A critical need for sustainable peace and security for an effective East African Community integration

How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/

EDITORIAL NOTE *

The author of this article works at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; the views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the official position, past, present or future, of the United Nations or of UNHCR. The assessment of the parties to the tensions described, and the attribution of responsibility for them, likewise reflect the author’s own perspective; this journal’s editorial position is neutral as between the states concerned.

ABSTRACT *

This article examines why the East African Community has not progressed beyond the first two of its four stages of integration, and locates the answer in the persistence of intrastate and interstate conflict among its members. After tracing the Community’s establishment, its achievements in the customs union and common market, and the limitations of the East African Court of Justice, the author documents a series of bilateral ruptures, including border closures between Rwanda and Uganda and between Rwanda and Burundi, trade restrictions among Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, and the expulsion of migrants from Tanzania in 2013 that gave rise to litigation before the Court. Internal conflicts in the Great Lakes region, Somalia, South Sudan and eastern Congo are then assessed for their regional effects, together with the accession of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The article closes with proposals: addressing root causes rather than symptoms, sustained diplomatic contact, the use of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, an empowered regional standby force, and selective adaptation of the European experience of common security policy.

KEYWORDS

Regional integration, conflict resolution, economic development, sustainable development, common market, customs union, common currency, sustainable peace and security, terrorism, genocide, collective defense.

INTRODUCTION

The East African Community (EAC) started the regional integration process with the customs union and common market, which are temporary phases of the course of regional development to a political federation as its ultimate goal, which makes it the only regional economic bloc whose Treaty provides for the establishment of a political federation. However, the basis of stages of integration has experienced enormous challenges, including intrastate and interstate conflicts, that have reduced the course of the realization of this last goal. Consequently, within the EAC, progress has been slower than initially planned. Concerning peace and security, the EAC was expected to have an extensive and positive impact on peace and security among the member states. This impact of regional integration on security includes encouraging conflict resolution and working together towards a peaceful regional block, despite the challenges of limited resources and lack of motivation[1]. On the contrary, EAC has recorded dramatic conflict crises for so long while poverty in its member states continues to deepen. In that regard, I argue that there is a critical need for sustainable peace and security to make the EAC’s period-long dream of regional integration a reality.

Typically, when joining regional groupings, member states hope to address common challenges related to the improvement of economic policy, poverty reduction, and managing the process of liberalization in a collective and coordinated manner. The critical concern I will address in this study is the persisting intrastate and inter-state conflicts in the East African Community member states, their impact on effective regional integration, and a proposal of collective mechanisms for redress. In this critical analysis, I will briefly overview the EAC integration process, highlighting its significant achievements and roadblocks in the first section. In this trend of roadblocks, I will critically analyze peace and security issues and their impact on EAC integration in the second section. More importantly, I will picture intra-state and inter-state conflicts and their effects on the concerned state and region.

In the last section, I will propose sustainable peace and security mechanisms for effective EAC integration. No tool can better address security, political crisis, violence, human rights abuse, and political tensions within the EAC than understanding and addressing the root causes of conflicts. Other mechanisms consist of promoting consistent diplomatic talks between member states, empowering traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, strengthening the security standby force in the region, and promoting unity and trust between the EAC member states.

MAIN CORPUS

Panorama of the establishment of the East African Community

Typically, states establish regional and international organizations to protect and promote their interests. Most such interests are shared; hence, interest convergence is central to founding and maintaining regional organizations as avenues for interstate cooperation. For EAC, the main goal was to create a common market, customs union, Monetary Union, and political federation. It is deplorable that member states have not agreed on Monetary Union and political federation while the assigned timeline passed; these two aspects remain the EAC’s ultimate vision. In peace and security matters, under chapter 23, partner states agreed to cooperate in various political and security affairs by establishing common foreign and security policies. They also committed to identifying and addressing common-interest issues, coordinated responses to regional security issues, peaceful resolution of intra-state conflicts, coordinating defense policies, consultations on peace and security of partner states, and undertaking defense cooperation practices, such as joint exercises[2].

The East African Community (EAC) was established in 1967 as a Customs Union between Kenya and Uganda but collapsed in 1977 due to political disparities. Tanganyika (Tanzania) joined in 1927, Rwanda and Burundi in 2009, South Sudan in 2016, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo joined in April 2022. Approval for Somalia’s membership has been pending since its application in 2012. This bloc is founded on four main pillars: a Customs Union, Common Market, Monetary Union, and a Political Federation. The EAC’s main aim in this integration process is to make the East African economic and political bloc robust and sustainable[3].

This panorama of establishment recorded other vital events, such as the Customs Union between Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika established in 1917. Other subsequent protocols include the East African Currency Board, the Postal Union, and the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa. In that channel of events, the East African Governors’ Conference, the East African Income Tax Board, and the Joint Economic Council were established between 1905 and 1940. The East African Airways Corporation was incorporated in 1946, and the East African Common Services Organization (EACSO) was developed in 1961, which replaced the East African High Commission[4].

Stages of integration versus failed pillars of integration

Customs Unions, Common Markets, and political federations have been the ideal of the EAC. Currently, the EAC is already a customs union and a common market. Supposedly, it is forming a Monetary Union and, optimistically, a future political federation[5]. As I will explore in the sections below, it is regrettable that trade conflicts, insecurity, and political tensions in the region have caused border closures, blocking movements of people, goods, services, and use of national airspace to commercial flights from partner states. As a result, the EAC is undermining the integration process to the extent that its entire project risks collapsing[6].

The customs union, which implies a free trade area by eliminating duty on goods and services, was the first integration step achieved by the EAC in January 2010, which became fully functioning in January 2010. In the second phase, a common market came into force in 2010. The expected market implies the free movement of goods and services, persons, labor, and capital in the Community. The two and third ideal goals are a Monetary Union and a confederation whose protocol was adopted in November 2013 with an expectation to be fully operational in 2023[7]. By the time of writing this paper, these two last stages were still distant dreams.

This failure is due to repetitive border closures between EAC member states. For example, the Gatuna and Kagitumba borders between Rwanda and Uganda and Akanyaru border between Rwanda and Burundi have been closed since February 28, 2019, due to political hostilities between the two countries[8]. Conversely, Tanzania has blocked products manufactured in Uganda, such as timber, milk, sugar, and maize. At the same time, Tanzania banned Kenya Airways from flying to Tanzania in retaliation to Kenya’s blockage of Tanzanian trucks moving to Kenya. The main reason was the COVID-19 pandemic[9]. I observe that these practices by EAC member states are enough to prove the EAC’s failure or unwillingness to implement its Treaty. Therefore, I can conclude that the EAC’s defeat in handling the COVID-19 crisis as a global problem is the most indicative of the dysfunction in the region’s integration process.

The particular role of the East African Court of Justice

In regional integrations’ courts of justice like the Court of Justice of the European Union, community law is an autonomous legal order in which partner states have accepted to cede part of their sovereignty to the Community. In other words, unlike international law, community law has precedence over the municipal law of the partner states, notwithstanding their constitutional philosophies[10]. This principle is different in EAC member states because Article 95 of the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 2003, revised in 2015, places treaties and international agreements that Rwanda ratified in the third place of the hierarchy of legal order. That is after the constitution and the organic laws[11].

The case of the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) is different because it lacks execution machinery of its own and relies on the procedure obtained in the country where the Court decree or order is to be executed. In other words, the execution of the Court’s decision will be governed by the rules of civil procedure in the partner state in which the execution is to take place[12].

Undoubtedly, the more East Africa gets integrated, the more disputes of a transboundary nature are likely to happen. In that regard, the EACJ was expected to constitute a unique opportunity for the EAC integration by being the principal judicial organ of the Community, accessible, independent, and rendering expeditious justice[13]. Furthermore, the EACJ rules of procedures require the partner states to work together to address the region’s root causes of conflict and deprivation.

Areas of success in the common market and customs union

The EAC has made some achievements, including interstate road transport through reduced documentation for crews and vehicles at border crossings. This transport facilitation has made transportation more accessible and encouraged traders from member states, contributing to economic ties and strengthening the region’s financial position. Additionally, it had harmonized immigration regulations, such as introducing an EAC passport, free visas for immigrants within the Community, and Customs Union through one border-posts system[14].

Tourism is one sector where the EAC has been strategic in its harmonization endeavors. The EAC partner states signed necessary protocols to help promote East Africa as a single tourist destination, attract more tourists and increase the tourism industry’s contribution to the East African economy. A single East African Tourist Visa for Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda EAC countries has been available since 2014[15].

Areas of failure in the implementation of the Treaty

Only the Customs Union and common market succeeded among the four pillars constituting the EAC treaty, though they still need improvement. Peace and security are essential pillars of the EAC treaty, and political integration is still a distant dream. In this present paper, I emphasize the aspect of peace and security. Additionally, I can observe that the principle of full and effective regional integration exists only on paper and is not in the organization’s actual practices. This failure of full and effective integration has been the cause of many other failed projects, including rerouting major regional infrastructure, railways, and oil exploitation in South Sudan. It pushes me to conclude that these failures reveal serious difficulties in cooperation among the member states and their commitment to previous integration initiatives[16].

Pending monetary union and political integration

The Customs Union was established in 2005, and the Common Market in 2010[17], while Monetary Union, expected to be done in ten years, and Political Federation are still unfinished, despite long talks and negotiations. The Protocol on Monetary Union was adopted under the EAC Treaty and signed in 2013. The period of ten years was a progressive opportunity for the EAC partners to converge their currencies into a single regional currency[18]. From this plan, I see that the Political Federation is the final goal of the integration process in this region. Regrettably, these two pillars constituting the final integration phases are still a distant dream.

The political federation would allow them to conduct a standard foreign and security policy and contribute to more effective implementation of the previous stages of cooperation. In that sense, political collaboration would improve the region’s stability and strengthen its position, especially in negotiations with other countries outside the bloc[19].

In addition to the failure of the Monetary Union and political federation, I lament the lack of specific institutions in member states whose primary responsibilities would be implementing the protocols in collaboration with all stakeholders, governmental institutions, the private sector, and civil society. Furthermore, difficulties related to the lack of capacity and resources to implement the protocols need particular attention[20]. From this discussion above, I can infer that EAC failed to implement its primary goals, revealing significant delays in solving major regional problems. The delays in implementing the protocols that failed some EAC goals show the organization’s weakness, especially the concerned member states’ lack of engagement and commitment[21].

Failure to safeguard peace and security in the region

Typically, regional integration is a standard policy or project aimed at increasing links and economic, political, and social transactions, strengthening integration processes, intensifying intergovernmental cooperation, and creating regional identity among the Community. On the contrary, as the EAC’s size expanded, the conflicts and insecurity areas also grew. Shockingly, EAC member states have been escalating political tensions that existed between themselves into bitter disputes. For example, free trade has not happened as stipulated in the protocols because there have been conflicting situations between member states leading to the closure of the borders[22].

I can optimistically envision that accession to the EAC by South Sudan and DRC should have given them an opportunity for economic and security stabilization. Simultaneously, the rest of the member states should increase their profits related to the oil industry in South Sudan and Uganda, natural resources, and the significant population in DRC. I agree with Gibb that there has been no substantial change since its accession by DRC, apart from becoming another complex security and political baggage. South Sudan, which became a full member of the EAC in September 2016, is yet to add value[23]. I understand that when joining the Community, DRC committed itself theoretically to be part of the Community and entering the various areas of cooperation in all the sectors, programs, and activities that promote the four pillars of regional integration, namely, the Customs Union, Common Market Protocol, Monetary Union, and the Political Federation.

Regrettably, there are various peace and security opportunities that EAC did not maximize adequately, thus causing persisting security issues in the region. Besides exploiting local security and defense opportunities, EAC relied much on overdependence on foreign security support. For example, The Africa Peace Facility (APF), which works as a conflict management tool instead of a preventive tool, overemphasizes conflict management and relies too much on Africa’s major donors, especially the EU, to fund the African Standby Force[24]. APF was established in April 2004 to strengthen peace and security through support for African peacekeeping operations. Its leading principles of partnership are African ownership, solidarity between AU member states to enable cooperation with regional sub-organizations in Africa, and creating conditions for development[25]. Regrettably, it has not contributed to promoting peace and security in the EAC because of many decades of struggles within this region.

Major causes of conflicts in the EAC region

Beforehand, I must recall that East Africa Community lacks an integrated conflict prevention, management, and mitigation framework[26], which I see as a security weakness for the East African region and a significant threat to the dream of effective regional integration. Peace, security, stability, and good governance are prerequisites to achieving sustainable economic development in any regional integration. Nevertheless, low-income states, with weak control combined with ethnic disputes, have been significant characteristics of the EAC member states. In that same trend, a practical peace and security safeguard process must consider the conflicts’ root causes.

Conflicts in the EAC region, particularly in the Great Lakes, have story-long causes and consequences. They result from identity division, structural violence, exploitation, the inability of the governments to manage multi-ethnic societies by guaranteeing equitable access to natural resources, lack of the rule of law, and political exclusion. Worse than that, conflicts in this region have always been complex because, though they seem intrastate initially, they have often extended to threaten the entire region[27].

Additionally, the partner states’ sovereignty has been another cause of political tension between member states. When establishing the EAC, member states reserved some sovereignty to member states until they became a federation. Unquestionably, reserved sovereignty is a crucial hindrance to the progress of the EAC because partner states have more sovereignty than the Community. Worse than that, the Community does not govern many vital matters; the member states govern them. This confusion causes breaches of the EAC Treaty and tensions between the partner states.

For example, in the case East African Law Society versus Secretary General of the EAC, the Court held that the EAC breached its duties to effectively investigate and redress possible violations of the principles in the EAC Treaty that arose from the allegedly illegal expulsion of Rwandan and Burundian immigrants from Tanzania in 2013[28]. In other words, the EAC failed to take remedial actions to ensure that expulsions conformed to regional legal standards and principles. This situation caused political tension between Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi.

In that case, the EAC argued that it had fulfilled its duties and that the states involved were responsible for remedying the situation, which they failed to do. Under articles 29, 71(1)(d), and 71(1)(l) of the EAC Treaty, it is the EAC Secretary General’s duty to both investigate possible violations of the EAC Treaty and to subsequently submit the findings of that investigation to the EAC Council of Ministers, the governing organ of the EAC[29]. Therefore, it was the responsibility of the Secretary-General to investigate the situation vigilantly, notify the Member State involved of its breach of the EAC Treaty, and take subsequent action following the investigation.

The status of inter-state and intra-state security issues

For decades, the Great Lakes Region states have been among the most affected by vicious and armed conflicts. Violent conflicts in the Great Lakes Region, Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC have caused massive damage to property and loss of lives. Under the memorandum of understanding, the EAC partner states committed to take measures to address the issues of defense, peace, and security. These measures include ensuring the maintenance of peace and stability in the region, avoiding and preventing conflict within the region, observance of good neighborliness, and peaceful resolution of disputes. In doing so, they made it a community vision to address the root causes of conflicts through observance of good governance, respect for human rights, and cooperation in defense matters, including preparedness for common defense and peacekeeping, conflict resolution, and disaster management[30].

The impact of inter-state political tensions on EAC operations

Beforehand, I must stress that the EAC cannot claim to achieve its mission of having a prosperous, competitive, secure, and politically united East Africa. Its member states do not adopt a structured security arrangement that can create the right environment for integration initiatives and protect the gains the Community has already attained. Unquestionably, political, ethnic, and other sources of civil conflicts, intra-state and inter-state conflicts are significant challenges to regional integration and economic development[31]. Below, I have demonstrated how at least each EAC member state entered into political tension with another member state.

Political tensions between Rwanda and Uganda

The Rwandan-Ugandan political tension broke a period-long friendship for countries with the same colonial history (both were colonized by Germany before Rwanda was transferred under the Belgian trusteeship after the German defeat). Their recent political tensions are based on accusations and counter-accusations between both countries to support enemies of either country, specifically Uganda and other countries providing training and army support to the Rwandan opposition groups[32]. On another side, Uganda charged Rwanda for making the Rwandan elements enter the territory and killing civilians. Consequently, these accusations and counter-accusations escalated into conflicts that caused border closure. This action breached the EAC Treaty, especially on the security aspect and the free movement of goods and persons.

On the good side, these two countries made tremendous efforts to settle the matter through mediation facilitated by their friend presidents, namely Joao Lourenco of Angola, Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo-Brazza, and Felix Tshisekedi of DRC[33]. After these failed mediative efforts, direct, amicable, and friendly talks between officials of these two countries successfully resumed diplomatic and business relations. Unquestionably, the economic activities of these two countries rely on cross-border commerce as an essential aspect of the EAC common market was negatively affected.

Tanzania versus Rwanda and Burundi

Tanzanian President’s decisions to expulse what Tanzania considered “illegal immigrants” and “criminals” caused diplomatic tension with the Rwandan government over the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It was by the Tanzanian presidential order issued on July 25, 2013, to expulse some 35,000 irregular migrants from Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda to leave Tanzania by August 11, 2013. The main reasons that Tanzania advanced to justify expulsion include the complaints from villagers over acts of armed robbery, bus attacks, and kidnaps attributed to illegal immigrants in the area. The basis of the political tension was that Tanzania expulsed immigrants, fearing that Rwanda might try to destabilize it in retaliation for its decision to send troops to DRC as part of a new UN force seeking to disarm and neutralize the M23 rebel group[34].

Political tension between Rwanda and Burundi

Burundi has its particular period-long political and civil crises and extreme poverty. Since its accession to the EAC, Burundi continues to struggle with poverty, insecurity, and poor governance, unresolved tensions that characterize the pre and post-elections period, and issues of refugees who work to come back to Burundi, to name a few. On another side, political tensions with Rwanda intensified in 2019, causing much worry about the stability of the already fragile Great Lakes Region. However, the attempts to restore relations by the presidents of both countries in 2020 have been fruitful since they agreed to cooperate on border security issues[35].

From these points above, I realize that the Burundian political crisis and tension with Rwanda are sensitive to intra-regional trade within the EAC, especially with repetitive border closures between Rwanda and Burundi and killings of civilians who cross the borders[36]. All EAC member states should pay particular attention to the dynamics of conflict in the Great Lakes Region to help new joiners fully integrate into the EAC, especially as the region has already shown its vulnerability to climate change.

The status of intra-state conflicts and their impact on the region

These conflicts in the EAC region caused loss of human lives, increased numbers of displaced persons, and psycho-social and economic negative impacts on surviving civilians, including increased hatred. The adverse effects of peace and security threats on EAC integration are enormous. It includes extreme human rights abuses, loss of trust among the member states, total failure of regional integration, negative public visibility, and an impediment to the implementation of the EAC treaty. The repetitive border closures have hampered inter-state trade and tourist activities and blocked the free movement of goods and people[37].

Additionally, they destroyed public and private properties leading to an enormous burden on the national economy. The intrastate conflicts had a negative regional impact, affecting the EAC region. While I cannot make a detailed description of each country’s conflict history, I will briefly present the status of the conflicts in these countries and their negative impact on socio-economic development and regional integration in general.

The decades-long conflicts in the Great Lakes region

The Burundian security crises of 2013 and 2015 emanated from a disagreement on election results and respect for the Arusha Agreement. These revolts and conflicts caused the loss of many people’s lives, and others have been displaced. The same happened with the Genocide committed against the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994. During this Genocide, more than 800,000 people were killed in less than 100 days, causing many others to be displaced. The eastern part of the DRC did not escape this history of conflict and insecurity because, beginning in 1996, violent conflicts involving internal and external armed groups led to the death of more than 6,000,000 persons and forced many more to be displaced[38]. Unsurprisingly, these conflicts result from social identities, such as ethnic polarisation, the politicization of ethnicity, inappropriate representation, too long leadership and domination, insufficient political systems, democratic trends against political systems, inadequate handling of risky changes, and proliferation of conflict into other countries[39].

The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s accession: an economic opportunity or an insecurity extension?

The answer to this question is twofold because DRC’s accession to the EAC benefits the DRC itself and expands the market EAC size. Secondly, it extended the security burden to the region because these conflicts have existed for so long in this country. When joining the EAC, the DRC expected to benefit from customs taxes exemption at any of the region’s border points. The main reason is that most of the DRC’s key markets, such as Bukavu and Goma, are geographically closer to the Kenyan port of Mombasa than the Atlantic Ocean. Therefore, open borders via the EAC could reduce shipping and receiving commerce time. Undoubtedly, this is a massive benefit to a country that needs assistance with infrastructure projects[40].

On the dark side, the DRC’s membership in the EAC brings another set of challenges, including insecurity and acts of violence in the Eastern region of DRC by M23[41]. Therefore, the EAC must double its efforts to integrate DRC and promote peace between its member states to maintain bloc unity. Though member states of the bloc agreed to deploy a regional security force led by Kenya to the Eastern DRC, their productivity is still questionable. Above all, I realize that after two years of DRC’s accession to the EAC, there has not been any significant change in cooperation between DRC and other EAC member states; the tension between DRC and Rwanda increased from allegations of Rwandan support to M23[42]. Therefore, I see new accessions have worsened the security issues instead of being an opportunity for the EAC to focus on the full implementation of the EAC treaty, especially the monetary Union, ensure the performance of the EAC Common Market Protocol, attain an EAC Single Currency, and strengthen regional peace, security, and governance.

The problem of decades-long insecurity and terrorism in Somalia

Somalia presents a particular characteristic; this country has been a victim of social, economic, political, and security problems for so long. Insecurity and terrorism are significant problems that Somalia adds to the EAC’s list of issues[43]. Somalia has been facing and is still facing various social, economic, and political issues. Somalia has been a victim of a drought threatening to cause famine in different areas for so long. Many Somali people have been victims of acute food insecurity and need humanitarian assistance. Additionally, the lack of funds to address the problems of drought, climate change, malnutrition, and famine, is a critical concern[44].

Worse, insecurity resulting from Al-Shabab terrorism cannot allow the government to focus on other socio-economic aspects. Al-Shabab has remained a severe threat to the government and its institutions. Without being cynical, I can realize that the delayed admission of Somalia into the EAC might have resulted from these decades-long problems, but most importantly, its insecurity issue, while the regional standby security forces failed to help the country restore its security[45].

Pre and post-election insecurity in Kenya and Uganda and genocide in South Sudan

Chaotic reactions by citizens in opposition parties characterized the eve of the elections in Kenya. The political crisis led to chaotic economic situations, including the closure of factories, accumulation of delays in supplies, cancellation after cancellation of the tourists’ travel, and even the collapse of the stock market. Unquestionably, these crises caused the country’s impoverishment and the entire region because Kenya is the gateway for supplies to many landlocked countries in East and Central Africa[46]. In other words, this Kenyan political crisis tarnished the country’s image and potentially had short-term and long-term economic consequences for the country and its neighbors.

The conflicting situation in South Sudan has a different story of being repetitive and implying civil war and Genocide. Typically, the first conflict peaked in the 1960s and ended in 1972, but the second one, which began in 1983, lasted for twenty-two years[47]. The AU and the UN have documented part of the violence in South Sudan, labeled it as ethnic cleansing, and have been reluctant to declare it a Genocide. In other words, the international community did not escalate its rhetoric to describe the violence in South Sudan as Genocide[48].

South Sudan, Africa’s youngest country, is still struggling to cope with an economic crisis caused in part by a recent civil war that has affected oil production, a significant income stream for the government of South Sudan, which seceded from Sudan on July 9, 2011. Regrettably, the country has been at risk of expulsion from the EAC because it has been defaulting over membership dues of ten million US dollars after its accession[49].

Addressing the root causes of conflict

The security issues and conflicts in the EAC region have particular features linked with the countries’ pre-colonial racial and social class divisions and the colonial divisionism legacy that prolonged in post-colonial periods. Briefly, these conflicts are mainly connected to the nature and history of the concerned country, and thus, there is a need for purely local mechanisms to deal with them and guarantee peace and security in the region. Undoubtedly, any successful resolution of these conflicts must address their root causes, involve collective efforts and collaboration between the member states, and focus on their vision in the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy, and Development in the Great Lakes Region[50].

One among many possibilities to address the issues of conflicts and profound insecurity that continues to ravage the region is to deal with their root causes because they escalate into complex forms. In other words, there is no single formula to deal with a particular conflict because an apparent conflict has many other connected ones and is story-long for each case. Though it is not easy to dress an exhaustive list of causes of these conflicts, the main reasons for recurring conflicts in EAC member states include economic stagnation and poverty aggravation, mistrust, and suspicion between governments, massive violations of human rights, and other policies of exclusion and marginalization, and gender inequality. Additionally, the list of possible causes includes the use of violence for conquering and conserving power, impunity of crimes of Genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons, a proliferation of armed groups, organized crime, and illegal exploitation of natural resources[51].

Focusing on unity and a democratic approach

More specifically, they should strengthen democratic institutions to emphasize development and sustainable democracy, establish an effective early warning security mechanism, and support domestic programs and activities to promote peace, security, and respect for human rights[52]. These include academic programs, community services, training, and seminars. They should also strengthen inclusive and constructive internal dialogue because an internal exchange facilitates the development of an exit strategy. Finally, they should build greater uniformity of peace and security policy.

Considering the complexity of these conflicts, diplomatic efforts and other conflict resolution attempts failed. These include negotiation, mediation, or coercive diplomacy. As a solution, involving local people and using traditional African experiences can be resourceful for conflict resolutions to achieve the best solutions[53].

For example, the Rwandan traditional Gacaca Courts played an unprecedented role in trying the suspects of Genocide committed against Tutsi in 1994, eradicating the culture of impunity and contributing to unity and reconciliation[54]. Furthermore, all EAC member states should effectively combat this problem of insecurity by cooperation and putting their resources together rather than individual state actions.

Strengthening the diplomatic approach within the region

When political violence in Burundi steadily escalated during 2015 in response to the President’s third term, the African Union mandated the EAC to address that conflict. The Burundian political crisis was the first test of the organization’s ability to ensure its peace and security mandate. I was surprised that internal divisions between EAC member states prevented the organization from mediation in a concerted and determined way, contributing to the mandate’s failure[55].

Member states appear to want to use the EAC framework to keep control of any action to be taken in the region and prevent countries outside the region from interfering, but peace and security evolvement have not been the EAC’s mandate[56].

Maximizing security and collective defense opportunities

As I introduced earlier, peace and security are critical pillars of the EAC Treaty. Even with new accessions, maintaining peace and security is a theoretical commitment among the EAC member states. In the EAC region, there are three most important regional security organizations to note, namely, the East African Community (EAC), the East African Standby Forces (EASF) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)[57]. Unsurprisingly, even these security organizations are subject to many critiques due to the different challenges they encounter.

First, in the Somali case, many security standby forces failed to restore security in Somalia. These include the African Union (AU) itself, African Standby Force (ASF), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Eastern African Standby Force Secretariat (EASFSEC)[58]. In restoring peace in Somalia, Sudan and Uganda were identified as the countries that would deploy troops under the IGAD Peace Mission in Somalia (IGASOM). The other IGAD countries were to assist in providing logistics, equipment, emergency assistance, and training for the Somalia Army and Police[59].

Beforehand, I must signal that EASF relies on funds from member and non-member states. Member states fund the headquarters. Exercises, educational programs, and real-life deployments are funded through friends of EASF; several states are willing to fund and support EASF. It is a severe impediment to the functioning of a standby security force. For the EAC, the main challenge is that it might prove difficult for EAC to act on military security matters within member states[60].

On another side, IGAD missions depend on military capacities from AU nations that are not members of IGAD. According to UN norms, states that border a country in conflict are ineligible to deploy troops into that country[61]. Considering these discussions and challenges above, I will not be cynical to conclude that peace and security have deteriorated since the establishment of the EAC. More specifically, this region does not have a collective defense system to help reinforce security measures.

Empowering the security standby forces

As I emphasized above, the existing security organizations have proven ineffective in ensuring peace and security due to numerous organizational, financial, and technical challenges. For example, the first deployment of the standby force declared full operational capability was a deployment of the East African Standby Forces (EASF) in Burundi in response to the political crisis caused by the President’s third term in 2015. However, it was eventually rejected at the AU level. Even EASF is subject to many critiques. The organization lacks strategic airlift capability and capacity to provision troops, funding issues, and adequate communications equipment that could enable command and control[62].

In that regard, I understand that this organization should have the decision-making power, financial capacity, and autonomous structure to be effective. Nevertheless, contributing countries where these forces are drawn decide whether troops can be deployed[63].

Additionally, several factors contribute to the spread of conflicts within the region. These include weak state institutional capacity in some states that constrain frontier security cooperation, the presence of armed and region-destabilizing hostile forces, mutual suspicions and low levels of trust among states, the multiplicity of structures, and externally driven initiatives[64]. These factors require strengthening the standby force to ensure regional peace and security. In the discussions above, I highlighted the challenges facing the EAC member states in ensuring peace and security. From these descriptions above, I can infer that creating collective defense forces would be a starting point, but having a trained national army and police force and ensuring financial capabilities is a requirement.

Improving the role of the East African Court of Justice in inter-state disputes

The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) plays the crucial role of interpreting the Treaty and other Community laws and ensuring respect for the founding principles of the Community. In that process, the Court tries to improve working relations with Partner States. In its judicial works, the Court hears cases on the rule of law violations. It is one of the fundamental and operational principles of the East African Community Treaty[65]. However, EACJ does not deal with substantive matters of the case but with rules of law. It means that it oversees whether the action followed the rules and procedures provided by the Treaty and domestic laws, while the substantive matters remain under the jurisdiction of domestic courts. Additionally, the EACJ does not have human rights violations jurisdiction. It pushes me to question the real work of this Court in guaranteeing justice to people in the absence of human rights jurisdiction.

Learning from the European Community model on peace and security

The EU emphasized the development of competence in justice, home affairs, the rule of law, and security by establishing and strengthening cooperation of police forces, cooperation between prosecutors, and border control[66]. Since the creation of the European Community until its enlargement to the European Union (EU), security and defense concerns have been of primary importance. In that respect, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) became the second pillar of the EU in the Maastricht Treaty to coordinate EU member states’ foreign policies and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was developed as part of the CFSP[67].

Therefore, the common security and defense policies constitute one of the EU’s intergovernmental pillars, implying that member states are responsible for decision-making and policy output. However, the dark side is that while committed to the purposes of the Union, they follow their national agenda[68]. I understand that the role and influence of the EU in peace and security aimed to strengthen the security and defense capacity (institutional, material, human and operational, and financial), devote resources to security and defense purposes, mainly driven by member states’ priorities, and accept to play an internal and external role as a leading actor in peace and security.

SUMMARY *

The article’s central proposition inverts the assumption on which regional integration projects are ordinarily built. Economic interdependence is expected to generate the political trust from which deeper union follows; the East African record examined here suggests the sequence runs the other way, since a customs union and a common market have not prevented members from closing borders against one another, and the two remaining pillars have stalled not for technical reasons but because monetary and political union require a degree of mutual confidence that repeated bilateral ruptures have consumed. The author’s supporting observation concerns capacity: the Community possesses no integrated framework for conflict prevention, its Court cannot enforce its own judgments, and its standby force has never deployed on its own authority, which means that when disputes arise between members the organisation has nothing to apply to them.

CONCLUSION

The East African Community started with good intentions of forming a customs union, a common market, and a political confederation. However, the reality of the situation is far from the imagined utopia. In this paper, I have demonstrated how effective regional integration in the East African Community is still a distant dream. In this paper, I discussed the negative impact of conflicts within the East African Community (EAC) member states, which undoubtedly affected the ordinary course of economic interdependence, expansion of the free market, and overall development of regional integration as well as its external relations with non-member bordering states. The spread of conflicts in the EAC region from one country to another makes the conflicts complex. Equally, I have proposed a few solutions that can guide the EAC to return to the regular track of regional integration.

Unquestionably, the EU has been a regional integration model for many regional integrations across the globe. Therefore, the EAC should learn policies and strategies for peace and security from the EU but implement them according to the context and realities of the EAC region. In the recent political tensions and conflicts discussed earlier, the EAC member states have been trying to make efforts to create sustainable peace and stability in the region, though their legal tools and competence to deal with existing and possible problems do not lead to the expected results. Efforts were vainly made to resolve these conflicts. The EAC member states should address the root causes of the disputes to reach a sustainable solution instead of the consequences of the conflicts.

Given the EAC’s people-centredness, it is helpful to promote public awareness of emerging issues and galvanize public support instead of relying on the eccentric judgment of a few officials that have proven to be defeating. They must involve and empower local citizens and strengthen amicable and traditional conflict resolution approaches to do so. Furthermore, the regional integration process cannot be separated from internal and external security situations. Therefore, regional integration and development cannot be fully implemented without eradicating all sources of intrastate and interstate conflicts. In that regard, Rwanda has been resourceful in the United Nations and African Union peacekeeping missions in Haiti and South Sudan and currently doing a great job in combatting terrorism in Mozambique. Thus, a sustainable peace and security solution in the EAC region should involve Rwanda, which was excluded from the EAC regional force.

Moreover, the EAC integration should be a reconciliation opportunity between partner states. EAC partner state leaders should grab the chance of summits and other official and unofficial gatherings to resolve any matter that might hamper the EAC integration process, especially the peaceful neighborhood. However, this cannot happen unless all EAC member states join efforts to fight the Genocide and Genocide ideology, neutralize, disarm, arrest, and transfer to relevant local and international tribunals the perpetrators of Genocide, including the forces that committed Genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994.

Finally, the EAC member states should work excessively towards peace and security in the region by preventing conflicts. They should also adopt common strategies for combating criminal activities, drug trafficking limitation, information exchange facilitation between member states for criminal intelligence, joint operations and patrols, and border and interstate security communication facilities.

POTENTIAL SOLUTION *

The article identifies the right problem and its remedy lies closer to hand than the proposals suggest. What the Community lacks is not additional instruments but the willingness to use those it has, and the difference matters because building new machinery is slow while activating existing machinery is not.

The Court is the clearest instance. The article notes correctly that its judgments depend on national execution and that it has no human rights jurisdiction, yet it also has something unusual: a member state may bring another before it without that state’s consent, and there is no requirement to exhaust domestic remedies. Every border closure described here was a prima facie breach of the Common Market Protocol, and none was litigated. The reason is political rather than legal, since states are reluctant to sue neighbours, but the consequence is that a Treaty obligation with a functioning forum operates as if it had neither. Reforms worth pursuing are correspondingly modest: extending jurisdiction to human rights matters, which the Treaty already envisages, and establishing an enforcement mechanism so that non compliance carries a defined consequence.

The deeper structural point concerns what the Community is asked to do when its own members quarrel. A body composed of the parties cannot mediate between them, which is why the Burundi mandate failed and why the Rwanda and Uganda tensions were addressed by presidents from outside the bloc. Rather than treating this as a deficiency to be corrected, the Community could institutionalise it: a standing panel of eminent persons from outside the region, or a permanent conciliation mechanism activated automatically when a member closes a border or restricts trade against another, would supply the neutrality the Secretariat structurally cannot. What defeats such disputes is not the absence of goodwill but the absence of any procedure that operates without both parties agreeing to it.

The comparison with the European experience is apt and its lesson is often misread. The European Coal and Steel Community was not built on trust between France and Germany; it was designed to make a particular kind of conflict materially impossible by placing the means of waging it under joint authority. The transferable principle is functional interdependence in specific sectors rather than declarations of common purpose, and its East African equivalents are identifiable: joint management of shared water resources, integrated power pools, cooperative border administration and joint customs revenue. Each creates a cost to rupture that a communiqué does not.

Two elements of the article’s own proposals deserve development. Traditional mechanisms are rightly commended, and their transposition requires care: Gacaca operated within a single society under state authority, and adapting community based approaches to disputes between states means asking what functional equivalent exists at that level, which is likely to be elders, religious authorities and cross border communities rather than a tribunal. And the article’s closing recommendations touch matters on which the parties themselves disagree, including the composition of the regional force and the characterisation of armed groups. Those are precisely the questions a neutral mechanism exists to determine, which is an argument for building one rather than for settling them in advance.

Finally, the article’s people centred observation deserves more weight than it receives. Cross border traders, transporters and communities bear the cost of every closure and have no voice in any of the decisions described here. Their inclusion is not merely equitable; it creates a domestic constituency for integration that presently exists only among officials, and it is the element most conspicuously missing from a project that has now been managed from the top for more than two decades.

* Added by the WMO Editorial Team

REFERENCES

Supplementary references added by the WMO Editorial Team

Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, 1999, Articles 5, 6, 7, 23 to 47, 71 and 123 to 125.

Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market, 2009, and the Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Monetary Union, 2013.

East African Court of Justice, Attorney General of Rwanda v Plaxeda Rugumba, Appeal No. 1 of 2012, and East African Law Society v Secretary General of the EAC, 2016.

Protocol on Peace and Security, East African Community, 2013.

Treaty on European Union (Maastricht), 1992, and the Treaty of Lisbon, 2007, provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Haas, E. B. (1958). The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950 to 1957. Stanford University Press, Stanford.

Söderbaum, F. (2016). Rethinking Regionalism. Palgrave Macmillan, London.

International Crisis Group, Africa reports on the Great Lakes region and on the East African Community, Brussels and Nairobi.