The New Maoist Conflict In Nepal

How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/

ABSTRACT *

This article examines the emergence of a new Maoist conflict in Nepal and applies mindful reflection as a possible response. The author traces the political trajectory from the end of the civil war and the abolition of the monarchy through the constitution of 2015, whose adoption is described as having been accelerated in the aftermath of the earthquake at the expense of opposition voices, to the splinter group led by Netra Bikram Chand, its use of violence, and the government’s ban on its activities. Two sets of reflective questions are then offered, addressed to the government and to the opposition respectively. The author concludes that mindfulness as a basis for mediation could ease tensions, while stating that the violent methods of the splinter group are not justifiable. The assessments reflect the author’s own perspective; this journal’s editorial position is neutral.

KEYWORDS *

Nepal, Maoist conflict, mindful reflection, constitution 2015, Communist Party of Nepal, political violence, opposition, mediation, self reflection, post conflict instability

INTRODUCTION

Following a decade-long insurgency and a tumultuous peace process, a new conflict might occur in Nepal (Adhikari 2019). After the civil war ended in Nepal, the government established a new constitution in 2015, which was criticized by the opposition, especially the Maoist Communist Party. Mindfulness as a mindset might be beneficial in decreasing tensions and revising the viewpoints of all parties involved in Nepal’s current political landscape. This report will describe the ‘new’ Maoist conflict. Afterward, a list of possible mindful questions will be given to reflect on the parties’ position. A short conclusion will follow at the end.

MAIN CORPUS

THE ‘NEW’ MAOIST CONFLICT

A decade ago, after the civil war in Nepal ended in 2008, the people of Nepal seemed optimistic, entering into a new, bright era. Nepal’s People’s Movement went to the streets of Kathmandu in 2006, overruled King Gyanendra, and established a parliament. The monarchy was officially abolished in May 2008, and Nepal organized a democratic system. Nevertheless, credit for building a new policy went to all parts of the population, including the Maoists. In the following time, efforts focused on drafting a new constitution. When the country was hit by a 7,8 magnitude earthquake and a series of aftershocks in 2015, more than 9,000 people were killed. The dominant parties, after that, subdued opposition voices to fast-track the implementation of the final constitution, misusing the needs of the population after the earthquake as justification. Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Oli took office in February 2018, claiming that Nepal will rise. His political decisions were often perceived as ‘illusionary.’ One can argue that, e.g., railroads between Nepal and Tibet, through the inaccessible mountains, might be a challenging vision. At the same time, a big part of the country does not even have access to health care, primary education, or social justice. The Maoists increasingly criticized government decisions from that perspective. In 2012, a group splintered away from the Maoist Party, now included in the ruling coalition. The group started a new, unified revolution. The group called itself the Communist Party of Nepal, led by Netra Bikram Chand. Nevertheless, the group utilizes peaceful but also violent means. For example, in April 2018, the group planted a bomb at the office of the Arun III Hydro Project, established by a company from India. In February 2019, the group targeted the Nepali telecommunication company Ncell, motivated by rumors that Ncell did not pay millions of taxes. As a result, Nepal declared the group a criminal, banning all its activities. As a result, protests increased. Even though demonstrations seem to be calm right now, the conflict has the potential to break out at any time. After Nepal’s political leadership ignored the voices of opposition for several years, they are now in a situation where they face threats from a new Maoist force fueled by anger and disillusionment. Many theorists believe that this situation could destabilize Nepal’s peace (Adhikari 2019).

MINDFUL REFLECTION

According to Erdmann, a mediator needs a set of different qualities, such as an open mind and the ability to reflect behavior. Mediation is not solely focused on structures and regulations but needs to be tailored to the needs of the conflict parties. Asking the right questions is crucial to understanding the conflict and creating content (Erdmann 2018). ‘Be the change you wish to see in the world,’ – said Mahatma Gandhi. Change lies within each of us.

Translated to the conflict described above, the Government of Nepal could utilize mindful reflection as a tool to understand the Maoists, but also to reflect on their viewpoints and revise motivations:

• Why do we set our priorities the way we do?
• Why do we, as the Government of Nepal, ignore the voice of the Maoists for so many years?
• Why did the Maoists fuel the civil war in the past?
• Is it true that we used the chaos after the earthquake to silent opposition and designed the constitution according to our needs? If so, why?
• Where might the anger of the Maoists lead to? How can the conflict be resolved, and what can we, as the government, do to prevent violence?
• How do we act as role models?
• How can we practice what we preach and rule Nepal according to everyone’s interests?
• What do the Maoists’ threats do with us individually?
• How can we establish long-lasting peace and political stability?

The Communist Party, as the opposition, could ask themselves:

• How does our aim justify our means of violence?
• What can we do differently to be heard and taken seriously?
• Is violence the right answer?
• Is our response a result of our values, experiences, upbringing, or situation?
• What would we do if the government reacts in the same way as we? Would that be okay? Why?

SUMMARY *

The article identifies a pattern familiar from post conflict states: a peace settlement that brought former insurgents into government, followed by the exclusion of those who remained outside it, and the emergence of a new armed faction from precisely that exclusion. The author’s central claim is that the confrontation is sustained less by ideology than by unexamined positions on both sides, and the reflective questions are structured to test that on each in turn, asking the government about its use of the post earthquake moment and its treatment of dissent, and the splinter group about the relationship between its aims and its methods.

CONCLUSION

Considering Nepal’s government’s often criticized political priorities, ignorance towards the voice of opposition, and years of repression of oppositional groups, the Government of Nepal may highly benefit from mindful reflection. Nevertheless, the Communist Party’s violent approaches are, from my perspective, not justifiable. Therefore, a mediator bringing the two sides together utilizing mindfulness as a basis for mediation can potentially improve existing tensions.

POTENTIAL SOLUTION *

The reflective questions in this article point toward something the case demonstrates with unusual clarity: a peace process that ends a war can generate the next one if it defines success as bringing the armed party into government. Nepal’s settlement did exactly that, and the faction now at issue emerged from those for whom inclusion in the state meant abandonment of the programme they had fought for. The lesson is not that the settlement was wrong but that peace agreements require a continuing political channel for those who remain dissatisfied, or dissatisfaction will find the channel it knows.

Proscription illustrates the same difficulty in miniature. Banning a group’s activities removes its lawful avenues while leaving its grievances untouched, and it converts a political dispute into a security matter in which negotiation becomes an admission of defeat for whichever side proposes it. Where a group has both political and violent wings, the more effective sequence is generally the reverse: keep the political channel open on the explicit condition that violence ceases, so that renunciation of violence brings something tangible rather than nothing.

That points to the practical architecture of any renewed process. A reciprocal step, cessation of attacks in exchange for lifting the ban and restoring the right to organise, is achievable without either side conceding its programme, and it can be verified. Quiet facilitation by figures both sides accept, respected civil society organisations, religious authorities or elders from the districts concerned, is more likely to produce it than formal talks, since neither government nor banned group can afford to be seen requesting negotiations first.

Beyond the immediate confrontation, the article’s own observation about health care, education and access to justice identifies the ground on which this dispute grows. Grievances about exclusion are answered by inclusion, and visible improvement in the districts where the group recruits is both a public good and the most reliable form of prevention. Where the constitutional process itself is contested, a formal review mechanism, in which those who feel the document was adopted over their objections can raise amendments through parliament rather than through explosives, addresses the complaint at its source.

Finally, a word on the author’s closing position. Stating that violence is not justifiable is a legitimate moral judgment and a necessary one, but it sits awkwardly with the mediator’s role that the article otherwise commends. A mediator can hold firmly that violence must stop while still working with those who use it, precisely because those are the people whose conduct needs to change. The distinction worth preserving is between the act, which can be condemned without reservation, and the person, who must remain someone one can speak with. Refusing to speak with those who use violence is a defensible political choice; it is not, however, mediation, and the difference should be conscious rather than accidental.

* Added by the WMO Editorial Team

REFERENCES

REFERENCES

Adhikari, Gyanu. “The Spectre of a New Maoist Conflict in Nepal.” 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/spectre-maoist-conflict-nepal-190404111507371.html. Accessed March 16, 2020.

Erdmann, Daniel. “Section: B) – Syllabus 2 – World Mediation Organization.” 2018. https://worldmediation.org. Accessed March 16, 2020.

Supplementary references added by the WMO Editorial Team

Constitution of Nepal, 2015.

Comprehensive Peace Accord between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 21 November 2006.

International Crisis Group, reports on Nepal’s peace process and post conflict politics, Brussels and Kathmandu.

Human Rights Watch and Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), reports on political violence and the ban on the Communist Party of Nepal (Chand), Kathmandu.

Nepal Peace Trust Fund and United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal, documentation on implementation of the peace process.