How to cite this journal: Author, Date of the post, WMO Conflict Insight, Title of the post, ISSN: 2628 6998, https://worldmediation.org/journal/
ABSTRACT *
This article examines why diplomatic resolution of the India Pakistan conflict has repeatedly failed, identifying four interlocking obstacles. The first is the paralysis of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, whose consensus rule allows a single withdrawal to cancel a summit, and which the author regards as caught in a cycle where poor bilateral relations disable the organisation and its weakness in turn prevents dialogue. The second is the role of China, described as Pakistan’s principal defence partner and as a counterweight to Indian regional centrality. The third is Kashmir itself, traced from the accession of 1947 and the position of the Maharajah through decades of separatist violence and the association of the Kashmiri struggle with terrorism. The fourth is nuclear proliferation, where the author draws on Sagan to argue that organisational bias, preventive logic and the dispersal of arsenals under threat make deterrence less stable than its theory suggests. The characterisations reflect the author’s own perspective; this journal’s editorial position is neutral.
KEYWORDS *
India, Pakistan, Kashmir, SAARC, China, nuclear deterrence, Kargil, proliferation, regional cooperation, intractable conflict, partition, security dilemma
INTRODUCTION
India and Pakistan’s complex relations are as old as the countries themselves. The partitioning of India along with their independence in 1947 triggered what would become one of the most complex, intractable and vicious conflict of control over disputed land. The region heavily fought over, Kashmir, is host to valuable resources, strategic geographical sites and numerous potential economic benefits for any country involved. Neither country is willing to let go of what they consider their entitlement to the land. Over the years, a variety of factors contributed to the deepening conflict in the region; SAARCs failed agenda, Chinese involvement, nuclear proliferation and inheritance rights over Kashmir will be detailed as the core intractables preventing diplomatic resolutions in the intricately complex region.
MAIN CORPUS
SAARC’s failures and the involvement of China
The intergovernmental South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, established in 1985, has been hindered in its implementation of its agenda to promote peace, security and prosperity since it’s foundation. This hinderance is largely attributable to the complex relations between India and Pakistan, in which China plays a vital role. India as an increasing superpower has introduced competition to Chinese influence on a global scale (Rahman, 2004). Since India borders most of SAARC’s member states, trade, border crossing and energy agreements are only possible with the cooperation of New Delhi (Yousaf et. al, 2017). China refuses to accept India’s centric role with military might, economic strength and extensive territory and has leveraged itself as a strategic state by enhancing already strong Pak-Sino ties (Hafeez, 2016).
China has emerged as Pakistan’s largest defence provider. The Pak-Sino military cooperation has expanded with China now maintaining significance in Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure, so much so that the Pakistani nuclear weapons program is considered an extension of the Chinese one (Pant, 2016). This certainly strains the relationship in the SAARC community given India’s turbulent history with both China and Pakistan.
Pakistan, India and the other SAARC members are caught in a vicious cycle of SAARC failures preventing effective dialogue in the region and the relationship between the states in turn prevent SAARC from working effectively. This was made clear when India pulled out of the 19th SAARC summit in Islamabad, in response to increased terrorism in India believed to be on account of Pakistan (Yousaf et. al, 2017). According to SAARCs rules, if a single member state pulls out, the summit itself is cancelled; this further stalled any progression.
Kashmir is a centre-point for political rivalry and militant action
Kashmir has been disputed territory between India and Pakistan since their independence in 1947 left two countries and additional terrain posing difficulty in defining its position in the region. While 80 percent of the Kashmiri population was Muslim, its Maharajah was Hindu. The Maharajah failed to take sides, which resulted in Pakistani troop-backed Muslim rebels of the British Colonial Army attacking the Kashmiri state militia. The Maharajah fled to India, only then expressing the desire to become part of India. Indian military units had been immediately deployed to Kashmir to defend the territory, resulting in what is today one of the most heavily disputed territories in the world, with a separatist violence death toll of ca. 5000 in the last decade (CNN, 2020). The violence within Kashmir has further distanced any prospects of diplomatic negotiations. Pakistan acting as a front-line state both in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and in the post-9/11 war of terror, has witnessed extra regional powers pursuing their own interests by training and equipping thousands of Pakistani men (3). This saw an unprecedented rise in radicalisation in Pakistan and Kashmir subsequently, worsening the bilateral relations between Pakistan and India, as the latter has associated the indigenous struggle of the Kashmiri people with terrorism (Hafeez, 2016). China is considered a loyal ally to Pakistan in times India’s dominance seemed intimidating, to an extent that China has tacitly endorsed Pakistan’s strategy of utilising terror as a policy instrument to counteract India (Pant, 2016).
Nuclear power poses more of a threat than a diplomatic power equilibrium
The nuclear proliferation in India and Pakistan has both symbolised the mistrust in each other as well as expanded the mistrust between them. India became a nuclear state in 1974, with its military traditionally uninvolved in decisions surrounding nuclear facilities. Pakistan pursued a nuclear program in response to India, which was intended to be a strategic equaliser in the deterrence tactic of a cold war (Sagan, 2003). Contrasting to its counterpart, Pakistan’s military largely runs the nuclear weapons program (Perkovich, 1999). Despite the theoretical deterrence strategy in a nuclear arms race, the security dilemma of the region structured both countries’ political and military behaviour, each interpreting the defensive moves as constructions for defensive action (Hagerty, 1998).
The aspiration for the deterrence strategy in the situation of nuclear states was undermined during the Kargil conflict. The organisational biases of the Pakistani army arguably sparked crises in the past and will continue to do so during future tensions. The dangers of both preventive and pre-emptive strikes if war is esteemed inevitable prevail, and nuclear deployments may well threaten deterrent forces on the enemy side (Sagan, 2003).
Broader strategic consequences in Pakistan’s preventive approach and its dealing with nuclear arms became dangerously apparent after the December 13 terrorist attack against the Indian Parliament. Having received the warning from India to crackdown on terrorist activity coming from Pakistan, Pakistan feared an attack on their nuclear arsenal and moved it into an unsecure field. These actions make the arsenal more vulnerable to theft from Islamic militants, jeopardising the security of India, Pakistan and Kashmir (Sagan, 2003).
SUMMARY *
The article’s argument is that the four obstacles it identifies reinforce one another rather than operating separately. Regional institutions cannot function because the two principal members are in dispute; the dispute is sustained by a territorial question that neither side can concede without loss of legitimacy; that question draws in a third power whose support alters the balance; and the nuclear dimension raises the cost of any miscalculation while, on the author’s reading, doing less to prevent conflict than deterrence theory would predict. The conclusion drawn is pessimistic: the causes of the conflict are themselves the reason diplomatic resolution has failed.
CONCLUSION
All things considered, the sources of conflict themselves between India and Pakistan have been the sole reason resolution through diplomatic means has failed. Having been established with undefined borders, the countries have been deprived of peace prospects. SAARCs regional integrational approach has been its own worst enemy, displaying itself as a weak intergovernmental entity compared to three nuclear powers bordering each other. Both sides have seen it as essential to their own existence to maintain Kashmir as “theirs”, with claims for occupation ranging from ethno-demographic importance to the containment of terrorism. The conflict today seems as unsolvable as it ever was, and most probably as it will ever be.
POTENTIAL SOLUTION *
The article closes on a note of finality that the historical record does not quite support. This conflict has produced more agreements than most: the ceasefire and the establishment of the Line of Control, the Indus Waters Treaty, the Simla Agreement, the Lahore Declaration, the ceasefire understanding of 2003 renewed in 2021, and the back channel of 2004 to 2007 which, by the accounts of those involved, came close to a framework on Kashmir. The problem is not that agreement has proved impossible but that agreements have not survived changes of government, attacks by actors outside the process, and the absence of any mechanism to hold them in place.
That points to the most important design lesson available here. Every promising process in this relationship has been ended by a violent incident, and the pattern is consistent enough to be planned for. An agreed continuity provision, committing both governments in advance that talks will not be suspended in response to an attack but will instead convene immediately to address it, removes the incentive that makes such attacks effective. Those who wish to prevent an accommodation currently need only one operation; a process designed with this in mind denies them that.
The nuclear dimension the article treats as an aggravating factor is also, in one respect, the most tractable. Whatever their disagreements, neither government wants an accidental exchange, and the measures that reduce that risk are technical, reciprocal and already partly in place: the agreement on non attack against nuclear installations, notification of missile tests, the military hotline. Extending these to cover incidents at sea and in the air, the compressed decision times that new missile systems create, and the confidence building that would make dispersal under threat unnecessary, is achievable without either side conceding anything on Kashmir. The episode the article describes, in which an arsenal was moved to less secure positions out of fear of pre emption, is precisely the scenario such arrangements exist to prevent.
The Indus Waters Treaty deserves particular attention as the standing counter example to the article’s pessimism. Negotiated with third party facilitation, it has survived three wars and numerous crises, because it is technical rather than symbolic, has its own dispute mechanism, and gives both parties something they need continuously. Building comparable functional arrangements, on trade across the Line of Control, on divided families, on pilgrimage access, on environmental cooperation in the glacial regions, is how relationships of this kind recover, and each such arrangement survives independently of the political weather.
Two final observations. The article says relatively little about Kashmiris themselves, who appear mainly as the object of the dispute rather than as parties to it, and no settlement negotiated over their heads has held or is likely to. Intra Kashmiri dialogue across the Line of Control, on movement, trade, family reunification and the fate of the missing, is both valuable in itself and the missing element in every previous framework. And on the article’s central claim that regional institutions have failed: the consensus rule it describes is a design flaw rather than a law of nature. Sub regional cooperation among willing members, which has already developed in energy and transport, demonstrates that progress does not require unanimity, and it accumulates the habits of cooperation from which a wider settlement might eventually be built.
* Added by the WMO Editorial Team
REFERENCES
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Supplementary references added by the WMO Editorial Team
Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir, 26 October 1947, and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 47 (1948) and 91 (1951).
Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan, with the World Bank as signatory, Karachi, 19 September 1960.
Simla Agreement, 2 July 1972, and the Lahore Declaration, 21 February 1999.
Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities between India and Pakistan, 1988, and the Agreement on Pre Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles, 2005.
Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, 1985, Article X on unanimity in decision making.
Coll, S. (2009). The Back Channel: India and Pakistan’s Secret Kashmir Talks. The New Yorker, 2 March.
Ganguly, S., & Kapur, S. P. (2010). India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia. Columbia University Press, New York.