Mending Relationships Through Mediation: Negotiation for Peace in South Sudan

How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/

ABSTRACT *

This article examines mediation in the South Sudanese conflict from the outbreak of civil war in 2013 to the present, and asks why two negotiated agreements have not produced lasting peace. After tracing the historical roots of the conflict in the wars with Sudan, the divisions within the liberation movement, and the ethnic and resource dimensions that emerged after independence, the author assesses the mediation led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development against the standard requirements of mediation practice. The assessment identifies problems at each stage: an insufficient initial conflict assessment conducted under pressure of events, doubt as to whether the conflict was ripe for negotiation, mediators appointed by a body whose member states were themselves parties to the regional dynamics, and limited attention to cross-cultural and traditional mechanisms. Sections on trust, interpersonal relations between the principal leaders, political power, and control of oil revenues follow, before an account of the recurring obstacles: mistrust, political manipulation of the agreements, competing external interests, and weak implementation. The article closes with recommendations centred on confidence building, transparency, grassroots and traditional mediation, institutional reform, and impartial international oversight.

KEYWORDS *

South Sudan, mediation, IGAD, ARCSS, revitalised agreement, ripeness, impartiality, trust, spoilers, oil, implementation, traditional conflict resolution

INTRODUCTION

The Republic of South Sudan, a nation that gained independence in 2011 after a protracted conflict with Sudan, is known for a turbulent history marked by cycles of ethnic conflict and political instability. The civil war which erupted in 2013 has roots in political rivalries, ethnic divisions, and competition for resources, and has resulted in widespread suffering and displacement of civilians, destruction of property, and limited socio-economic development. Though lasting peace has not been achieved, South Sudan has gone through a journey marked by several efforts to reconcile the various parties. These efforts have been mainly through mediation, a strategic instrument for peacebuilding that has gained significant attention in recent years. Two peace agreements resulted from the mediation and negotiation processes: the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan of 2015 and the Revitalised Peace Agreement of 2018.

Drawing on theoretical insights and on the South Sudanese case as a practical example, this paper assesses the role of negotiation in fostering relationships among the conflicting parties. The paper considers the processes leading to peacebuilding in contexts marked by deep historical and socio-political complexity, the role played by multiple regional and international actors in the negotiation process, and the challenges faced by mediation efforts. In doing so, the paper aims to contribute to a broader understanding of how mediation and negotiation can contribute to peace in nations such as South Sudan, which are marked by profound political and ethnic divisions.

Since its independence in 2011, South Sudan has suffered from long-lasting, deep-rooted ethnic conflict and political instability. These conflicts, characterised by repeated cycles of violence, have continued to breed mistrust among the parties despite numerous mediation initiatives. Even with these efforts and agreements, lasting peace has not been achieved, owing to a persistent lack of trust among the parties, communication gaps, and the powerful influence of internal and external actors. This paper explores the South Sudanese mediation process, the competing interests, power imbalances, and challenges encountered, and examines the role of negotiation in relationship building to foster sustainable reconciliation. On this basis, the paper recommends approaches to achieving lasting peace in such situations.

MAIN CORPUS

Assessing the conflict in South Sudan: historical context

The historical context of the South Sudanese conflict is deeply rooted in the country’s struggle with Sudan’s colonial past and its subsequent quest for independence and governance. Upon the independence of Sudan from British and Egyptian rule in 1956, tensions arose between the predominantly Christian and traditionalist south and the Arab Muslim dominated north. The southern region felt marginalised by the northern government’s policies and dominance, leading to disputes exacerbated by ethnic and regional disparities. This marked the beginning of two major civil wars: the first lasting from 1955 to 1972 and the second from 1983 to 2005. Key figures during this period included John Garang de Mabior, who led the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and its armed wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. The movement’s challenge to northern domination was significantly weakened by internal splits, notably when Riek Machar led a faction pursuing self-determination for the south, diverging from Garang’s vision of a unified Sudan. Over the years, Machar switched allegiances several times, signing the Khartoum Peace Agreement with the government in 1997 before rejoining the movement when it became clear that a referendum could lead to southern independence. This illustrates the long-standing political and leadership rifts within the movement, rifts with ethnic dimensions.

After achieving independence in 2011, South Sudan entered another cycle of conflict in 2013, characterised primarily by political rivalries, ethnic divisions, and resource competition. The conflict principally involved forces loyal to President Salva Kiir, who had succeeded Garang after his death in a helicopter crash in 2005, against those led by former Vice President Riek Machar. Ethnic tensions, particularly between the Dinka and Nuer communities associated with Kiir and Machar respectively, further fuelled violence and humanitarian crisis. This internal power struggle, together with the ambitions and grievances of these groups, perpetuated a volatile environment, resulting in widespread suffering, displacement, and socio-economic underdevelopment. While agreements such as the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan of 2015 and the Revitalised Peace Agreement of 2018 aimed to reconcile the factions, pervasive ethnic and political divisions have continuously obstructed the journey towards lasting peace.

Resource-based divisions

The conflict is deeply intertwined with resource-based divisions, particularly surrounding the country’s oil reserves. The oil-rich Greater Upper Nile region has become a focal point of violence, as local communities and armed groups clash over access to oil and to other valuable resources such as fertile land, water, and cattle. This struggle further exacerbates socio-economic challenges, perpetuating poverty and limiting development amid inadequate infrastructure and limited social services. Historical neglect and resentment towards government have intensified these tensions, creating conditions for rebellion. Competition for control over these resources is central to the strategies of both government and opposition forces, hindering peace processes and contributing to continuing instability.

Main conflicting parties and their interests

The conflict primarily involves the forces of President Kiir and those led by Machar. Kiir, representing the government, is motivated by a desire to retain power and control over critical economic resources, particularly oil. His administration has sought to consolidate political dominance by mobilising ethnic Dinka support, particularly from Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and by maintaining alliances with regional actors such as Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Despite signing both agreements, his actions indicate a reluctance to distribute power equitably or to foster genuinely representative governance, as evidenced by the suppression of dissent and the detention of rivals.

Machar’s opposition, drawing primarily on Nuer communities, seeks to challenge a government perceived as Dinka dominated. The opposition accuses the ruling administration of sowing ethnic divisions to consolidate its position. While presented as a struggle for political reform and inclusivity, these efforts are also driven by ambitions of control over national resources and the redistribution of power. Beyond the main factions, other groups such as the South Sudan Opposition Alliance and various armed groups add further complexity, each seeking recognition and resources while opposing perceived corruption and ethnic favouritism. These dynamics reflect the multi-dimensional nature of the struggle, intertwining ethnic grievance, political ambition, and resource control.

External parties, including Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, China, and the United States, have interests ranging from regional stability and economic gain, particularly in oil, to strategic influence, further complicating mediation and peacebuilding. Vertin documents this mix of competing interests among the regional actors:

“In time, the values brought to the South Sudanese mediation effort by IGAD’s frontline states, unique knowledge, relationships, and direct interest in stability, were outweighed by their competing national interests and stakes in the outcome. Uganda’s army doubled down in support of the government, provoking strong reactions from Sudan. Ethiopia was frustrated by its inability to unite the region or deliver a settlement. Weapons and ammunition flowed into the country from Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda. Broader regional rivalries meant Egypt and Eritrea also paid close attention and were suspected of partisan involvement. It was a dizzying mix of competing interests and egos, all playing out on a South Sudanese canvas, while those suffering as a result of the war sometimes got lost in the mix.”

Effective mediation fundamentals as applied to the conflict

Mediation is a structured process that seeks resolutions by formulating hypotheses and setting attainable goals. The process must focus on resolving the core issues essential to sustainable peace while avoiding the complexity of addressing every potential issue. Effective mediation depends on several critical considerations that together shape an environment conducive to conflict resolution. At the heart of these is a thorough assessment to identify the key characteristics of the conflict, the core issues, the parties involved, and the context in which the conflict occurs. In the case of South Sudan, mediation efforts led by the African Union and by the churches were initially unsuccessful. After the outbreak of war on 15 December 2013, there appears to have been considerable urgency among regional and international actors to bring peace to the country. As fighting continued in the days that followed, shuttle diplomacy began to press the warring parties towards negotiation. This is described in the conflict insight published by the Institute for Peace and Security Studies:

“Following the outbreak of the war in 2013, IGAD dispatched its council of ministers to conduct a fact-finding mission in South Sudan, along with the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security and the UN Special Envoy to the AU. On 27 December 2013, IGAD established the Office of the Special Envoys for South Sudan, which was composed of representatives from Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya. The mediating teams brokered a cessation of hostilities agreement on 24 January 2014 and oversaw the signing of a series of other agreements in the subsequent months. However, a final negotiated agreement proved difficult to conclude due to continued violations of the agreement by the SPLM-IG, the SPLM-IO and other factions.”

Three mediators, representing Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan, led the process. Together with Uganda, these four states were the most influential participants in the crisis and in the peace process. The leading role of the regional body was endorsed by the African Union and the Security Council, as well as by the United States, China, and other supporters of the process.

On 27 December 2013 the regional body convened its first extraordinary summit on South Sudan and appointed the three mediators. Negotiations started immediately, and after nineteen days the parties signed an agreement to cease hostilities. These timelines suggest that the mediators did not undertake a comprehensive assessment of the conflict, since the immediate pressure was to limit the loss of life.

Considering the timeline that followed the outbreak of war, the question of the conflict’s ripeness for mediation arises. A conflict is considered ripe for negotiation when the parties recognise that they are in a mutually hurting stalemate and see a possible way out. While the background to this conflict spans decades of deep-seated grievance, it remains unclear whether such a stalemate had been reached. This is further evidenced by the level of commitment that the principal parties gave to the process, particularly in honouring the agreements made. The continuing nature of the conflict, with an increasing number of armed groups, suggests a situation that is complex and potentially less ripe for resolution.

The urgency of the situation led to the appointment of a three-member mediation team shortly after the outbreak of war. It is unclear whether the choice of mediators was consented to by the principal parties and whether they were regarded as possessing the requisite expertise and as impartial. The objections expressed by one of the principal parties are a clear demonstration of gaps in the selection of mediators, which ultimately affected the process. The regional body’s role was seen to be limited by regional politics and by bias, particularly where its member states were themselves participants in the wider conflict, introducing considerations related to their national interests. These dynamics compromised the mediation, which was impaired by a lack of regional impartiality, affecting the credibility and effectiveness of the effort.

The African Union coordinated with regional organisations and with international bodies including the United Nations, the European Union, and the Troika, to align efforts and maintain a unified approach. The Union has continued to seek a constructive role in supporting peace processes, leveraging international cooperation, and applying political and legal pressure to encourage adherence to agreements and accountability for actions during the conflict. As its Commission of Inquiry observed: “While the process in which this Commission has been engaged is delinked from the IGAD mediation process aimed at finding a political solution to the crisis, it is the Commission’s view that irrespective of the political settlement that is reached, the post-conflict dispensation must include renewal of existing institutions and the construction of new ones to better respond to the imperatives of effective, inclusive, accountable and democratic governance” (African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 2014: 35).

Cross-cultural considerations in conflict resolution are addressed by recognising and being sensitive to the multicultural and multi-faith environments in which the parties operate. This involves drawing on existing knowledge of conflict resolution practices embedded within different communities, focusing on nonviolent and culturally rooted methods. An approach that creates inclusive and supportive environments, promoting participation, cooperation, and respect for difference, and that is attentive to gender and to diversity, is to be encouraged. The mediation team should be constituted with an eye to cross-cultural perception as well as to the skill, experience, and judgment of prospective members.

The regional mediation recognised the ethnic diversity and tensions, particularly between the Dinka and Nuer, alongside more than sixty other ethnic groups, and their role in the dynamics of the conflict. Efforts by regional states to mediate suggest an attempt to navigate this complex landscape. However, the persistent escalation of the conflict suggests limitations in effectively assessing and addressing deep-rooted cross-cultural issues. It is therefore essential that the mediation team uncover these long-standing issues and, where possible, engage mediators who relate closely to South Sudanese cultural realities, together with traditional and religious leaders.

Successes of mediation efforts

Mediation in South Sudan has registered some successes even while the conflict continues. The Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan of 2015, which aimed to end the conflict, frame a post-conflict transition, and begin reconciliation and reform, represented a significant achievement, albeit with difficulties. The process that led to it brought rival factions together and initiated a ceasefire that offered a window for political dialogue and power sharing. This demonstrated that, despite deep-rooted grievance, the parties could come to the negotiating table, establish temporary arrangements for peace, and agree mechanisms for resource sharing and political inclusion. The agreement provided a platform for de-escalation and laid the groundwork for future initiatives by addressing some immediate concerns of the warring sides.

Despite the 2015 agreement, ceasefire violations continued. These difficulties led to a further round of negotiation and to the Revitalised Peace Agreement of 2018. That agreement sought to address outstanding issues and to expand participation by including more stakeholders, reinforcing transitional governance structures and confidence-building measures. There were renewed efforts from international and regional actors to support implementation and monitoring.

However, both agreements have faced significant limitations, including difficulties in implementation, limited oversight and enforcement, external influence, internal rivalry, and persistent mistrust.

Relationship building in mediation: the importance of trust

Trust building is a critical component of conflict resolution, as it is the foundational element that enables opposing groups to overcome deep-seated distrust and animosity. Since trust building is a process, an incremental approach to confidence building is crucial, as it limits risk while fostering new relationships. Trust is established by fulfilling commitments, respecting agreements, and demonstrating reliability during negotiations, creating space for open dialogue and joint problem solving. Effective communication, the establishment of a non-threatening environment, and the demonstration of mutual respect further facilitate the process. Ultimately, trust helps shift the expression of conflict from competitive and aggressive behaviour towards nonviolent advocacy and cooperation, paving the way for mutual settlement and long-term reconciliation.

In South Sudan, several factors indicate the depth of the distrust. Since independence there has been a perception of Dinka dominance, especially in public employment, in oil revenues, and in land. This perception has fuelled long-standing resentment among other groups, particularly the Nuer. With the conflict taking on ethnic dimensions, and with widespread violence between Nuer and Dinka, ethnic targeting and killings have contributed significantly to distrust, fuelling resentment and retaliation along communal lines. The mutual distrust between Kiir and Machar, evidenced in the allegation of an attempted coup and in Machar’s accusation that Kiir was arming militias to instigate chaos and detaining political figures, further aggravates this distrust. Additionally, the involvement of military forces and external actors, with Uganda supporting the government and arms reaching the opposition, added layers of regional distrust which affected the process. The real test of trustworthiness lay in the inability to keep the commitments made during negotiation.

The continued failure to honour commitments is a clear indication of deep-seated distrust, and calls for a thorough re-analysis of the conflict and of the strategy for conflict resolution in South Sudan.

Strengthening interpersonal relationships

Effectively addressing conflicts not only helps settle immediate disputes but also rebuilds and strengthens relationships on a mutually beneficial foundation, potentially preventing future conflict. This is amplified when the process does not focus solely on demands and compromise. Considerable effort must therefore be made towards strengthening interpersonal relationships, particularly among the leaders of the conflicting parties. Some conflicts become so personal that they shift from deeper issues to superficial ones, with argument over matters of little importance signalling difficulties in personal relations.

The conflict in South Sudan is to some extent a reflection of long-standing personal difficulties between Kiir and his principal challenger. In this case, the involvement of external figures of standing able to reach both leaders may be essential for mending broken relationships, which, if achieved, can be crucial in advancing the process. While external actors may exert influence, the internal transformation of the leaders themselves might be more consequential. Such relationship-building strategies, and the roles of leaders within the parties, can have more direct and immediate impact on a peace process.

Power and influence in peace negotiations

The role of political power in conflict resolution is significant and is even more pronounced in armed conflict. Conflict resolution therefore involves addressing extreme power imbalances while recognising that power and justice must both be considered, since national leaders with significant power can leverage their positions in negotiation. The high visibility of leaders limits their negotiating flexibility without risking their interests. In the case of South Sudan, political power dynamics are deeply intertwined with ethnic identities, influencing both the causes of the conflict and the efforts to mediate it.

Political power dynamics and the lack of political will among the parties heavily influenced the mediation. Despite the involvement of the regional body and other international partners, the success or failure of the process depended primarily on the willingness of the principal parties to engage in meaningful negotiation. The parties often displayed hostility towards the idea of a negotiated settlement. This posed a significant obstacle for the mediators, as both government and opposition were more focused on retaining or gaining power than on seeking an inclusive and sustainable peace. This resistance to broad-based participation curtailed efforts to address the root causes of the conflict through inclusive dialogue involving political parties, civil society, and other stakeholders. President Kiir, wielding considerable power under the transitional constitution, held the upper hand in negotiations, hindering implementation and thereby eroding the process.

Furthermore, the competing national interests of the regional member states compounded the political complexity of the effort. Kiir’s influence extended to leveraging external support from Uganda, which maintained a military presence in Juba to his advantage. This was exacerbated by the lack of clarity in the cessation of hostilities agreement regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops, which was exploited to allow continued involvement without consequence. The opposition also acted as a spoiler in negotiations by demanding a power-sharing arrangement, which became a point of contention and contributed to the collapse of the regionally led process in March 2015.

The mediators, constrained by political realities, had to navigate between immediate military and political urgency and the long-term goal of a comprehensive settlement. With government and opposition frequently prioritising power over peace, mediators faced the challenge of maintaining urgency without resorting to temporary fixes that could lead to further conflict. The absence of a shared political vision among the principal parties meant that the push for an expansive agenda covering governance, security, reconciliation, and reform was difficult. Despite the agreements, the process remained fragile and susceptible to the prevailing power struggles, highlighting the critical need for genuine political commitment from all parties to transform the gains of mediation into lasting peace.

Economic influence and control over resources

The desire to control natural resources can significantly influence a peace process, acting both as a catalyst for conflict and as a barrier to resolution. When groups or states seek to dominate valuable resources such as oil, minerals, or water, tensions can escalate, leading to prolonged conflict as parties compete for economic and strategic advantage. This can complicate negotiation, as parties may be unwilling to compromise on resource control, fearing loss of revenue or of power. Furthermore, resource wealth can finance continuing hostilities, reducing incentives for peace. Addressing resource control and ensuring equitable distribution is therefore crucial in achieving sustainable agreements. The struggle for control over South Sudan’s oil has significantly complicated the process. The economy depends heavily on oil revenues, which has led to intense competition among rival factions for control of oil-rich regions. This competition has fuelled conflict, as opposing groups view control over resources as a means to gain political power and leverage in negotiation. These underlying economic interests have hampered the process, as parties may be less willing to reach a compromise that could threaten their access to resources.

The country’s mineral wealth also attracted neighbouring states and global powers seeking to shape the process to their benefit. The perception that the peace process could serve as a means of access to the country’s natural resources led to distrust among key domestic actors. The influence of the international community was viewed with suspicion, as it was believed that pressure exerted on the process might be intended to establish a government favourable to foreign economic interests. This perception weakened implementation, as the 2015 agreement was seen not only as a route to peace but also as a potential threat to sovereign control over resources. Consequently the effort remained fragile, with the fear that any shift in power could compromise domestic control over valuable resources.

Challenges in negotiating for peace

Mistrust and deep-rooted grievances. Past grievance and a sense of injustice can provoke escalation, particularly where one party feels unfairly treated and blames its opponent, leading to a desire to retaliate. If the aggrieved party overreacts, this can provoke outrage and intensify the struggle. Such hostility-driven escalation may be rooted in past events, leading to a cycle of revenge. In South Sudan, deep-seated grievance and lack of trust between Dinka and Nuer present a significant obstacle to lasting peace. Repeated cycles of violence have deepened mistrust while driving fears of betrayal, marginalisation, or oppression, making reconciliation difficult. This mistrust has been fuelled by repeated violations of ceasefires and agreements, leading to scepticism about the intentions and commitments of opposing factions. In this environment, mediators face the challenge of addressing political power sharing and deep-seated grievance, ensuring equitable representation, and rebuilding trust across the country.

Political manipulation. Political manipulation of peace agreements occurs when parties to a conflict, or external actors, use the process to achieve their own political aims rather than genuinely striving for peace. This can involve shaping the terms of an agreement to consolidate power, exclude rivals, or attract international support. Such manipulation significantly undermined efforts in South Sudan. Despite attempts to broker an inclusive process, prominent political actors on both sides acted to restrict participation, limiting the legitimacy and effectiveness of the mediation. Resistance to broad-based dialogue, together with the competing national interests of regional states, further complicated matters. This manoeuvring not only limited meaningful engagement with the principal parties and with civil society but fostered an environment in which vested interests overshadowed the pursuit of peace, culminating in an unfulfilled agreement in 2015 and continued conflict.

Political manipulation may also lead to the inclusion of ambiguous language that leaves room for differing interpretation, allowing parties to act in ways that favour their interests while appearing to adhere to the agreement. This is evidenced by the lack of clarity in the cessation of hostilities agreement regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops, which allowed continued involvement without consequence. This, together with the involvement of other regional and international actors, often produced conflicting agendas that diverted focus from the primary objective. Ultimately this undermined trust and effectiveness, leading to difficulties in achieving sustainable and inclusive peace.

Competing interests among external parties. Conflicting interests among influential states or organisations can pose significant obstacles to a successful settlement. Powerful states may influence local parties by acting as allies or adversaries. In South Sudan, competing interests among neighbouring states and external parties severely challenged the process. Complex geopolitical dynamics led neighbouring countries to seek influence over the government in Juba, resulting in a lack of cohesive support. Each pursued its own agenda, diminishing the effectiveness of monitoring and enforcement and of holding violators to account.

International actors, who should have played a pivotal role in supporting enforcement, fell short, particularly in providing funding and oversight during implementation of the 2015 agreement. The lack of consistent international support and the presence of competing interests meant that efforts struggled to maintain momentum. This left the revitalised agreement of 2018 facing difficulties in securing a lasting peace.

Weak implementation of peace agreements. Various factors can hamper implementation. Agreements may lack the components necessary to ensure long-term stability. They may fail to address the root causes of conflict, lack comprehensive enforcement mechanisms, or suffer from ambiguous terms that lead to differing interpretation. Agreements brokered under urgency and international pressure, or in response to immediate ceasefire needs, may fall short of comprehensive conflict analysis and involve only limited participation, leading to omissions that can reignite tension. Weak agreements may also lack adequate support from the international community for implementation, monitoring, and enforcement, yet mobilising international resources, including funds and expertise, is critical for implementing agreements and supporting difficult transitions.

The South Sudanese process that produced the agreements of 2015 and 2018 may have suffered a similar fate, falling short of adequately addressing the complex dynamics and the varying levels of commitment among the parties, coupled with external influence. This can be further complicated by individuals and groups that attempt to undermine a process, the so-called spoilers. Failure to identify or address the interests, support, and resources available to such actors leaves room for conflict to persist. Additionally, the limited commitment of international actors to finance, monitor, and enforce implementation aggravated an already difficult position. Robust agreements must therefore be developed with precise implementation arrangements which ensure accountability for all parties.

SUMMARY *

The article’s assessment produces a consistent finding across every stage it examines. The mediation was convened within days of the outbreak of fighting, before any assessment of the conflict had been made and before either party had reason to believe it could not win; the mediators were appointed by a body whose leading member states were arming or hosting the parties; the resulting agreements contained language ambiguous enough for foreign forces to remain lawfully; and no mechanism existed to make violation costly. The author’s implicit argument is that each of these was a decision rather than a misfortune, and that the speed which appeared humane in December 2013 produced an agreement that could not hold. The counterweight the article proposes is not a better convener but a different level of engagement: churches, traditional authorities and communities, whose standing does not depend on regional politics.

CONCLUSION

The pursuit of peace in South Sudan has been complex, and several factors have severely hampered the journey. Deep-seated mistrust among the principal parties, each showing little confidence in the other or in the process, has been exacerbated by the absence of consensus on the nature of the conflict and by the vulnerability of the process to internal and external spoilers, including regional actors whose interests sometimes conflicted with the objectives of peace. The involvement of various international and regional actors led to a lack of coherence in mediation, further complicating negotiation and its outcomes. Internally, unresolved ethnic, political, and intra-group tensions weakened the prospects for lasting peace. Additionally, even where agreements were reached, they lacked clear and robust oversight and enforcement mechanisms, allowing violations to go unchecked and ultimately leading to repeated breakdowns. Collectively these challenges undermined the sustainability of peace efforts and stalled progress towards a stable and unified South Sudan.

To address these challenges, it is recommended that trust and confidence-building initiatives among the parties and across the country be strengthened, as this is essential for a successful process. Promoting and prioritising transparency in negotiation and implementation is essential to minimise suspicion and ensure accountability. To reduce misunderstanding and promote cooperative dialogue, clear channels of communication between all stakeholders must be established and respected. Further, grassroots mediation should be strengthened by involving community leaders, faith leaders, and local organisations. Community-driven reconciliation can play a crucial role in promoting social cohesion at the local level, ensuring that peace is not only negotiated nationally but embraced by the communities affected by conflict.

It is also recommended that institutional reforms be undertaken to create a resilient governance structure able to withstand political change and ensure long-term stability. Once institutions are strengthened, governance-related grievances that fuel the conflict can be managed. Alongside negotiation, traditional conflict resolution methods that are culturally relevant to South Sudan should be integrated into the process, with emphasis on strengthening relationships between all actors. Empowering local mediators familiar with cultural norms can enhance these efforts. Furthermore, managing external political influence requires coordinated effort among international and regional actors to prevent competing interests from dominating. It is also essential to encourage impartial international oversight to ensure that peace efforts remain focused on stability rather than on external geopolitical interests.

POTENTIAL SOLUTION *

The article’s finding about ripeness is the sharpest in it and its consequence deserves to be stated plainly, because it cuts against an instinct that is difficult to resist. Nineteen days elapsed between the outbreak of a civil war and a signed cessation of hostilities. Nothing in that period could have established what the parties actually wanted, who else needed to be present, or whether either side believed it could still win. What was produced was an agreement that neither party had reason to keep, and the pattern repeated: each subsequent violation was met with another summit, another deadline, another signature. This is the phenomenon the literature calls premature mediation, and its cost is not merely a wasted process but the devaluation of agreement itself, since parties learn that signing carries no obligation.

That said, the alternative is not to stand aside while people are killed, and the resolution the field has reached is to separate the tracks. Humanitarian negotiation over access, corridors and the protection of civilians can and should proceed immediately, conducted by different people with a narrow mandate. Political settlement requires conditions that did not exist in January 2014 and could not have been manufactured. Conflating the two produced a political agreement doing humanitarian work, which is the weakest possible form of both.

On impartiality, the article identifies the problem and the remedy is available. A mediator need not be neutral, and the regional actors’ knowledge and leverage were genuine assets; what was missing was any acknowledgment of their interests and any external counterweight. The arrangements that have worked elsewhere combine a regionally led process with a co-chair from outside the region, published terms of reference stating what each mediating state’s interests are, and a guarantor that no party can veto. The later engagement of the African Union High Level Panel and of Sudan and Kenya in the revitalisation moved partly in this direction, and the 2018 agreement has held longer than its predecessor for reasons that include this.

Three additions belong here. Implementation is where both agreements failed, and the mechanisms exist: the ceasefire monitoring body, the Joint Defence Board, the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission. Each has reported violations, and none has had any means of imposing consequence. Monitoring without enforcement produces an accurate record of a collapsing agreement. The chapter of the 2018 agreement providing for a hybrid court, a truth commission and a reparations authority remains largely unimplemented more than six years on, and its absence is not incidental, since the principal parties are among those it would examine. And the article’s recommendation on traditional mechanisms is the one with the strongest evidence behind it: local peace agreements between Dinka and Nuer communities, brokered by chiefs and church leaders, have repeatedly halted cattle raiding and revenge killing in defined areas while the national conflict continued. That is a limited achievement and it is real, and it is the level at which most South Sudanese experience violence.

Finally, the observation that the conflict reflects a personal relationship between two men is accurate and carries an uncomfortable implication. A settlement built around the accommodation of two principals has been attempted repeatedly, and each iteration has enlarged the government while leaving the population’s position unchanged. If the war is genuinely about who holds office, then power sharing is the answer and it has been tried; if it is about how a state distributes oil revenue, land and security among its peoples, then power sharing among the belligerents is a distraction from it. The article’s own material points toward the second reading, and the recommendations that follow from it, on institutions, resource management and community reconciliation, are the ones it rightly places at the end.

* Added by the WMO Editorial Team

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Supplementary references added by the WMO Editorial Team

Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, Addis Ababa, 17 August 2015.

Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, Addis Ababa, 12 September 2018, in particular Chapter V on transitional justice, accountability, reconciliation and healing.

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