How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/
EDITORIAL NOTE *
The author of this article works at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; the views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the official position, past, present or future, of the United Nations or of UNHCR. The assessment of the states discussed, and the attribution of responsibility for regional insecurity, likewise reflect the author’s own perspective; this journal’s editorial position is neutral as between the states concerned.
ABSTRACT *
This article examines Somalia’s application to join the East African Community and asks what the accession would mean for both parties. The author first sets out the Community’s history, its admission criteria and its achievements in transport, immigration and tourism, before surveying the conditions in Somalia: drought and food insecurity, weak governance, dependence on imported grain, and the continuing insurgency of Al Shabaab. Two lines of argument are then developed. The first concerns opportunity, through market access, the transfer of knowledge, the coastline linking the region to the Arabian Peninsula, and the established Somali business networks in East African cities. The second concerns risk, drawn from the Community’s failure to complete its own integration, the limited effect of the accessions of South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the repeated failure of regional forces to restore security in Somalia. The author concludes that the Community should consolidate before expanding, and that Somalia’s accession requires preventive security measures agreed in advance.
KEYWORDS
The East African Community, regional integration, conflict resolution, economic development, sustainable peace and security, terrorism.
INTRODUCTION
Regional integration is a powerful catalyst in the business environment’s development, advancing social and economic development. Regional integration policies and initiatives are adopted to pursue shared economic, social, and political action, and economies in developed and developing regions implement them. The EAC currently has seven member countries: Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s accession in April 2022, with Somalia’s current request to join the integration. Somalia’s membership has been a long time since its application in 2012.
More particularly, this country has been a victim of social, economic, political, and security problems for so long. The Somali problems will not be new or the only ones in the EAC; the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been an emblematic signal of insecurity and violence, especially in the Eastern region, political problems in Burundi, and South Sudan that are still struggling with its reconstruction in connection with various insecurity issues. On another side, Rwanda and Uganda have made tremendous steps in ending the political tension between these two countries.
Though the number of members has increased and is still growing with new accessions, EAC is still struggling with the implementation of the Treaty establishing it, including the full implementation of a single customs territory, legal and political harmonization, and security issues. This EAC’s experience pushes me to analyze how much Somalia will contribute to regional integration considering its local problems. This analysis consists of the potential of Somalia’s accession and anticipated threats. In that sense, this analysis serves as an alert for the EAC to adopt appropriate preventive measures before being overloaded with unresolvable problems.
MAIN CORPUS
The genesis, development and major achievements of the East African Community
Typically, regional integration presents different benefits, including increasing trade and investment, economic cooperation, and other various opportunities for globalization. The EAC has its particularity of being a region characterized by small states with small markets. Therefore, focusing on economic cooperation and regional integration can create an expanded and unified market, diversify the monetary base, and increase competitiveness in the global market[1]. Before elaborating on the potential of the EAC member states to the bloc, I must trace its historical view.
The East African Community (EAC) was established in 1967 as a Customs Union between Kenya and Uganda but collapsed in 1977 due to political disparities. Tanganyika (Tanzania) joined in 1927, Rwanda and Burundi in 2009, and South Sudan in 2016. This bloc is founded on main pillars such as a Customs Union, Common Market, Monetary Union, and Political Federation, while the organization’s main aim is to make the East African economic and political bloc powerful and sustainable[2].
In that process, other important events are emphasized, such as the Customs Union between Kenya, Uganda, and, later, Tanganyika, established in 1917. Other subsequent protocols include the East African Currency Board, the Postal Union, and the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa. In that channel of events, the East African Governors’ Conference, the East African Income Tax Board, and the Joint Economic Council were established between 1905 and 1940. The East African Airways Corporation was incorporated in 1946, and the East African Common Services Organization (EACSO) was developed in 1961, which replaced the East African High Commission[3].
Admission criteria under the East African Community
The EAC Treaty requires the new countries to accept the community set out in the Treaty, adhere to universally acceptable principles of good governance, democracy, and the rule of law, and observe human rights and social justice[4].
Other criteria include the potential contribution to strengthening regional integration, geographical proximity to and inter-dependence between it and the EAC partner states, establishing and maintaining a market-driven economy, and social and economic policies compatible with the community. These include Somalia’s institutional and legal frameworks, policies, strategies, and programs, and its areas of cooperation with the EAC member states[5].
Significant achievements of the East African Community
The EAC has made some achievements, including interstate road transport through reduced documentation for crews and vehicles at border crossings. This transport facilitation has made transportation more accessible and encouraged traders from member states, contributing to economic ties and strengthening the region’s financial position. Additionally, it had harmonized immigration regulations, such as introducing an EAC passport, free visas for immigrants within the community, and Customs Union through one border-posts system[6].
Tourism is one sector where the EAC has been strategic in its harmonization endeavors. The EAC partner states signed necessary protocols to help promote East Africa as a single tourist destination, attract more tourists, and increase the tourism industry’s contribution to the East African economy. A single East African Tourist Visa for Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda EAC countries has been available since 2014[7].
Major problems facing Somalia as a new EAC member
Somalia has been facing and is still facing various social, economic, and political problems. Somalia has been a victim of a drought threatening to cause famine in different areas for so long. Many Somali people have been victims of acute food insecurity and need humanitarian assistance. Additionally, the lack of funds to address the problems of drought, climate change, malnutrition, and famine, is a critical concern[8]. Worse, insecurity resulting from Al-Shabab terrorism cannot allow the government to focus on other socio-economic aspects. Al-Shabab has remained a severe threat to the government and its institutions.
As I introduced above, the deteriorating situation of drought has affected half the population. There is a severe issue of food insecurity due to the failed rainy season, insecurity, lack of functioning governance structures, poor infrastructure, lack of adequate policies supporting integration into the community, an increasing inflation rate, many Somalis being at risk of famine and starvation, many displaced people, consequences of war in Ukraine and Russia, because Somalia imports much of its wheat from Ukraine and Russia. Insecurity and terrorism are significant problems that Somalia is adding to the list of issues facing the EAC[9]. Without being cynical, I can realize that the delayed admission of Somalia into the EAC might have resulted from these decades-long problems, but most importantly, its insecurity issue. However, once Somalia becomes a member of the EAC, the latter must commit to addressing them. Otherwise, Somalia’s accession will be another burden to the bloc.
An opportunity to boost Somali economic development
When establishing the EAC, the plan was to form a political federation to strengthen and expand economic, political, social, and cultural integration. In that sense, the EAC formed the East African Community and Customs Union (EACCU) in 2005 with the primary goal of promoting the free flow of goods and services, labor, and capital from one partner state to another by lowering trade barriers and facilitating markets for each member state’s products[10]. For Somalia, joining the EAC will make its markets more competitive, give consumers more options, and improve resource mobilization efficiency, industrialization, and scale productivity[11]. Additionally, Somalia will benefit from knowledge transfer, including technologies brought by companies investing in the country, by taking the excellent example of Rwanda.
In the same context, free trade will eliminate economic distortions caused primarily by other neighboring countries when importing and exporting goods, services, and foreign exchange. In that sense, free trade will encourage competition with other businesses in the region and political stability and security in the country because the country will need to attract foreign investors and people movements.
Undoubtedly, Somalia will benefit significantly through the increased movement of goods, services, and people within the bloc and expanding intra-regional trade. Furthermore, exploiting Somalia’s blue economy resources, such as fish, will boost the regional economy. If Somalia becomes a full member of the East African Community, Somali citizens will now be free to move and do business across the bloc, and the country will benefit from the community’s economic, political, and social support programs. In these free movements of people, the citizens will have visa-free entry to the EAC countries and be eligible for an East African passport, like any other citizens from the EAC member states. However, I recommend strict border control measures to prevent the spread of terrorists in all areas of the region.
Somalia’s accession as an economic opportunity for the East African Community
Somalia has the longest national coastline of over 3000 km in Africa, linking Africa to the Arabian Peninsula, which the region can tap into to increase intra-regional trade[12]. In other words, the geographical structure of Somalia will benefit other EAC member states due to its long Indian Ocean Red Sea route connecting Africa to the Arabian Peninsula, a significant economic zone, and, by extension, the rest of Asia; Somalia can serve as a gateway to international trade.
Moreover, Somalia’s accession to the EAC will undoubtedly strengthen the organization because Somalis share historically rich and diverse everyday experiences, such as culture and Kiswahili, which can be used to build trust and networks for business and trade with other East Africans. Somalis have contributed to East African cities’ economic and social transformation by investing in local companies[13]. In the 1990s, many Somalis fleeing anarchy in Somalia settled in Nairobi, transforming Eastleigh, then a residential suburb of Nairobi, into a bustling business zone. They established various businesses, including export and import networks and local services[14].
Finally, admitting Somalia to the EAC will significantly raise the movement of goods, services, and people across the bloc, thereby increasing the bloc’s gross domestic product (GDP) and encouraging the region’s already established Somali businesses[15].
Failed areas of integration before Somalia’s accession
Regional integration arrangements include other protocols to address specific integrative measures and deepen integration. However, some of these protocols are ineffective due to delayed legislative approval processes among members and political reasons.
The Customs Union was established in 2005, and the Common Market in 2010[16], while Monetary Union, expected to be done in ten years, and the Political Federation are still unfinished, despite long talks and negotiations. The Protocol on Monetary Union was adopted under the EAC Treaty and signed in 2013. The period of ten years was a progressive opportunity for the EAC partners to converge their currencies into a single regional currency[17]. From this plan, I see that the Political Federation is the final goal of the integration process in this region. It would allow them to conduct a standard foreign and security policy and contribute to more effective implementation of the previous stages of cooperation. Political cooperation would improve the region’s stability and strengthen its position, especially in negotiations with other countries outside the bloc.
In addition to this failure I emphasized above, I deplore the lack of specific institutions in member states whose primary responsibilities would be implementing the protocols in collaboration with all stakeholders, governmental institutions, the private sector, and civil society. Furthermore, difficulties related to the lack of capacity and resources to implement the protocols need particular attention[18]. From this discussion above, I can infer that EAC failed to implement its primary goals, revealing significant delays in solving major regional problems. The delays in implementing the protocols that failed some EAC goals show the organization’s weakness, especially the concerned member states’ lack of engagement and commitment[19].
Additionally, I can observe that the principle of full and effective regional integration exists only on paper and is not in the organization’s actual practices. This failure of full and effective integration has been the cause of many other failed projects, including rerouting major regional infrastructure, railways, and oil exploitation in South Sudan. It pushes me to conclude that these failures reveal serious difficulties in cooperation among the member states and their commitment to previous integration initiatives[20].
Lack of significant added value from recent accessions
Typically, regional integration is a standard policy or project aimed at increasing links and economic, political, and social transactions, strengthening integration processes, intensifying intergovernmental cooperation, and creating regional identity among the community. For example, free trade has not happened as stipulated in the protocols because there have been conflicting situations between member states leading to the closure of the borders[21]. In other words, free trade only happens when it is convenient for one member state. In that regard, accession to the EAC by South Sudan should have given it an opportunity for economic stabilization, while the rest of the member states should increase their profits related to the oil industry in South Sudan and Uganda.
I agree with Gibb that there has been no significant change since its accession by DRC, apart from becoming another complex security and political baggage. South Sudan, which became a full member of the EAC in September 2016, is yet to add value[22]. I understand that when joining the community, DRC committed itself to be part of the community and entering the various areas of cooperation in all the sectors, programs, and activities that promote the four pillars of regional integration, namely, the Customs Union, Common Market Protocol, Monetary Union, and the Political Federation.
The lesson from the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s accession
When joining the EAC, the DRC expected to benefit from customs taxes exemption at any of the region’s border points. The main reason is that most of the DRC’s key markets, such as Bukavu and Goma, are geographically closer to the Kenyan port of Mombasa than the Atlantic Ocean. Therefore, open borders via the EAC could reduce shipping and receiving commerce time. Undoubtedly, this is a massive benefit to a country that needs assistance with infrastructure projects[23].
On another side, the DRC’s membership provides the EAC states access to the Atlantic coast. I understand that this access is an important development since EAC countries needed to utilize Indian Ocean-based ports in Kenya and Tanzania, and an obvious problem with these options is piracy off the Somalia coast.
However, the DRC’s membership in the EAC brings another set of challenges, including insecurity and acts of violence in the Eastern region of DRC by M23[24]. Therefore, the EAC must double its efforts to integrate DRC and promote peace between its member states to maintain bloc unity. Though member states of the bloc agreed to deploy a regional security force led by Kenya to the Eastern DRC, their productivity is still questionable.
Above all, I realize that after two years of DRC’s accession to the EAC, there has not been any significant change in cooperation between DRC and other EAC member states; the tension between DRC and Rwanda increased from allegations of Rwandan support to M23. Therefore, I am convinced that welcoming new members would be an opportunity for the EAC to focus on the full implementation of the EAC treaty, especially the monetary union, ensure the performance of the EAC Common Market Protocol, attain an EAC Single Currency, and strengthen regional peace, security, and governance.
Failed attempts to address insecurity and terrorism in Somalia
Beforehand, I must recall that East Africa Community lacks an integrated conflict prevention, management, and mitigation framework. It is a security weakness for the East African region and a significant threat to the dream of effective regional integration. For the issues of insecurity in Somalia there have been initiatives and efforts by the African Union to address insecurity issues in East African countries, particularly in Somalia. These include the African Union (AU) itself, African Standby Force (ASF), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Eastern African Standby Force Secretariat (EASFSEC)[25].
In restoring peace in Somalia, Sudan and Uganda were identified as the countries that would deploy troops under the IGAD Peace Mission in Somalia (IGASOM). The other IGAD countries were to assist in providing logistics, equipment, emergency assistance, and training for the Somalia Army and Police[26]. The failure of IGAD resulted from its organizational structure, logistical and financial issues, and an arms embargo imposed on Somalia on January 23, 1992, following the rapid deterioration of the situation and heavy loss of human life after the overthrow of Siad Barre[27]. I understand that without a trained national army and police force, it will be difficult for the Somali government to be able to address the insurgents in the country while at the same time protecting the local population.
Somalia’s accession as an amplification of existing security problems
No single country within the EAC makes a significant difference because almost every member state faces some of the following insecurity problems. These include increasing levels of terrorism and piracy off the Somali coast, cross-border smuggling between Kenya and Sudan, and between Kenya and Somalia[28]. There is a general increase in violent crimes in the cities of some EAC member states, such as burglary, hijacking, poaching in the game parks, banditry and robbery, and cattle rustling in the rural areas[29].
I must signal the decades-long ethnic violence in Burundi that inevitably deterred the achievement of political and social harmony and rendered peace deals unworkable. Worse than that, the state’s weakness allowed perpetrators to go unpunished. In other EAC member states, these social and political conflicts have created many refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)[30]. Without any doubt, the influx of refugees from conflicts in neighboring countries retards development for both hosts and the refugees, and most often, they can become another cause of insecurity when they try to fight for their rights.
From this discussion above, I can infer that conflict and conflicting situations (intrastate and interstate) have become the common denominator among the EAC member states. Somalia has been struggling with insecurity resulting from terrorism, while Burundi has continued ethnic and political problems. However, Rwanda has managed to recover from the consequences caused by the Genocide committed against the Tutsi in 1994; DRC is still struggling with the Rwandan ex-FAR that is a threat to Rwanda, the newly formed M23 rebel insurgency in the Eastern DRC. Somali’s social, economic, political, and security problems are added to other member states’ issues, including Burundi, South Sudan, and insecurity in the Eastern area of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)[31].
To address this insecurity in the Eastern region of DRC, the EAC has been calling for armed groups in eastern DRC to lay down their arms while reiterating respect for the territorial integrity of the DRC. However, all these endeavors have sounded to a deaf ear because insecurity escalated in that region. I realize that the only way to address these conflicting situations, whether in Somalia, Burundi, or DRC, is to focus on the political realities of the country more than on abstract ideas. Finally, if EAC opts to welcome new members, it should commit to addressing the insecurity fully and effectively, ensure the protection of human rights, and put an end to internal and interstate conflicts.
An opportunity to end terrorism in the Horn of Africa, or another security burden?
As I insisted earlier, Al-Shabab has been deteriorating security in Somalia, infiltrating Uganda and Kenya, and ravaging many people’s lives. It signals that the EAC does not have adequate security organs and mechanisms. Worse than that, there has been an international reluctance to intervene in Somalia after the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) left the country to rely on informal groups for the provision of basic social amenities that turned out to harbour terror groups[32]. Consequently, I believe Somalia’s accession to the EAC will be another security burden for the EAC.
Somalia has been for so long a lawless country with a disorganized government, providing an environment for fugitives and terrorists to hide and plan attacks not only in the region but worldwide. Some of the causes include, among others, access to Somalia is unrestricted mainly due to the absence of customs or immigration officials to patrol the long Indian Ocean Coastline that, consequently, attracted militants fleeing from the hotspots of Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and Egypt[33]. It indicates that Somalia has been a regional hub for terrorists due to patrimonialism, the militarization of the state, and being the victim of the Cold War. Since 1991, after the withdrawal of American backing at the end of the Cold War, Somalia has had to contend with a civil war that has led to governmental failure to provide services and guarantee state territorial sovereignty, massive displacement of people, and social and economic decline[34].
Inevitably, the decline of the Somali state has coincided with the global preoccupation with combatting terrorism, with Western coalitions going to war against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Iraq and drone attacks in Yemen and Pakistan. Therefore, Somalia has become a haven for fleeing Islamic militants who regroup and seek retaliatory attacks on western interests. Additionally, the free flow of contraband weapons and arms, and organized terror groups, will put the EAC region in severe security challenges that require a timely response and particular resources. Unless the EAC adopts adequate preventive measures, Somalia’s accession is another security threat to the region.
A wake-up call for security measures in the EAC
Since its inception in 1999, the EAC has made tremendous steps to create a framework and structures to address peace and security issues. However, the systems have not been effective due to a lack of clear strategic direction in the critical areas of cooperation. Against this background, upon the Sectoral Committee on Interstate Security recommendation, the EAC Council of Ministers established an expert group to develop a Regional Strategy supported by a practical implementation plan[35].
The strategy was developed through a highly consultative and inclusive process. It was expected to boost peace and security sector activities and be the foundation for cooperation in addressing regional peace and security threats. In that sense, I agree with Ball that technological advancement, knowledge dispersal, and globalization can influence crime types and trends, especially in cyber crimes, money laundering, and terrorism financing[36].
Article 124 of The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community recognizes the region’s need for peace and security. The same article describes wide-ranging approaches for implementing a stable and secure regional environment[37]. This kind of environment can only be possible by promoting the development and harmonious living of the people of East Africa.
This strategy covers collaboration on cross-border crimes, theft of automobiles, drug trafficking, terrorism, money laundering, and other crimes. Considering the severe security concern in Somalia as a new joiner to the EAC, I see that this is an opportunistic time for the EAC as a bloc to adopt appropriate security measures, including reviewing and implementing the existing security plans for its sustainable integration.
SUMMARY *
The article weighs two propositions that are both plausible and mutually opposed. Somalia’s accession offers the Community a coastline of exceptional strategic value, access to the Arabian Peninsula and beyond, a fishing economy largely unexploited, and business networks already operating in East African cities. It also imports into the bloc an insurgency that has attacked two existing members, a state whose capacity to police its own territory is limited, and a humanitarian emergency of the first order. The author’s resolution is sequential rather than substantive: the question is not whether Somalia should eventually join but whether a Community that has not completed its own integration, cannot enforce its Common Market Protocol against members who close borders, and possesses no functioning conflict prevention framework, is presently in a condition to absorb it.
CONCLUSION
Regional integration is a way to encourage trade flow between member states and facilitate more efficient allocation of resources by stimulating competition and increasing the capacity of the internal market. That is expected to result in faster economic growth and increased per capita income. EAC is among regional organizations that have often been inadequately operating, and whenever they run, they end up with negative consequences. The community was established to make East Africa prosperous, competitive, secure, stable, and politically unified. Its orientation was to form a political federation that would strengthen and expand economic, political, social, and cultural integration.
However, EAC has proved unable to solve the main regional problems. Somalia is joining the EAC with various economic, political, and security issues to prevent them from becoming another burden to the community. To benefit from the integration, Somalia should improve its institutions by harmonizing the Federal and Regional governments, and reforming its internal policies, laws, and security, especially addressing the issues of terrorism by Al-Shabab. Apart from increasing the number of military and police forces, it should develop army and police control measures and ensure their personal and professional development. Furthermore, strengthening its political and military cooperation with Eritrea and Ethiopia as its neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa, reinforcing the border control measures, and working with IGAD is a strategic way to improve its internal political and security stability.
Additionally, it should adopt strategic plans with a progressive implementation plan to boost its economy and improve its infrastructure which is still poor. In this context, it should reinforce its work and cooperation with Non-Governmental Organizations operating in the region to make their economic functions more beneficial to the country and address their dark side that may flourish if they are not well utilized.
On another side, EAC should support Somalia by adopting the mechanisms and setting agenda for its progressive integration so that it can overcome the struggles of state-building. Finally, the EAC members must first work on their unity and cooperation, resolve any conflict between them fully and effectively, and enhance regional security as a group. Instead of focusing on membership expansion, EAC should review its regional realities and set achievable goals. In this sense, it should fully and effectively focus on security and economic integration as the major problems facing it, the success of which can enable it to undertake other integration phases. Moreover, it should be imperative for each EAC member state to have an internal organ or institution in charge of the implementation of the EAC treaty.
POTENTIAL SOLUTION *
The article’s argument for consolidation before enlargement is well made, and it invites a comparison the author does not draw. The European experience of eastward enlargement addressed exactly this problem through accession conditionality: candidates were assessed against defined criteria, progress was monitored and published, and membership followed the meeting of benchmarks rather than a political date. The Community’s Treaty already contains admission criteria, as the article notes, and what it lacks is any mechanism for verifying that they have been met or for sequencing accession accordingly. Adopting one would allow expansion and consolidation to proceed together rather than as alternatives, and it would give a candidate state something valuable in itself, namely a published standard against which its own reforms can be measured.
That points to a further consideration the article touches only in passing. Accession is generally more useful to a fragile state as a process than as an outcome, because the requirements of membership supply external anchoring for domestic reforms that are otherwise politically difficult. Phased accession with defined stages, in which market access expands as institutional benchmarks are met, offers the Community a means of managing risk and offers a candidate a reason to persist with reform. It also converts the question the article poses, opportunity or burden, into something a process can answer over time rather than a judgment that must be made in advance.
On security, the framing deserves one qualification that strengthens rather than weakens the case. Al Shabaab already operates across the borders in question, and it has struck in Nairobi and Kampala without Somalia being a member of anything. Membership does not create that exposure; what it changes is whether cooperation against it is conducted through a common framework or bilaterally and ad hoc. Formal accession brings joint border management, intelligence sharing, coordinated financial measures and mutual legal assistance within a single structure, and there is a reasonable argument that this improves rather than worsens the regional position. The genuine risk lies elsewhere, in free movement provisions introduced before border and identification systems can support them, and the remedy is transitional arrangements of the kind used in every comparable enlargement.
Two elements would complete the picture. The article records at length what the region gains from Somalia’s coastline and what it fears from Somalia’s insurgency, and says less about what Somalia itself requires, which is investment in ports, fisheries and livestock export, resolution of the maritime boundary questions in the region, and support for federal state relations that remain the central unresolved question of Somali governance. And the humanitarian dimension the article opens with deserves to be carried through: a bloc admitting a member in the midst of a food security emergency has an obligation that precedes any question of trade or security, and regional grain reserves, coordinated response mechanisms and reduced dependence on distant suppliers are matters on which the Community could act now, whatever it decides about membership.
Finally, the article’s underlying counsel, that an organisation should complete what it has begun before undertaking more, is sound and applies beyond this case. It carries a corollary worth stating. Enlargement is frequently pursued because it is visible and consolidation is not, and a Community whose members close borders against one another while admitting new ones has chosen the appearance of progress over its substance. The remedy is not to stop enlarging but to make the internal obligations enforceable, which returns to the point that runs through this author’s work: institutions that cannot bind their own members cannot integrate anyone.
* Added by the WMO Editorial Team
REFERENCES
[Bibliography and footnotes 1 to 37 as in the original manuscript]Supplementary references added by the WMO Editorial Team
Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, 1999, Articles 3 and 124.
Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market, 2009.
Decision of the 23rd Ordinary Summit of the EAC Heads of State admitting the Federal Republic of Somalia, Arusha, 24 November 2023.
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 733 (1992) on the arms embargo, 2093 (2013) on its partial lifting, and resolutions establishing AMISOM and its successor ATMIS.
Integrated Food Security Phase Classification and FEWS NET, Somalia food security analyses.
Menkhaus, K. (2018). Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Somalia Case Study. Stabilisation Unit, London.
Copenhagen criteria for accession to the European Union, European Council, 1993, and the accession negotiation framework.
International Crisis Group, Africa reports on Somalia and the Horn of Africa, Brussels and Nairobi.
