How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/
EDITORIAL NOTE *
This article surveys several contested conflicts. The historical accounts, the characterisation of the parties and the attribution of responsibility reflect the author’s own perspective; this journal’s editorial position is neutral as between the parties concerned.
ABSTRACT *
This article examines the role of race and ethnicity in international conflict and asks what distinguishes successful from unsuccessful mediation in such cases. After considering how racial and ethnic categories are constructed and how in-group preference operates, the author surveys five cases: the genocide committed against the Tutsi in Rwanda and its continuation into the Congo wars; the Bosnian war and the settlement reached at Dayton; the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds; the Israeli Palestinian conflict; and the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar, with comparative reference to India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The author’s central claim is that mediation succeeds where it establishes governing frameworks that redistribute power and allow populations to coexist under conditions of relative security, and fails where it addresses symptoms while leaving the underlying distribution of power untouched, or where one party seeks the elimination rather than the accommodation of the other.
KEYWORDS
Race, ethnicity, conflict, division, genocide, exploitation, mediation, Bosnia, Israel, Palestine, Rwanda, Myanmar
INTRODUCTION
Race and ethnicity have long been at the heart of international conflicts; from our ancient ancestors engaging in clan-based feuds to modern-day ethnic conflicts, racial divisions often lead to violence and civil unrest. These conflicts also interplay with a variety of other variables that influence conflict, such as resource distribution, cultural suppression, colonization, and economic inequality, which are collectively referred to as systemic racism (Banaji, Fiske and Massey 2021). Typically, one group is often seen as superior to another, leading to inequality and systemic oppression. Race and ethnicity are powerful social constructs that influence perceptions of who belongs and who does not, and these divisions can be weaponized by political elites to mobilize groups for power or survival. In many cases, third-party interventions, either by nations or non-governmental organisations, are necessary to mediate these conflicts, though success depends heavily on the willingness of conflicting parties to acknowledge their shared humanity and address the underlying causes of division. All too often, the resentment between ethnic divides creates frameworks of demonization of peoples; we see this all the time, even outside of war. Across the globe, there are neighbouring cultures and peoples, and in almost every situation, we find entrenched racial divisions to varying degrees. It is the work of the international community to bridge divides and prevent racism from escalating into violence. Here, we will assess cases of ethnic or racial conflicts and how mediation failed or succeeded in resolving the conflict, to see if we can identify any pattern or shared thread in regard to these issues.
MAIN CORPUS
Perceptions of race and ethnicity
Humans perceive race and ethnicity through both cultural and biological lenses. Though modern science has rejected the notion of biologically distinct races, race is instead a set of arbitrary cultural categories humans craft based on natural gradients in human phenotypes, but also informed by culture, religion, nationality, and history, both real and folk history. From a biological standpoint, human beings are remarkably similar, with genetic differences among individuals being far less significant than people tend to assume. For example, in the United States, African Americans are genetically closer to European Americans than to any single continental African population. Regardless of this fact, humans tend to divide people into folk taxonomies even though the bulk of African American populations have been present in America and engaged in gene flow with the overall population much longer than later waves of European migration to the continent (Edgar 2009). However, socially constructed ideas of race persist, as humans have a natural disposition towards forming in-groups and out-groups, and tend to unconsciously favour familiarity, possessing a tendency to be cautious of unfamiliar peoples. These behaviours are derived from instincts to maintain the survival of oneself and one’s own familial group (Lewis and Bates 2010). This is not to say these instincts or behaviours are justified; to the contrary, they are one of the root causes of conflict and violence and a leading source of human suffering. To think otherwise would be an appeal to nature, a fallacy too often employed when discussing humans and their relation to the natural world (LaBossiere 2010). For the purpose of discussion here, I will focus on the cultural forces at play and their relation to the psychological framework humans operate from when engaging in conflict and race.
Cultural perceptions of race are typically based on visible characteristics, such as skin colour or facial features, but these characteristics are given meaning through historical and social contexts. Ethnicity, by contrast, tends to be defined by shared cultural traits like language, religion, and ancestry. Both tend to overlap to varying degrees, as one’s heritage tends to inform one’s culture and to affect physical characteristics. Likewise, divisions between races often lead to increased divisions in culture due to decreased societal interaction between groups, as well as the systemic pressures typically placed on one group as compared to the privileges enjoyed by the other, which further exacerbates cultural and genetic divides (Erk and Anderson 2009; Brondolo et al. 2012). Race and ethnicity are also markers of identity and belonging, leading to the creation of in-groups and out-groups. Ethnic conflicts arise when these divisions are politicized, often by leaders seeking to consolidate power by appealing to nationalist or racial ideologies. As seen in many international conflicts, these identities can be manipulated to justify violence and exclusion, even when the underlying cultural and biological differences between groups are minimal. The perception of difference is tied to grievances and perceived threats and thus becomes the catalyst for conflict.
Conflict in Rwanda: Hutu and Tutsi
The genocide committed against the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994 is one of the most tragic examples of how racial and ethnic tensions can escalate into mass violence in recent history. Prior to contact with European peoples, the peoples of Rwanda had a social hierarchy in which the categories of Hutu and Tutsi were associated with occupation, cattle ownership and status. In practice they came to be viewed as distinct groups by many Rwandans in terms of perceived heritage (Blench 1999, 41 to 60). When Belgium administered the region from the First World War onward, this division was further exacerbated by the introduction of racial pseudo-scientific narratives describing the Tutsi as of superior descent and the Hutu as of inferior stock (Fornace 2009). While these specific myths originated with European colonisers, they attached themselves to a pre-existing hierarchical system which separated groups on the basis of background and perceived purity. The creation myths of both groups reflect these differences as well, as some accounts describe the origins of Hutu and Tutsi as brothers from a shared father, while others hold one group to have existed prior to the other, mirroring and likely influenced by the prevailing power dynamic (Vansina 1985).
Post-independence, division in Rwanda continued to deepen as political leaders sought to capitalize on the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi. By the 1990s, the Hutu-dominated government began a campaign of propaganda that dehumanized the Tutsi, describing them as cockroaches to be eradicated. After the assassination of Burundian President Ndadaye, mass violence took place in Burundi, a chilling foreshadowing of what was to come. Months later, the aeroplane carrying Rwandan President Habyarimana and the new president of Burundi, Ntaryamira, was shot down, though responsibility for the attack remains disputed to this day. What had happened in Burundi then began in neighbouring Rwanda (Stanton 2004). Despite several international efforts at mediation, including the presence of UN peacekeepers, the genocide unfolded with horrifying speed, resulting in the deaths of an estimated 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu within the span of 100 days (Maron 2019). Mediation attempts failed due to several factors, including the lack of international political will to intervene decisively and the slow response of the UN to recognize the scale of the atrocities. Additionally, the deep-seated hatred cultivated between the groups made peaceful negotiation nearly impossible. Mediation failed because the political and military forces driving the genocide were uninterested in compromise; they sought total elimination of the Tutsi population (Caplan 2012, 446 to 475). Indeed, as Hutu combatants and civilians fled into Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo, armed elements of the former government mounted incursions across the border. This is an example of when diplomacy is virtually impossible, as the international community showed no will to intervene militarily, and in an already impoverished country overcome by internal conflict, economic sanctions would have been of little consequence. There was no leverage to push against the atrocities, as the conflict devolved into total war between the government forces and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which defeated the government during the civil war in the midst of the genocide.
The Rwandan Patriotic Front took control of Rwanda and drove out the forces responsible for the genocide. Large numbers of Hutu civilians fled into the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These events were among the catalysts for the First and Second Congo Wars. Today, the Rwandan government has been reported by United Nations expert groups to support M23, an armed group operating in eastern Congo, a charge the government denies. Prior to the genocide, the Arusha Accords were signed between the competing political factions in Rwanda, intended to mediate tensions before violence erupted (Beloff and Lakin 2019). These accords failed spectacularly, as the power-sharing stipulations only heightened tensions between the signatories, and without enforcement mechanisms they were quickly abandoned. The accords sought to treat the symptoms of a fatal illness that permeated Rwandan politics and culture. The entrenchment of generalized sentiment between the respective out-groups had become ingrained. This demonstrates the capacity for humans to demonize groups over which they hold political power, escalating to violence and the destruction of minority communities when the minority group is framed as a threat to the in-group. This perceived threat need not be violent; it can be economic, cultural, or even genetic, as racial purity is typically emphasized during such conflicts.
Conflict in the Balkans: Serbs and Bosniaks
The Bosnian genocide, part of the broader Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, exemplifies how ethnic tensions can escalate into mass atrocities when exacerbated by nationalist fervour and state-sponsored violence. Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serb nationalist forces sought to create a Greater Serbia by eliminating or expelling Bosniak Muslims and Croat populations from Bosnian territory (Blagojevic 2009). This process, known as ethnic cleansing, was rooted in historical grievances between the various ethnic groups, particularly the portrayal of Bosniaks as foreign because of their Muslim identity. This is made all the more terrible in view of the mass killing of Serbs during the Second World War. To clarify, Bosniak refers to the ethnic group, while Bosnian more generally refers to all people living in the country of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
International mediation was attempted during the conflict, most notably through the Dayton Accords, brokered by the United States in 1995. The accords succeeded in ending the large-scale violence by creating a power-sharing arrangement between the warring ethnic groups, effectively dividing Bosnia into two entities: one controlled by Bosnian Serbs and the other a federation of Bosniaks and Croats, together forming the modern state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Belloni 2001; U.S. Department of State Archive 2001). While the Dayton Accords succeeded in stopping the war, they have been criticized for failing to resolve the deeper ethnic tensions, as the agreement essentially froze the conflict rather than creating a pathway for long-term reconciliation. Despite the success of mediation in halting the violence, the structural divisions imposed by Dayton institutionalized ethnic divisions territorially and governmentally rather than fostering integration and cooperation. These criticisms may, to invert a phrase, be missing the trees for the forest. While it would be preferable to eradicate racism and have people live in harmony, in practice one cannot make someone suddenly love a person who may be responsible for killing their family, and vice versa. What the Dayton Accords accomplished was focusing on the immediate needs of the people in the context of realities on the ground instead of aspirations. The result is a multicultural state that is politically stable, has recovered economically, and has provided the breathing room for these once-warring groups to integrate gradually on their own terms and at their own pace. The guardrails erected by the accords established a framework for Serbs and Bosniaks to see each other more as an in-group than as separate out-groups, though of course they remain distinct ethnicities, reducing tension and the potential for conflict (Clarke-Habibi 2005).
This is not to say things are perfect, but while regional and foreign influences continue to disrupt the Balkans, as is the legacy of the region given the historical borders between Europe and the Ottomans and the subsequent collapse of Yugoslavia, it has proven a bridge between these groups. In some ways it is reminiscent of Czechoslovakia, a multicultural state divided between Czechs and Slovaks, which maintained cultural and political cohesion under Communist rule. Yet after the collapse of that regime, ethnic divisions began to grow as the distinct groups vied for political influence. Instead of allowing this to escalate into violent conflict, the country peacefully split into two states which now better represent the interests of their respective populations without the threat of one subjugating the other. This has similarities to the dissolution of the union of Serbia and Montenegro, which was also a relatively peaceful and gradual process. In contrast, Kosovo, which had a majority Albanian population, went through war before obtaining independence, as Serbia saw it as a strategic threat by an out-group (Macek-Macková 2011). Whether Bosnia and Herzegovina takes the same trajectory and formally splits remains to be seen, as a rise in nationalism, promoted in part by neighbouring Serbia, has prompted cultural and political unrest. But as of now, this appears unlikely.
Outside the Balkans, we are reminded of how ethnic tensions between India and its Sikh population have been managed, a case of both success and major failure. Sikh nationalists have sought, and some still seek, their own sovereign nation in north-western India, which they call Khalistan. In order to provide Sikhs with political power and influence without dividing the nation, Sikhs held a prominent role in the military, which provided cultural and political assurance. This arrangement was a carryover from British rule in India, when Sikhs were recruited in disproportionate numbers into the colonial army, a sadly ironic parallel to their treatment by later Indian governments. Obviously, this system was not perfect, as demonstrated by the conflict between the Indian state and Punjab insurgents in the 1980s and 1990s, the subsequent assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and the retaliatory violence targeting Sikh communities. To this day, these tensions have affected India’s diplomatic relations, as Canadian authorities alleged Indian involvement in the killing of a Sikh separatist leader in Canada in 2023, and further allegations followed in the United States, leading Canada to expel Indian diplomats (Biswas 2024). Regardless of these tensions, Sikhs remain prominent in the Indian military, and while calls for separatism are still present, the movement is largely peaceful, with much political support going to Sikh politicians associated with the Khalistan cause (Takkar 2024).
Conflict in Turkey: Turks and Kurds
The conflict between Turkey and the Kurdish people has its roots in the Kurdish struggle for autonomy and recognition. After the First World War, the Ottoman Empire was partitioned by the Allied powers, and the Treaty of Sèvres envisaged Kurdish autonomy. That provision was never implemented, and the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 established the Turkish republic without it. Since then, the Kurds have been a stateless people, the regions they inhabit split across Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. In Turkey, the government’s refusal to recognize Kurdish identity and grant political and cultural rights led to decades of conflict, with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party engaging in armed struggle against the Turkish state. The Turkish government’s portrayal of Kurds as a separatist threat has exacerbated tensions, often leading to harsh crackdowns on Kurdish communities. Turkey has also conducted military operations in northern Syria in areas under Kurdish control. This conflict has been compared to the historical tensions between the Ottoman state and the Armenians, particularly in the context of the destruction of the Armenian population from 1915, when Ottoman authorities killed and deported the Armenian population of Anatolia. Just as Armenians were portrayed as a threat to Turkish national identity, Kurds have been marginalized and vilified in a similar way (Kasbarian and Öktem 2014).
Mediation attempts have been inconsistent and largely unsuccessful, as Turkey has refused to recognize the PKK as a legitimate representative of Kurdish interests, framing the conflict as one of terrorism rather than ethnic self-defence. While the European Union has pressured Turkey to grant more rights to Kurds as part of its accession process, these attempts have met resistance from Turkish nationalists. The failure of mediation stems from the deep mistrust between the Turkish government and Kurdish groups, as well as the reluctance of the Turkish state to acknowledge the legitimacy of Kurdish demands for autonomy. In the absence of mediation, the United States and its allies have militarily supported Kurdish forces in Syria and Iraq, arguably taking advantage of their position to create geostrategic leverage, given the Kurdish hold of territory between four states, and as part of broader Middle East policy (Hama 2020). This has been to the Kurds’ benefit, as they have consolidated military and economic power in the region and are able to defend and advocate for themselves, achieving many of the attributes of statehood aside from international recognition. This demonstrates how victimized groups can be supported to defend themselves and how this can be used to apply pressure to out-groups who are then obliged to engage with them rather than seek to eliminate them, as happened with the Armenians.
Conflict in Israel: Israelis and Palestinians
The conflict between Israel and Palestine is one of the most enduring and complex ethnic and national conflicts in modern history. Though the region’s contested history extends over many centuries, involving numerous invasions and successive regimes, we will focus here on the modern conflict rooted in the establishment of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent displacement of Palestinians. This conflict has been fuelled by competing national identities and religious claims to the land. Over the decades, divisions between Jewish Israelis and Arab Palestinians have deepened, with both sides portraying the other as an existential threat to their survival. Numerous mediation efforts have been attempted, most notably the Oslo Accords of the 1990s, which sought to create a framework for peace by establishing the Palestinian Authority and laying the groundwork for a two-state solution. While the accords were initially hailed as a breakthrough, they ultimately failed to resolve the core issues, such as the status of Jerusalem, the right of return for Palestinian refugees, and the continued expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank (Alkidwa 2019). The Abraham Accords later sought to normalise relations between Israel and several Arab states, and while mentioning aspirations for peace and Palestinian sovereignty, no concrete commitments followed. Given the escalation of the conflict since 2023 and the scale of civilian casualties, these accords leave the Palestinian question without a clear resolution (Goldstein 2022).
The two-state solution sought by most in the international community mirrors the arrangement in Bosnia and Herzegovina at first glance, but I argue that the strict division of the two into distinct nations removes most incentives for Israel and Palestine to find investments in one another, and may in fact incentivize conflict as the two nationally distinct populations compete for influence and space in the region. The two remain perpetually out-groups to one another with little room for the unification of identities, as can be gradually seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mediation in the Israeli Palestinian conflict has been hampered by the unequal balance of power between the two sides. While third parties, including the United States and the United Nations, have played roles in facilitating dialogue, they have been unable to compel either side to make the compromises necessary for lasting peace. As in the other examples, both sides portray each other as existential threats, the same zero-sum sentiment seen time and again. The phrase from the river to the sea has been used by some Palestinian groups and is widely understood by Israelis as denying Israel’s existence; formulations invoking Israeli sovereignty over the same territory have also been used by Israeli political figures.
Conflict in Myanmar: Buddhists and Rohingya
The conflict between Buddhists and Muslims in Myanmar, particularly the persecution of the Rohingya Muslim minority, has escalated into one of the worst and most underreported humanitarian crises of the 21st century. Tensions between the majority Buddhist population and the Rohingya have long existed, but they intensified following decades of discrimination and denial of citizenship to the Rohingya. The Myanmar military, along with extremist Buddhist nationalists, has portrayed the Rohingya as outsiders and a threat to national culture and security, leading to widespread violence, displacement, and findings of ethnic cleansing and genocidal intent by United Nations bodies (Zarni and Cowley 2014). This parallels the Islamophobia seen across the globe and demonstrates that no religious tradition, even one like Buddhism with a stereotypically peaceful perception in Western culture, prevents its followers from succumbing to prejudice and extremism. The same can be seen in Hinduism, another tradition stereotypically seen as peaceful, which has extremist factions (Malji 2020). It is a mistake to think that a particular religious framework can somehow reduce conflict; assuming otherwise often promotes sentiments of religious supremacy, which ironically lends itself to conflict. As in the other examples discussed, this conflict too is deeply rooted in ethnic and religious divisions, with the Rohingya portrayed as both ethnically and religiously inferior to the Buddhist majority. Human rights organizations have documented extensive abuses, including mass killings, sexual violence, confinement in camps, and the displacement of over a million Rohingya to refugee camps in Bangladesh (Human Rights Watch 2020). In some ways this recalls China’s internment of Uyghur Muslims, the removal of Islamic religious and cultural practice from communities in Xinjiang, and reported practices of sexual violence and forced sterilisation (Associated Press 2020). These cases may demonstrate a larger pattern of growing Islamophobia in Asia.
The rise of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, a militant group formed in response to the persecution of the Rohingya, further escalated tensions, as the Myanmar government used the presence of armed resistance to justify its military crackdown. The military coup and ongoing civil war have allowed the group to establish itself within the conflict. Its reach has extended into Bangladesh, which itself has a history of ethnic conflict between the Muslim majority and various minority groups (Siddiqui 2024). Following recent upheaval in Bangladesh, targeted violence against non-Muslims, particularly Hindu civilians, has been reported. The group has operated within Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh at the border with Myanmar to recruit and extort the displaced people there (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024; Amnesty International 2018). There is some overlap between this and the ethnic conflicts of the nearby Assam region of India, where migration has stirred concern among smaller ethnic communities who fear cultural replacement (Krusch 2024). This further demonstrates how the ostracization of a group often leads to reprisals of violence not only against perceived perpetrators but against civilians who may be ethnically or religiously associated with them.
International mediation efforts have been largely unsuccessful, despite involvement by the United Nations and pressure from countries such as the United States, India, and China, which of course have geostrategic interests in the region. The Myanmar government’s refusal to acknowledge the Rohingya as citizens or grant them basic rights has made mediation difficult. Moreover, the ongoing civil war has further complicated the situation, as the military remains deeply entrenched in the political system and resistant to outside influence. Like Turkey and many other states, actors push to consolidate national identity around ethnic uniformity instead of expanding their idea of national identity to include marginalized communities. In Sri Lanka, similar patterns can be observed, where Tamil minority communities have been marginalised following the civil war against the Sinhalese majority, and where Muslim communities have also been the target of discrimination and violence (Kursch 2024). As things stand in Myanmar, the ongoing civil war has taken up all available attention, and perhaps understandably, as no realistic resolution to the oppression of the Rohingya can be achieved until the conflict between the parties responsible for governance is settled.
SUMMARY *
The comparison the article draws produces a finding that runs against a good deal of contemporary practice. Where a settlement acknowledged group identity and built institutions around it, as at Dayton, large scale violence ended and has not resumed for three decades; where a settlement assumed that identities could be set aside in favour of shared institutions, as at Arusha, it collapsed within months. The author’s explanation is that people who have recently been at war do not first reconcile and then coexist but coexist first, under guarantees they trust, and reconcile slowly or not at all. From this follows the article’s most contested claim, namely that partition into separate states may entrench hostility rather than resolve it, since two sovereign entities have no shared institutions in which any common identity might eventually form.
CONCLUSION
Demonstrated here is a pattern in which the ostracization of one group by another routinely leads towards violence, as dominant ethnic or racial groups attempt to expel or destroy a minority group in response to instability, whether economic or political. This often leads to the radicalization of the oppressed group, which results both in acts of political defiance and self-defence and in acts of terrorism and extremism, which in turn retroactively appear to justify the persecutor’s sentiment and validate extremist factions, bringing that sentiment further into the mainstream and perpetuating the cycle of hatred and violence. Given the human tendency to divide one another into groups on cultural, religious, linguistic, and racial grounds, coupled with behaviours that prioritize perceived in-groups, concrete measures must be taken in order to prevent ethnic conflict beyond aspirations for peace and unity. Not even the experience of genocide prevents a victimized group from committing atrocities in turn, and it may be observed that victimization can give groups a disposition towards escalatory behaviour, as inherited trauma may make them prone to heightened protectionism and entrenched grievance.
As shown, there is evidence that the establishment of equitable governing frameworks can help alleviate the power imbalance between groups while reducing perceived threats, as populations are allowed to acclimatize to other cultures and peoples in an environment of relative peace and mutual benefit. The precursors to ethnic and racial violence are usually clear, yet preventative measures are rarely taken, in order to maintain dominance in government, as leverage against a minority group, or as political gamesmanship. Incentives must be placed upon states that subject peoples to inequitable treatment, which not only pose threats to their respective domestic stability but, as shown, routinely spill over into neighbouring states as prejudice crosses cultural and national borders. Rarely will these states engage in such mediation domestically, as too often politicians benefit from such divisions, capitalizing on them for short-term political gain. The international community must encourage these arrangements of power-sharing through diplomatic means, although this is easier said than done, as no multicultural state is entirely innocent when it comes to the equitable treatment of minority populations. Hopefully, as the world becomes more aware of the systemic challenges to multiculturalism, and as the value of pluralism becomes more widely recognised, these issues will be engaged with more seriously, resulting in meaningful change.
POTENTIAL SOLUTION *
The comparison between Arusha and Dayton is the most productive element here and it repays a closer look, because the difference between them is not principally about how each treated identity.
Arusha was signed by parties still contesting power, with a peacekeeping force whose mandate did not permit it to enforce anything, and with the extremist faction that would carry out the genocide excluded from and opposed to the agreement. Dayton was signed after a change in the military balance, after months of intensive great power engagement, and it arrived with sixty thousand troops under a mandate to use force, a High Representative with authority to impose legislation, and the sustained commitment of the states that had brokered it. The lesson most reliably supported by the pair is therefore about implementation: agreements survive where the guarantor can and will act on breach, and collapse where it cannot. Institutional design matters, and it matters less than whether anyone stands behind the design.
That said, the article’s substantive point about consociational arrangements has considerable support in the literature and deserves stating carefully. Power sharing does reduce the immediate risk of renewed war, and it does tend to entrench the categories it recognises, so that voting, appointment and public employment run along ethnic lines and politicians have a standing incentive to keep them salient. Bosnia illustrates both halves: three decades without war, and a political system in which nationalist parties are structurally advantaged and citizens who decline to declare an affiliation are excluded from the highest offices, a position the European Court of Human Rights found discriminatory in Sejdić and Finci. The design question is therefore not whether to recognise identity but whether to build in a route out, through sunset provisions, review mechanisms and electoral rules that reward cross group appeal, and Northern Ireland’s arrangements provide a comparison worth studying alongside Bosnia’s.
On the Israeli Palestinian case, the article’s argument that separation removes the incentive to invest in one another is a real position in the debate and it has a counterargument the article does not address. Consociational arrangements presuppose that both communities accept a shared state; where neither does, and where one community would be a demographic majority in it, the proposal is understood by the other as a demand for its dissolution. That is why the single state options canvassed in the literature divide sharply between one with equal rights and one without, and why confederal models, two states with shared institutions, open movement and joint arrangements in Jerusalem, have attracted attention as an attempt to hold both the article’s insight and the parties’ insistence on self determination. Naming that literature strengthens the argument considerably.
Two further points bear on the article’s practical conclusion. Its recommendation that the international community impose power sharing arrangements runs against everything the record shows about ownership: imposed constitutions are implemented reluctantly, litigated endlessly and abandoned when the guarantor’s attention moves, and the leverage available in practice is conditionality, accession processes and the withholding of legitimacy rather than imposition. And the article’s opening claim that in-group preference is a natural disposition, which it rightly declines to treat as a justification, has an evidential corollary worth adding: the categories that matter vary enormously across societies and change within a generation, which means the disposition to form groups is far less informative than the political work that determines which line becomes the one that matters. It is that work, and not human nature, that the measures the author recommends are actually aimed at.
* Added by the WMO Editorial Team
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Supplementary references added by the WMO Editorial Team
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Agreement), Paris, 14 December 1995.
Arusha Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, 4 August 1993.
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