‘perpetrators’ by academia who become perpetrators themselves but also people outside this group. This means that in certain situations, people can also become perpetrators who would never expect it of themselves.
The fact that ordinary people without a prior history of extraordinary violent behaviour can become perpetrators involved in genocide or other atrocities is troubling. These findings are in line with the findings of Holocaust research (Hale 2020) and the results of experiments like the Milgram experiment (Miller 2014). We have to acknowledge that individuals who are not inherently violent can still be driven to commit horrific acts under the influence of fear, social dynamics, and authoritative manipulation. This understanding compels us to recognize the potential for atrocity in any society and thus gives us an approach to global genocide and mass atrocity prevention. By acknowledging that genocides are not solely the product of deep-seated ethnic hatred but rather the culmination of strategic manipulation and social pressures, international efforts can focus on early intervention strategies.
SUMMARY *
The article’s central tension lies between two explanations it presents without collapsing them into one. If a fixed proportion of any population lacks ordinary empathy, then perpetrators are a distinct category and the question is how they come to be released. If, as the research on Rwanda largely finds, participation was driven by fear, authority and the dynamics of groups formed in the moment, then the category dissolves and the relevant question becomes what conditions convert neighbours into killers. The author declines to choose, and the testimonies assembled here support that reluctance: one man describes sorrow at the killing of his former classmates and a need to confess; others, decades later, insist that they were not blinded by anything and knew exactly what they were doing. The preventive conclusion drawn holds in either case, since it concerns conditions rather than persons.
CONCLUSION
Particularly in this day and age, when politics and social media fuel emotions and especially hatred, we need a vigilant civil society that closely monitors these developments, exposes abuses, and takes a stand against them. And precisely because all people can become potential perpetrators, we need institutions such as the rule of law to protect minorities from the arbitrariness of others.
POTENTIAL SOLUTION *
The article’s most important move is its refusal to settle on a single explanation, and the reason that refusal is correct deserves stating. Research on Rwanda has converged on the finding that participation was heterogeneous: the small group that planned the genocide, the local officials who organised it, the militia who led the killing, and the very large number who joined, hesitated, complied, fled or resisted were not one population and did not act for one reason. The most consistent finding across the field studies, which the article’s own sources support, is that participation was better predicted by local social ties, by the presence of an authority figure willing to give orders, and by whether one’s neighbours were participating, than by anything about the individual. That is what makes the conclusion generalisable, and it is also why the figure of a fixed percentage of latent perpetrators should be treated with caution: it locates the danger in a type of person, when the evidence locates it in a type of situation.
Two additions strengthen the preventive argument. The article names early warning signs, and the record shows that in this case they were seen. Dehumanising broadcasts, lists of names, the distribution of machetes and the organisation of militias were all reported before April 1994, including in a cable from the force commander of the United Nations mission in January. The independent inquiry commissioned afterwards concluded that the failure lay not in information but in the will to act on it. Prevention research has therefore shifted from improving detection toward the harder question of what makes decision makers respond, and the answers identified, standing capacity, pre agreed triggers, and political costs for inaction, are institutional rather than analytical.
The second concerns what actually stopped participation where it was stopped. Alongside the perpetrators, Rwanda produced a substantial number of people who hid neighbours at mortal risk to themselves, and the research on rescuers across atrocities finds that they were not distinguished by exceptional moral conviction but by circumstance: prior close relationships across the dividing line, membership of a group with its own authority structure that did not endorse the killing, and, above all, being asked. If ordinary people become perpetrators through social dynamics, they also become rescuers through them, and prevention that builds cross community ties in ordinary times is acting on the same mechanism from the other direction.
Finally, the article’s turn to the present deserves to be made specific, because the comparison is closer than a general warning about social media suggests. The role of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines is among the most studied features of this genocide, and its function was less to create hatred than to identify targets, signal that killing was sanctioned, and let each listener know that others were participating. That is precisely the function that platform amplification performs now, and the finding matters for how it is addressed: what proved dangerous was not the expression of prejudice but the coordination of action and the manufacture of the impression that everyone was already doing it. The conclusion is a demanding one and follows from the article’s own argument. If atrocity is a matter of situation rather than character, then no society can regard itself as exempt, and the institutions the author names, an independent judiciary, protected minorities, a press that is not an instrument, exist to hold at the point where individual conscience has repeatedly been shown to give way.
* Added by the WMO Editorial Team
REFERENCES
Aegis Trust (2020) Testimony of Jean de Dieu Twahirwa, Genocide Perpetrator. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MslanLXzx6Y
Baum, S. (2008) The Psychology of Genocide: Perpetrators, Bystanders, and Rescuers. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Fujii, L. A. (2009) Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Goeschel, C. and Wachsmann, N. (2010) Before Auschwitz: The Formation of the Nazi Concentration Camps, 1933 to 1939. Journal of Contemporary History 45(3), 515 to 534.
Hale, R. (2020) ‘They Were Just Following Orders’: Relationships between Milgram’s Obedience Experiments and Conceptions of Holocaust Perpetration. In: Foster, S., Pearce, A. and Pettigrew, A. (eds.) Holocaust Education: Contemporary Challenges and Controversies. UCL Press.
Miller, A. G. (2014) The Explanatory Value of Milgram’s Obedience Experiments: A Contemporary Appraisal. Journal of Social Issues 70(3), 558 to 573.
OHCHR (2023) UN Expert Demands Accountability for the Rohingya and an End to ‘Paralysis of Indifference’.
Straus, S. (2004) How Many Perpetrators Were There in the Rwandan Genocide? An Estimate. Journal of Genocide Research 6(1), 85 to 98.
Straus, S. (2016) Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention. Washington, D.C.: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
USHMM (w.D.a) What Have We Learned about the Risk Factors and Warning Signs of Genocide?
USHMM (w.D.b) The Rwanda Genocide.
Supplementary references added by the WMO Editorial Team
Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, United Nations, 15 December 1999.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948.
United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention (2014). Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention, New York.
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