The global energy transition is often framed around solar panels and lithium-ion batteries. Yet the real struggle for geopolitical dominance is occurring in a quieter, far more consequential arena: the scramble for critical minerals that underpin nuclear power and artificial intelligence. Minerals such as copper, uranium, gallium, zirconium, and germanium sit at the heart of national security strategies from Washington to Beijing to Moscow. As AI demand surges and nuclear power re-emerges as a politically attractive low-carbon option, the world finds itself entering a new kind of arms race. This time, the competition is not over warheads, but over the inputs that make both AI and nuclear development possible.
The AI–Nuclear Feedback Loop: A New Front in Geopolitics
AI is extremely energy-intensive. Data centers already consume as much electricity as mid-sized nations, and demand is projected to multiply. As AI systems become more complex, quantum-adjacent, or integrated into autonomous military systems, energy requirements will accelerate beyond what current grids can sustain.
This is why nuclear power—previously stalled by cost, regulation, and public perception—is being rebranded as the only energy source capable of powering the next era of computation. But this revival comes with geopolitical consequences. During the Cold War, the nuclear arms race was defined by the number of warheads. In the emerging AI-nuclear era, power may instead be measured by:
Who controls the mineral supply chains.
Who can afford to build next-generation reactors.
Whose AI systems those reactors ultimately power.
Nuclear Energy’s Mineral Backbone
Despite its reputation as a reliable, low-carbon alternative to fossil fuels, nuclear energy rests on structurally fragile supply chains. While nuclear output is not dependent on weather variability like solar or wind, recent research emphasizes that its production is deeply dependent on critical minerals with volatile supply chains (Dolan & Heath, Energy Policy, 2024; International Energy Agency, 2023).
Uranium is only the most visible mineral needed. As Hwang (2009), Degueldre (2017), and Jang et al. (2024) demonstrate across multiple nuclear-materials studies, reactor construction and operation require a constellation of metals, including nickel, chromium, copper, and zirconium. Zirconium, in particular, is non-substitutable. Its exceptionally low neutron absorption cross-section makes it the only viable material for fuel rod cladding in light-water reactors. Metallurgical analyses in Progress in Nuclear Energy and Journal of Nuclear Materials (Lemaignan & Motta 2012; Brachet et al. 2016) show that zirconium alloys such as Zircaloy-2, Zircaloy-4, and ZIRLO retain superior corrosion resistance and structural integrity under high-temperature, high-radiation conditions. Attempts to replace zirconium with alternative alloys consistently fail to meet reactor-grade performance thresholds.
Moreover, the list of critical minerals continues to expand. The U.S. Department of Energy’s 2023 Critical Materials Assessment identifies cobalt, niobium, tantalum, titanium, tungsten, vanadium, and hafnium as increasingly essential for advanced reactors — from accident-tolerant fuels to next-generation coolant systems. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s 2024 assessment of advanced nuclear materials similarly emphasizes the rising importance of high-performance alloys in small modular reactors (SMRs) and molten-salt designs (PNNL, 2024). These technologies, often promoted as future pillars of AI-driven industrialization, rely on metals that are geologically scarce, geopolitically concentrated, and difficult to refine at scale.
This makes nuclear energy inseparable from the broader resource politics of the clean-energy transition. Copper and nickel—foundational to nuclear infrastructure—are already among the most supply-constrained minerals globally, with demand projected to outstrip supply by 2030 (USGS, 2025; IEA, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, 2023). Zirconium and hafnium, largely co-produced through zircon mining, are refined primarily in China and a small number of facilities in the U.S. and Europe, creating structural chokepoints. Meanwhile, chromium and high-grade nickel used in reactor steels are increasingly sourced from regions facing political instability or governance deficits, including the DRC, Indonesia, and South Africa.
Importantly, the oft-repeated claim that nuclear power is “less mineral-intensive” than solar or wind is technically accurate only in terms of total tonnage per MW—a metric that obscures the real strategic vulnerability. As the World Nuclear Association notes, nuclear requires fewer bulk materials, but relies on disproportionately strategic ones (WNA, 2024). A solar panel can be produced with aluminum, silicon, and steel — materials with diverse global supply bases. Nuclear reactors, by contrast, depend on minerals that are rare, geopolitically contested, and technically irreplaceable.
Seen through a systems lens, nuclear energy shifts vulnerability from weather volatility to mineral scarcity. As states turn to nuclear power to supply the explosive energy demand of AI data centers, autonomous weapons systems, and high-performance computing infrastructure, these mineral dependencies harden into geopolitical chokepoints. The competition over zirconium, nickel, copper, and the broader constellation of nuclear-grade metals is already shaping U.S.–China–Russia rivalry, supply-chain securitization, and the emerging politics of techno-industrial power.
Ultimately, any future nuclear development will depend not on reactor design, but on whether states can secure the material backbone that sustains it. Without confronting the mineral politics beneath nuclear expansion, countries risk building energy systems that are technologically sophisticated but exposed to global supply-chain shocks.
AI, Data Centers, and the Overlooked Minerals They Depend On
While the EV revolution is led by lithium, copper, and cobalt, the AI boom depends on a different mineral ecosystem. Gallium, germanium, indium, palladium, and tantalum form the backbone of GPUs, semiconductors, photonics, and advanced data infrastructure. These minerals are central to computational power. Without them, modern AI would collapse entirely (Foreign Policy 2025, SFA Oxford).
And yet, environmental and human rights assessments of their extraction and refining lag dramatically behind public awareness. The geopolitical asymmetry is stark:
China controls 98% of primary gallium production and 60% of global germanium refining.
The United States holds pockets of rare earth deposits but lacks large-scale refining capacity.
Russia, though less dominant, maintains significant uranium reserves.
Given AI’s exponential energy and hardware requirements, these supply chains represent vulnerabilities larger than those of the battery sector. The AI revolution, in other words, is only as resilient as the minerals China chooses to export (CSIS 2025, Müller and Pippart 2025).
Divergent Trajectories: The U.S., China, and Russia
China: The Supply Chain Superpower
If the United States and Russia remain the primary military nuclear powers, China is the undisputed superpower of the critical minerals and energy-technology supply chain. Its dominance is not incidental but the product of decades of strategic industrial policy, aggressive overseas investment, and state-backed financial architecture that Western democracies have been structurally unable—or politically unwilling—to replicate.
Regarding industrial integration and mineral dominance, recent analyses by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2025) show that China controls: 70–75% of global lithium and cobalt refining, over 90% of natural graphite and rare-earth processing, and a majority share of copper, nickel, and manganese processing is essential for nuclear construction and AI infrastructure.
While mineral extraction is globally dispersed, refining and processing—the chokepoints of value—are almost entirely Chinese-controlled. This vertical grip means that even if Western firms source ore elsewhere, they remain dependent on Chinese facilities to transform those minerals into usable industrial inputs.
A 2025 network analysis of rare-earth and high-tech supply chains reinforces this reality: China occupies the “low-risk, high-influence” node of global mineral networks, while the U.S. and EU reside in “high-dependency, high-risk” positions (Cao et al., 2025). In geopolitical terms, this is structural leverage. China’s dominance is further entrenched by long-term equity stakes, mining partnerships, and offtake agreements—particularly in resource-rich but politically vulnerable regions. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chinese companies control the majority of industrial cobalt mining. In Chile and Argentina, Chinese-backed firms hold increasing influence in lithium brine extraction. In Canada, Indonesia, and Australia, Chinese investors maintain stakes in nickel, copper, and rare earth operations.
Research from the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada and Tatvita Analytics (2022–2025) underscores how these investments are not isolated ventures but part of a coordinated national strategy: secure resources upstream, dominate processing midstream, and monopolize manufacturing downstream. China’s leadership in critical minerals directly fuels its rapid nuclear and AI development. China currently operates the world’s fastest-growing civilian nuclear program, with more reactors under construction than the U.S. and EU combined (World Nuclear Industry Status Report, 2024). It is simultaneously pouring billions into high-performance computing (HPC), AI datacenters, and advanced semiconductor capacity.
The link is straightforward: AI requires minerals → minerals require refining → refining is controlled by China → AI expansion strengthens China’s geopolitical position. Furthermore, China’s mineral and nuclear strategy operates on three interlocking pillars: control upstream extraction through overseas mining investments; dominate midstream refining to create structural global dependencies; use downstream nuclear and AI expansion to consolidate technological and geopolitical influence.
This model encapsulates China’s approach to the new arms race: not through warhead numbers but through supply-chain supremacy. Unlike the United States and Europe—where nuclear investment stalled in the late 1970s due to safety fears, cost overruns, and political fragmentation—China invested early, accelerating nuclear development as a pillar of national revitalization. Nuclear energy provides stable baseload power for AI datacenters, heavy industry, and military R&D. Beijing’s planners understand that energy is the hard power behind digital power.
Although China is expanding aggressively, it still trails the U.S. and Russia in military nuclear stockpiles and delivery platforms. Yet even here, China is closing the gap rapidly through modernization programs, new reactor technologies, and dual-use research facilities. The mineral and energy control it currently wields may be the leverage point that allows Beijing to accelerate military techno-industrial growth.
United States: Technological Leader, Supply Chain Dependent
The United States remains at the forefront of AI innovation, semiconductor design, and nuclear-reactor engineering. Yet despite this technological leadership, Washington continues to depend heavily on foreign sources—particularly foreign processing capacity—for the critical minerals that undergird modern computing, energy, and defense infrastructure. That structural dependency has become a national-security vulnerability.
Recent U.S. policy reflects awareness of this risk. Under the authority of the Energy Act of 2020 and related legislation, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) periodically updates a list of “critical minerals,” highlighting dozens of resources whose supply chains are judged fragile and whose disruption would pose serious economic or national-security consequences. As of 2025, the USGS recognizes copper, silver, uranium, and other key industrial materials among the critical minerals flagged for supply risk.
But official policy alone does not guarantee supply-chain resilience. As a 2024 assessment noted: even with the incentives of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and domestic-mineral policies, the U.S. remains substantially import-dependent for many critical minerals—especially those requiring sophisticated processing and refining steps that the U.S. largely lacks (Deberdt 2024). In response, Washington has adopted a dual strategy: (1) building “friend-shored” supply-chain partnerships with allied or partner states, and (2) ramping up domestic processing and refining capacity through public-private investment. Under the 2025 Critical Minerals and Materials Accelerator, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has issued new funding opportunities to support domestic critical-materials processing and manufacturing. These measures signal that U.S. leaders recognize minerals as a strategic vulnerability and are investing to reduce foreign dependence.
Russia: A Nuclear Legacy in Decline, but Not Irrelevant
Russia retains one of the world’s largest uranium enrichment capacities and decades of nuclear expertise. Sanctions pressure has pushed Moscow closer to Beijing, and their alignment in mineral and energy supply chains will shape emerging multipolar blocs. Despite economic decline, Russia remains a major exporter of uranium fuel and reactor technology through Rosatom. Its geopolitical relevance persists not because of innovation, but because its assets remain strategically indispensable.
A New Arms Race—But One That Could Still Be Contained
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other multilateral frameworks are increasingly sidelined by states pursuing parallel nuclear strategies. As countries rush to secure minerals and reactors, the risk of fragmentation grows. A world defined by mineral competition, nuclear expansion, and AI-enhanced command-and-control systems creates conditions for miscalculation reminiscent of the Cold War.
This mineral-driven competition is not inherently doomed to conflict. If the U.S., China, and Russia can maintain channels of communication—however strained—there remains room for dialogue on nuclear safety, transparency, and AI governance. China’s rapid rise does not preclude cooperation; in fact, its dominance makes it central to any meaningful global framework. Critically, the money being funneled into the mineral-AI-nuclear complex reflects a strategic misalignment. Trillions are being mobilized not to reduce climate risk or enhance global equity, but to secure a narrow competitive advantage. Technology is outpacing diplomacy, and without intervention, the consequences will be systemic.
Conclusion
The United States, China, and Russia are locked in a defining strategic competition over access to critical minerals, processing capacity, and the ability to translate these resources into nuclear and AI power. This mineral arms race will shape the geopolitical hierarchy of the 21st century, as nuclear reactors, AI data centers, semiconductor fabrication, enrichment facilities, and advanced military technologies all depend on minerals that are scarce, geographically concentrated, and controlled through complex, asymmetric supply chains.
China’s structural advantages in refining capacity, integrated industrial policy, and control over key chokepoints position it as a dominant actor, while the United States maintains leadership in AI innovation and advanced nuclear design but remains dependent on foreign processing. Russia’s strategic enrichment capabilities and Rosatom’s global presence ensure it remains a critical player, despite narrower resource control.
Yet, even amid this intense rivalry, the mineral supply chains underpinning these technologies are inherently interdependent. Complete decoupling is impractical—no state can fully secure its needs in isolation. This creates a strategic paradox: competitors rely on one another even as they seek to outmaneuver each other.
In this context, maintaining open channels of communication and fostering multilateral cooperation become essential for global stability. Dialogue on mineral transparency, nuclear safety, and AI governance can mitigate risks of miscalculation, prevent escalation, and build trust despite strategic competition. Multilateral frameworks, though challenged, offer essential platforms for conflict prevention and cooperative management of shared vulnerabilities.
The mineral arms race, if managed carefully, need not spiral into open conflict. Instead, it can catalyze new forms of diplomatic engagement and cooperative security. Recognizing the intertwined nature of technological advancement and resource access, states must invest not only in strategic capabilities but also in diplomatic channels. Only through sustained diplomacy can the global community navigate the complex nexus of minerals, technology, and power—ensuring that the future of AI and nuclear development supports stability, equity, and peace rather than rivalry and fragmentation.
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