Race and ethnicity have long been at the heart of international conflicts; from our ancient ancestors engaging in clan-based feuds to modern-day ethnic conflicts, racial divisions often lead to violence and civil unrest. These conflicts also interplay with a variety of other variables that also influence conflict, such as resource distribution, cultural suppression, colonization, and economic inequality, which are collectively referred to as systemic racism (Banaji, Mahzarin R., Susan T. Fiske, and Douglas S. Massey 2021). Typically, one group is often seen as ‘superior’ to another, leading to inequality and systemic oppression. Race and ethnicity are powerful social constructs that influence perceptions of who belongs and who does not, and these divisions can be weaponized by political elites to mobilize groups for power or survival. In many cases, third-party interventions, either by nations or NGOs, are necessary to mediate these conflicts, though success depends heavily on the willingness of conflicting parties to acknowledge their shared humanity and address the underlying causes of division. All too often, the resentment between ethnic divides creates frameworks of demonization of people groups; we see this all the time, even outside of war. Across the globe, there are neighboring cultures and peoples, and in almost every situation, we find entrenched racial divisions to varying degrees. It is the work of the international community to bridge divides and prevent racism from escalating into violence. Here, we will assess cases of ethnic or racial conflicts and how mediation failed or succeeded in resolving the conflict to see if we can parse any pattern or shared thread in regard to these issues.
Keywords: Race, Ethnicity, Conflict, Division, Genocide, Exploitation, Mediation, Bosnia, Israel, Palestine, Rwanda, Myanmar
Perceptions of Race and Ethnicity
Humans perceive race and ethnicity through both cultural and biological lenses; though modern science has rejected the notion of biologically ‘distinct’ races, race is instead arbitrary cultural categories humans craft based on natural gradients in human phenotypes, but also informed by culture, religion, nationality, and history (both real and folk history). From a biological standpoint, human beings are remarkably similar, with genetic differences among individuals being far less significant than people tend to assume. For example, in the US, African Americans are genetically closer to European Americans than they are to any continental African racial group. Regardless of this fact, humans tend to divide people into ‘folk taxonomies’ even though the bulk of African American populations have been present in America and engaged in gene flow between the overall population much longer than later waves of European migrations to the continent (Edgar, Heather J.H. 2009). However, socially constructed ideas of race persist, as humans have a natural disposition towards forming in-groups and out-groups, and tend to unconsciously favor familiarity, possessing a tendency to be cautious of non-familiar peoples. These behaviors are derived from natural instincts to maintain the survival of one’s self and one’s own familial group (Lewis, Gary J. and Timothy C. Bates 2010). This is not to say these instincts or behaviors are justified; to the contrary, they are one the root causes of conflict and violence and a leading source of human suffering. To think otherwise would be an appeal to nature, a fallacy too often employed when discussing humans and their relation to the natural world (LaBossiere, Michael C. 2010). For the purpose of discussion here, I will focus on the cultural forces at play and their relation to the psychological framework humans operate from when engaging in conflict and race.
Cultural perceptions of race are typically based on visible characteristics, such as skin color or facial features, but these characteristics are given meaning through historical and social contexts. Ethnicity, by contrast, tends to be defined by shared cultural traits like language, religion, and ancestry. Both tend to overlap to varying degrees, as one’s heritage tends to inform one’s culture, and obviously directly impact their physical characteristics. Likewise, divisions between races often lead to increased divisions in culture due to the decreased societal interactions between people groups, as well as the systemic pressures typically placed on one group as compared to the privileges levied by the other, which further exasperates cultural and genetic divides (Erk, Jan and Lawrence Anderson 2009) (Brondolo, Elizabeth et al. 2012). Race and ethnicity are also markers of identity and belonging, leading to the creation of in-groups and out-groups. Ethnic conflicts arise when these divisions are politicized, often by leaders seeking to consolidate power by appealing to nationalist or racial ideologies. As seen in many international conflicts, these identities can be manipulated to justify violence and exclusion, even when the underlying cultural and biological differences between groups are minimal. The perception of differences is tied to grievances and perceived threats and thus becomes the catalyst for conflict.
Conflict In Rwanda: Hutu and Tutsi
The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 is one of the most tragic examples of how racial and ethnic tensions can escalate into mass violence in recent history. Prior to contact with European peoples, the peoples of Rwanda had a caste system similar to that found in India, where the Hutu were the dominant group and were societally divided from the lower-class Tutsi. These people groups are of different ethnicities, with different cultural and linguistic backgrounds, but in practice, they are viewed as separate races by most Rwandans who tend to view each other as racially separate in terms of perceived heritage (Blench, Roger 1999, 41-60). When Belgium colonized the region in the late 19th century, this division was further exasperated by interjecting their own racial pseudo-scientific narratives describing the Hutu, the dominant ethnicity prior to European contact, as descended from “the best blood of Abyssinia” while the Tutsi were of “primitive” low-blood (Fornace, Kimberly 2009). While these specific myths originated from European colonists, they reflected the caste system that had previously existed and was adopted by the Hutu, as it fit into their traditional pre-colonial hierarchal system, which separated groups based on background and the perceived ‘purity’ of said backgrounds. Indeed, the creation myths of both groups reflect these differences as well, as the Tutsi describe the origins of both Hutu and Tutsi as brothers from a shared father, while the Hutu hold that they had existed prior to the Tutsi, mirroring and likely influenced by cultural power dynamic (Vansina, Jan 1985).
Post-independence, division in Rwanda continued to deepen as political leaders sought to capitalize on conflicts between the Hutu and Tutsi. By the 1990s, the Hutu-dominated government began a campaign of propaganda that dehumanized the Tutsi, describing them as “cockroaches” to be eradicated. After the assassination of Burundi President Ndadaye by Tutsi extremists, the Burundi Genocide took place as the Hutu majority began killing the Tutsi minority en masse, a chillingly identical foreshadowing of what was to come. Months later, the airplane carrying Rwandan President Habyarimana and the new president of Barandi, Ntaryamira, was shot down, though the blame for the attack is still heavily disputed to this day. As what happened in Burundi began in neighboring Rwanda (Stanton, Gregory H. 2004). Despite several international efforts at mediation, including the presence of UN peacekeepers, the genocide unfolded with horrifying speed, resulting in the deaths of an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus within only the span of 100 days (Maron, Jeremy 2019). Mediation attempts failed due to several factors, including the lack of international political will to intervene decisively and the slow response of the UN to recognize the scale of the atrocities. Additionally, the deep-seated racialized hatred between Hutus and Tutsis made it nearly impossible for peaceful negotiations to take place. Mediation failed because the political and military forces driving the genocide were uninterested in compromise; they sought total elimination of the Tutsi population (Caplan, Gerald 2012, 446-475). Indeed, as Tutsi migrants fled into Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Hutu-led government mounted two insurgencies over the border to attack Tutsi refugee camps. This is an example of when diplomacy is virtually impossible, as the international community showed no will to militarily intervene, and in an already impoverished country overcome by internal conflict, economic sanctions would be of little consequence. There was no leverage to push against the atrocities, as the conflict devolved into ‘total war’ between the Hutu forces and the Uganda-backed Tutsi rebels in the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which defeated the Hutu during a civil war during the midst of the genocide.
The Tutsi later since reclaimed control of Rwanda and expelled the Hutu militias and leaders from the country as recompense for the genocide. Over two million Hutu fled into the DRC, ironically just as the Hutu did to the Tutsi. These events were the catalyst for the First and Second Congo Wars. Today, the Tutsi-led Rwandan government has funded and directed ‘M23’, a Tutsi militia, to cross the border into the DRC to attack Hutu militias and populations, again, just as the Hutu did to the Tutsi during the genocide. Prior to the genocide, the Arusha Accords were signed between the competing ethno-political factions in Rwanda, intended to mediate tensions before violence erupted (Beloff, Jonathan and Samantha Lakin 2019). These accords obviously failed spectacularly, as the power-sharing stipulations only furthered tensions between the signatories, and without enforcement mechanisms, they were quick to dismiss the agreements as soon as they were able. The accords only sought to treat the symptoms of a fatal illness that permeated Rwandan politics and culture. The extreme entrenchment of generalized sentiments between the relative out-groups became ingrained in the respective cultures. The Hutu, historically the minority group, were the outlet for grievances and fears by the majority group, similar to how Germans oppressed the Ashkenazi in the early 20th century or how Anglican Americans oppressed African Americans during the Reconstruction Era following the Civil War (or prior, in the terms of slavery for that matter). This clearly demonstrates the capacity for humans to demonize groups that they hold political power over, escalating to violence and destruction of minority communities when the minority group is framed as a threat to the in-group. This perceived threat need not be violent, it can be economic, cultural, or even genetic, as racial purity is typically emphasized during these conflicts.
Conflict In The Balkans: Serbs and Bosniaks
The Bosnian Genocide, part of the broader Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, exemplifies how ethnic tensions can escalate into mass atrocities when exacerbated by nationalist fervor and state-sponsored violence. Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, ethnic Serbs sought to create a ‘Greater Serbia’ by eliminating or expelling Bosniak Muslims and Croat populations from Bosnian territory (Blagojevic, Bojana 2009). This process, known as ethnic cleansing, was rooted in historical grievances between the various ethnic groups, particularly the Serbs’ portrayal of Bosniaks as foreign invaders due to their Muslim identity. This is made all the more horrible, knowing that the Serbs faced genocide themselves during WWII. To quickly clarify, “Bosniak” refers to the ethnic group, while “Bosnian” more generally refers to all people living in the country of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
International mediation was attempted early in the conflict, most notably through the Dayton Accords, brokered by the United States in 1995. The accords succeeded in ending the large-scale violence by creating a power-sharing arrangement between the warring ethnic groups, effectively dividing Bosnia into two entities: one controlled by Bosnian Serbs and the other by a federation of Bosniaks and Croats, together forming the modern Bosnia and Herzegovina government and state (Belloni, Roberto 2001) (U.S. Department of State Archive 2001). While the Dayton Accords succeeded in stopping the genocide, it is criticized for failing to resolve the deeper ethnic tensions, as the agreement essentially froze the conflict rather than creating a pathway for long-term reconciliation. Despite the success of mediation in halting the violence, the structural divisions imposed by the Dayton Accords for institutionalizing ethnic divisions territorially and governmentally rather than fostering integration and cooperation. These criticisms may be, to inverse a phrase, ‘missing the trees for the forest’. While yes, it would be nice if we could magically eradicate racism and make humans get along and live in harmony, in practice, you can not make someone suddenly love another person who may be responsible for killing your family, and vice versa. What the Dayton Accords accomplished was focusing on the immediate needs of the people in the context of realities on the ground instead of fanciful aspirations. The result? A multicultural nation that is politically stable, economically successful, and has provided the breathing room for these once-warring ethnic groups to gradually integrate with one another on their own terms, at their own pace. The guardrails erected by the accords established a framework for Serbs and Bosniaks to see each other more as an in-group rather than separate out-groups (though of course they remain distinct ethnicities), reducing tensions and potential for conflict (Clarke-Habibi, Sara 2005).
This is not to say things are perfect, but while regional and foreign influences continue to disrupt the Balkans, as is the legacy of the region given the historical borders between Europe and the Ottomans, and the following collapse of Yugoslavia, it has proven a bridge to brotherhood between these groups. In many ways, it is reminiscent of Czechoslovakia, a multicultural state divided between ethnic Checs and Slovaks, which maintained cultural and political cohesion under the control and maintenance of the USSR. Yet after the collapse of the authoritarian regime, ethnic divisions began to grow as the distinct people groups vied for political influence. Instead of allowing this to escalate into violent conflict, the nation peacefully split into two nations which now can better represent the interests of their respective populations without threat of one subjugating the other. This, of course, has similarities to the dissolution of the country of Serbia and Montenegro, which was also a relatively peaceful and gradual process, but both Serbia and Montenegro had high Serbian populations. In contrast, Kosovo, which had a majority Albanian population, had to go to war in order to obtain independence, as Serbia saw it as a strategic threat by an out-group (Macek-Macková, Emanuela 2011). Whether Bosnia and Herzegovina take the same trajectory and formally split is yet to be seen, as a rise in Serbian nationalism, promoted in part by neighboring Serbia, has prompted some cultural and political unrest. But as of now, this appears unrealistic.
Outside of the Balkans, we are reminded of how ethnic tensions between India and their Sikh populations have been managed, a case of both success and major failures. The Sikh people sought, and still seek, their own sovereign nation in Northwestern India, what they deem Khalistan. In order to provide Sikhs with political power and influence without dividing the nation, Sikhs were given an outsized role in the military, which provided them with the cultural and political assurances needed to maintain peace. This arrangement was a carryover from British occupation of India, when they used Sikhs as a militant force to subdue Indian uprisings, a sadly ironic parody of how they have been treated by the modern Indian government. Obviously, this system was not perfect (though is any system perfect?), as demonstrated by civil conflict between India and Punjab insurgents in the 1980’s to 1990’s, the subsequent assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and retaliatory violence targeting Sikh communities. To this day, these tensions have impacted India’s diplomatic scope, as Indian officials allegedly ordered the assassination of a leading Sikh separatist leader in Canada in 2023, and again attempted the assassination of another notable Canadian Sikh leader while they were in New York in 2024, leading Canada to expel Indian diplomats and sever ties with the country (Biswas, Soutik 2024). Regardless of these extreme tensions, the Sikhs still dominate the military elite of India, and while calls for separatism are still present, the conflict is largely peaceful and non-violent, with most political support going to Sikh politicians who are involved in the Khalistan movement (Takkar, Jatin 2024).
Conflict In Turkey: Turks and Kurds
The conflict between Turkey and the Kurdish people has its roots in the Kurdish struggle for autonomy and recognition within Turkey. After WWI, the Ottoman Empire was divided by the Allied Powers, giving rise to many new nations. Kurdistan was one of these new nations, but before its official inception, Turkey, the successor state of the Ottomans, militarily invaded the region to prevent the nation from forming. Since then, the Kurds have been a stateless ethnic group; the regions they inhabit split across Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran, and they continue to be denied statehood of their own. In Turkey, the government’s refusal to recognize Kurdish identity and grant political and cultural rights led to decades of conflict, with the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) engaging in armed conflict against the Turkish state. The Turkish government’s portrayal of Kurds as a separatist threat has exacerbated tensions, often leading to harsh crackdowns on Kurdish communities. Turkey has even gone as far as to occupy sections of northern Syria under Kurdish control. This conflict mirrors the historical tensions between Turkey and the Armenians, particularly in the context of the Armenian Genocide of 1915, when Turkish Ottomans killed and expelled hundreds of thousands of Armenians from the territory. Just as Armenians were portrayed as a threat to Turkish national identity, whose aims were to unify Turkish ethnic and national identity, Kurds have been marginalized and vilified in a similar way (Kasbarian, Sossie and Kerem Öktem 2014).
Mediation attempts have been inconsistent and largely unsuccessful, as Turkey has refused to recognize the PKK as a legitimate representative of Kurdish interests, framing the conflict as one of terrorism rather than ethnic self-defense. While the EU has pressured Turkey to grant more rights to Kurds as part of its accession process, these attempts have been met with resistance from Turkish nationalists. The failure of mediation stems from the deep mistrust between the Turkish government and Kurdish groups, as well as the reluctance of the Turkish state to acknowledge the legitimacy of Kurdish demands for autonomy. In the absence of mediation, the US and its allies have militarily supported Kurdish forces in Syria and Iraq, arguably taking advantage of their vulnerability to create geostrategic leverage against Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, given the Kurds de facto hold of the territory between all four nations, and as part of the US’s broader Middle East efforts (Hama, Hasan 2020). This has been to the Kurds’ benefit, as they have found themselves consolidating military and economic power in the region, able to defend and advocate for themselves, achieving their goals of establishing their own state in most measures aside from international recognition. This demonstrates how victimized groups can be supported to successfully defend themselves and how this can be used to apply pressure to out-groups who are then forced to engage with them rather than simply eliminate them, as what happened with the Armenians.
Conflict In Israel: Israelis and Palestinians
The conflict between Israel and Palestine is one of the most enduring and complex racial and ethnic conflicts in modern history. Though this conflict arguably dates back to thousands of years, involving numerous invasions and conquering by disparate regimes, such as the Arab Jihads of the Early Middle Age, the European Crusades of the High Middle Age, and reconquest by the Ottomans, we will focus here on the modern conflict rooted in the establishment of Israel in 1948, and the subsequent displacement of Palestinians. This conflict has been fueled by competing national identities and religious claims to the land. Over the decades, racial and ethnic divisions between Jewish Israelis and Arab Palestinians have deepened, with both sides portraying the other as an existential threat to their survival. Numerous mediation efforts have been attempted, most notably the Oslo Accords of the 1990s, which sought to create a framework for peace by establishing the Palestinian Authority and laying the groundwork for a two-state solution. While the accords were initially hailed as a breakthrough, they ultimately failed to resolve the core issues, such as the status of Jerusalem, the right of return for Palestinian refugees, and the continued expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Indeed, once the timeframe of the accords expired, Israel abandoned the agreements therein and resumed policies that continued to exasperate the conflict (Alkidwa, Nasser 2019). The Abraham Accords later attempted to foster peace in the Arab world at large, fostering the normalization of relations between Israel and other Arab nations, and while mentioning vague aspirations for peace and sovereignty for Palestine, no concrete commitments have been made by Israel, and given the recent escalation of the conflict by Iranian proxy groups, notably Hezbollah and Hamas, who held outsized political and militant control in Gaza prior to Israel’s occupation of the region, and Israel intensified attacks and seemingly disregard for civilian casualties, these accords leave the Palestine question without a clear resolution (Goldstein, Rami 2022).
The two-state solution sought out by most in the international community mirrors the solutions found in the Bosnia and Herzegovina example at first glance, but I argue that the strict division of the two into distinct nations removes most incentives for Israel and Palestine to find investments in one another, and may, in fact, incentivize conflict as the two nationally distinct populations compete for influence and space in the region. The two remain perpetually out-groups to one another with little room for the unification of identities, as can be gradually seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mediation in the Israel-Palestine conflict has been hampered by the unequal balance of power between the two sides, and at this point, Israel may have more to lose geostrategically in Palestinian independence as they now have increasing hegemony over the region given the intense militarization driven by US investments. While third parties, including the US and the UN, have played crucial roles in facilitating dialogue, they have been unable to compel either side to make the necessary compromises for lasting peace, especially given Iran’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah, who consistently agitate Israel’s security, or as many see it, defend Palestine. As in our other examples, both sides portray each other as existential threats that must be eradicated before they themselves are eradicated, the same zero-sum sentiment seen time and time again. Palestinian extremists often invoke the phrase “From the river to the sea” in claiming their claim to Israel as a whole, from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, which has been criticized as conveying genocidal, antisemitic sentiment. Confusingly, Israeli leadership, including the current Prime Minister, has recently parroted this same exact phrase, which they themselves claimed was genocidal, in their pivot away from a two-state policy.
Conflict In Myanmar: Buddhists and Rohingya
The conflict between Buddhists and Muslims in Myanmar, particularly the persecution of the Rohingya Muslim minority, has escalated into one of the worst and underreported humanitarian crises of the 21st century. Tensions between the majority Buddhist population and the Rohingya have long existed, but they intensified following decades of discrimination and denial of citizenship to the Rohingya. The Myanmar military, along with extremist Buddhist nationalists, has portrayed the Rohingya as outsiders and a threat to regional culture and national security, leading to widespread violence, displacement, and accusations of ethnic cleansing (Zarni, Maung and Alice Cowley 2014). This parallels the islamophobia we see across the globe and demonstrates that any religious group, even ones like Buddhism with a stereotypical ‘peaceful’ perception in Western culture, does not prevent its followers from succumbing to racism and extremism. The same can be seen in the Hindu religion, another theology stereotypically seen as peaceful and passive, who have extremist Islamophobic factions (Malji, Andrea 2020). It is a mistake to think a particular religious framework can somehow reduce conflict; assuming otherwise often promotes sentiments of religious supremacy, which ironically lends itself to conflict. As in the other examples discussed, this conflict, too, is deeply rooted in ethnic and religious divisions, with the Rohingya portrayed as both ethnically and religiously inferior to the Buddhist majority. Human rights organizations have documented extensive abuses, including mass killings, sexual violence, internment in ethnic camps, and the displacement of over a million Rohingya to refugee camps in Bangladesh. As inconceivable as it may sound, Buddhist extremists in Myanmar have placed Muslims in concentration camps (Human Rights Watch, 2020). In some ways, this mirrors neighboring China’s internment of Uyghur Muslims into reeducation camps, forcefully expelling Islamic religion and culture from communities in Western China, and engaging in obscene practices of sexual assault and forced sterilization of Uyghur women (Associated Press, 2020). These cases may demonstrate a larger pattern of growing islamophobia in Asia.
The rise of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), a militant group formed in response to the persecution of Rohingya, further escalated tensions, as the Myanmar government used the presence of armed resistance to justify its brutal military crackdown. The Myanmar military coup and ongoing civil war allowed for the ARSA to formalize itself within the conflict, currently aligned with the military forces and fighting against the toppled government forces who once oppressed them. They have also extended their reach into Bangladesh, which has itself has a long history of ethnic conflict between the Muslim majority and various minority groups (Siddiqui, MS. 2024). The systemic racism in Bangladesh hit its peak following the ongoing revolution, as while forces have forced the ousting of the authoritarian ruling class, it has contributed to the targeted violence against non-Muslims, particularly Hindu civilians. The ARSA has infiltrated Rohingya refugee camps within Bangladesh at the border with Myanmar to recruit and extort the displaced people there (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024) (Amnesty International 2018). There is some overlap between this and the ethnic conflicts of the nearby Assam region of India, where Bangladeshi migrants have stirred concern among the small ethnic communities who fear cultural replacement (Krusch, Antony 2024). This further demonstrates how the ostracization of people groups often leads to the unintended but expected reprisal of violence not only to the perceived perpetrators but innocent civilians who may be ethnically or racially aligned with said perpetrators.
International mediation efforts have been largely unsuccessful, despite intervention by the UN and pressure from countries like the US, India, and China, who of course have geostrategic interests in the region. The Myanmar government’s refusal to acknowledge the Rohingya as citizens or grant them basic human rights has made mediation efforts difficult. Moreover, the ongoing civil war in Myanmar has further complicated the situation, as the military remains deeply entrenched in the political system and resistant to outside influence. Like Turkey and many other nations, state actors push to consolidate the national identity of ethnic uniformity instead of expanding their ideas of national identity to include those marginalized communities. In Sri Lanka, the same patterns are emerging, where Tamil minority groups are being increasingly ostracized from politics and governance a result of the civil war against the Sinhalese majority and targeted by Muslim extremists in violent attacks, who ironically themselves are targets of discrimination in Sri Lanka as well (Kursch, Anthony 2024). As things stand in Myanmar, the ongoing civil war has taken up all oxygen, and perhaps rightfully so, as no realistic resolution to the oppression of the Rohingya can be achieved until the conflict between parties responsible for said governance can be settled. Currently, mediation and negotiations have turned from resolving the civil war to formally dividing Myanmar into two distinct states. While the divide between these sides is predominantly ideological, liberal vs. authoritarian, again, we see the drive for ethnic groups to maintain a distinct state or role in governance as many ethnic militias have aligned themselves with different sides to ensure political strength, the ARSA being no exception.
Conclusion
Demonstrated here is a pattern of how the ostracization of a people group by another routinely leads towards violence, as dominant ethnic or racial groups attempt to expel and/or destroy a minority group in response to instability, whether that be economic or merely political. This often leads to the radicalization of the oppressed group, which results in both justified acts of political defiance and self-defense, to horrible acts of terrorism and racial extremism, which in turn retro-actively justifies the persecutor’s racist sentiment and validates extremist factions, bringing said sentiment more into the mainstream and perpetuating the cycle of hate and violence. As an apparent inevitability of human nature to divide each other into arbitrary groups based on cultural, religious, linguistic, and racial grounds, coupled with behaviors that prioritize perceived in-groups, concrete measures must be taken in order to prevent ethnic conflict beyond aspirations for peace and unity. Not even the experience of genocide prevents a victimized group from enacting atrocities themselves, and it may even be noted that victimization often perversely gives ethnic groups a disposition towards escalatory behaviors, as generational trauma may make them prone to heightened protectionism and entrenched grievances.
How To Move Forward?
As shown, there is evidence that the establishment of equitable governing frameworks can help alleviate the power imbalance between groups while reducing perceived threats as populations are allowed to acclimate to other cultures and peoples in an environment of relative peace and mutual benefit. The precursors to ethnic and racial violence are always painfully clear, yet preventative measures are rarely taken in order to maintain racial dominance in government, as leverage against a minority group, or as simple political gamesmanship. Forced incentives must be placed upon nations that subject people groups to inequitable treatment, which not only pose threats to their respective domestic stability but, as shown, routinely spill over into neighboring nations as racist sentiment crosses cultural and national borders. Rarely will these nations engage in such mediation domestically, as too often politicians benefit from such divisions, capitalizing on it for short-term political gain. The international community must force these regiments of power-sharing onto nations through diplomatic means, although this is, of course, easier said than done, as no multicultural nation is truly innocent when it comes to the equitable treatment of minority populations, but hopefully, as the world continues to become more aware of systemic challenges to multiculturalism, and the value in pluralism and cosmopolitan policies become more normalized as we’ve seen in recent decades, these issues will continue to be engaged with more seriously, resulting in meaningful change.
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